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
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THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

JULY, 1871.

ART. I.—EVOLUTION AND FAITH.

The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. By CHARLES DARWIN, M.A. 2 vols. London : Murray. 1871.

Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection. By A. R. WALLACE. Second Edition. London : Macmillan. 1871.

L'Instinct ; ses Rapports avec la Vie et avec l'Intelligence. Par HENRI JOLY. Paris : Thorin. 1870.

The Genesis of Species. By ST. GEORGE MIVART. London : Macmillan. 1871.

MR. CHARLES DARWIN is a writer whom it is difficult to answer, for two reasons. In the first place, he deals with such an enormous number of facts that a complete answer must be as voluminous as his own writings. Otherwise, if any of the facts are left unnoticed, his sophistry will always seem to have still a covert to lurk in. In the second place, he is one of those writers who implies far more than he proves, or even pretends to prove ; and thus his arguments may be successfully met whilst his *animus* remains unaffected and the weight of his character as a man of learning is still as much as ever on the wrong side. And a man who has written a great book, which has been successful and has been widely circulated, invariably acquires a greater reputation than he deserves. His brilliant and striking theories, which he himself had announced as only probable or at least as not completely proved, are just the points that the general mind seizes hold of ; and by dint of repeating them the majority of people come to regard them as settled things. Mr. Darwin's great theory is the evolution of all living beings by means of natural selection alone. He has not proved this ; he does not pretend to have proved it ; yet his own mental bias is so evident, and the reading world has talked about his theory so much, that in all probability most people will be very much surprised to hear us say so.

"The Descent of Man," which appeared in the spring of this year, is, in a certain sense, the crown of Mr. Darwin's labours.

VOL. XVII.—NO. XXXIII. [*New Series.*]

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Some eleven years ago, when the famous "Origin of Species" came before the world, a hint was given that "more important researches" were awaiting the naturalist in the distant future. "Psychology will be based upon a new foundation—that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light also will be thrown on the origin of man and his history." (P. 577, *fifth edition*.) The new work purports to supply this light, and to establish this foundation. The conclusions at which the author arrives are somewhat as follows.

From the similarity of man to the lower animals in many points of structure and constitution, and especially in embryonic development, and also from the rudiments of parts and organs which he retains, and the reversions to which he is liable, Mr. Darwin has no doubt that man is descended from some less highly organized form. He even attempts a history of his evolution and a sketch of some of his ancestors. One of these was "a hairy quadruped, furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in its habits, and an inhabitant of the Old World."* Still further back, we have an ancient marsupial, himself developed from a reptile, who in his turn descended from a fish; until at length, in the dim obscurity of the past, we faintly picture to ourselves the first progenitor of all the vertebrata in a very imperfect "aquatic animal," of which perhaps the best idea will be given by the familiar tadpole. In regard to the difficulty of seeing how, in this theory, the intellectual powers of man can ever have taken their rise, Mr. Darwin considers that the mental powers of man differ from those of the higher animals, not in kind, but only in degree. Since, therefore, such powers, in all their various grades of development, would always be highly advantageous to their possessor, natural selection would account for their continued growth and improvement. As to the "more interesting and difficult problem" of the development of the moral qualities, he takes for granted that the foundation of morality lies in the "social instinct." The continued presence of the social instincts and of their derived emotions, such as love and sympathy, in conjunction with great mental activity, with the vivid impression of past events, and with the power of foresight, is sufficient, he thinks, to account for dissatisfaction with certain actions, and for a resolution to act differently for the future—in which resolution he places the essence of conscience. These are the main conclusions of the book; but although they are very completely argued out, and an immense array of facts is brought forward to support them, they do not represent the half of what the book contains. The greater portion of the two volumes is taken up with a discussion of "Sexual

* "Descent of Man," ii. p. 389.

Selection," chiefly as to its effects on difference of race in man. Although this is a subject that it is difficult to treat in any Review but a strictly scientific one, we are bound to say that, as far as we have noticed, Mr. Darwin handles it in a way that entirely strips it of all offensiveness. But as it has but little to do with the first part of the book, and is in fact a distinct essay, it will not be necessary for us to do more than occasionally allude to its arguments.

We are not disposed to attach too much importance to Mr. Darwin's speculations, considered from the point of view of Faith. It has been too hastily assumed that the "evolution" theory is a smashing assault upon orthodoxy that is carrying terror and confusion into the ranks of all believers in Revelation. It is nothing of the kind. We have no doubt that some of its advocates devoutly intend it to be all this. But the truth is, that as long as the scientific men confine themselves to their science, and do not set it to prove more than it is adequate to prove, Revelation remains just where it was. Meanwhile it must be admitted that, as Catholics, it is our duty to meet fairly such a question as this. It is a great pity that Mr. Darwin, or Mr. Darwin's friends, should pursue their valuable and original physical researches in a spirit that contemns, or at least ignores, revelation. But we cannot alter facts; and since certain questions are mooted, we must examine them and give them an answer, even if in order to do so we are obliged to draw lines where simple faith may not have hitherto made distinctions. We are quite aware—and this is another reason for our writing—that educated Catholics, who read what is written from day to day, feel the difficulty of taking up satisfactory views on the questions to which we refer, and whatever we can do towards assisting them will at least be welcome, even though it should prove insufficient. Besides, Catholic theology lives by growth, and in the designs of Providence nothing has stimulated its growth so much as the contradictions which in every age it has had to sustain. The truths of the Faith have been discussed in every century, and if they are discussed in the present it will not be less to their advantage than it has been. Their illustration and their development—the "species, forma, distinctio," of Vincent of Lerins—have been the duty and the glory of our fathers, and their children must continue the work. It need not be said that we write "under correction." There are at least one or two points of the present controversy on which authority has not had occasion to speak clearly; but if we make mistakes, our mistakes themselves, when they are pointed out, will ultimately lead to greater certainty and a wider development of truth.

Whilst not overrating the seriousness of the present state of the evolution theory, it is, of course, quite possible to make too little of it. It is, no doubt, not without grave importance in several

respects. It seems to contradict the fact of the distinction of matter and spirit; because the theory is, that all faculties whatsoever, in man as in the lower animals, have been evolved from one or a few primordial forms. It seems to deny the special and separate creation of the human soul, which is a point of Catholic faith. It appears to oppose the received opinion, that the living principles of the animal and vegetable kingdoms were likewise the result of distinct creative acts, and that the bodies of the first human pair were miraculously formed by God. Nay, there is but too much reason to be apprehensive that the greater number of its advocates have no adequate idea of the dogma of Creation itself, and that they think they are more than sufficiently respectful when they set down the notion of a Creator among the things that are "unknownable."

As far as we are aware, Mr. Darwin does not deny Creation or a Creator. Nay, he not unfrequently speaks of both the one and the other in terms of respect. Perhaps the most unfortunate passage in his writings is the very conclusion of his interesting work on "Domestication," in which he comes across the old difficulty of reconciling the idea of an omniscient and all-wise God with evil, and, in fact, with anything at all except an optimist universe.* With his characteristic weakness whenever he faces a metaphysical problem, Mr. Darwin here simply throws up his hands and shakes his head, and winds up his book with a sentence or two of "regretful" scepticism which might have been written by Voltaire, if Voltaire could have been dull and respectable. But, as he admits himself in the same place, this kind of speculation is "travelling beyond" his "proper province." And, in fact, in his "Origin of Species" he distinctly recognizes that his theory is not opposed to primordial creation, for he speaks (p. 579) of life "having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one." But it is quite evident, from what has just been stated, that, like a good many more of our modern physiologists, he has never fully wrought out in his own mind what ideas are necessarily involved in the word "Creator"; and therefore it is no wonder that, whilst verbally admitting Creation, these writers, and Mr. Darwin amongst them, frequently stick fast in that most difficult of all the regions of metaphysics which is concerned with the possibility and the consequences of this all-important fact. We call the reader's attention to this, for it will help to explain some seeming contradictions. That the theory of Evolution itself is not opposed to Creation, we need not stop to show. It is quite possible that it may be opposed to the actual way in which Creation was brought about, as revealed in Holy Scripture; and this question we shall examine

* 'Plants and Animals under Domestication,' vol. ii. p. 431.

presently. But whether it be held that all existent living beings are evolved out of four or five distinct types, or even that they are growths out of one sole primordial substance, as Mr. Darwin is inclined to think, still those who hold either of these views may admit, and generally do admit, that the one substance, or the several types, were originally called out of nothing by the *fiat* of the Creator.*

When, however, we come to compare the Darwinian Evolution theory more in detail with Revelation and Christian Faith, we are forced, however unwillingly, to see that it contains points which no orthodox Christian can accept. There can be no doubt whatever in the mind of the most cursory reader of the new volumes on "Man," that their author holds the human soul to have been developed gradually from the powers or principles of animal life. Mr. Darwin does not often use the word "soul." Man, to him, is only a complex of faculties, emotions, or instincts. But, as we have said before, he professes to prove the probability, and even to explain the possibility, of the intellectual and moral powers having been a gradual growth out of blind instinct. He admits, indeed, that the greatest difficulty of his theory arises from man's intellect and morality; but he maintains that the mental powers of the higher animals are "the same *in kind* with those of mankind, though so different in degree."† He alludes in one place to immortality, and anticipates that many will find it hard to conceive how or when in the gradually ascending organic scale man became "an immortal being." This, he says, cannot possibly be determined; just as it cannot be determined in the case of any particular infant.‡ It is impossible to consider this passage without concluding that he does not recognize the independent creation of the human soul, in the evolution either of the species or of the individual. It is well known that Professor Huxley agrees with Mr. Darwin in this matter, though his point of view is entirely different. In the article "On the Physical Basis of Life" he states, with greater precision of language than logical cogency, that his studies on "protoplasm" have driven him to the conclusion, "that our

* It is not to be supposed that we consider that modern physical science is satisfactory in its treatment of Creation; but we think we are right in saying that it generally admits the *term*, though often meaning very little by it. Perhaps the most curious example, in recent books, of an attempt to get rid of the idea, is that of Mr. Herbert Spencer ("First Principles," pp. 30 et seq.), in which he proves with great elaboration, following in the wake of Sir W. Hamilton and Dean Mansel, that no possible hypothesis as to the world's origin is even conceivable, because self-existence, self-creation, and creation by an external cause, are all alike outside the limits of the "thinkable."

† "Descent of Man," vol. ii. p. 390.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 395.

thoughts are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life" (protoplasm) "which is the source of our other vital phenomena."* It need not be said that there are many scientific writers of less name who loudly, and sometimes offensively, express their materialistic sympathies. On the other hand, Mr. Wallace, who, we venture to predict, will one day be recognized as a sounder philosopher than Mr. Darwin, has emphatically declared that no material element, no molecule, no number of such elements, even though infinite in number and combined in any degree of complexity, can have the slightest tendency to originate consciousness.† Professor Tyndall, in an address delivered at the Norwich meeting of the British Association, in 1868, spoke in striking words of the utter impossibility of passing, by any intellectual process, from the physical processes to the facts of consciousness.‡ If the passage to which we refer means anything, it seems to imply that science can never prove, or even hear of, any evolution or correlation between organism and mind. It is true, however, that Professor Tyndall has been accused, since he uttered those words, of being a materialist; and it must be confessed that if he is not a materialist, that is, even if he does not (as he says he does not) make out all force to be what the vulgar call "matter," yet he seems at least to do away with all difference, except difference of degree, between matter and spirit.§ And as to Mr. Wallace himself, it is not quite clear, from the elaborate paper which he contributed to the "Academy" on the appearance of Mr. Darwin's book on "Man," whether that book has not shaken his convictions on the subject of matter and mind. At any rate he has made no protest against what every Christian thinker, it would seem, should at once protest against, viz., the assertion that the soul of man is a mere development of the forces that have shaped the world and made the grass grow. Perhaps it did not require so many words to prove that the Darwinian Evolution theory, as explained by its author, denies the separate creation of the soul, and that his views are only too much in agreement with those of the greatest physical philosophers of the day. But it is as well that it should be clearly understood. That so-called science opposes a Christian dogma is, of course, serious, but it is not overwhelming; whilst to accept, to favour, to propagate such science, with hazy notions as to what its authors intend it to lead to, is to put our faith in danger.

The special creation of the soul of Adam is a dogma of Catholic

* "Lay Sermons," p. 138.

† "Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection," p. 365.

‡ "Fragments of Science," p. 121.

§ P. 165, *note*.

Faith, and is accepted by most of those who profess to believe in the Holy Scriptures. It is of faith, moreover, that the origin of the human soul, in each individual of Adam's posterity, is not a mere metamorphosis or evolution of organic or inorganic forms of existence. There was a certain kind of *Generationism* (Traducianism, it has been called) which at one time prevailed to some extent in the Church, which has been revived in these latter times by certain German theologians, and which has never been formally condemned by a dogmatic decision. This theory holds that, just as body begets body, so soul begets soul. But it seems certain that this is opposed to the voice of the "ordinary magisterium" of the Church; and if so, of course it is contrary to Faith.* With regard to the soul of man, then, no evolution-theory can be held. Each human individual receives his soul, as Adam did, immediately from the "breath" of Almighty God.

The teaching of Faith is, therefore, clear with respect to man's soul. But it is more difficult to say what must, or must not, be said with respect to the formation of the bodies of our first parents, and also with respect to the "creative periods" which are alleged to be revealed in the first chapter of Genesis. On these heads there is no mistaking Mr. Darwin and those who are with him. Modestly as the author of "Natural Selection" speaks of his own labours, he does claim to have given a fatal blow to the commonly received doctrine, that each species was separately created. And he feels no remorse for what he has done. "When I view all beings," he says, "not as special creations, but as the lineal descendants of some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Silurian system was deposited, they seem to me to become ennobled."† "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning, endless forms, most beautiful and most wonderful, have been, and are being, evolved."‡ "Analogy would lead me . . . to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some *one prototype*. But analogy may be a deceitful guide."§ Thus we may briefly state Mr. Darwin's present views to be,—first, that a somewhat dubious analogy leads him to consider all organic nature to be descended from one primordial form; secondly, that he is

* We do not prove this point at length, because there is no probability that any one will deny it; but the proofs may be referred to in the pages of the "Civiltà Cattolica," Serie V., vols. ix. x.; especially in an article entitled *La Creazione dell' Anima umana e il Dogma cattolico*, vol. ix. p. 677.

† "Origin of Species," p. 578.

‡ P. 579.

§ P. 572.

convinced that all animals had at most only four or five progenitors, and plants an equal or lesser number; thirdly, that he has no doubt that man and some of the apes are co-descendants of the "extinct form," whose description we gave in his own words a page or two back. Of the nature of Mr. Darwin's arguments we say nothing here, as we shall have to consider them later on. What we wish to settle just now is, how far it is allowable on the part of a Catholic to assent to his conclusions.

There is nothing more curious in that important treatise by S. Augustine, which is called "*De Genesi ad literam*," than the certainty he seems to have, that very little indeed was known to him or to his contemporaries about the true literal interpretation of the mysterious record; and the fear that seems to haunt him, lest foolish believers arouse the infidel to scorn, by talking nonsense about the physical world and appealing to Moses to prove what they say. The Duke of Argyll has quoted* a remarkable passage from the "*Confessions*" (lib. xii. c. 31), in which the holy Doctor seems to assert the widest possible liberty of interpreting the book of Genesis. However interesting it might be to have a doctor of the fifth century a prophet of the future possibilities of science, it is to be feared that he was thinking, when he wrote the passage cited, rather how the sun and the moon are figures of the preachers of the Gospel, than how the sun and moon were made. But whatever we make of his words in the "*Confessions*," there can be no doubt as to what he says in the literal commentary on Genesis. He speaks of the obscurity of the divine revelations, and of the possibility of arriving at different conclusions as to their interpretation; and he warns us that, in taking up any particular line of interpretation, we must be ready to abandon it if, on discussion, truth be found to be against it.† Non-Christians, he says, often know a great deal about physical matters, by means of reason and experiment; and they know it so well as to be quite certain.‡ . . . And he goes so far as to say that the great lesson or fruit of his own attempts at the interpretation of Genesis is, that he has taught himself not to take up any man's particular view when upholding the Faith against infidel scoffers; but that whenever they undoubtedly (*veracibus documentis*) prove anything to be a fact in physical nature, he considers it to be his duty to prove it

* "*Primeval Man*," p. 35.

† In nullam earum nos precipiti affirmatione ita projiciamus, ut si forte diligentius discussa veritas eam recte labefactaverit, corruamus.—"*De Gen. ad lit.*," lib. i. cap. xviii.

‡ Plerumque accidat ut aliquid de terrâ . . . de naturis animalium, fruticum, lapidum atque hujusmodi cæteris, etiam non Christianus ita noverit, ut certissimâ ratione et experientia teneat.—*Ibid.*, cap. xix.

not to be contrary to Scripture.* We must hold fast to "sound faith" and the "rule or canon of piety": but in matters which do not oppose Faith he advocates "discussion"; he is ready to trust "reason and experiment"; and all he requires is "veracious proof." And he sums up in one of his epigrammatic sentences, by a double warning, against the seductions of loquacious philosophy on the one hand, and against superstitious timidity on the other.† It is pleasing to go back to the fountain-head, and to seek the true spirit of Faith and science from the living waters of the great source of Western Theology.

The question, then, is, how far is it allowable to a Catholic to deny special creations after the first creation, and to deny the special formation of the body of Adam, or of Eve?

We begin with the question of special second creations. It appears, on the face of the sacred narrative, that after the creation of the world out of nothing, after, perhaps, long periods, during which it was shaped and fashioned by the laws of inorganic matter and by heat, there were created at separate periods first the plants, then the animals, both in their several species. Is it allowable, in spite of the text of Holy Scripture, to assert that all living beings, both plant and animal, sprang from one primordial form—or even to go so far as to say—what, however, Mr. Darwin does not say—that even this primordial organism is evolved out of the inorganic?

There is a controversy, now over and done with, which has not been without its fruit in the interpretation of the Mosaic account of the creation. No one now doubts that it is perfectly allowable to hold that the "six days" mentioned in the Sacred Record need not, as far as faith is concerned, be interpreted to be six ordinary solar days of twenty-four hours each.‡ The settlement of this point has given us two principal lessons. It has taught us, first of all, that the literal meaning of Holy Scripture does not always lie on the surface, or even in the sense that is popularly attached to the words of the text. It has thrown light, in the second place—and it is a most important lesson—on what is meant by the "unanimous consent of the Fathers," as applied to the interpretation of Scripture. Every one knows the famous declaration of the Council of Trent and of the Creed of Pope Pius IV., which forbids us to interpret the written word of God, "nisi juxta unanimum consensum Patrum." As to the "six days," there

* "De Gen. ad lit.," cap. xxi.

† Ut neque falsæ philosophiæ loquacitate seducamur, neque falsæ religionis superstitione terreamur.—*Ibid.*, cap. eodem.

‡ See the discussion of this point in "Cosmogonia naturale comparata col Genesi," by F. Pianciani, S. J. (Rome, 1862), *Introduzione*.

can be no doubt that the large majority of the Fathers consider them to be six ordinary days.* They are so "unanimous" that there really appears to be no Father of any name, except S. Augustine and perhaps Origen, who holds a different opinion.† But, for all that, they are not sufficiently "unanimous" to bind us to interpret the "days" in their sense. Either then the singular voice of a great Father like S. Augustine on the opposite side, as long as his opinion had not been formally condemned, was enough to make the question uncertain; ‡ or else (which at last is probably the true view) we must lay stress on the qualification actually expressed by the Council (Sess. IV.), limiting its restriction to "*res fidei et morum ad ædificationem doctrinæ Christianæ pertinentium.*" Now nothing most certainly has been defined in any Creed or document of the Church, with respect to the origin of species, or the question of second creations. At all events then it is well worthy of inquiry, whether the text of Genesis is so clearly and unanimously explained to mean second creations, that to reject that theory is to contravene the "*unanimis consensus Patrum.*"

It is well known, as we have already hinted, that there are two great Patristic schools of the interpretation of the first two chapters of Genesis. One is that of S. Augustine: the other is that which we may perhaps be allowed to call the school of S. Basil; for S. Ambrose follows S. Basil so closely, and S. Ambrose and S. Basil together have been so exclusively the storehouse from which following ages have drawn, that the name of the great Greek Doctor may well stand for all who do not follow S. Augustine. The school of S. Basil, then, hold views as to the Mosaic narrative of creation, which may be briefly enumerated under the following heads:—(1) It considers the "six days" to be ordinary days. (2) It asserts several distinct "creative periods"—periods separated by time from the first creation of inorganic elementary matter, and separated also by time from one another, but all occurring before the end of the sixth day. (3) The earth, that is the primordial elementary creation, spoken of in Gen. i. 1, had, when created, the power of producing organic life—but only in a certain sense, for (4) the earth had *not* this power, in another sense (and that, perhaps, a more important sense), but awaited (5) the Command, or Word, of God. This command, however, is not called, simply, creation, but is distinguished from the exercise of power implied in

* S. Basil, S. Ambrose, S. Chrysostom, S. John Damascene, S. Gregory the Great, Ven. Bede, and others.

† Petavius, "*De Opificio sex Dierum.*"

‡ Si *unius* aut *paucorum* [Patrum] opinatio non fuit ab Ecclesiâ rejecta, tam plurimorum auctoritas quemadmodum diximas, nihil certum firmiterque conficiet.—Melchior Canus, "*De Locis Theol.*" lib. vii. cap. 3, n. 3.

the primary creation. For instance S. Ambrose constantly employs several parallel pairs of words to express the two kinds of operation; as "Primo fecit—postea venustavit;" "Creavisse—ornasse;" "Facere—componere." And this "secondary creation" is the commencement of the Laws of Nature; in fact, the very command of God becomes the Law of Nature, as that command successively brings forth each fresh department of things. (6.) Though this school is not perfectly unanimous as to what is the exact enumeration of the particular periods of creation—as to how many there were, and what was created in each—yet for the most part it follows closely the exact words of Holy Scripture, and considers that whenever the sacred writer says that God did anything, he implies that He did it immediately, or at least by the ministry of angels. Nevertheless they do admit that some things were created *in aliis*, that is, by the creation of other things which would naturally produce them. And hence it may be noticed at once that the question as to how many things were created, whether the "how many" has reference to departments, or to the number of genera in each department, is treated by this school as, *to some extent*, a matter of detail. But (7) they are agreed in holding that at least a great many of the organic genera did not come into existence by a gradual process of growth, as things do in the ordinary course of nature, but sprang up perfect, "suddenly," "quickly," "at once." "Imagine," says S. Basil, "the cold and sterile earth heaving, at that little word and that brief command, with the sudden throes of birth and breaking forth into fruitfulness, throwing aside her garb of mourning and casting around her that grand robe of joy, her own glorious vesture, as there burst from her bosom the myriad species of the plants." *

Here we have the spirit of the school to which we have given the name of S. Basil. And the authority of the view here detailed can be seen in the fact that it is adopted and defended by Suarez.† Whilst following S. Basil almost exactly in the several points mentioned above, Suarez explains himself on many of them more fully than his authorities had done. For instance, he defines the power, primarily bestowed upon the earth, of bringing forth life, to be mere potentiality—the "material" cause of the living being, as the scholastic phrase is—not by any means its proximate efficient cause.‡ That is to say, life was in the power of the inorganic creation as much as the finished statue is in the power of the rude marble block, and no more. He is definite in his description of what the "word" or "command" of God was. It was a different

* S. Basil, Hom. V., on the "Hexæmeron," vol. i. p. 97 (Migne's ed.)

† "De Opere sex Dierum," tom. iii. (ed. Vivès).

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. i. cap. xii. n. 13.

operation from creation proper, because it supposed the pre-existence of matter that could be transmuted; it was rather a change than a creation, yet a change of a much higher kind than any created agent could bring about;* it might be called "secondary creation";† it is, as it were, a mean between creation and strict generation, and is therefore sometimes called creation and sometimes generation.‡ He is quite clear that the principal genera of the organic kingdom came into existence suddenly and in adult perfection.§ It need hardly be added that both Suarez and the Patristic school of interpretation which he follows assume that species are immutable. "No lapse of time destroys the *idiomata* of animals," says S. Basil.|| And some theologians, who flourished a long long time before Mr. Darwin, here notice that fact of the sterility of hybrids, which is one of the chief difficulties in the way of the indefinite mutability of species which is postulated by the Darwinian theory of evolution.¶ Nevertheless it is to be observed that the gist of observations like this is rather that the species created by God Himself are not subject, on the whole, to degeneration, than that no new species can be formed, or even propagated, for the last two processes are sometimes expressly admitted.** The immutability of species is taken by this school (as indeed by most ancient writers of every school) as a simple evident fact, which it has never occurred to any one to deny. They set it down, and they undertake to find reasons for it, just as they set down that gold was generated by the sun. It is important to observe this, because there are two kinds of "unanimous consent of the Fathers" to be distinguished; one, when they *materially* agree—that is, simply say the same thing; the other, when they use words expressing their *formal* opinion that such a sense is the sense in which alone a given passage can safely be taken. Bearing this in mind, it is not too much to say that nearly the whole of the interpretation above ascribed to the school of S. Basil is merely material agreement. The only point on which there is formal consent seems to be that God made all things (in some way or other) out of original nothing. We put forward this view with diffidence, but it seems to us strongly probable. There is one argument that seems peremptory. There is no point of the whole interpretation on which the school is more unanimous than the point that the "six days" are natural, ordinary days; but it is granted, by universal consent, that

* "De Opere sex Dierum," lib. i. cap. x. n. 25.

† *Ibid.*, lib. iii. cap. n. 13.

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. i. cap. xii. n. 14.

§ *Ibid.*, lib. i. cap. vii. n. 15.

|| Hom. IX. on the "Hexæmeron," p. 190.

¶ See Gazzaniga, "De Opere sex Dierum," diss. II. cap. vii. n. 209.

** See Cornelius à Lapide, "Comm. in Genesim," ad cap. i. v. 8.

this mode of interpreting the sacred writer is not obligatory. Therefore, it appears to us that even if the school of S. Basil could be proved to represent the sense of the Church, there is not one of the points of its interpretation given above (with the exception named) that could be considered to be authoritative, precisely as being attested by the "consent of the Fathers."

But the truth of this last assertion appears still more evident when we turn to the consideration of the other great Patristic school—the school of S. Augustine. The holy Doctor has treated of the Mosaic narrative of creation in more than one of his works. He wrote two books on the spiritual and allegorical sense, against the Manichæans. He afterwards began a second treatise, intended to be a literal commentary, but this he has left imperfect. The spiritual commentary contained in the three last books of the Confessions came next; and finally he wrote the elaborate treatise "*De Genesi ad litteram*," in twelve books, which is our chief source of reference on the present subject. No one can go through it without feeling the enormous difference there is between it and the "*Hexæmeron*" of S. Basil. The Greek Doctor writes rather for edification than for instruction: he explains, indeed, and he confutes, as occasion offers; but he raises no difficulties of his own, and his answers to heretics and gainsayers, if solid, are still the regular prescriptive answers of the pulpit; and he is glad to dismiss them and float once more into his broad current of eloquence, deep and abundant, with occasional reaches of sparkling rhetoric. But S. Augustine, in his commentary on the Mosaic narrative, is a philosopher of faith rather than a preacher of morals. He meets the objections of enemies, but his greatest difficulties are the product of his own thought. He ponders and reflects, he analyses and doubts, he returns again and again to what he has dismissed; and when he rises into eloquence, it is the eloquence of depth of thought, of earnestness, and of piercing intellect. The result of this difference between these two Saints is, that the reader feels the Latin to be earnestly facing intellectual difficulties, whilst the Greek is thinking of prayer and praise and holy living. Now the view of S. Augustine on the Six Days of Creation is very easily and briefly stated. (1) He held that the whole of what is detailed in the first chapter of Genesis came to pass at once, in one instant. The reason why the narrative is arranged in six distinct days is to assist the incapacity of those who are unable, without details, fully to take in what is meant by simultaneous creation.* (2) All things that were created were created at once, but not in their perfect or adult state; they were created in their *seminal* or *causal ratios*. There has been some hesitation expressed as to what S.

* "*De Genesi ad lit.*," lib. iv. cap. 23, n. 52.

Augustine means by these primordial innate principles out of which he asserts all things to have sprung. But there can be little doubt that he really intends to say that God, at the instant of creation, gave to the earth the power or capability of producing in due course the whole of the organic genera which it was afterwards to produce, and this without any further necessary action of Almighty God himself than that by which He co-operates in all the operations of second causes. Let it be observed, however, that he does not say that no miraculous or extraordinary and immediate action of God *has not at times* caused the development of plants or animals. But sudden, and therefore miraculous, development he does not consider to be the rule. We say that we think there can be little doubt this is S. Augustine's meaning. The *potentia* which he attributes to primordial creation is the "innate" efficiency of a real "cause." His often-repeated expressions of "seed" and "germ" mean the same thing. The only two kinds of Divine operation which he distinguishes are, first, that by which the Almighty wrought during "six days"—an instantaneous act, from which He rested on the seventh; and, secondly, that by which He continues to work "until now," that is, the ordinary course of His providence.* The "conditio" or first establishment, of the universe, was complete instantaneously; never since that instant has its Author created anything new (in material substance); He has only governed and directed its development (administravit);† "explicat sæcula," says S. Augustine, "quæ illi [creaturæ suæ sc.], cum primum condita est, tanquam plicata indiderat."‡ And to remove all doubt, he compares the efficacy of the seminal and causal ratios innate in the world at its creation to the way in which there lies invisible in the grain of seed all that is afterwards to grow up to be a tree.§

But, it may be asked, can it be true then that S. Augustine actually admits that the earth, thus fecundated by Almighty power at its first creation, developed its organic life by degrees, and during long spaces of time? To this we answer that S. Augustine stops short just at this point. He certainly does not say so; and we believe that he had no conception of the existence of those long ages which modern geology has revealed. Yet just as certainly he does not deny it. There is one remarkable passage in which he almost seems to anticipate modern science. He asks himself|| what kind of thing these "seminal ratios" were; were

* "De Genesi ad lit.," lib. iv. cap. 12, n. 28.

† *Ibid.*, lib. iv. cap. 12, n. 22.

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. v. cap. 20, n. 41.

§ *Ibid.*, lib. v. cap. 23, n. 45.

|| *Ibid.*, lib. vi. cap. 14, n. 25.

they such as passed through their varied intervals of time, each according to its kind, just as we see organisms do now? Or was it their nature to come to maturity *at once, without progressive growth, as is believed of Adam?* He answers; Why should we not believe that they had *both* these descriptions of nature?—so that what was afterwards done with them depended upon the good pleasure of their Maker. That is to say, they had the power to develop in the ordinary, gradual way; and they had likewise the power, if their Maker pleased, to develop suddenly and miraculously. But whether or no organisms did, as a rule, develop miraculously and suddenly, S. Augustine does not decide. It seems to us that he was hindered from saying they did by a feeling that there was no necessity for it; and yet he could not say they did not, because the idea of geological time did not occur, and could not have occurred, to him. But he uses certain expressions in speaking of development, such as “*per temporum moras*,”* “*per congruos temporum motus*,”† “*omnia suis quæque temporibus jam per sæculorum ordinem [fiunt]*”‡ which might be adopted without alteration by an evolutionist. And it must be remembered that besides this process of development, which he expressly says is going on yet, he admits only one other species of operation of Almighty God, viz., the simultaneous primordial creation.

From this summary of the two chief schools of Patristic interpretation of Genesis, it seems clear enough, that, with respect to all organisms lower than man, Catholic faith does not prevent any one from holding the opinion that life, both vegetable and animal, was in the world, in germ, at its creation, and afterwards developed by regular process into all the various species now upon the earth. We do not by any means say this is the true opinion. It is certain that hardly one scientific man holds it in its whole extent; and Mr. Darwin himself does not pretend to have proved it.§ And we do not admit that its proof altogether depends on physical science; there are other considerations, both metaphysical and moral, to be weighed. But it seems to us to be free at least from any suspicion of dogmatic heterodoxy.

There are no doubt very many who object, with a sort of objection which almost seems like a religious scruple, to think that life, whether vegetable or animal, could make its appearance in the

* “*De Genesi ad lit.*,” lib. v. cap. 23, n. 45.

† *Ibid.*, lib. v. cap. 5, n. 14.

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. vi. cap. 5, n. 8.

§ Mr. Darwin, indeed, does not profess to treat of the origin of life. “Science as yet throws no light on the (far higher) problem of the essence or origin of life.”—“*Origin of Species*,” p. 568. His endeavour is, taking life for granted, to prove that all living things have come, chiefly by a law which he calls “natural selection,” from, at most, a few primordial living types.

world without the immediate action of Almighty God. Perhaps they would not admit that such immediate action was *miraculous*; for they would say it is the commencement of a law of nature. Still, even if not technically a miracle, it would be, with reference to the order of things before it happened, quite as extraordinary an exercise of Divine power as the changing of water into wine at Cana. Now we do not by any means deny that such miraculous creation may actually have happened: human science will never prove it did not. But it certainly cannot be asserted that it is unorthodox to deny it; and this is all that we here assert. It is a point on which Revelation is silent, and on which philosophical arguments can only establish a probability; and it is a point, therefore, on which the arguments and discoveries of physical science may be, and ought to be, counted for what they are worth. We may even add—without positively declaring our approval of any particular system of development—that physical science, and especially what it tells us of geological time, seem to make it more probable than not that, even if we maintain that life was not evolved out of matter in which vital germs had been primordially created, yet the first creation of life was not a creation of a multitude of perfect species, but rather of rudimentary organizations which were left to develop chiefly by natural law.* Suarez has two rules or canons on this subject which seem remarkably applicable to a view that differs considerably from his own. His first is this (he is speaking particularly of the work of the “six days”): “Opera miraculosa vel extraordinaria absque necessitate vel sufficienti testimonio audienda non sunt;”† and the other is as follows: “Deus ea tantum immediate produxit, quæ nonnisi per Ipsius actionem in rerum naturâ introduci poterant quoad species suas.”‡ These rules, which are found in almost identical words both in S. Augustine and in S. Thomas, should, it seems to us, have the widest possible application. God made all things; He governs and directs all things; He foresaw from all eternity the minutest change of all the millions of changes that have been and that will be, and they all happened because He willed. It is not in any way derogatory to these Catholic truths to hold that life-germs were created at the first instant of creation. Let it be noticed that this is not saying that the inorganic can, as such, develop into organism; although, as regards vegetable life, even this seems to be admitted as *possible* by Catholic philosophers.§ It seems to be

* Not, however, let it be observed, by natural selection only.

† “De Opere sex Dierum,” lib. ii. cap. vii.

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. ii. cap. x.

§ We refer particularly to F. Tongiorgi, S.J. He says, after denying that organs and organic bodies can be constructed by chemistry: Certè

proved that living organisms may exist in such minute forms in matter as not only to defy the microscope but even to resist disintegration by a heat of 150° Cent. ; being ready, after this fiery trial, to discover their existence by coalescing into masses that can at length be detected by the lens.* Now it is quite conceivable that these infinitesimally minute life-germs may have remained latent for many cycles of ages, until those conditions came about under which, by virtue of their divinely-established nature, they were able to coalesce and produce by gradual stages one living thing after another. S. Augustine might have had this very thought in his mind. There are numberless difficulties in the way of such a theory ; there is little or no direct proof of its truth ; but what we are at present concerned with is its admissibility. Once grant it to be a possible solution, and then physical science (assisted by metaphysics and authority in various details) may be left alone to prove it or disprove it. The most insuperable objection, from a metaphysical point of view, to a consistent theory of evolution, is no doubt the apparent impossibility of admitting that creatures capable of sensation, like the higher animals at least, could have come from vital germs whose sensibility, on such an hypothesis, must have been latent for an enormous lapse of time. It must be remembered, however, that though sensibility always supposes life, a living thing may be sensitive under some circumstances and non-sensitive, whilst still alive, under others ; so that it is possible that the germs of animal life, without sensibility, may have existed for any length of time, undeveloped, but fully capable of sensation under certain conditions, such as coalition in brains or ganglia. Those who maintain that the soul of sentient animals is a simple, immaterial substance, independent of the body as to being, hold, of course, that it is specially created in the case of each individual animal and insect ;† and development can present no difficulties to this theory. We may notice, however, that neither S. Basil, S. Augustine, nor S. Thomas had any notion that it was necessary to postulate the special creation of the soul of each animal. But the

si homo oculos haberet satis acutos ad atomos materiæ tam ponderabilis quam imponderabilis singillatim discernendas, manusque aptas ad atomos easdem prensandas ac disponendas juxta typum primum a Deo extractum, tunc, credo, posset homo plantas efficere." ("Institutiones Philosophiæ," vol. iii. p. 26.) The author intends this for a *reductio ad absurdum*. But if vegetable vitality is reducible to *arrangement*, why should such vitality be less a law of matter than crystallization is ? And why should not chemists, who can see and handle invisible molecules without eyes or hands, some day, whether by accident or otherwise, hit upon that peculiar arrangement of them which constitutes a cell ?

* See Dr. Bastian's experiments, "Nature," vol. ii. p. 170.

† F. Tongiorgi, S.J., "Institut. Phil.," vol. iii. p. 42.

settlement of such a question as this would depend upon a full analysis of what sensation is—sensation in the animals, be it observed, not in man, in whom its phenomena are difficult to discover pure.

No one can deny that the theory of Evolution (which Mr. Darwin was by no means the first to put forth, and about which very much remains to be discovered and discussed) is full of fertile views in natural science, and therefore also in theology and morality. The axiom "*Natura non facit saltum*" was well known in the ages of the Scholastics. And the more width of design and system the mind finds in the works of God, the more is its idea of Him exalted. It has been so always. It was so with the discovery of the antipodes, with the knowledge of the realms of the stars, with the laws of modern chemistry, and with the conception of the secular changes of the earth and its inhabitants. And it will be so, there is no doubt, with all that science has to tell us of the order of the vegetable and animal world, by means of those comparatively new researches in morphology, embryology, and heredity which are now advancing so rapidly. "*Infimum supremi attingit supremum infimi.*" Aristotle saw that, as far as regards structure. It is perhaps reserved for our days to see it clearly in evolution also. The evolution of a tree from a seed is apparently a very different thing from the evolution of a tree from a lichen. But in the extent of change and in the absolute impossibility of following the steps of the process with the senses, it may serve as a parallel. And it seems to be well ascertained that the highest animals, and man also as to his body, grow up in the womb from a germ which does not differ, as far as can be seen, from the germ out of which every animal and plant is evolved; a germ which then grows to resemble that of a worm, then that of a reptile, then that of a mammal, passes afterwards through grades of resemblance to that of various divisions of the mammalia, then comes to be indistinguishable from those of the higher quadrumana, and finally, in the case of man, receives its differentiation as a human foetus. In this process we know, from Revelation and the practice of the Church, that the spiritual soul is infused before birth; but we have no revealed grounds for saying that any other soul was created or infused previously; we are therefore thrown upon science. It is the same, possibly, with the primordial evolution of life. The plant-germ has been transmuted into the animal-germ, and whether such power of evolution was primarily given to matter, or suddenly created for its work, a Catholic, as such, seems not to be called upon to decide.

It will be remembered that in beginning to speak of the development of life, we expressly excepted from our remarks the question of the evolution of the body of the first man. That question, therefore, now comes before us. Can we believe it possible that

the body of the first man was not formed instantaneously in full perfection, but that it was the result of ordinary natural laws? In other words, can we believe that the human body existed as an animal before it was informed by the rational soul? Let it be observed that the question is not about the instantaneous formation of *man*. There is not the slightest doubt that man became man in the instant that his spiritual soul was breathed into him,—no sooner and no later. But what was that into which the soul was breathed? Before inquiring into the teaching of tradition, it may be stated that only two hypotheses seem admissible on grounds of reason. Either the soul was breathed into a previously existing anthropomorphous animal, or else a special anthropomorphous body was instantaneously formed from pre-existent matter, and in the same instant was vivified by the soul. Two other suppositions need only be mentioned to be dismissed. To say that the body of the first man was created in an infant state, and *à fortiori*, to say it was created in an embryonic state, would require us to suppose not one miracle but a series of miracles; for miraculous conservation would have then been as necessary as miraculous procreation. In like manner to say that an anthropomorphous statue or *cadaver* was formed, by degrees or not, and that time elapsed before it was animated by the soul, would also be a gratuitous assumption of the miraculous. We are left, therefore, it would seem, to choose between an instantaneous triple act, that is to say, the formation of the body, the creation of the soul, and their union, in one and the same instant, and on the other hand, the assumption by the soul of a previously developed animal.

There is no need to say that the whole school of Fathers which has been called the school of S. Basil, takes for granted that Adam's body was formed by the immediate act of God, in the same instant as the soul was breathed in. There are one or two indeed who seem to think that an appreciable time elapsed between the formation of the anthropomorphous "statue" and the vivification by the soul.* But this hypothesis we need not entertain, for, as has already been stated, it is more miraculous than its alternative; it is put forward by its authors more as a ground for moral teaching than as an interpretation, and, as opposing evolution, it is virtually the same as the opinion of the rest of the school of S. Basil. Confining our observations, therefore, to those who hold the first view, it is to be remarked that the whole of this school—which is nearly the same as saying the whole "*traditio Patrum*"—is unanimous in observing that Adam's creation is related in different words from that of all other things. And their words, in many instances, apply specifically to his body. S. Irenæus notices that Adam is

* For instance, S. John Chrysostom, Hom. XII. and XIII. on Genesis.

formed "by the hands of God."* Tertullian draws a contrast between God's "imperial word" in the case of other creatures, and His "familiar hand" in the case of man.† Others remark on the particular word "Formavit" or "Finxit" instead of "Fecit." S. Gregory the Great notices how man is "fashioned out of slime, as it were studiously" (quasi per studium).‡ Severianus of Gabala, a contemporary of S. John Chrysostom, has a suggestive passage, in which he observes that in the case of other living things God said, Let the earth bring forth, and body and soul came out together; but with man He made first the body and then the soul.§ No one will deny that the Fathers as a rule speak after this manner of Adam's body, and it may therefore be argued that whatever weight their authority lends to the opinion of the instantaneous creation of other living things, it lends more to a similar theory about Adam's body. At the same time it must be said that when the Fathers speak in these terms they are rather seeking to show the *dignity* of man than the precise point of the specialty of his body's creation.|| And they never use the word "immediate" or any equivalent; though it is true they deny the "ministry of angels." On the whole, what they do say may, it would seem, be reduced to this: God formed man, as to his body, in some special way, and with special intention, out of the slime of the earth. By the word "formed" it is suggested that the making of man's body was not a true creation out of nothing, but a fashioning out of pre-existent matter. As to the "special way" of this formation, except that it was instantaneous, nothing definite is to be found. And with regard to the material out of which the body was fashioned, viz., the slime, it is not expressly said that it was the immediate and proximate material; except for what is implied by the word instantaneously, it might have been merely the original and remote, just as it is in the case of men who are born in the ordinary way. And the great number of Scriptural and Patristic texts that allude to man's formation out of dust or slime, are all susceptible of interpretation in the sense of original or primordial matter; as is proved from the fact that many of the texts refer at once to Adam and his posterity; now Adam's posterity are certainly not formed *mediately* out of slime or dust. It may here be observed, that from the Scriptural expression "dust" or "slime" the Fathers do not understand that no other substances entered

* In Præfatione lib. iv.

† Lib. ii. contra Marcionem, cap. iv.

‡ Lib. ix. "Moralium," cap. 27.

§ Hom. V.

|| This is easily seen from a comparison of the passages in Petavius Opere sex Dierum, lib. ii. cap. 1, nn. 4, 5, 6.

the composition of Adam's body. They admit that it is probably composed of all the elements, in various proportions; but that Moses, speaking with a special purpose and to an unenlightened people, thought it necessary to mention only the most obvious.

Let us now turn to S. Augustine. In accordance with his view that the work of the six days was simultaneous, he considers that a twofold creation of man is mentioned in Genesis; the first on the sixth day, when man, like everything else, was created in seminal ratio; the second (Gen. ii. 7) when, after a time, God "formed man of the slime of the earth." He also thinks that the evolution of Adam's body out of these causal ratios took place, not after the ordinary way of progressive growth, but "repente, in ætate perfectâ";* and he compares such a "formation" to the changing of the water into wine and the turning of the rod of Aaron into a serpent.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that the universal tradition of the Fathers is that Adam made his entrance into the world as a grown man; and also, though this is not quite so clear, that the body which, when united with the God-inspired soul, made up the man Adam, was instantaneously, or at least not by any usual process, evolved out of the elements of matter. We say this last is not so clear, because, though the Fathers everywhere undoubtedly imply it, they do not formally say it; because the question as between sudden production of the body and completely progressive evolution could not have occurred to them. It is remarkable that the one who speaks most clearly is S. Augustine himself in the passage just cited; and yet there is a certain amount of hesitation in his words;† and he might certainly be taken to be speaking of the question whether *Adam* was formed an infant, and not whether *Adam's body*, infantile or not, had grown by natural processes before the soul came into it; which latter is the question here at issue.

We can hardly help, therefore, taking it as "Catholic doctrine," that Adam first took his place in the world as an adult man, without having previously been either an embryo or an infant. But if this be so, it would have been less miraculous to fashion his body expressly for him and to unite soul and body together in the instant of fashioning, than to have taken a previously developed animal and, expelling or superseding the animal soul, breathed into it the soul of a man. This reason, together with the *superficies* of the literal sense of Genesis ii. 7, and the implied, if not express, consensus of the Fathers, and, we may add, the *sensus fidelium* also, which, though not well defined on the question, undoubtedly

* "In Genesim ad lit.," lib. vi. cap. 13, n. 23.

† An potius hoc non requirendum?

leans to the side of immediate formation,—all these reasons combined would make it—we are inclined to think—at least rash and dangerous to deny, that the body of Adam was formed immediately by God, and quasi-instantaneously, out of earth.*

And what we have here concluded about the body of Adam, may be said still more confidently about the body of Eve. No one can deny that the Fathers are unanimous in asserting that, just as Adam's body was formed of the earth, so the body of Eve was formed of a rib of Adam, in the literal sense. Suarez declares this to be "Catholic doctrine"; and the only eminent man that has maintained a metaphorical sense for Gen. ii. 21, is Card. Cajetan,† who has never had a disciple. Eugubinus (Jerome of Gubbio, a celebrated Italian physician of the sixteenth century) held that the first created human being was *androgynous*, and that the formation of Eve was the separation of the two sexes. But he is quite alone, and his assertion has only served to furnish a paragraph of refutation to orthodox writers.‡ The body of Eve, therefore, was formed after the creation of Adam, out of his rib, immediately by God, and instantaneously; the last condition implying not necessarily strict instantaneity, but at least the briefest and shortest stages; not, perhaps, one instant, but at all events, not many.

Men whose minds are much occupied with physical science at first hand, or even who read books and enter earnestly into scientific problems and victories, and who at the same time are weak in supernatural faith, cannot fail to be shocked and repelled by the miraculous. God, when He works by nature's laws, works in such

* *Propositio temeraria* apud censores Theologos ea est quæ in materiis theologicis sine sufficienti fundamento vel auctoritatis vel rationis asseritur; vel aliter ea est quæ communi SS. Patrum doctrinæ adversatur, aut quæ constanti theologorum sententiæ contradicit absque gravi rationis vel auctoritatis fundamento.—Montaigne, "De Censuris," n. 6 (apud Migne, *Curs. Theol.*, tom. i.)

† Patres omnes et universa Ecclesia usque ad Cajetanum ita Scripturam intellexerunt, ut tanquam rem certam et catholicam crediderunt Evam ex costâ Adæ fuisse formatam.—Suarez, "De Opere sex Dierum," lib. iii. cap. 2, n. 4.

‡ We have not quoted S. Thomas, nor even the later *schola*, such as Suarez and Berti, as authorities on the questions here discussed; because what they say, as distinguished from their arguments, is only a repetition of some statement of an earlier writer, and we are here inquiring for Patristic authority. Of course we have been guided throughout by their interpretation of the Fathers, and we could easily load our pages with voluminous citations. But they throw no light upon the precise question of *evolution*, because, of course, they had never heard of it. We think, however, that Suarez, for instance, will be found to go no further than we do, if it be borne in mind that the question is, what is right or safe from the point of view of Catholic faith.

silent ways, making every step hardly a step and every change so imperceptible, that the observer of nature finds his imagination beginning to make a sort of worship of the *gradual*. The miraculous becomes not merely a falsehood, but an impiety; it seems to contradict God's own acted word. But the eye that looks too exclusively on physical nature loses the habit of considering that nature is not the whole of God's plan. Nature was not made for nature's sake. The world is for man, and man means reason, free will and conscience. God's dealings with man are not confined to the mere conservation of nature. Every one who admits the Incarnation must admit the extraordinary—not to say the extra-natural. It would seem that, considering man's reason, and God's manifested care of him, we should even expect that the extraordinary will intervene at certain important points of his history. And it would seem, also, that his first appearance in the world was a fitting occasion for it. Taking for granted that man was to be a spiritual and immortal soul, and that his soul therefore was a special creation out of nothing, it does not seem incongruous that his body should have been "fashioned" after an extraordinary way.* The first beginning of an order of things should correspond to the whole course. Man's body was to be the instrument of a spiritual essence, and to be ruled and guided according to far other laws than those of chemistry, of locomotion, or of instinct. Therefore it is right that it should have been specially formed. It is even questionable whether any animal organization whatever, not surpassing the wants of an animal, could have been a fit instrument of a rational soul, without special, and therefore miraculous, adaptation. We know, for instance, that the weight of brain in proportion to bulk is at least four times as great in man as in any animal whatever. And considering the enormously complicated play of fantasy, of emotion, and of sensitive memory, which is introduced by reason, it seems at least a reasonable supposition, though it can never be verified, that no apparatus of nerves and nerve-matter which would suffice for an irrational creature, would be fine enough

* Mr. Wallace's admission that man was not altogether developed by natural selection, is an example of how "scientific" men dread the shadow of the extraordinary. "The inference," he says, "which I would draw from this class of phenomena is, that a superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite direction, and for a definite purpose. . . . At the same time I must confess that this theory has the disadvantage of requiring the intervention of some distinct individual intelligence, to aid in the production of what we can hardly avoid considering as the ultimate aim and outcome of all organized existence—intellectual, ever-advancing, spiritual man." (*Contributions, &c.*, p. 359.) The "ultimate aim and outcome" of the act of a man who presents me with a house and estate is, in a certain sense, myself; but what "disadvantage" is there in the theory that I myself am not grown on the estate?

or extensive enough to provide that sensitive accompaniment which ever goes together with the independent spiritual action of the soul. And is there not much violence and improbability in trying to imagine the conversion of an animal into a man? All things are possible to God; but it would surely require a clear revelation to make us dream of supposing that an adult animal, with all its organs adapted to the narrow circle of a rough and elementary sensitive experience and fixed in the instinctive pursuit of a few objects of appetite, should suddenly vibrate with consciousness, and feel itself master of its choice and knowing right and wrong. But all who do not admit that the spiritual soul can grow, would, on the hypothesis that an ape suddenly became a man, be obliged to hold this. It is quite true that Mr. Darwin would not be affected by the absurdity of such a view; for he admits no soul in man that is different in kind from that of the brutes. And so the debate seems to resolve itself into this; shall we maintain special creation and the spirituality of the soul, or continuous evolution, and confound intellect with sensation? The spirituality of the soul is really the point at issue. If it can be shown that man's soul is proved by facts to be of a widely different *kind* from any power we know of in the brutes, no amount of experiment and no analogical physiology will ever bridge over the chasm between the two, or show that the higher can issue out of the lower. If, on the other hand, reason be only an extension of instinct and the spiritual only the material in a refined state, evolution becomes at once so probable that in examining its proofs we should set out with a strong presumption in its favour.* We maintain, of course, that the spirit is one thing, the animal-soul quite another. And as we think that facts show this as convincingly as they can show anything, we will give here an outline of our case.

Powers, agents, or forces, can be known by their effects or phenomena. This is so true, in physics at least, that there are many who assert that all we can know of the constitution of a force or power is the synthesis or complex of its effects upon ourselves or upon other beings. But it is convenient to use the word "power," as expressing that nature or φύσις which, when in contact with other natures, is seen or known by certain resulting phenomena. Even if it be true—which of course we distinctly deny in the case of the human soul, at least—that there is nothing beyond

* No mention is here made of the argument from the revelation of the original justice in which man was constituted by his Maker; because it is defined, not that man was so *created*, but that he was so *constituted*; so that there might conceivably have been a time in which he had only natural gifts. But we need not say it is the more common and far the more probable opinion that our first parents at the moment of their creation received supernatural sanctity at the same time with the gifts of their human nature.

the group of phenomena, nevertheless the stability and unity of the group may fairly be represented by such a name as power. If, therefore, it be proved that two sets of effects or phenomena are different, it is evident that the powers or natures from which they proceed are different in the same proportion. But a difference may be of two kinds,—mere difference or disparateness, and proper difference or opposition. Opposites not only differ from, but exclude, each other. When two sets of phenomena differ so far that they exclude each other, there can be no doubt whatever that they proceed from powers or natures which exclude each other. Thus the analyst uses his test-papers and his tubes, and according to the phenomena which he obtains, he classifies the substance or nature under its proper name; or if the phenomena are altogether new, and exclusive of all others with which science is acquainted, he concludes that he has discovered a new substance, and gives it a new name. Exclusiveness of effects, then, is a test of difference of nature. But exclusiveness may be either relative or absolute. Properties or effects may exclude each other under certain circumstances, but not under others. A portion of gas may exhibit the phenomena of burning; another portion, under different circumstances, may refuse to burn; but it cannot be inferred that these two portions of gas are different substances; they are perhaps only relatively different. Now relativeness is of various degrees of transcendentalness. In plainer words, a fact that is absolutely true in one order may be only relatively true in another. Thus it is said that the very distinct sensations which we respectively call sight and hearing may be analysed, as to their exciting cause, into a repetition of one and the same primitive infinitesimal element. Thus, again, two highly complex and completely distinct organic substances may really consist of the same molecules, and these molecules, differing as they do in all their properties, may perhaps consist of homogeneous ultimate atoms. And we believe that philosophers make a further generalization, and think that the ultimate elements of all matter, ether, light, heat, or by whatever name force is called, may probably be found to be of one and the same substance. It may seem, therefore, that no two known natures absolutely exclude each other, except the last, unattainable elements of all natures. But we have now to notice the important fact that even these ultimate particles do not exclude each other absolutely. It may be said that a being gifted with an eye sufficiently penetrating could make sure that one of such atoms was not the same as another, from the very fact that it never could be another, or resolved into the other's elements (elements not being possible in the ultimate). The phenomena being always individual, the nature must be individual too, and thus they would be different individuals. It would be impossible to think of one atom as occu-

pying the same space, time, or place as another atom ; and thus it would seem, though this would not constitute a great difference, it would be an ultimate and absolute difference, impossible to transcend. But is it so ? Can we not conceive that neither space nor time nor locality exist ? Then, it will be replied, the atoms would not exist either. This we at once admit. But that is not the point. The question is whether there is a view of matter more *ultimate* and absolute than analysis into its own elements ; or rather, it is to show that if there exist such a *transcendental* analysis, it is absolute and ultimate in a true and *proper* sense. And it is evident that if an atom can be viewed independently of space and time, the atom so viewed will differ from the atom viewed under space and time in a way which is certainly well expressed by the word *absolute*, because it is an incomparably more fundamental difference than any other difference which our faculties know, or can know, in matter.

Two things follow from this last proposition. First, it will be evident that any independence of space and time which there is in the atoms (or, to leave the atoms, in material nature), will not be there by virtue of material nature itself—on the hypothesis, it is understood, that any such independence exists. Secondly, between the cognitive powers which apprehend the phenomena as under space and time and as not under space and time, respectively, there will be a great difference—a difference analogous to the difference in the phenomena ; that is, a difference as *absolute* as our faculties can conceive ; or at any rate, a difference so absolute that even if the word *absolute* be refused to it, man must invent some special word to express it, just as the difference between the phenomena under the two several aspects must be described at least by some word which transcends even the ultimate conceivable elements of matter.

For the sake of convenience, we may call a notion which pre-scinds from space and time the *abstract*, although the word has several other acceptations, and, indeed, is rather indefinite. But it will answer our purpose here. Now it certainly seems that few will deny that this “abstract” exists in our consciousness. But in order, not so much to prove that it exists, as to define more closely what it is, let us take one or two facts of consciousness, and try if we can discover it in them.

Let it be supposed that I am the spectator of a great battle. Posted upon the vantage-ground of a lofty tower, I see it begin, continue, and come to an end. Early in the morning, whilst the rays of the summer sun are yet slanting nearly level across the plain below, one host is coming into view and massing its battalions where the slight rise of the ground meets the sky. Opposite to it is the vast irregular semicircle of the enemy, half hidden in dips and hollows, one flank resting upon a wood, and a broad high-

road running through the centre of his position. The battle begins with the advance of a strong division on one side, and a heavy fire of shells from batteries of both the armies. The advancing forces are met by others; the sharp cracking and rattling of the rifles mingles with the roar of the cannon; more forces engage; the battle is general all along the line. The noise and the smoke confuses the spectator. There is retreat, advance, fight, first on one part of the field, then on another. Bodies of troops are broken, the dead begin to strew the field, and the bearers of the wounded pass swiftly between the battle and the rear. Brilliant masses of cavalry thunder down upon bright lines of bayonets that wither them with far-reaching death. Officers gallop hither and thither; the reserves come up; shouts as of victory are heard, and with a general advance of one army, the other is driven back, broken, put to flight, slain, or taken, until the wave of war seems to pass away over the sky-line from whence in the morning the attack had been made. The sun sets and the moon rises upon wreck, blood, dead and dying men, plunderers, slowly vanishing smoke, and what seems like silence.

All this scene I have taken in with my senses. Complicated as it has been, I have followed it with accuracy, estimated distances and velocities correctly, and formed a fair impression of what has actually been transacted. What is more than this, I have that scene with me still, although it is past never to return. I can recall it on the following day, a year after, now. And when I recall it, it seems to be the same in its details as when I saw it. The battle-field comes back to me with its apparent space and breadth, the horizon, the wood, the hollows, and the road. I realize the colour—the green of the grass and of the springing corn, with their different shades, the darker wood, the red and the blue of the massed troops, the glitter of helmet, bayonet, and scabbard, the flash of sabres, the lightning and black storm of the guns, great and small. I seem to hear the sounds. The din of roaring culverin and bursting missile, the noise of men and of horses, the far-off rushing, audible and desperate, though so far away—how clear they come back! And I distinguish in my fancy all the movements and manœuvres of that hard-fought day—the charges, the *mêlées*, the retreats, the pursuits. Many a slight and momentary scene or sound revives—the gallant rider throwing up his arms as the fatal bullet found him out, the plumed hat with which the field-officer on the white charger waved on his men, the mad riderless horse that galloped my way, the wild shriek that once and again had come up out of the uproar and appalled me. It all remains; not, perhaps, as fresh to-day as it was yesterday, but quite unmistakable; and it is probable that I shall carry it with me to my last moments. If I lose any of the details, I can often

recall them by first of all recalling what preceded or followed ; one fragment of the picture suggests another. And even if I meet with similar details in quite other scenes, my battle is brought back to my imagination. The harmless firing of volunteer artillery recalls the fearful volleys of that day. I cannot see the smoke of a weed-fire hanging in the air of a March afternoon, or watch the mists curling along the sides of a wooded hill after rain, without having the lurid canopy of that field in my thought again. When I mount a church-tower and look out over Yorkshire wold or Cornish moor, I range my armies as they once stood on another plain far away. The smell of the blue-bells never fails to make me think of that day, for there was a patch of blue-bells under the trees by my post of observation. Whenever I see again that peculiar arrangement of the clouds that marked one moment of the day, I recollect the tremendous rush of cavalry there was just then. Nay, if I had reason during the fight to fear for my own life or safety, there are moments when a tremor of my nerves, proceeding from fear or from ill-health, or from surprise, will carry me back from the midst of a crowd and from the engrossment of interesting conversation to the moment when I stood solitary and anxious so long before upon the tower.

Upon such undoubted facts as these, which of course no one denies, it is observed, first, that there is a certain internal process by which we reproduce in our consciousness what has once impressed our senses. Shall we call this process *Thought* ? There is no doubt that nearly all modern English and French metaphysicians call it *Thought*. But it is not the custom of Catholic philosophy to use the word *Thought* in this sense. The reason of this is on the surface ; for it is evident, in the second place, that all the internal process that has been described above is a mere reproduction of the sensible. I have nothing more when I recall the battle than I had when the battle was going on ; indeed, not so much. If there was colour, locality, external shape, motion of body, and the passing of time, in the phenomena of the battle, all these reappear in my reconstruction of it. Take the point of time, which may seem the least likely to be reproduced. It is certain that if I recall the battle exactly as it happened, I shall be just as long over doing so as it really lasted when it was fought. An incident is made up of other incidents ; and the ultimate element of all sensible incidents is an infinitesimal “*shock of the sense*” ; the feeling or consciousness of time consists in the consciousness of “*before and after*” in sensible impressions. It is unavoidable, then, that if an incident or a succession of incidents be reproduced in the imaginative way just described, the time occupied in doing so must be the same as that which the incidents occupied when they really occurred. But incidents never are reproduced with

absolute exactness, or with anything like it. A continuous impression is made on the senses when such a scene as a battle is transacted in their presence; but of the enormous multitude of minute "shocks" only certain of the more vivid groups can be reproduced; just as the wind that moves the leafy branches of the trees leaves no record of its ceaseless activity except when it has risen to a gale and torn away trophies of its force. Thus time is always found in the pictures drawn by the imagination, as far as the imagination reproduces. And indeed that time and all the other sensible accompaniments should be there as they were when the impressions were first made is only what might have been predicted beforehand. For this image-producing or picture-painting is nothing but a continuation of the actual sensible impression. Whatever be the nature of the thrill or vibration or undulation that is the condition of sensation in brain and nerve, that condition has a tendency to continue, and will continue, until it meets with conditions powerful enough to expel it; just as a long chain suspended from a high vault swings for hours after it has been set in motion. And even if the nerve-condition—which, however, be it observed, is not the whole of the fact of sensation—even if this condition be thought to have ceased, it can be made to begin again without any such external impression. In either case the nerve-condition is precisely the same in reproduction as in actual experience. And this alone is sufficient to prove that whatever there was in the sensible experience, so much and no more is there in imaginative reproduction.

We all know that it is said of some people that they never reflect. Taken literally, of course, the case never happens. However habitually a human being may be taken up with what his senses tell him, he cannot help making some kind of rudimentary reflection on what passes before him. But let us suppose that we had actually found a man who never had had any ideas or consciousness except such as imply place, space, colour, and time. Let us suppose that the man who witnessed the battle already mentioned had lived for several years after it, and neither during its occurrence, nor since, had travelled out of the region of impressions and reproduction described above. And let it be supposed that, one day, under circumstances of peculiar quietness and solitude, there suddenly arose within his mind a reflection—the reflection, for instance, that the battle after all was utterly *useless*. Surely this is a step into a higher atmosphere. He did not see that in the battle itself. "Utility" did not come in through his eyes and ears. It certainly did not exist in the battle. For the same reason it could not have existed, and so been impressed on his sense, in any other battle or in any other incident whatever. Besides, even if it were possible that it had existed elsewhere, and been caught by the

sense, the difficulty would still remain of accounting for its connection with that particular battle—connected, be it observed, not as when one sight or sound suggests another without suggesting a relation, but by a definite process of affirming the battle to be what it did not at all declare itself to be. Can a relation, or an affirmation be given in sensible impression—in reiterated shocks of the sense? This is the deeper question which is forced upon us. We may leave out of consideration the abstract “utility” and the difficulties attending its origin and application. The question is, Can the sense say anything, make a judgment at all? Can it furnish the blank formula of judgment—the “is,” in “A is B”? The grass of the battle-field was green, and the sense gave both the grass and the greenness; but did it *affirm* that “the grass is green”? It may be answered that “grass” and “green” together form one complex sensible object, which is an object under space and time, and therefore of sense. But against this the rejoinder at once is, that the sense may indeed take in and report (so to speak) a complex object, but that in this case the question is, not about the complex object, but about the *complexity* of the object. It is one thing to see “green grass,” and evidently quite another to affirm the *greenness* of the grass. The difference is all the difference between seeing two things united and seeing them *as united*. It may be further contended that “grass” is an object of sense, and “greenness” also is an object of sense, being the remembrance or revival of a certain frequently-repeated sensation, which, in order to label it, has been denominated greenness; and since both the terms of the judgment are objects of sense, the juxtaposition or composition of the terms may also be effected by the sense. But the reply again is evident. “Green” in the sense of “greenness” cannot have come from the sense—that is from any faculty which is impressed only by a repetition of shocks in space and time; for, first, it is not the greenness of any particular object, but greenness in general; secondly, it is not the greenness of all the green objects experienced in the past, but, as is admitted, a general idea acquired from these, and labelled or named; and, thirdly, even if it were the greenness of a particular sensible object, the sense, as we have already contended, could not have given it, because the sense only gives “green.” A further important consequence follows. If in the judgment “the grass is green,” “green” cannot have come altogether from sense; then neither can “grass” have come altogether from sense. In other words, “grass” seen or known by sense is a different mental object to “grass” as the term of an affirmation or judgment. For, in this particular judgment, of what is “green” affirmed? Of this plant called “grass.” But “green” is a part of the object “grass,” as it comes to the sense. The sense knows no such thing as green and no such thing as grass as existing

separately, over against each other, comparably ; it only knows a particular plant which would not (by hypothesis) be this particular plant at all unless it were green. And therefore, just as the term "green" in the affirmation contains in it an element not furnished by sense, so does the other term "grass." It is evident then, that not only must we say of a judgment that the relation it expresses by the word "is" cannot have been furnished by sense-impressions, but we must also say that the very *terms* of that relation or judgment must also have been derived from another source.

It need hardly be insisted that the terms of this judgment, let alone the "is" of the judgment, are independent of space and time. Not only so, but they so absolutely exclude and transcend space and time that to think them under space and time would be to destroy them. "Green," as we have so often said, is not this greenness, but greenness in general ; but no such thing as greenness in general exists *in rerum naturâ*, or can be conceived to exist. But if greenness be thought under space (so much) and time (so long) then it is no longer greenness, but some green thing. And "grass," also, in the judgment, is independent of space and time. For to judge that grass is green implies, as we have said, a mental separation of this grass from its greenness ; for you cannot compare two things between which no separation exists. But this grass does not exist in space or time separated from its greenness ; and so far as it is thought under space and time, it actually is (the same as) green. Therefore as it occurs in the given judgment, it excludes space and time. And the same reasoning might be made as strongly in regard to the copula, "is." If a brute could think "is," brute and man would be brothers. "Is," as the copula of a judgment, implies the mental separation and recombination of two terms that only exist united in nature, and can therefore never have impressed the sense except as one thing. And "is," considered as the substantive verb, as in the example "This man is," contains in itself the application of the copula of judgment to the most elementary of all abstractions—"thing," or "something." Yet if a being has the power of thinking "thing," it has the power of transcending space and time by dividing or decomposing the phenomenally one. Here is the point where Instinct ends and Reason begins.

If it were not a fact that such books as Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Principles of Psychology" are written and read by intellectual men at the present day, it would seem superfluous to go on to say that the faculty which elaborates what we have called "the abstract" cannot be the same faculty as that which receives and conserves the sensible. The simple reason is, that they necessarily exclude each other. The faculty which is affected by the shock or impact of the external object, must convey the object under space-

conditions and time-conditions, and, if so, must revive it and reproduce it under the same conditions. But the mind, as we have shown, has notions or ideas which, as a condition of their thinkableness, exclude space-conditions and time-conditions. Therefore it is impossible that the latter class of notions can reside in or be elaborated by, the faculty which takes note of the former.

In making the foregoing observations the simplest example has been taken, an example hardly one degree removed from the blank formula of judgment. But it is evident that the spectator of our battle, if he were a reflecting man, and much more if he were an educated thinker, would have thought much and made innumerable reflections on that battle—reflections which, if set down, would make the evidence for the existence of a higher order of thought (or as Catholic philosophers prefer to call it, thought proper) not perhaps more evident, but much more vivid and impressive. He might have written a description of the battle, and in the course of it he would no doubt have speculated and reasoned about it from various points of view. He would have examined the End or purpose with which it was fought by both sides respectively, and how far each had succeeded or failed. In the course of this examination he would have spoken of such highly abstract ideas as the State, the Family, the Individual; he would have generalized on Religion, on Politics, on Finance; he would have touched, perhaps, on difficult questions of morality and looked into the obscure depths of Free Will. Amid the smoke and the noise of the field he would have seen the Hand of God and read the lessons of Providence. The massed squadrons would have been in his eyes Christian men and immortal souls; the idea of Judgment would have made him shudder as death was busy, and the terrors of a Future State would have made that scene of carnage indefinitely more serious and terrific. Or if he confined himself to mundane reflections, he might have entered into a wilderness of hypothetical calculations and possibilities, tending to prove the tactics a mistake and the commanders foolish blunderers; and he might have filled page after page with chains of consequences and serried demonstrations. All this complex reasoning would rest, so to speak, on that scene which he bore away in his imagination when he descended from his tower of observation; but it would be a new world—a world colourless, bodiless, out of space, out of time; a world that his eye had not discovered on the earth or in the clouds, but which a higher vision than that of the body—a power so high that it is an image of the Highest—had furnished forth to his intelligence and made quite as real as the world that struck upon his sense. A broad comparison between the world of sense and the world of reason, we say, tends to impress the observer with the truth of the assertion, that sense and reason themselves are two absolutely different things. On the

one hand there is the concrete singular, alone or grouped and combined, capable of affecting the sensory nerves of the human body with repeated shocks, from whose quicker, slower, and variously combined impressions, there arise all those differences of consciousness that are called colour, hardness, distance, locality, space, time, and the rest. On the other hand, there is the equally varied realm of reason and reflection, of antecedent and consequent, of doubt, opinion, certainty, of analysis and classification, of daring views and profound speculation, of infinitely progressive syllogizing and never-ending intellectual advance, of grand thoughts and worshipful ideas; all of which phenomena of our inner world are the evolution and the synthesis of the primitive "abstract"; of that primary operation whereby the mind views the quality or thing as separable from its conditions of existence, and as comparable with, or standing over against, something which is actually part of it as far as it is presented by the sense. For obvious reasons, especially in these days of analysis and evolution, we have compared together the primary elements of these two realms of consciousness—the primordial shocks of sensibility with the primitive constituent of thought. Their difference seems to be completely evident. And their centres of elaboration must be different also—as different as any two things can be conceived different within the circle of the created. The one power, sense and imagination (which for the purposes of the present discussion need not be distinguished) man has in common with the brutes; and the power of action which is its correlative, a power acting, necessarily, without knowledge of means and end as such, and automatically, is called Instinct. The other power, reason, is solely human; and its activity is free, spontaneous, and completely reflex, and is called Intelligence. Intimately as the two are connected in man, yet there are phenomena in which their distinction seems almost discernible to the eye. One of these is the remarkable effect produced on each respectively by the excessive activity of their respective objects. Any excess of a primary object of sensibility, such as colour, is first painful and ultimately destructive to the sense. The reason is easy to see; excessive rapidity of impact in the primitive elements of sensible excitement acts upon the organ in such a way as to disintegrate its tissues. But with regard to the "abstract" or anything compounded of "abstracts," no amount of clearness, luminousness, definiteness or intensity produces any effect of pain. The sensible eye may be blinded by light, but the eye of the mind was never blinded by Truth. The idea is absurd. And there is another fact closely allied to this. It is the suggestive fact of the co-existence of contradictory states of activity in the mind. Allusion is here intended, not so much to the way in which the seeing-power of reason gradually calms the blind outbreak of the sensibilities;

but to the fact that a man sometimes has what seem to be two contradictory sets of activities going on at once within him. Take, for instance, the case of hunger. On the one hand, the hungry man experiences a feeling of discomfort and pain owing to a physical condition—the inaction of the alimentary canal; and this is accompanied by a desire for food, and, if food be present, or only imagined to be present, by the nascent activity of all the muscles and organs that are used for seizing and taking food. Here we have hunger as a pain, food as a desire, and activity actually commenced. On the other hand, let us suppose the hungry man to have resolved, for some reason or other, not to eat just then. In this case we have, at the same time, hunger as a pleasure, food rejected and activity controlled. Surely it is impossible that these *contradictory* states and activities—pleasure and pain in the same thing—desire and rejection of the same—activity striving and controlled about the same—it is impossible that these contradictions should exist in one and the same immediate subject. As soon could a man sit and run, be asleep and awake, be in a fever and be quite well, at one and the same moment.

It seems to us, then, that the absolute difference between Imagination and Reason, Instinct and Intelligence, rests upon the ground of incontrovertible fact. But in order to meet the many specious objections which we admit may be raised, we must dedicate the remainder of our space to a consideration of Instinct and its phenomena.

There is no doubt that the apparent knowledge of end and means possessed and acted upon by some of the brutes is among the most difficult facts to be accounted for without allowing them the possession of reason. Mr. Darwin quotes the following two anecdotes in his recent work; they are perhaps the strongest facts he has adduced, though, of course, there are plenty of such stories to be met with both in books and out of them.

Mr. Colquhoun winged two wild ducks, which fell on the opposite side of a stream; his retriever tried to bring both over at once, but could not succeed; she then, though never before known to ruffle a feather, deliberately killed one, brought over the other, and returned for the dead bird. Colonel Hutchinson relates that two partridges were shot at once, one being killed, the other wounded; the latter ran away, and was caught by the retriever, who on her return came across the dead bird; she stopped, evidently greatly puzzled, and after one or two trials, finding she could not take it up without permitting the escape of the winged bird, she considered a moment, then deliberately murdered it by giving it a severe crunch, and afterwards brought away both together. This was the only known instance of her ever having wilfully injured any game. Here we have reason, though not quite perfect, for the retriever might have brought the wounded bird first, and then

returned for the dead one, as in the case of the two wild ducks.—“*Descent of Man*,” vol. i. p. 48.

This is a fair example of what induces Mr. Darwin and others to assign reason and intelligence to the brutes, and to assert that they differ from man on this head only in degree. But what is it that is implied in such actions as these just described? * Animals, as all admit, have the capability of feeling internal states or conditions of their organism, as for example, hunger, thirst, and other kinds of pain. Moreover, they have external sensations; the circumstances round about not only move them, but make them feel. Now, the analogy of our own experience proves that this combination of internal and external feeling gives rise to a tendency; the animal that feels hungry and sees food, feels an attraction or longing for it. This tendency, which is physiologically a nascent excitation of the organs by which the pain or inconvenience is overcome, at once, therefore, puts in play any apparatus that may exist in the animal which may be suitable for the attainment of its want. That is to say, the animal feels its own organization and is borne forward, by the fact of its being alive, to certain ways of acting; sensibility conveys to it the presence of those external objects which are suitable to it; the twofold consciousness, causing excitement of the nerve-fibres, causes also contraction of those muscles which are intimately united with them, and external action is the result. All this is implied in instinct. And yet all this does not imply the “abstract,” even in its most primitive element. Doubtless instinct has an infinite number of gradations. Between the hydra that has no nervous system at all, and holds its food fast by the mechanical squeezing of the simple *sac* that constitutes nearly all its organism, and the hunting cat, that calculates its distance to a hair’s breadth when it leaps upon the bird in the hedge, the degrees of complexity of nerve-centres and muscular centres are innumerable. But they are only degrees—degrees of greater or less complexity in the reflex action that is the result of nervous excitation.

But two important observations must here be made. The first is, that animals, since they have sensation, have also imagination. That is to say, their nervous system has the faculty not only of receiving, but of retaining impressions; and not only of retaining, but of reproducing them. The nerves which constitute the sensorial organs are grouped in distinct centres. In proportion as these centres satisfy certain conditions, so are sensations retained in them

* We here acknowledge some obligation to M. Joly’s book upon *Instinct*, named at the head of this article. It is a work in which the difference between instinct and intelligence is explained and proved at length in the most solid and satisfactory manner.

more vividly; and, being retained, they of course influence other connected centres, and produce various motions in the locomotive organs. If, therefore, it be granted that locomotion is a consequence of sensation, it must also be granted that locomotion may result from revived sensation, that is, from the operation of the imagination. And when several sensations are revived (just as when several sensations are present) the action of the animal will correspond to that sensation, or group of sensations, which, for whatever reason, is most strong and lively.

The second observation is, that not only the sense, but the muscular system is liable to the influence of what is called Habit. The organs may become *habituated* to certain determinate motions. In proportion as these motions are repeated, they grow more and more easy; intermediate sensations, by which, in the first instance, the motions had been brought about, disappear, and the connection between a want or a sensation and a movement becomes so constant and necessary, that the one follows the other, so to speak, unconsciously. A canary, for instance, that at first draws his water with difficulty, soon draws it easily and quickly. Thus, habits modify instincts; or, rather, they are additional instincts. An instinct is a congenital habit; a habit is an acquired instinct.

If we bear these facts in mind, it is not difficult to explain what is meant by the "education" of animals. To educate an animal is to excite certain artificial relations between its sensations, and so to superinduce a habit or habits of movement which are not natural to such animal. Here is Brehm's description of the education of a personage who has been rather prominently before the public lately. The learned naturalist is speaking of the ape: "It is easy," he says, "to teach an ape to do a thousand feats. You show him clearly what you want him to do, and then you thrash him until he does it as you want. This is the whole art of educating an ape! As a general rule, an ape will learn any feat you please in the course of a couple of hours; and then you have only to make him repeat it from time to time, for he soon forgets what he has learnt."* And it is well known that bears are taught to act by putting them on hot tiles, and playing a drum and fife. Here an artificial relation is produced between the sound of the fife and pains alleviated by motion; and the corresponding motion follows and becomes a habit. So with the ape. A connection is established in the sensitive system of the animal between a gesture, a beating, and the performance of a certain trick; and this relation reproduces itself in the nerves whenever the gesture is repeated.

The explanation, therefore, of the actions of the two retrievers in Mr. Darwin's example does not seem far to seek. Let us take

* Brehm, *Les Mammifères*; p. 12.

the first. The animal had been educated to carry and not to kill; that is, its natural instinct, which would have urged it to destroy and tear what it found, had been modified by means resembling those used in the case of the ape and the bear, so that it carried game to its master's feet. It had been well educated, and the habit was very strong. Under these circumstances the animal has two wounded wild ducks before it. A great complication of instincts and habits at once besets it. First, the instinct to kill and tear; secondly, the instinct to hold fast; thirdly, the habit of carrying without killing; fourthly, a desire or emotion to be at its master's feet with something or other, dead or alive (for it had often carried dead birds). We may take for granted that it would act in accordance with the most vivid of these habits or instincts. Taking the actual results, therefore, a fair hypothesis would be that the instinct of holding, or not allowing to escape, was the strongest feeling, and therefore the dog killed one of the birds. The act would be a not very complicated case of instinct, such as one sees in every hunting animal; the wounded and fluttering bird irresistibly suggesting the sensation of escape. But as soon as one bird was dead, the same phenomena were not suggested by the other, because the dog had it fast; and, therefore, the "taught" habit of carrying without hurting was not interfered with. Exactly the same kind of answer may be given in the second case. The instinct of holding or keeping (not allowing to escape) was decidedly the predominant feeling, and the dog acted in accordance with it. It looked "puzzled," no doubt; any animal with conflicting desires would look puzzled, like the traditional ass between the two bundles of hay. The reason is, that the mechanism of sensation, and corresponding muscular action, is not adjusted *in instanti*, but requires a lapse of time, greater or less, according to the complexity of the circumstances.

Every single case that has ever been brought forward, or that can be brought, of the "intelligence" of animals—and no one admits more readily than ourselves the marvels to be met with in animated nature—may be explained on such principles as we have stated. It must be remembered that we establish the spirituality of the human soul—that is, the absolute difference of reason from sensation—on grounds taken from internal human consciousness. What we have to do, then, when answering difficulties such as those here noticed, is not to prove that certain visible results produced by the movements of animals might not conceivably under other circumstances be the result of reason like that of man, but that they can be explained fully and adequately, in the given case, without assimilating their motive principle to human reason. Animals may have many of the external attributes and gestures of man; they may seem to adapt means to end, to be conscious of

right and wrong, to speak and understand language ; but all these phenomena are sensible, not properly conscious, without reasoning, without judgment such as man has, in a word without the "abstract."* It would, of course, take a volume to draw out all the differences of detail between man and brute corroborative of this fundamental distinction. But perhaps enough has been said to show some *à priori* grounds for expecting that the human soul should have been specially created, and why no consistently reasoning thinker can ever hold that a monkey can develop into a man, understanding man as soul and body together.

We are so convinced that the question of the difference between matter and spirit is at the bottom of both Mr. Darwin's theories and of his blunders, that we have been led to dwell upon the subject, rather to the exclusion of any direct criticism of his book. The truth is that if we criticised in detail those chapters which speak of the intellectual and moral evolution of man, we should have to repeat the same complaint at every paragraph ; the complaint that he makes no difference of kind between the highest operations of man and the lowest ; between the operations of the animal and those of the man. It is this fundamental obtuseness that makes nearly everything in the "Descent of Man," except the stark facts, so unsatisfactory and even so contemptible. How can you reason with a man that can see no difference, except in degree, between the purely sensitive "talk" of a parrot, and the "universal" that is contained in the sentence of a man ? Between the animal affection of a dog for his master, and the abstract judgment implied in man's worship of God ? Between the act of a dog licking a friendly cat in its basket, and a man judging of right and wrong ? How, at least, can you argue with him except by showing, once for all, in some such way as we have endeavoured to do, that there are two absolutely distinct orders of internal phenomena in the human mind ? The position of Faith, then, with regard to theories of evolution appears to be this. It is not contrary to Faith to suppose that all living things, up to man exclusively, were evolved by natural law out of minute life-germs primarily created, or even out of inorganic matter. On the other hand, it is heretical to deny the separate and special creation of the human soul ; and to question the immediate and instantaneous (or quasi-instantaneous) formation by God of the bodies of Adam and Eve—the former out of inorganic matter, the latter out of the rib of Adam—is, at least, rash, and, perhaps, proximate to heresy.

It is to be expected that scientific men will answer Mr. Darwin's

* "All these (apparently human) tendencies in the lower animals are stopped dead, as it were, by the want of the faculty for apprehending universals."—Sir A. Grant, "Contemporary Review," May, 1871, p. 277.

"Descent of Man" on his own ground. Mr. St. George Mivart has already put the difficulties against natural selection in general in a light which must strongly influence the thought of the day, as his book becomes more widely known; and we expressed in our last number how very highly we estimate his labours. If he undertakes to criticise Mr. Darwin's latest effort, he will find his task the more easy in proportion as that work is weaker in argument and more fanciful in that propensity for extracting universals out of singulars which is a besetting sin with theorizing men of science. But while we most fully admit the value and the necessity of scientific answers to Darwinism, it must be remembered that a merely scientific answer cannot possibly refute such errors as we have been noticing. If the evolutionists were merely scientific, our answer could afford to be merely scientific. But the thorough-going evolutionist is one who appends a metaphysical, or, we might say, a mythological, conclusion to an induction of facts that can never be complete.* To argue from the fact that men once dead do not come to life again, to the conclusion that Lazarus did not come to life again, is illegitimate; because there is another set of facts, viz., a God, a moral order, and a revelation, which are quite as real as the facts of death and non-resurrection. Hence to conclude peremptorily that Lazarus did not rise again, would be a mythological guess, not a scientific deduction; not to say that it would be a mythological blunder. It is the same with the beginnings of life and of existence. The limited number of facts which the observation of all possible observers can take note of has only as much value for purposes of deduction as natural uniformity has in the question of miracles. That is to say, uniformity in natural law, just as it is not absolute in the future, so it has not been absolute and indefeasible in the past. Therefore the certainty which it affords as to the nature of the beginning is only certainty in the absence of *a priori* probability to the contrary. But the evolutionists do not admit the possibility of *a priori* probability to the contrary. They set aside and deny such probability. Therefore their conclusions are not scientific, in any true and proper sense, but mythological; as mythological and as baseless as the speculations of the Antiquary in the romance, who thought he had discovered the site of Agricola's camp in the remains of a moorland hovel. And as they go beyond the lawful bounds of science, so those who answer them are obliged to insist upon much that is antecedent to science. This is, and must be, the position of all who hold a revelation and a moral

* An able article in the "Rambler," New Series, vol. ii. p. 361, uses the word "mythological" with regard to Mr. Darwin's first great work, "The Origin of Species," and argues somewhat as we do in this paragraph. The article is well worth reading.

order; and whatever it may be good and useful to attempt afterwards, it must first be clearly laid down that the pretensions of our adversaries are unwarrantable, that their method is illogical, and that nothing can be more truly unscientific than to make science responsible for conclusions, which the mere observation of facts cannot by any possibility prove.

ART. II.—THE RULE AND MOTIVE OF CERTITUDE.

La Philosophie Scolastique Exposée et Défendue. Par LE R. P. KLEUTGEN, S. J. Paris: Gaume.

An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D.D., of the Oratory. Third Edition. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

Essays Philosophical and Theological. By JAMES MARTINEAU. London: Trübner & Co.

An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART MILL. Third Edition. London: Longmans.

IN July, 1869, we published an article on the "authority of the scholastic philosophy." We said that the foundation by Descartes* of what is called "the modern philosophy" may fairly be accounted the severest intellectual calamity which ever befel the Kingdom of Christ. We spoke in detail of the disastrous results which have ensued from the divergence, now so widely extended through the Church, on the very foundations of philosophy: and we expressed our opinion, that the philosophical union of Catholics is the one pressing Catholic intellectual need of our time; the first, second, and third thing intellectually necessary for the Church's well-being. We affirmed (giving reasons for our affirmation) that there is one philosophy in particular—the scholastic—to which all eyes should turn as to the nucleus of such unity; and of which indeed the essential and fundamental principles should be

* The philosophical character of Descartes is very differently estimated by great authorities of this day. Professor Huxley accounts him as, more than any other man of his time, a representative of "the philosophy and science of the modern world" (*Lay Sermons*, p. 352): whereas Mr. Mill considers, that he carried "the abuse of deduction" "to a greater length than any distinguished thinker known to us, not excepting the Schoolmen"; and that "the premises from which his deduction set out" are still more exceptionable (pp. 610, 611).

admitted by all Catholics to be infallibly true. We pointed out at the same time how far this statement is from implying, that scholasticism is a perfect and fully satisfying philosophy; or that it may not need very important additions and more than a few corrections in order to present needs. And we proceeded to cite F. Kleutgen's strong testimony to both these conclusions. Then—the deference due to scholasticism having been entirely based by us on the Church's authority—we proceeded to vindicate her *claim* to authority within the philosophical sphere. And we concluded our general argument by indicating various readily accessible means—over and above her express *pronouncements* which in themselves are very momentous—for knowing (in order that we may humbly accept) her judgment on things philosophical.

In a notice of the same number, we mentioned that no less an authority than F. Franzelin, in treating no less vital a dogma than that of Transubstantiation, proceeds on the very principle which we had put forward.* “What philosophy he uses is scholastic, and principally from Suarez; yet he introduces theories about *force*, wholly unknown to the scholastics, as an improvement and a complement of their doctrines.” “He adopts their main principles, yet he does not hesitate to improve upon and complete them. In one sense his theory is even a correction as well as completion.” It is a philosophical theory, devised by himself for the theological purpose in hand; though he subsequently found that it had originated with Leibnitz.

Now—so far as England at least is concerned—one great cause of philosophical disunion within the Church admits, as we have been always quite confident, of very easy removal. Many Catholic thinkers, of whom Dr. Meynell is one chief representative, have thought that philosophers of the scholastic following—Liberatore, Dmowski, and the rest—deny the existence of “an *à priori* objective element of thought stamped with the character of necessity and universality.” Now for our own part, as we frankly said in October, 1869 (p. 317), we hold with firmest conviction that such denial “lays its axe at the very root of all philosophy, of all religion, and of all morality. It is the one speculative misery of our time.” We cannot therefore be at all surprised, nor can we at all regret, that those who thus understand scholasticism should view it with profound aversion; though we do regret that they can have been led so grievously to misapprehend its teaching. We

* We should explain that this notice was not furnished by the present writer; but by a contributor, vastly his superior in philosophical knowledge and acquirement, who had seen and approved the article on scholasticism.

devoted therefore a second article in the same number, on "Philosophical Axioms," to the task of clearing up this misconception. We admitted that such writers as Liberatore devote their principal energy to those particular errors with which they have been brought into conflict; and that those errors—the doctrines of ontologism, e. g., and of innate ideas—are in the very opposite pole to those of Messrs. Mill, Bain, and Huxley. But we pointed out (p. 168) that Dr. Meynell himself could not use stronger language than does Liberatore, on the cognizableness of necessary and immutable truth; and that F. Kleutgen—whom we must consider immeasurably the greatest Catholic philosopher of the present time—is constantly laying emphatic stress on the same verity. The chief purpose of our article meanwhile was to draw out various propositions, which, as we consider, are on the one hand in perfect harmony with theology and reason and recognized Catholic philosophy; while on the other hand they are precisely and saliently opposed to that desolating system (or rather negation) of thought, against which we have spoken so severely.

With a similar view of assisting to marshal Catholic forces against the enemy, we wrote an article in the following number on "Psychologism and Ontologism." Dr. Meynell was under an impression, that the tenet of "ontologism," against which various Catholic philosophers inveigh so severely, is no more nor less than the cognizableness by human reason of necessary truth. While such mutual misunderstanding as this exists among Catholic philosophers, they have no more power of co-operating against the common foe, than at this moment of our writing have the Versailles and Paris governments of combining against the Emperor of Germany. We were therefore eager to point out, that the existence and cognizableness of necessary *à priori* verities is not more firmly held by the ontologists themselves, than it is held by F. Kleutgen, their recognized opponent; nay, and by none of them has been set forth so powerfully and masterfully as by him. The characteristic tenet of ontologists is, that God is presented immediately to the human intellect as its Object; a tenet false in philosophy no less than in theology, and which, if it were admitted by Catholics, would only hamper them in their war with empiricism. At the same time we protested, in company with F. Kleutgen, against inflicting the very inappropriate name of "psychologism" on all who oppose "ontologism;" or, in other words, on all who deny that in this life man is gifted with the immediate vision of his Creator. We proposed that the word "psychologism" should be rather reserved to express that error, which is most extremely opposed to the ontologicistic, and no doubt immeasur-

ably the more disastrous of the two. Between both stands the fundamental Catholic verity—the doctrine of “objectivism,” as we proposed to call it—that there exists a large body of objective necessary truth, cognizable with certainty by man through that created gift which is called the light of reason.

Our preparations against the enemy having been thus more or less completed, our next business would have been, in accordance with our expressed intention, to begin the assault on our own account. In other words, having ascertained the conclusions which Catholics should combine to advocate, we were to have attacked the foe with those arguments, which might seem to us most solid and most available. Catholic education is on the advance; and educated Catholics are every day brought into closer and closer contact with what is sometimes called “modern thought.” Now “modern thought” in this technical sense, as is most truly observed in the “Pall Mall Gazette” of May 11th, “is a rising flood, which, if it rises high enough, will drown all the Christian congregations in their churches.” Either English Catholics must be much more completely equipped than they are now to encounter it, or the result will be far more serious than some are apt to suppose. To ourselves it had been a matter of constant regret, that we had not been able to do more service of this necessary kind; and we had at length every hope of commencing in one particular direction. Yet at this point we have unfortunately been detained by circumstances for almost two years; and we have thought it better to begin with the above recital, as we could not hope that our readers would carry with them for so long a period a memory of what we had projected. In our former articles we addressed Catholics alone; but in those now commencing we address all English philosophers without exception.

These for our present purpose may be divided into two sharply-contrasted classes, whom we may call objectivists and phenomenists respectively. The latter think that man has no knowledge whatever, except of phenomena, physical or psychical; nay, more correctly psychical alone: * whereas the former stoutly maintain that man has cognizance of objective truth. We desire to take our own humble part in this momentous controversy. We hope firstly to demonstrate by argument, that there exists a body of necessary truth cognizable by man: and secondly to consider particular *portions* of that truth; such as the intrinsic distinction between moral good

* It admits of “*no doubt*,” pronounces Professor Huxley *ex cathedra*, “that *all our knowledge* is a knowledge of states of consciousness” (Lay Sermons, p. 373).

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d be rather reserved to express that error, which is most
c, and no doubt immeasur-

present experience itself. To doubt my present inward consciousness, as Mr. Mill most truly affirms (p. 166), "would be to doubt that I feel what I feel." So far then the phenomenist and ourselves run evenly together; but here we may come to a very broad divergence. "I am conscious of a most clear and articulate mental *impression*, that a very short time ago I was suffering cold;" this is one judgment: "a very short time ago I was suffering cold;" this is another and totally distinct judgment. That I know my present *impression*, by no manner of means implies that I know my past *feeling*.

We would thus then address some phenomenistic opponent. You tell us that all diamonds are combustible; and that the fact is proved, by various experiments which you have yourself witnessed. But how do you know, that you ever witnessed any experiment of the kind? You reply that you have the clearest and most articulate *memory* of the fact. Well, we do not at all doubt that you have that present *impression*, which you call a most clear and articulate memory. But how do you know—how can you legitimately even guess—that the present *impression* corresponds with a past *fact*? See what a tremendous assumption this is, which you—who call yourself a cautious man of science—are taking for granted. You are so wonderfully made and endowed—such is your assumption—that in every successive case your clear and articulate *impression* and *belief* of something as past, corresponds with a past *fact*. You find fault with objectivists, for gratuitously and arbitrarily assuming first principles: was there ever a more gratuitously and arbitrarily assumed first principle, than your own?

You gravely reply,* that you do *not* assume it as a first prin-

* What follows does not apply personally either to Mr. Mill or Mr. Bain. The former, with that candour which characteristically distinguishes him, frankly confesses (p. 203, note) that "our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate: no reason can be given for it, which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well founded." This admission was the more signally candid, because Mr. Mill must have seen that it furnishes his antagonists with a very powerful "argumentum ad hominem," of which indeed we hope to avail ourselves in our next number. Mr. Bain makes the same admission: "Deductive Logic," p. 273. On the other hand Professor Huxley (Lay Sermons, p. 359) says that "the general trustworthiness of memory" is one of those "hypothetical assumptions which cannot be proved or known with that highest degree of certainty which is given by immediate consciousness; but which nevertheless are of the highest practical value, inasmuch as the conclusions logically drawn from them are always verified by experience." The argument in the text applies directly to this view. Professor Huxley cannot legitimately even guess that *anything whatever* has been "verified by experience," unless he *first* knows that certain acts of memory testify truly.

ciple. You tell us you trust your present act of memory, because in innumerable past instances the avouchments of memory have been true. How do you know—how can you even guess—that there is *one* such instance? Because you trust your present act of memory: no other answer can possibly be given. You are never weary of urging, that *a priori* philosophers argue in a circle; whereas no one ever so persistently argued in a circle, as you do yourself. You know forsooth that your present act of memory testifies truly, because in innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory has been true: and you know that in innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory has been true, because you trust your present act of memory. The blind man leads the blind, round and round a “circle” incurably “vicious.”

Remarks entirely similar may be made, on the validity of the inductive process. The proposition, that all the diamonds, which *I have myself seen* consumed by fire, were at that moment combustible—of *this* proposition we can well understand phenomenists saying, that it requires no further authentication than the trustworthiness of my memory. But the proposition that *all* diamonds on earth are always combustible—or even that the very diamonds which I saw burned were combustible *one day earlier*—who can say that *this* proposition requires for its knowledge nothing more than experience? It is *inferred* from experience; and its truth cannot possibly be known by me, unless I first know the validity of the inferring process, whatever that process may be.*

Without at all prejudging then any question really at issue between objectivists and phenomenists as such, we may say that “primary truths” consist of two classes: viz., (1) *primary premisses*; and (2) the validity of one or more *inferring processes*. We may add, that the cognition of a primary truth as such is precisely what is called an “intuition.” If these primary truths are guaranteed with certitude—but not otherwise—

* Mr. Bain admits *this* statement of ours as frankly as Mr. Mill admitted the former. “The most fundamental assumption of all human knowledge” is “expressed by such language as ‘nature is uniform’; ‘the future will resemble the past’; ‘nature has fixed laws.’ . . . Without this assumption, *experience can prove nothing*. . . . This *must be received without proof*. . . . If we seem to offer any proof for it, we merely beg it in another shape” (Deductive Logic, p. 227).

In case any of our readers should think it doubtful whether it *be* absolutely necessary for phenomenists to assume as a separate principle the validity of their inferring process—Mr. Mill indeed apparently does *not* account this necessary—we would point out (what will be very obvious as our article proceeds) that no part whatever of our argument depends on this particular statement.

there is a stable foundation for human knowledge in its entirety and totality. The inquiry then to be instituted is this. Firstly, what *characteristics* must be possessed by those truths, which the thinker may legitimately accept as primary? and secondly, *on what ground* does he know, that the propositions are true which *possess* those characteristics? Or to express the same thing in F. Kleutgen's words (n. 263),—firstly, what is the *rule* of certitude? and secondly, what is its *motive*?

There never was any answer but one given to this question by Catholics, before the deplorable darkness spread abroad by Descartes over the whole region of philosophy. (1.) Primary truths are those, which the human intellect is necessitated by its constitution to accept with certitude, not as inferences from other truths but on their own evidence: this is the *rule* of certitude. (2.) These truths are known to be truths; because a created gift called the light of reason is possessed by the soul, whereby every man, while exercising his cognitive faculties according to their intrinsic laws, is rendered infallibly certain that their avouchments correspond with objective truth: this is the *motive* of certitude. "It is conceivable," says Professor Huxley (Lay Sermons, p. 356), "that some powerful and malicious being may find his pleasure in deluding us, and in making us believe the thing which is not every moment of our lives." Quite conceivable, doubtless; but the light of reason makes man infallibly certain, that such a supposition is absolutely contradictory to fact.

This is the doctrine accurately and carefully elaborated by F. Kleutgen, in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th chapters of his Third Dissertation. "It is the light of reason which makes us certain of what the *sensus intimus* attests" (n. 263). "Proceeding from the facts furnished by experience, we advance to further knowledge by the principles of pure thought; but the truth of those principles and the reality of those facts are not certain to the mind, except through the light of reason which is inherent in the human mind" (n. 264). "The mind in thinking by reason has the consciousness of possessing truth, so long as it knows the agreement [which exists] between its thoughts and those principles which we call the laws of thought" (n. 274). Since the creature's "faculty of knowledge is created and therefore limited, no creature can be infallible in this sense, that by his own strength he can judge of *every thing* with certitude. In the creature infallibility is always united with fallibility, as being is united with not-being. Yet, just as the creature's being, though finite, is nevertheless true being,—so his *infallibility*, though limited, is *nevertheless real infallibility*" (n. 277.) "The principles wherewith we

begin, the logical laws which we follow in deduction, are *infallible*, as the rule whereby we judge the truth of our experimental knowledge" (n. 278).*

We may be allowed to call this doctrine the doctrine of intrinsic certitude. We would so call it, in order to distinguish it from those theories, which rest certitude on some basis extrinsic to the mind itself: from Descartes's e. g., who rests it on the veracity of God; and from Lamennais's, who rests it on the consent of mankind. According to this, which we must be allowed to call the one Catholic doctrine on the subject, the mind's intrinsic light declares the objective truth, of whatever man's cognitive faculties subjectively avouch. Would we demonstrate that there are necessary verities? Would we demonstrate that this or that particular proposition is among this number? In either case it is requisite, and it is sufficient, to demonstrate that the human intellect, acting on the laws of its constitution, so declares. This is the foundation we wish to lay in our present article, for the controversy with Mr. Mill which is to follow. But before proceeding to vindicate its truth, we must guard against two possible misconceptions of our meaning.

In the first place it is abundantly possible, that men may *misinterpret* the avouchment of their intellect; and this indeed would constitute an important addition to the causes alleged by F. Kleutgen (see our preceding foot-note) for their proclivity to error. Both schools of philosophy admit this. The objectivist says to his opponent—If you will only look fairly at this and that intellectual fact to which I draw your attention,—you will not be able to deny, that such and such is the declaration of your cognitive faculties. And the phenomenist is not slow in making a similar retort. We hope ourselves indeed in our

* We should not fail however to quote the important elucidation which F. Kleutgen subjoins: "And that we may understand how little this prerogative [of partial infallibility] would justify human pride, let us observe the limits of that sphere within which [alone] it is ascribed to him. In our investigations we need experimental knowledge, not only in commencing our inquiries but during their whole progress; especially when we would apply science to the conduct of life. Now how many things are necessary in order to our arriving at full certitude by means of personal experience and other men's observations! What calm! what attentiveness! what impartiality! what efforts! what perseverance! How often it happens that a new observation, a more profound examination, an unexpected discovery, have overthrown the most accredited systems by taking from them their basis! If then our age glorifies itself for its progress in the experimental sciences, men should not be unmindful at the same time of the lesson in humility which should be learnt from that very progress," &c. &c.

next number vigorously to illustrate this fact: we hope to show, by appealing to this that and the other mental experience, that phenomenists have not a leg to stand on, when they deny that their cognitive faculties declare the existence of necessary truth. What we are maintaining in *this* article is, that such is the sole legitimate controversial ground; that the avouchment of man's cognitive faculties is his final and his infallible standard of truth.

But secondly we appeal to the mind's positive, not its negative constitution; or in other words we lay our stress on its *affirmations*, not on its *incapacities*. It does not follow, because the human mind cannot conceive a proposition, that such proposition may not be true; nay that it may not be most certain and inappreciably momentous. We express this qualification here, that we may distinctly explain the precise bearing of our main thesis; but we reserve our argument on the matter to a later part of our article.

Our main thesis then is this. "Man's cognitive faculties, while acting on the laws of their constitution, carry with them in each particular case their own evidence of absolute trustworthiness. All human knowledge has its commencement in various truths—whether of memory * or of other kinds—which are self-evidently known as true, each by itself, under the light of reason." It would of course be a contradiction in terms, if we professed to adduce direct arguments for this thesis: because such profession would imply, that the self-evidence of these truths is a verity inferred from premisses; whereas the thesis itself states, that the knowledge of one or other of them as self-evident is an absolutely essential *preliminary* to all inference whatever. But we will (1) adduce for it strong *indirect* argument; and (2) (which is much more important) suggest to our readers such mental experiments, as shall (we trust) satisfy them of its truth. We state our indirect argument as follows.

Every one really knows, that he knows something besides his present consciousness: that he has had this or that definite past experience; that, through this or that moral or intellectual training, he has arrived at this or that interior result; and the like. There are some few most singularly constituted men who, at particular moments of their life, persuade themselves

* We are amazed that both Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mill concur in censuring Reid for his statement, that "memory is immediate knowledge of the past." (Mill on Hamilton, p. 134.) The statement seems to us not only indubitable, but even elementary; and we are sanctioned in this opinion by the high authority of Mr. Martineau (vol. ii. pp. 258-263). That which I immediately think of, in remembering, is surely my past experience. But the question is wholly irrelevant to our present purpose.

that they *doubt* whether they possess such knowledge; and we will presently consider their case: for the moment however we will put them out of account. Speaking generally then, every one knows that he knows something besides his present consciousness. But he *cannot* possess that knowledge, except through the exercise (past or present) of his cognitive faculties; and he cannot accept it, as *being* knowledge and not delusion, except by knowing that the declarations of those faculties are true. Now how can he know this? By the authentication of God? by the testimony of his fellow-men? But it is only by trusting the declaration of his cognitive faculties, that he can know or even guess the existence of God and his fellow-men; and still more, that he can know or even guess what God and his fellow-men testify. Unless therefore his cognitive faculties authenticate *themselves*, they cannot be authenticated *at all*. And if they are not authenticated at all, no man on earth knows anything whatever, except his own experience of this particular moment. Than this there can be no more clenching *reductio ad absurdum*.

Passing now to the direct establishment of our thesis, we appeal to each man's consciousness in our favour. That which his faculties indubitably declare as certain, he finds himself under an absolute necessity of infallibly knowing to be true. I experience that phenomenon of the present moment, which I thus express: I say that I remember distinctly and articulately, to have been much colder a few minutes ago when I was out in the snow, than I am now when sitting by a comfortable fire. Well: in consequence of this present mental phenomenon, I find myself under the absolute necessity of knowing, that a very short time ago I *had* that experience which I now remember. Professor Huxley may talk of "some powerful and malicious being," who "finds his pleasure in deluding me" and making me fancy what never happened; but I am absolutely necessitated to know, that I am under no such delusion in regard to this recent experience.*

* In a passage which we quoted in a previous note, Professor Huxley seems to say, that the truth of what memory distinctly testifies, is not known "with that highest degree of *certainty* which is given by immediate consciousness," but is nevertheless in the very highest degree *probable*. If we rightly understand him,—with very great respect for his usual power and clearness of thought,—we must nevertheless say, that this seems to us the most unreasonable opinion on the subject which can possibly be held. If my memory may be trusted, those things which it distinctly testifies are known with most absolute certainty: if it cannot be trusted, its avouchment does not render them even remotely *probable*. Indeed what can be more violently unscientific—from the stand-point of mere experimental science—than to assume without grounds, as even *probable*,

And so with my other intellectual operations. My faculties pronounce, that my present impression of colour differs from another of which I retain a distinct idea; or they pronounce, that this trilateral figure, which I distinctly image in my mind, is triangular; or when I see two strips of wood lying in an oblong box close together and parallel to the sides, my faculties pronounce, that the one which reaches beyond the other is nearer than that to the further end of the box. In all these cases I am necessitated to know, that which my faculties declare as true.

As we have already said, there are some few most singularly constituted persons who, when contemplating their own mental phenomena, become for the moment dizzy with self-inspection; seized with vertigo (as one may say) with gazing down the abyss: and these men persuade themselves, that they do possess a power of distrusting their cognitive faculties. We would thus address such a sceptic, if we could obtain his attention. We appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober. You are giddy for the moment and beside yourself, like a man in liquor. If you would correctly appreciate your mental constitution, look back at some given period of your life, when your faculties were braced and in full play, not paralyzed by morbid introspection. You were engaged in that anxious commercial speculation; or in that important lawsuit; or you were taking measures to avert imminent gout. Had you at that time the power of doubting, whether you had previously *entered* on that speculation, or *engaged* in that lawsuit, or *experienced* premonitory symptoms of gout? Or when your mother was at last pronounced out of danger, could you really prevent yourself from infallibly knowing, that you *had* been anxious? Or had you really the power of doubting, whether you had ever seen that sweet face before? You will reply perhaps—and indeed you are bound (we admit) in consistency to reply—that you have no reason to know you ever *were* in such circumstances; that you know nothing whatever about yourself, except your present consciousness. In that case we will practise on you a *future* experiment. Employ yourself in whatever most interests you; in studying mathematics or taking a part in glees. While you are so engaged, we will suddenly come up and seize you by the arm. Can you *now*, we will say, prevent yourself from infallibly knowing, that a very short time ago you were immersed in mathematical study or engaged in singing that glee?

the very singular proposition, that mental phenomena (by some entirely unknown law) have proceeded in such a fashion, that my clear *impression* of the past invariably corresponds with my past *experience*?

However, whether or no we would succeed in curing this monomaniac, is an irrelevant question: for that he *is* a mere monomaniac, and moreover, that he has no real power of persevering in such scepticism, will be admitted by all our readers. For the consistent sceptic cannot possibly *be* a reader. He cannot understand one single sentence—unless, while *reading* the last words, he trusts his *memory* for the first. Now if he trusts his memory so far as this, he has ipso facto abandoned his sceptical position.

Phenomenists then, as we have urged, act suicidally in disparaging the light of reason; for it is only by surrendering themselves to that light and so trusting their memory, that they can know anything whatever *about* phenomena. They are very much given however to such disparagement; and they are very fond of alleging certain supposed difficulties. I see a straight stick in the water, and my faculties (they urge) confidently pronounce that the stick is crooked; or if a cherry is placed on my crossed fingers, my faculties confidently pronounce that my hand is touched by *two* substances. It is apparently for some such reason, that Mr. Mill lays so much stress on Berkeley's theory of vision. Men fancy themselves—such is Berkeley's theory—to see distance immediately; but in fact that conviction of distance is *an inference* and no immediate judgment whatever. Now we do not admit this theory except for argument's sake; and Mr. Abbott in his little volume called "Sight and Touch" professes to disprove it.* But we cannot at all agree with the latter writer, when he says (Preface) that if Berkeley's theory were admitted, "consciousness" would be proved "delusive" and "doubt must reign supreme:" for on the contrary—so far as the controversy with scepticism is concerned—we consider the question one of complete indifference. All these superficial difficulties are readily solved, by resorting to a philosophical consideration, which is familiar to Catholics, though (strangely enough) we do not remember to have seen it in non-Catholic works. We refer to the distinction, between what may be called "undoubting" and what may be called "absolute" assent.

By "absolute" assent we understand an assent so firm, as to

* The present writer has never given his mind to it, and has no bias whatever on either side. Dr. M'Cosh ("Intuitions of the Mind," p. 114, note,) thinks Mr. Abbott's argument sufficient for part, not the whole, of his conclusion. Mr. Mill (p. 300) considers that Mr. Abbott has been conclusively answered by Professor Fraser in the "North British Review" for August 1864. On the other hand the last writer on the subject, Professor Huxley, takes part *against* Mr. Mill and Professor Fraser. See "Macmillan's Magazine" for June, p. 153.

be *incompatible* with the co-existence of doubt: but by "undoubting" assent we mean no more, than that with which *in fact* doubt does not co-exist.* Now the mere undoubtingness of an assent does not at all imply any particular *firmness*; but arises from mere accident. For instance. A friend, coming down to me in the country, tells me that he has caught a sight of the telegrams as he passed through London, and that the Versailles government has possession of Paris. I had long expected this, and I assent to the fact without any admixture of doubt. In an hour or two however the morning paper comes in; and I find that my friend's cursory glance has misled him, for that the army has only arrived *close up to* Paris. The extreme facility, with which I dismiss my former "undoubting" assent, shows how very far it was from being "absolute." Its true analysis in fact was no more than this: "there is an *à priori* presumption that Paris is taken." But as no particular motive for doubt happened to cross my mind, I was not led to reflect on the true character of the assent which I yielded.

Now to apply this. Evidently it cannot be said that my cognitive faculties declare any proposition to be certainly true, unless they yield to that proposition "absolute" assent. But a moment's consideration will show, that my assent to the crookedness of the stick or the duplicity of the cherry—may accidentally indeed have been undoubting—but was extremely far from being absolute. Its true analysis was: "there is an *à priori* presumption, that the stick is crooked or that there are two objects touched by my fingers:" and *this* declaration of my faculties indisputably corresponded with objective truth. A remark precisely similar may be made, on my putatively immediate perception of distances; and we may bring the matter to a crucial experiment, by some such supposition as the following.

I am myself but youthful, whether in age or power of thought; but I have a venerable friend and mentor, in whose moral and intellectual endowments I repose perfect confidence. I fancy myself to see a crooked stick, or to feel two touching objects; but he explains to me the physical laws which explain my delusion, and I surrender it with the most perfect facility. He further expounds and demonstrates Berkeley's theory of vision; and here, though I have a little more trouble with myself, yet after a short consideration I entirely acquiesce. He proceeds however—let us suppose, for the purpose of probing the

* In our last number we used the word "undoubting" as synonymous with "absolute;" but we think that our present terminology is more conducive to clearness of thought.

depth of my convictions—to tell me, that I have no reason whatever for knowing that I ever experienced a certain sensation, which my memory most distinctly declares me to have experienced a very short time ago: or again that, as to the particular trilateral figure which I have in my thoughts, I have no reason whatever for knowing it to be triangular, and that he believes it to have *five* angles. Well—first of all I take for granted that I have not rightly understood him. When I find that I *have* rightly understood him, either I suspect him (as the truth indeed is) to be simulating; or else I pluck up courage and rebel against his teaching; or else (if I am too great an intellectual coward for this,) I am reduced to a state of hopeless perplexity and bewilderment, and on the high road to idiocy. So great is the distinction between merely “undoubting” and “absolute” assent; between my faculties testifying that there is an *à priori presumption* for some theory, and their testifying that it is *certainly true*.

Another objection, raised by phenomenists, turns on the divergence which exists among objectivists, as to what their faculties do testify. Thus many men do not think themselves to intue any axiom of *causation* at all; and of those who do allege such axiom, there are different schools each differently analyzing it. Many again do not think themselves to intue the intrinsic distinction between moral good and evil; and among those who do recognize this distinction, there are differences which may in some sense be called fundamental. This objection cannot however be maintained, unless its advocate first makes good a preliminary position. He must show that the difference, on which he insists, is a difference between what the intellect of different men declares, and not merely between what they *interpret* it as declaring. But we are perfectly confident that he cannot show this, for that it is not true. We shall examine the phenomena on which he relies, when we come to treat the respective questions of morality and causality.

A third objection has been urged against us, founded on the indubitable fact, that we may not, at this rudimental stage of our argument against phenomenists, assume the Creator's Veracity. Could not a mendacious creator, it has been asked—Professor Huxley's “powerful and malicious being who finds his pleasure in deluding” mankind—so have constituted the human intellect as that it should testify falsehood, and nevertheless have given men the same trust in its declarations which they *now* feel? We reply easily in the negative. To say that mendacious faculties can be infallibly known as trustworthy, is a contradiction in terms. No possible creator could any more achieve such result, than he could form a crooked straight line.

We have now then sufficiently illustrated our fundamental thesis, that every thinker infallibly knows each successive declaration of his faculties to be true. And we have also sufficiently illustrated the first explanation, which we appended to that thesis; viz., that what he can ultimately trust, is the *declaration* of these faculties and not his own *analysis* thereof. We proceed to the second qualification which we made at starting. We appeal, we said, to the mind's positive, not its negative constitution: we cannot admit that what is inconceivable is therefore untrue. We side here with the vast majority of phenomenists,* against certain objectivists; but we believe that our divergence from the latter is exclusively verbal. They say, e. g., that no trilateral figure is quadrangular, and that two straight lines never enclose a space, because in either case the supposition is *inconceivable*: but what they intend is, that such supposition *contradicts* what I know as true, by my very conception of a trilateral figure or a straight line. We think it however a real calamity that they have used the expression which we criticise, because it permits such writers as Mr. Mill to rest contented with a most inadequate apprehension of the objectivist argument.

In justice however to these writers, we must distinguish carefully between two different senses of this word "inconceivable": and this procedure will lead us, into what our readers may at first be tempted to suppose a digression, but which they will ultimately find to be no digression at all. Sometimes the word "inconceivable" is taken to mean "unimaginable," at other times "unintelligible" or "unthinkable." Now there is a large class of unimaginable things, which are by no means unthinkable; and no objectivist ever alleged, that the *unimaginableness* of a proposition is incompatible with its truth. We may express the distinction in Mr. Martineau's words; though we are not aware that this most able philosopher has ever adopted the particular formula which we are criticising, of inconceivableness being conclusive against truth. Ideas, he says (vol. i. p. 193), may be clear and thinkable, which "do not come before the *imaginative* or *representative* faculty." "You may deny the idea of the 'infinite,'" he adds (p. 194), "as not clear: and clear it is not, if nothing but the *mental picture* of an *outline* deserve that word. But if a thought is clear when it sits apart *without danger of being confounded with another*, when it can exactly keep its own in speech and reasoning without forfeit and without encroachment,—if in short

* Mr. Herbert Spencer is, we believe, the only exception; and that on grounds of his own which we need not here consider.

logical clearness consists not in the idea of a limit but in the limit of the idea,—then no sharpest image of any finite quantity . . . is clearer than the thought of the infinite." And so at p. 205, the author contrasts an "idea of the *reason*" with one "of the *phantasy*." "It is no objection," he adds (p. 238), "to either the reality or the legitimacy of a thought, that it is not of a kind to be brought before the mind's *eye*." So Dr. M'Cosh. "The thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the same as the imaging power" ("Intuitions," p. 195, note). Similarly speaks Mr. Mill from the opposite school. Take the case of some large number: suppose e. g., it were said that over a certain tract of ground there had been counted 27182818 potatoes. It is simply impossible to have this number in my *phantasy* or *imagination*, so as to distinguish it from 27182817 and 27182819. Yet says Mr. Mill (p. 100), "We have a" sufficient "*conception* of it, when we have conceived it by some one of its modes of composition, such as that indicated by the position of its digits." This "limited conception enables us to avoid confounding the number in our calculations with any other numerical whole"; and we can also "by means of this attribute of the number ascertain and add to our conception as many more of its properties as we please." In other words, this large number is most easily *thinkable*, though by no means *imaginable*.

This distinction, between propositions *imaginable* and propositions only *thinkable*, is in some degree correspondent, though not precisely so, with a distinction made by F. Newman, between what he characterizes respectively as "real" and "notional" assent.* He adds also this obvious qualification, that multitudes of men, from indolence or other causes, give no more than a "notional" assent to propositions most easily "imaginable." And this circumstance, as F. Newman emphatically repeats in various passages, is often a very serious moral or intellectual calamity.

Now, as we have said, those objectivists against whom we are now arguing, undoubtedly use the word "inconceivable" to express not "unimaginable" but "unthinkable." We are led then to consider, whether any proposition can (in this sense) be truly called inconceivable, except those which actually *contradict* what is known by my very conception of their "subject." If there are none such, then our only quarrel with these philosophers will be, that their language understates the *positiveness*

* He thinks however (p. 43) that men cannot have even a "notional" apprehension of a very large number, such as a billion or a trillion. We are certainly disposed to dissent from him on this small episodic question.

with which man's cognitive faculties declare certain propositions to be necessarily false. But we think there *are* propositions, which may most fitly be called inconceivable and unthinkable, yet which all Theists regard as indubitably true. We refer to religious *mysteries*.*

Let us begin with an illustration, which has often been given by F. Newman. It is most easily supposable that there may be rational creatures to whom, as being incorporeal themselves, the union of soul and body is a veritable mystery. If it were revealed to them—or again if it were deducible from premisses with which they were acquainted—that the soul of man is on one hand spiritual and indivisible, while on the other hand it is integrally present throughout every particle of an extended body—such a proposition would be inconceivable to them. It would be inconceivable, in what Mr. Mill calls (p. 90) “the proper sense” of the term: it would be “that which the mind is unable to put together in a representation.” Their first impulse would be to think that it is a contradiction in terms.† But subsequent

* It is said in Göschler's “Dictionary of Catholic Theology” (article “Mysteries”), that theologians are extremely far from accord in their acceptation of this word. F. Perrone (“de Verâ Religione,” prop. 3) uses it substantially in the same sense with F. Newman, and we ourselves so adopt it in the text. F. Franzelin however (see e.g. “de Deo Trino,” thesis xvii.) employs the word quite otherwise; viz., to designate those truths, which can in no sense be intrinsically established by reason, either before or after their revelation. But it is very difficult indeed to find a substitute for the word, as expressing FF. Perrone's and Newman's idea: whereas F. Franzelin may most easily express *his*, by a phrase which also he often uses; viz. “superrational verities.”

† “The soul is not only one, and without parts, but moreover, as if by a great contradiction even in terms, it is in every part of the body. It is no where, yet every where. . . . No part of a man's body is like a mere instrument, as a knife or a crutch might be, which he takes up and may lay down. Every part of it is part of himself; it is connected into one by his soul, which is one. Supposing we take stones and raise a house, the building is not *really* one; it is composed of a number of separate parts, which viewed as collected together we call one, but which are not one except in our notion of them. But the hands and feet, the head and trunk, form one body under the presence of the soul within them. Unless the soul were in every part, they would not form one body; so that the soul is in every part, uniting it with every other, though it consists of no parts at all. I do not of course mean that there is any real contradiction in these opposite truths; indeed, we know there is not, and cannot be, because they *are* true, because human nature is a fact before us. But it is a contradiction *when put into words*; we cannot so express it as not to involve an apparent contradiction; and then, if we discriminate our terms, and make distinctions, and balance phrases, and so on, we shall seem to be technical and artificial and speculative, and to use words without meaning. . . . What (we should ask) was the meaning of saying that the soul had no parts, yet was in every part of the body? what was meant

consideration might bring to their mind, that, as F. Newman expresses it (Grammar, p. 44), their "notion" of a thing so entirely external to their experience "may be"—nay is almost sure to be—"only partially faithful to the original"; that the word "presence" may have a far wider sense, than any which they can ever so distantly apprehend. That their *notions* therefore of subject and predicate are more or less mutually contradictory, is no proof whatever that there is incompatibility between the *archetypes* of those notions. And we human beings indeed, in *this* case, are so well aware of the ludicrous mistake which would be made by these immaterial creatures if they reasoned otherwise, that we are mightily tempted to forget, how prone we are ourselves in other instances to a similar paralogism.

A proposition then may be called "mysterious" to some given thinker, when it would be rightly accounted by him self-contradictory, if he supposed that the notions which it conveys to him adequately represent their archetypes. It should be carefully observed however, that his faculties themselves convey to him an assurance of his notions *being* thus utterly inadequate, and of no contradictoriness being therefore necessarily involved in the proposition itself. And it is further worth pointing out, that such mysterious propositions may nevertheless give real—possibly therefore vitally important—information: though it would carry us too far from our theme, if we here enlarged on this truth.

Now as the union of soul and body might be utterly inconceivable to certain immaterial creatures, however strong their evidence for the fact;—so there are various propositions concerning God, rigidly demonstrable by human reason, which are nevertheless inconceivable to the human intellect. That He Who is absolutely Simple and Indivisible, is present throughout all space—that He in Whom is no succession of time, is ever diversely energizing—that in God there is no real distinction whatever between His Nature and His Acts—here are proposi-

by saying it was every where and no where? how could it be one, and yet repeated, as it were, ten thousand times over every atom and pore of the body, which it was said to exist in? how could it be confined to the body at all? how did it act upon the body? how happened it, as was pretended, that, when the soul did but will, the arm moved, or the feet walked? how can a spirit, which cannot touch any thing, yet avail to move so large a mass of matter, and so easily, as the human body? These are some of the questions which might be asked, partly on the ground that the alleged fact was impossible, partly that the idea was self-contradictory."—F. Newman's Oxford "Parochial Sermons," vol. iv. pp. 325-8.

tions, at once humanly demonstrable and humanly inconceivable. We should add, that no mysteries added by revelation are *more* inconceivable, than those irresistibly authenticated by reason.*

Mr. Mill excellently explains (p. 82), why it is abundantly possible that such inconceivable propositions may be true. "The inference" that "what we are incapable of conceiving cannot exist," "would only be warrantable, if we knew *à priori* that we must have been created capable of conceiving whatever is capable of existing; that the universe of thought and that of reality must have been formed in complete accordance with each other. . . . But an assumption more destitute of evidence could scarcely be made; nor can one easily imagine any evidence that would prove it, unless it were revealed from above."†

We implied a few pages back, that a proposition is necessarily false, which contradicts what is known by my very conception of its "subject." We should here explain, that this does not at all conflict with what we have just been saying about mysteries. The reason is this. When the archetype is apprehended by me as indefinitely transcending my *conception* thereof, various propositions are *not* "known by its very conception," which otherwise *would* be.

We have given then two reasons for deeply regretting the phrase used by many objectivists, that what is inconceivable is necessarily false. Firstly, even if no proposition could be called "inconceivable" except that which actually *contradicts* what is known by my very conception of its "subject"—still it was extremely to be desired that a stronger expression than "inconceivable" should be used to express this. But secondly the word "inconceivable" may very naturally be understood, as

* We earnestly hope we shall not be understood to characterize *all* propositions concerning God as inconceivable. God in most of His aspects can be *apprehended* by man (to use the common phrase) though not *comprehended*. Accordingly a great majority of the propositions concerning Him are readily conceivable, thinkable, intelligible, though not comprehensible in all the fulness of their meaning; while some few are inconceivable as explained in the text. Nothing e.g. in the world conveys a more intelligible and practical idea, than the affirmation that God is Loving, Veracious, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Holy. The same distinction applies to *revealed* propositions concerning Him. F. Newman (pp. 120-137) considers those various statements, which combine to express the dogma of the Blessed Trinity; and in a very masterly way determines, which of these statements admit of "real," and which of only "notional" assent.

† We were much disappointed on coming a few pages later (p. 119, note) to Mr. Mill's disparagement of "mystical metaphysics" and "mystical theology": for there cannot be a better defence of "mystical metaphysics," than the passage quoted in the text.

applying to every "mystery"; and if it be so understood, all Theists know that certain "inconceivable" propositions are demonstratively true.

Here then we sum up. Our direct thesis has been, that whatever men's cognitive faculties indubitably declare, is thereby known to be infallibly true. To prevent misconception however, we have added two explanations. (1) This infallibility appertains to what they *declare*, not to what they may be *understood* as declaring; and (2) it appertains to their positive declarations, and not to their incapacities. Now since Mr. Mill is to be our principal opponent in various succeeding articles, it is absolutely necessary before we conclude, to see how far we are in harmony with *him* on this preliminary question. We are hereafter to argue against him, that the existence of necessary truths is cognizable with certitude by mankind: but in order to discuss this with any satisfactory result, it is extremely momentous that he and ourselves should arrive at an agreement, as to what constitutes a sufficient *test* of certain knowledge. And we shall be able on our side to make our position clearer, if we begin by distinguishing it from a ground importantly different, which has been occupied by more than one English non-Catholic objectivist.

Mr. Martineau indeed—whom (notwithstanding extreme theological divergence and some serious philosophical separation) we cannot but recognize as at once the ablest and most learned of these—entirely agrees with ourselves (if we rightly understand him) on the question we have been discussing. "We have entire faith," he says (vol. i. p. 241), "in the veracity and the consistency of the reports given in by our highest faculties." And he uses similar expressions in pp. 47, 48, 101, 232, 237. He says again pointedly (p. 104), "be the proof what it may which authenticates the belief, it is the faculty in the last resort which authenticates the proof." Yet even as to Mr. Martineau, we wish he had spoken more uncompromisingly. "Our faculties," he says (p. 238), "must be either taken at their word, or *dismissed as cheats*." We wish he had expressly said, what he evidently holds; viz., that it is physically impossible to "dismiss them as cheats" or to doubt their declaration. It is a very serious loss to metaphysical science, that Mr. Martineau has never found time for writing a systematic treatise.

Dr. Cosh, in his most valuable work on "the Intuitions of the *no*," speaks as strongly as F. Kleutgen himself, on one of our subject; viz. the *rule* of certitude. He mainly, that whatever the human faculties avouch, is *as* certain *as* they avouch it. The capacity of cognition

in the mind he says (p. 17), "is not that of the bent mirror to reflect the object *under modified forms*, but of the plane mirror to reflect it *in its proper shape and colour*. The truth is *preserved* by the mind, not *formed*; it is *cognized*, not *created*." But when question arises on the *motive* of certitude, he often seems to turn off into a different groove. He often partakes in fact the error of Descartes; and implies that my reason for knowing the veracity of my mental constitution, is my previous conviction of God's Veracity. See third edition, pp. 30, 113, 116: see also p. 333, where his remarks are singularly unsatisfactory. In fact we suspect that this view possesses, more or less systematically and consciously, not a few speculative minds of non-Catholic England. Yet surely never was there an error more suicidal; and Mr. Mill in a few pregnant words utterly explodes it. We quote the passage with a few verbal changes (pp. 161, 162), and we italicise two sentences.

"If the proof of the trustworthiness of our faculties is the veracity of the Creator, on what does the Creator's veracity itself rest? Is it not on the evidence of our faculties? The Divine veracity can only be known in two ways: 1st. By intuition, or 2nd through evidence. If it is known by intuition, it is itself an immediate declaration of our faculties; and *to have ground for believing it we must assume that our faculties are trustworthy*. . . . If we hold that God is not known by intuition but proved by evidence, that evidence must rest in the last resort on the immediate declaration of our faculties. Religion thus, itself resting on the evidence of our faculties, cannot be invoked to prove that our faculties ought to be believed. *We must already trust our faculties, before we can have any evidence of the truth of religion.*"

We are bound in fairness to add, that Dr. M'Cosh, in his "Examination of Mr. Mill's Philosophy" (p. 54), expresses full concurrence with this reasoning.

Dean Mansel has undoubtedly conferred important benefits on philosophy, and we hope in our next number to profit largely by his labours. Yet we must frankly say, that on the matter discussed in our present article, his doctrine differs from Dr. M'Cosh's, signally for the worse. He concurs with that writer in holding, that God's Veracity is my reason for regarding my faculties as in any sense trustworthy; but he considers that argument as availing—not for the conclusion that their declaration is always *true*—but only that they are not so utterly *mendacious* as to be the mere "instruments of deception." "We may believe and we ought to believe," he says ("Prolegomena Logica," p. 81), "that the powers which our Creator has bestowed upon us are not given as *the instruments of deception*. . . . But in believing this we desert the evidence of Reason to rest on that

of Faith." According to this view, I could not know or even guess that my faculties are not mere instruments of deception, except for my belief that they are given by God. But *on what ground* do I believe that they are given by God? Because they by their exercise lead me to that conclusion. But how do I know that, in thus leading me, they are not mere instruments of deception? Because they were given me by God. But how do I know that they were given me by God? And so on with a vicious circle *ad infinitum*.

We would only add here, to prevent possible misconception of our meaning, that God's Veracity is undoubtedly a most legitimate philosophical premiss for the establishment of any conclusion, which is not *itself* required as a premiss for the demonstration of God's Veracity. For our own part, we think that a consideration of God's Attributes might with advantage be much oftener employed in philosophical argument, than is commonly the case. But this by the way.

We are now then to consider, how far we may count on Mr. Mill's agreement with ourselves, in holding that the genuine declaration of man's faculties is in every case infallibly true. It is by no means so easy to answer this question confidently, as might at first be supposed. At p. 152 indeed, he seems to speak unmistakably in our sense. "The verdict of . . . our immediate and intuitive conviction is admitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal." Again in p. 166: "As regards almost all if not all philosophers" he says—and by his very phrase he implies that *he* at all events is no dissentient—"the questions which divided them have never turned on the veracity of consciousness."* What Sir W. Hamilton "calls the *testimony* of consciousness to something beyond itself, may be and is denied; but what is denied, has almost always been that consciousness gives the testimony, *not that if given it must be believed*." In the preceding page he says that no philosopher, not even Hume or Kant, had "dreamed of saying that we are compelled by our nature to believe" error. At page 161, note, he cites with approval Mr. Stirling's excellent statement, that it is the business of man's cognitive faculties to consider carefully what it *is* which they themselves declare: and adds pointedly and justly, (p. 166) that "we certainly do not know by intuition what knowledge is intuitive."

Yet in p. 171 he introduces a very ominous qualification of this doctrine. Men should only accept, it seems, "what con-

* It should be explained, that here and elsewhere he adopts under protest Sir W. Hamilton's use of the word "consciousness," to express, not merely "self-consciousness," but man's intuitive faculty.

sciousness," i.e. their intellect, "told them *at the time when its revelations were in their pristine purity.*" There are "mental conceptions which become so identified in thought with all our states of consciousness, that we seem and *cannot but seem* to receive them by direct intuition." (Ib.) Some thinkers (p. 177) "may be personally *quite incapable of not holding*" a fundamental error. "We have *no means of interrogating* consciousness," i.e. our intellect, "*in the only circumstances* in which it is possible for it to give a trustworthy answer" (p. 172). "Something *which we now confound with* consciousness may have been altogether foreign to consciousness *in its primitive state*" (p. 185). He seems really to distinguish between the *primitive* and the *adult* state of man's cognitive faculties. He seems to imply, that the laws of man's mental constitution are changed during his progress from infancy to manhood; and that it is to their earlier not their later declarations, that we are to look for authentication of truth.

We cannot believe that Mr. Mill really intends this; and we will therefore for the moment content ourselves with a brief reply to his possible meaning. We will say this then. If the laws of man's mental constitution do really change in his progress from infancy to manhood,—then never was there a philosophical proposition more preposterously unfounded, than that assumed by Mr. Mill throughout; viz., that man's *primitive* faculties testify truth. On what ground does an adult trust his faculties? We know of no other answer, than we gave in an earlier part of our article. In each individual case he finds himself necessitated to know infallibly, what his faculties indubitably declare as certain; and he generalizes this by degrees into the universal proposition, that they are veracious. But all this applies to his *adult*, not his *primitive*, mental constitution; and if the former in any respect contradicts the latter, his reasoning so far does not apply to the latter at all. Mr. Mill professes, as strongly as we do, that no knowledge or experience is possible, unless the thinker first trust the distinct declarations of his *memory*. Is it only then the clear declarations of man's *primitive* memory, which Mr. Mill accounts self-evidently true?

For ourselves we cannot but entirely agree with Mr. Mill's critic, whom he mentions in his note to p. 173. We think it would be "contrary to all analogy," if man's cognoscitive faculties did not need and did not receive, as time advances, "development and education."

An argument, precisely resembling the above, applies à fortiori to a view which Mr. Mill ascribes (p. 175, note) to Mr. Herbert Spencer: viz. that "our primary forms of thought" are in many cases "inherited by us from ancestors by the laws

of the development of organization," and need not therefore correspond with objective truth. It is plain—we may observe in passing—that such a theory applies no less to *memory*, than to man's other cognitive faculties: and the view thus stated impresses us as indicating the lowest point of speculative degradation, at which "the progress of thought" has yet arrived. We should add however, that all readers of Mr. Spencer are unanimous in accounting him a writer of rare subtlety and genius.

Returning to Mr. Mill,—we cannot persuade ourselves that he really means what he seems to say; that he really regards man's mental constitution as undergoing a change between infancy and maturity, in such sense that its declarations of a later period can possibly contradict those of an earlier. Nor again do we interpret a singular expression in his "Logic," as indicating a real difference between him and ourselves, on what has been the theme of this article. Yet we cannot refrain from adverting to that expression. He says (vol. ii. pp. 97–8, seventh edition) that "the truth of a belief" would not follow even from an "irresistible necessity" of entertaining it; and that mankind might conceivably be "under a permanent necessity of believing what might possibly not be true." But though Mr. Mill here speaks very obscurely, we understand him as referring to a certain imaginary state of things, which *might* have existed; and not as denying that *in fact* man's reason infallibly authenticates its own authority. It seems to us, from his language in both works, that Mr. Mill has failed indeed (as we should estimate the matter) in clearly and consistently apprehending and bearing in mind the true doctrine; but that he has never intended to advocate a different one in preference. We shall take for granted therefore in our next number, unless we are admonished of being mistaken, that the controversy between him and ourselves turns in no respect on the *authority* of man's faculties, but exclusively on their *avouchment*.

On the other hand we fully admit, that again and again inferences are so readily and imperceptibly drawn, as to be most easily mistaken for intuitions; and that, in arguing hereafter against Mr. Mill, we shall have no right of alleging aught as certainly a primitive truth, without *proving* that it cannot be an opinion derived inferentially from experience. It is our strong impression that this, and no more, is what Mr. Mill intends to urge, in the distinction which he draws between the primitive and the adult avouchment of men's faculties.

We think so highly of F. Newman's philosophical acumen, that it would not be fair if we did not in conclusion place before our readers a passage, in which he apparently gives the

weight of his authority to a different view from that which we have supported throughout this article:—

Sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory, that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a first principle; but we cannot properly be said to have any trust in them as faculties. At most we trust in particular acts of memory and reasoning. We are sure there was a yesterday, and that we did this or that in it; we are sure that three times six is eighteen, and that the diagonal of a square is longer than the side. So far as this we may be said to trust the mental act, by which the object of our assent is verified; but, in doing so, we imply no recognition of a general power or faculty, or of any capability or affection of our minds, over and above the particular act. We know indeed that we have a faculty by which we remember, as we know we have a faculty by which we breathe; but we gain this knowledge by abstraction or inference from its particular acts, not by direct experience. Nor do we trust in the faculty of memory or reasoning as such, even after that we have inferred its existence; for its acts are often inaccurate, nor do we invariably assent to them.

However, if I must speak my mind, I have another ground for reluctance to speak of our trusting memory or reasoning, except indeed by a figure of speech. It seems to me unphilosophical to speak of trusting ourselves. We are what we are, and we use, not trust our faculties. To debate about trusting in a case like this, is parallel to the confusion implied in wishing we had had a choice if we would be created or no, or speculating what I should be like, if I were born of other parents. “*Proximus sum egomet mihi.*” Our consciousness of self is prior to all questions of trust or assent. We act according to our nature, by means of ourselves, when we remember or reason. We are as little able to accept or reject our mental constitution, as our being. We have not the option; we can but misuse or mar its functions. We do not confront or bargain with ourselves; and therefore I cannot call the trustworthiness of the faculties of memory and reasoning one of our first principles (pp. 58–9).

We cannot doubt, that these comments are aimed by F. Newman at opinions, entirely similar to those of this article, which were advocated by Dr. Ward in his “*Philosophical Introduction.*” We heartily concur however with the first of the two paragraphs, as all will have seen who have read our remarks; nor did Dr. Ward express himself otherwise in his work. Of F. Newman’s *second* paragraph we confess ourselves unable to apprehend the bearing; though very probably our inability to do so arises from some narrowness of intellectual vision. We can hardly be mistaken however in saying, that the objection is directed against our method of *expressing* our doctrine, and not against that doctrine itself; and we will beg our readers to give F. Newman’s comment their attentive consideration.

In our present article then we have maintained, that whatever man's cognitive faculties indubitably declare as certain, is thereby known to be infallibly true. In our next number we are to maintain against Mr. Mill, that there is no one thing which they *more* indubitably declare as certain, than the existence of necessary verities.

ART. III.—DR. HAMPDEN AND ANGLICANISM.

Some Memorials of Renn Dickson Hampden, Bishop of Hereford. Edited by his Daughter, HENRIETTA HAMPDEN. London: Longmans. 1871.

THE publication of this volume has of necessity revived a controversy long dead and buried, but which five-and-thirty years ago excited a deep and wide interest. It is with sincere regret that we find ourselves compelled to revert to it, and we have not done so until the grave moral charges which it contains against all those who felt it their duty to protest against the nomination of Dr. Hampden as Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford, and afterwards as Bishop of Hereford, have been repeated, not only as indisputable, but as admitted by the parties concerned, we believe by every one of the leading newspapers of the day.

Before we say anything on this subject, we must say a word about the book itself. Miss Hampden's own share in it seems to us much to her credit. She writes with sincerity so undoubting, that it evidently has never occurred to her that any one could take any other view of the facts than that which she details. It is impossible not to see that that view is not her own, but her father's, and that she has accepted it as virtually infallible, in the pious simplicity with which she worships his memory. It is a view which obviously implies that all those who opposed his teaching were hypocrites, who for motives "political and personal," to quote her own expression, loaded him with charges which they did not themselves believe, and persisted in doing so for years, all the while solemnly protesting that they were acting against him with sincere reluctance, and compelled by a sense of imperative duty towards God and His truth. Anything more deliberately and malignantly wicked and base than the conduct thus imputed to that

“party” it would be impossible to conceive; yet so much is Miss Hampden’s pious simplicity counterbalanced by her genial charity, that although she cannot help knowing the names of the individuals whom Dr. Hampden thought fit to group together under this collective title, we do not think that in the whole volume a single word of her own writing could be found, which expresses or even implies any unkindly feeling on her part towards any of them. We are anxious, then, explicitly to declare beforehand, that in the remarks which the book itself compels us to make, we do not intend to express the least blame of Miss Hampden. We consider it as virtually an autobiography, to which she has supplied nothing except the arrangement and some of the language, while the whole responsibility for the views expressed, both of events and persons, is her father’s.

Of Dr. Hampden himself, far be it from us to say so much as one unkind word. Indeed, we have no temptation to do so. There is no need even to advert to the solemn consideration, that he has passed beyond the sphere of man’s judgment, and has already given an account of himself and his works to Him who to a knowledge of men’s hearts and actions, absolute and unerring, unites infinite mercy and righteousness. Before that tribunal may he have found a judgment such as we hope and desire for ourselves. But in truth, the men who felt it their duty to protest most earnestly against his theology, all of whom had before enjoyed his acquaintance, some of them his friendship, were throughout careful not merely to abstain from anything approaching to personality (from all temptation to which indeed their habits and education exempted them), but to express in the strongest language their respect for him personally. It is little likely that any one who feels with them would now be tempted to begin in cold blood what at the time, and under the strongest provocations, they most carefully avoided. It gives us also real pleasure to add, that the picture of his life and character (painted, no doubt, by a most loving and partial hand) exhibits him, with one painful exception, in a very amiable light. He was consistently loving and affectionate as a husband and a father. As a friend, we are informed by those whose personal experience enabled them to judge, that he was more than charming. We have been assured by ladies who were admitted to his family circle in his old age that his smile and gracious manner were full of fascination, and reminded them strangely of the aspect of the Father of the Christian world, Pius IX.—while he charmed all who approached him by the high polish of his scholarship and the easy play of his intellectual powers. The expressions of his

personal religious feelings and affections, especially in his later years, were such as became a man who, although so unhappy as to be without the pale of the Church, sought and found his strength and consolation in those detached fragments of Catholic truth which Anglicanism, amidst all its errors, has retained. Of his theological statements, if truth allowed it, we should prefer to say nothing. But it gives us sincere pleasure to be able to hope that even in this matter the blame may lie upon the school in which he was brought up, and the circumstances by which he was surrounded, rather than upon himself.

But our business is not with Dr. Hampden, but with the men whom he is pleased to call "the party." His charge against them, repeated by himself scores of times in this volume, supported by Lord Melbourne, Lord Radnor, and others in the House of Lords, and by Dr. Whately, Protestant Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Arnold, and others, in letters here published, is, that they never sincerely objected to anything in Dr. Hampden's theological statements. Accordingly, his Bampton Lectures were first preached and afterwards published without exciting the least opposition. Nay, the University lavished honours upon him. A year after the Lectures were preached he was made Principal of St. Mary Hall; the next year Professor of Moral Philosophy. In this position he took a decided part in support of the Whig ministry, which was then very unpopular with the majority of Oxford men, and in opposition to the endeavours that were making to Romanize the Church of England. In particular, he advocated the admission of dissenters into the University. This political liberality of course offended the political bigotry of Oxford; and the leading bigots, looking about for some weapon against Dr. Hampden, bethought themselves of the Bampton Lectures, "published years before," and "never before objected to," in which they pretended to find statements subversive of Christian Faith. They refused, however, to bring any definite charge, which could easily have been answered, and confined themselves to general charges of heresy. Neither would they bring these before any proper tribunal (as they might easily have done, and were earnestly desired by him to do), but appealed to the passions of the multitude, calling on the members of the University scattered over the whole country to assemble at Oxford and carry by tumultuary votes a statute against Dr. Hampden, which was, says Whately, a privilege in the most odious sense of the word. What was most observable was, that not merely the great majority of those who voted against Dr.

Hampden, but even the leaders in the opposition, gave evident proof that they had never read the works they assailed. They used, however, all the most vulgar electioneering tricks, and at last carried their measure. Meanwhile, the most remarkable characteristic of Dr. Hampden's conduct was that "amidst troubles and difficulties that would have unnerved an ordinary mind, he never lost the calm temper with which he was pre-eminently endowed" (p. 161, note). He was always ready to explain, although he could not, without betraying the cause of truth, retract or alter anything that he had said; and the result was that even those who were at the time most violent against him, before long acknowledged their error, and recognized in him an orthodox and sound Anglican divine. True, the same political opposition was renewed in 1847, when he was nominated to the See of Hereford, but it soon subsided, and all men acknowledged him to be an excellent bishop.*

Every separate clause of this indictment is absolutely opposite to the truth. It would be tedious to go in detail through each particular, pointing out its unverity. Perhaps the best course is to state what really happened. Before 1836 the theology of Oxford had long been lying in a deep sleep. The so-called Evangelical movement, which had acquired so remarkable a degree of influence in the sister university, had hardly succeeded in disturbing its dreams. The disciples of that movement were almost entirely confined to a single community, which, truth to speak, was little noticeable for anything else, and hardly one of them was known even by sight to the students of the more aristocratic colleges who set the tone of Oxford society. What is described in "Loss and Gain" is no exaggeration. When Reding was invited to one of their parties, he found that "he had got into another world; faces, manners, speeches, all were strange, and savoured neither of Eton, which was his school, nor of Oxford itself." The little knot of men no doubt had the consolation of feeling that they were the only converted characters in Oxford, the only spot of light amid the general Egyptian darkness. The mass of the undergraduates of course were "students who never studied," who came to Oxford to complete their training as gentlemen. The "reading men" were content with *Æschylus* and *Thucydides*, *Cicero* and *Aristotle*;

* Any one who has read the volume before us must feel that this account of the motives, character, and conduct of those who opposed his appointments, as described by himself and his supporters, is not exaggerated, but greatly understated.

and neither one class nor the other gave themselves any trouble about theological disputes. In the main it was not much otherwise with those known in Oxford language as Dons. They were chiefly very young men, just elevated from the condition of pupils and employed in teaching others. They took the Anglican system pretty much on trust, and, as a general rule, gave themselves little trouble as to its theological grounds or its logical defence. Many of them were, in their way, religious men. They were conscientious in their conduct, and had no doubt of the truth of the Christian religion, "especially that pure and Apostolical branch of it established in this kingdom," as the preachers before the University used to rejoice in declaring. "Popery" they sincerely believed to be so absurd, that if (to put a case which certainly never happened, and could hardly have happened as things were) any one of them had heard of a man he knew "turning Papist" he would have exclaimed, like Sheffield, in the same delicious volume, at the time when such things did begin to be heard of, "the idea of his swallowing of his own free-will the heap of rubbish which every Catholic has to believe!—in cold blood tying a collar round his neck and politely putting the chain into the hand of a Priest. . . . And then the Confessional! 'Tis marvellous,"—and he began to break the coals with the poker. "It's very well if a man is born a Catholic. I don't suppose they really believe what they are obliged to profess; but how an Englishman, a gentleman, a man here at Oxford, with all his advantages, can so eat dirt, scraping and picking up all the dead lies of the dark ages—it's a miracle."

It need hardly be said that in such a state of things dogma, as such, could not possibly hold any high place. The simple fact was that no one knew anything about it. Dr. Lloyd, tutor to Sir Robert Peel, Professor of Divinity, and Protestant Bishop of Oxford, used to tell his pupils—"D' ye see, I take it that the old Church of England mode of handling the Creed went out with Bull." But it is important to observe that, all along, these men not only thought themselves orthodox, but had a belief, vague indeed yet on the whole quite sincere, that orthodoxy was generally necessary to salvation. We believe this wholesome prejudice (for it really was very little if anything more) was mainly kept up by the periodical reading of the Athanasian Creed. That the Creed was true was an axiom, and those who admitted it could not help feeling that belief at least in two dogmas (those of the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation) was necessary to salvation. No doubt this feeling did not fit in very logically with the rest of their system, but it was highly salutary.

While things were in this state, two important changes came over the spirit of Oxford. The first was the rise of what was then called "the Oriel school." It began with Copleston, afterwards Protestant Bishop of Llandaff; Davison, the well-known author of the "Discourses on Prophecy," and Arnold may certainly be reckoned among its numbers; perhaps even John Keble, different as his tone was from that of most of the others. But in truth the characteristic of this school was not any peculiarity in theological opinion, but rather superior ability and activity of mind. It came to its zenith in Whately. No doubt his habit of mind was very un-Catholic, yet he was far from being what is now considered a Broad Churchman. The "Apologia" mentions him as the person from whom F. Newman first learned "the existence of the Church as a substantive body or corporation, and those anti-Erastian views of Church polity which were one of the most prominent features of the Tractarian movement." No two opinions could be more opposite to those of the Broad Churchmen of the present day. The fact is that the Oriel school of that day was little more than a group of men superior in abilities and independence of thought to their contemporaries in Oxford, who had naturally been gathered together by the system of election by merit which then prevailed strictly in Oriel, and in Oriel alone,* and some of whom it must be admitted were on that account disliked, and accused, perhaps not wholly without foundation, of an assumption of intellectual superiority which could not be otherwise than unpopular. Living, as they did, in one college, and meeting daily in hall and common room, they were almost of necessity classed together, even when, as was the case with John Keble at least (and to a considerable degree with others), they were in many respects widely different. This state of things had lasted for years. But the character of the school had lately been materially changed by the personal character and tone of the man who with his immediate followers (his clientela, as F. Newman has called them) now constituted it. "He was a man of generous and warm heart. He was peculiarly loyal to his friends, and, to use the common phrase, 'all his geese were swans.'" We cannot help thinking however that there was a condition *sine qua non* of the continuance of this high estimate. Oxford used to be surprised to hear the somewhat exaggerated applause which Dr. Whately heaped upon the intellectual powers of men whom it knew well, and in whom no one else had ever seen anything extraordinary. But there was one quality in

* See "DUBLIN REVIEW" for April, 1869, page 312.

which none of them must be wanting. Whatever else they were, they must be, and notoriously were, worshippers of Dr. Whately. No one was surprised when "the formal break came" between him and the ablest of his friends, for Mr. Newman was not disposed to take all his opinions on his authority. And unhappily so keen-sighted a man could not fail to discover that the influence of Dr. Whately was giving a wholly new turn to what had formerly been called the Oriel school, a turn towards rationalism, or what Mr. Newman himself called "liberalism."*

Thus there were two parties, one which represented the old Oxford society, and comprised the great majority of the University, the other a small body of men far superior to them in ability and not to be separated from Dr. Whately, both of whom must have been seen by any sagacious observer to be held to dogma merely by habit and accident; nor could it be doubtful that if things went on long as they were going, the University would gradually and unconsciously slip down the inclined plane, till it found itself sunk in mere rationalism.

But this was not to be. It contained very many men called by Divine Grace, although as yet none of them knew the meaning and final objects of that voice which they were following in the dark and with many misgivings, waverings, and inconsistencies, yet called to emerge from darkness into the full light of the Church of God. If things had gone on silently and unopposed from bad to worse, it is impossible to imagine that they could have failed gradually to sink with the University itself into the abyss of unbelief. But this was prevented by the rise of what is still known as the Oxford school, the first seeds of which had been sown by John Keble, seeds which had already begun to spring up in the deep rich soil of the mind of Hurrell Froude, and which, taking root in that of a man of whom we can speak less freely because he is still spared to us, so filled it as gradually to destroy (by a process similar to that now called "natural selection") whatever remained of Protestant thoughts and feelings in John Henry Newman.

Of the early growth of that school we need say less because it is much better known to our readers than those of which we have already spoken, and because it has been to a considerable degree explained in the work to which we have already referred.† In 1836 it had already spread widely in Oxford,

* Appendix A. to the "History of my Religious Opinions."

† "My Religious Opinions."

and its tendency was as decidedly towards the Catholic Church as that of Whately and his school was to absolute infidelity, although as yet both parties were sincerely unaware whither they were tending.

In a university all the intellectual members of which were already grouping themselves into schools so opposite, and among a people in whom there was (and thank God still is) so much of religious earnestness, that men could not possibly hold strong opinions upon practical matters of momentous importance without giving expression to them and acting upon them; in a polity moreover in which complete civil liberty gave them every possible opportunity of speaking out, it was simply impossible that a collision should not very soon have taken place. It was Dr. Hampden's fortune (most unconsciously as now appears) to fire the train which had been so long preparing.

He was a man of unquestioned ability, a distinguished pupil of the old Oriel school, but could not be considered as belonging to it, because he had married and left Oxford almost immediately after passing out of the condition of a pupil. He went down to the country, and for several years had served curacies, when it was reported in Oxford that he was disappointed at his slow progress in his profession and had returned to the University. Of such a step we doubt whether there was then any example. He had great influence among the body of Heads of Colleges, who had, in those days at least, little either of social life or intellectual intercourse with the other members of the University. The ablest men usually stayed in Oxford a very few years, and then left it either as clergymen or lawyers, some few following the medical profession. Hence the great body of the talent of the University was in men, all single, and chiefly between twenty and thirty. But a man promoted to the headship of his college was expected to marry and to settle in Oxford for life. There was hardly an instance of a Head who disappointed the expectation. Thus the Heads formed a society almost by themselves, and a married clergyman of about their own standing who took up his residence in Oxford naturally fell into it. By the Heads of Colleges alone a person is annually chosen to preach the Bampton Lectures, and no one was surprised when Dr. Hampden was appointed to preach them in 1832.

He selected for his subject "The Scholastic Philosophy considered in its relation to Christian Theology." It is most curious that with all his ability he was evidently quite unconscious, not only at the moment but throughout his whole life, of the momentous character of the speculations which he

put forth in them. He assured Dr. Philpots (Protestant Bishop of Exeter) in 1836, "In my Bampton Lectures I had no other object but to give a history of some leading technical terms of theology." What he did say is too long to be quoted here. A singularly clear and succinct summary of it was given by Mr. Newman,* and it is important to observe that although Dr. Hampden and his supporters have indignantly denied the justice of Mr. Newman's statement, neither he nor they have ever attempted to show that his words are capable of any other meaning. Mr. Newman gives copious extracts from Dr. Hampden's statements,—1. concerning Doctrinal Truths; 2. on the doctrine of the Trinity; 3. on the doctrine of the Incarnation; 4. on the doctrine of the Atonement; 5. on the Sacraments; 6. on the doctrine of Original Sin; 7. on the Soul; 8. on Morals; lastly, Positive Statements. At the close of each section he appends some remarks, and concludes at the end—"Dr. H.'s views then seem at length to issue in the following theory: that there is one and one only truth; that that truth is the record of facts, historical and moral, contained in the text of Scripture; that whatever is beyond that text, even to the classifying of its sentences, is human opinion and unrevealed; that a thoughtful person cannot help forming opinions and theories upon the Scripture record, and is bound to act upon and confess those opinions which he considers to be true, yet he has no right to identify his own opinion on any point, however sacred in itself, with the facts of the revealed history, or to assume that a belief in it is necessary for the salvation of another, or to impose it as a condition of union with another; that though he considers he cannot be more sure of being right than another, and does not hold his own opinions to be more pious than another's, and will not pronounce heretical opinions (so-called) to be dangerous to any being in the world, except to those who do *not* hold them, yet he himself firmly believes the Church's dogmatic statements concerning the Trinity, &c., and at a proper season would contend as zealously against Arian or Socinian doctrines, as those who think that in the case of others belief in them is of importance to eternal salvation; and this although he considers these statements, as such, and so far forth as they are distinct from Scripture facts, which Arians and Socinians hold as religiously as himself to be 'a system of technical theology by which we are guarded,' only 'in some measure, from the exorbitance of theoretic enthusiasm,'

* In a pamphlet entitled "Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements."

a system of phrases borrowed from those who differ from us, and useful only in excluding *their* use of them." *

What is indeed most strange is, that Dr. Hampden was so little able to see things which concerned himself from the point of view of other men, that not only during the struggle but to the end of his long life he was wholly incapable of believing that any man who professed to object to these statements could possibly be sincere. His advocates more wisely took the line of urging that the objection to them came too late. Arnold wrote at the time, "Was there ever an accusation involving its unhappy promoters in such a dilemma of infamy? Compromisers of mischievous principle in 1832, 1833, 1834, and 1835, or slandering a good and most Christian man in 1836—disqualified for the office of religious instructors, upon their own showing, by four years of either dulness or indifference, during which they could not understand, or did not notice, what was mischievous—or else by one month of audacious and unprincipled calumny." If that good and able man had not (as too often happened to him) allowed his passion to blind his judgment, he would have remembered, what no man knew better than he, that the men who were "dull and indifferent" were not the same—nay, had no resemblance to those by whom the opposition to Dr. Hampden was made. The fact was that the Board of Heads of Colleges—a body in the appointment of whose members, or even of any one among them, the University had no voice or influence, direct or indirect, and the great majority of which most fully and worthily represented

* To examine in detail the Bampton Lectures and Dr. Hampden's "Observations on Religious Dissent" in order to show that this is a fair summary of his statements, would fill not an article but a volume in itself. We might easily have written what would make a much stronger impression upon most readers, by extracting offensive passages. But this would in fact be less fair. Short extracts may, of course, be so selected as to give an unfair impression of an author's meaning. It is a much more fair and sure course to take the short statement of that meaning given by a man of unquestionable acuteness and at least equal fairness and candour, after a careful study of the works themselves. To say that in this case the summary was made by an unfriendly hand is merely to beg the question. Mr. Newman was not, and never had been, on unfriendly terms with Dr. Hampden. Even in this very pamphlet he speaks of him personally with uniform kindness and respect. It is to his theological statements, and to them alone, that he is opposed. To object, therefore, to his account of Dr. Hampden's doctrine only because he does not agree with it, is in fact to say that no man, however able, upright, and otherwise qualified to form a judgment, is to be believed when he asserts that such and such a book contains such and such a statement, unless he himself agrees with what is stated. Some of the details of Dr. Hampden's statements are almost too painful to quote. They are given with as much of the context as space allowed in Mr. Newman's "Elucidations."

whatever of "dulness or indifference" there was in Oxford at that time, held (by a usurpation which to most men seemed consecrated by long possession) almost absolute power over everything that was done in Oxford.* The great body of the University was allowed only the liberty conceded by "Napoleonic ideas" to the universal suffrage of some province so unlucky as to tempt the Emperor to annex it to his dominions. It was allowed to say "Yes" or "No" to any proposition laid before it by the Heads of Houses, but they had usurped (in opposition to the statutes) the sole and exclusive power of proposing anything. No one else was permitted even to move an amendment to their proposals. Of this Board of Heads Dr. Whately was confessedly and beyond all comparison the ablest member—Dr. Hampden himself became a member of it in 1833. The great mass of its members were men advanced in years, wholly separated from all the movements of the University, whether intellectual or religious; and although there could be little doubt that some of them grumbled at what they heard, no one who knew them could expect that they would do anything on the subject, or indeed on any other, except as a concession to pressure from without;—and whence was such a pressure to come?

It must be confessed that Dr. Hampden was singularly unlucky in the moment at which his lectures were preached. Only five or six years earlier he might have said all he actually did say without any great danger of awakening the University from its sleep. But in those years a great change had taken place. The revival of old-fashioned Anglican doctrine and of theological study, commonly known as the Oxford movement, had spread widely among the younger masters of arts. Above all, Mr. Newman had, as he himself expresses it, come out of his shell. Perhaps if Dr. Hampden had not left Oxford for so many years, and had watched the gradual change, he would not have preached what he did, or, if he had, would have been less surprised at the indignation he excited. At the same time there was much to make any immediate movement exceedingly unlikely. As members of the University, the great body of the masters had been deprived of all means of taking a single step, except that of voting "Yes" or "No." Nothing could be more distasteful to their whole character and habits than anything like agitation. They were, to a man, in the best sense of the word, Conservatives—lovers of order, and preferring submission

* The abolition of this usurped power of the Heads was the first and most necessary part of the reform afterwards introduced into the University.

to resistance. At last no doubt they were driven by intolerable wrongs to combine together, to hold meetings, and call upon the authorities to act, or, as Dr. Hampden himself complains, to "agitate." Dr. Arnold's complaint really means only that when Dr. Hampden delivered his Bampton Lectures they did not at once break through all their cherished habits, and without waiting a moment to see whether or not the authorities would do their duty, adopt the extreme measures to which, much against their will, they were ultimately driven. How loud, and how just, would have been his outcry of indignation had they really done so !

This is enough to explain why the University was so late in expressing its indignation. But there were other reasons. Of those who afterwards so strongly censured the Bampton Lectures, probably not one in fifty knew anything about them when they were preached. Whatever may be the case now, Bampton Lectures, with two or three exceptions at most, were then a proverb for want of interest. Except those whose positions made their attendance a matter of decorum, very few indeed were those who heard them, and, as for readers, it may be doubted whether they ordinarily had any at all. Perhaps the best course which any man could have adopted, who wished to put his opinions safely on record and yet keep them a profound secret from the whole human race, and even from his most intimate friends, until he thought the time come for calling attention to them, would have been to publish them in that particular form. It was much safer than the plan sometimes adopted, of locking them up in a box, not to be opened till fifty years after the author's death. There was nothing in Dr. Hampden's Lectures to make them an exception. The volume before us boasts that they were delivered to "very large congregations." We heartily wish those congregations had been counted ; and strongly suspect that the undertaking would not have been very difficult.

Mr. Isaac Williams, afterwards well known in the Anglican communion, in which he died not long ago, both as a sacred poet and a writer of devotional works, used in after-years to say that Mr. Newman himself heard only the first of them, and that he himself, walking with him out of the church on that day, was shocked at his friend's strong expressions of dislike of what he had heard ; for Mr. Williams at that time accepted the principle laid down to the hero of "Loss and Gain" by his father,—*"all sermons are good."* It is probable that Mr. Newman, then working very hard at his first book, thought no more from that moment either about Dr. Hampden or his lecture. In the autumn the lectures were published,

and Mr. Newman at the same time left England for the Mediterranean, and, as all the world now knows, lay for weeks, in the following summer, between life and death, in a remote village in Sicily. He reached home, as he tells us, on the 9th of July, 1833. Any busy man, who has ever been for near a year absent from home, knows something of the vast accumulation of demands upon his time which rush in upon him on his return; in addition to all which, it must be remembered that Mr. Newman was carrying through the press his first work, "*The Arians of the Fourth Century.*" Under such circumstances no wonder he did not find time to examine a heavy volume of Bampton Lectures. In the next year Dr. Hampden published his "*Observations on Religious Dissent,*" in which he developed the principles laid down in the lectures, and called special attention to them. Here it is especially that he enters into the case of the Socinians; urging that the points in which they differ from other Christians are merely human opinions, not revealed one way or another, and that what he chiefly dislikes in them is, that they are too "dogmatic" in that they insist upon separating themselves from other Christians merely for the sake of their own theological opinions, which (though Dr. Hampden himself disliked them) he admits to be neither better nor worse than those of other people, his own included.

While things were thus getting worse and worse, the Heads of Colleges, who had made him Bampton Lecturer in 1832 (an appointment over which the University had no control), continued their patronage of him. In 1833 he became a member of their Board, by being made Principal of St. Mary Hall, on the nomination of the aged Chancellor, Lord Grenville, whose knowledge of him could only have been gained by the report of the resident authorities. In 1834 he was appointed, by a Board consisting of four Heads of Colleges and the two proctors, to the Professorship of Moral Philosophy. In all this the University had no part except that of suffering. Dr. Hampden and his supporters had evidently no anticipation of the coming storm. Like some child meddling with a piece of machinery worked by a steam-engine, he went on, in utter unconsciousness, trifling with a power the force of which he little suspected—the deep conscientious convictions of the mass of the younger graduates. But the storm was almost ready to break out, and there were already symptoms which would have suggested to any prudent man that the great body of the University would not much longer suffer in silence.

The first of these was the letter (published in the "*Apo-*

logia"), addressed to Dr. Hampden himself, by Dr. Newman, on the 28th of November, 1834:— *

DEAR MR. PRINCIPAL,—The kindness which has led to your presenting me with your late pamphlet encourages me to hope that you will forgive me, if I take the opportunity it affords me of expressing to you my very sincere and deep regret that it has been published. Such an opportunity I could not let slip without being unfaithful to my own serious thoughts on the subject.

While I respect the tone of piety which the pamphlet displays, I dare not trust myself to put on paper my feelings about the principles contained in it; tending as they do, in my opinion, altogether to make shipwreck of Christian Faith. I also lament that, by its appearance, the first step has been taken towards interrupting that peace and mutual good understanding which has prevailed so long in this place, and which, if once seriously disturbed, will be succeeded by dissensions the more intractable, because justified in the minds of those who resist innovation by a feeling of imperative duty.

I am, dear Mr. Principal, yours faithfully,

J. H. NEWMAN.

One would have been inclined to imagine that any one who, like Dr. Hampden, had the advantage of being personally acquainted with Mr. Newman, would have understood that this letter was an omen of something serious. The suspicion, strange to say, does not seem to have occurred to Dr. Hampden, who at once replied, in a somewhat jaunty tone, calling for a public controversy.

DR. HAMPDEN TO MR. NEWMAN.

MY DEAR NEWMAN,—I thank you for your candour, and I fully appreciate your motives in what you have said.

But I think the same candour and good motives should incline you to wish rather for a full discussion of a question, and a fair hearing of parties on both sides, instead of ruling it at once by the feelings on one side only. I do not intend to enter into any *personal* controversy on the subject; but

* The letters published in this article were written by men some of whom have already passed into the unseen world, and some of whom are still Anglicans, and might therefore be reluctant to be themselves a party by any direct act to their appearance in a Catholic Review. At the same time, their publication is rendered necessary by the recent publication of other letters written at the same time, and containing serious moral accusations against those who felt it their duty to oppose Dr. Hampden. Nor do we think it possible that any one could now object to it, especially as the letters were, even at the time, made almost as public in Oxford as their appearance in the papers could have made them. Under these circumstances, we have come to the conclusion not to ask authority for the publication of any of them. We have, therefore, suppressed the names of the writers in all cases in which it was possible; that is, in all except the cases of Dr. Hampden himself and F. Newman, who has already published with his own name at least one of the letters we are about to give.

I shall be quite ready to hear any arguments that may be alleged against my notions, to examine any such with freedom—and admit my error if I can be proved to be wrong.

Believe me to remain,
Yours faithfully,

St. Mary Hall, Nov. 28, 1834.

R. D. HAMPDEN.

There is an air of utter unconsciousness in this letter, which is really touching. When we remember the uncontrollable and almost inexpressible wrath of the writer as soon as his views were seriously contested, one is at first puzzled to understand what he really meant when he demanded a public controversy. Probably the explanation may be found in the peculiar meaning he annexed to the words "personal controversy." This naturally suggests the idea of controversies such as were only too common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when disputants made almost a point of assailing the personal character, and sometimes even ridiculed the bodily infirmities of those against whom they wrote. Dr. Hampden seems to have meant something quite different. All who ventured to say that this or that opinion was maintained in his published works he denounced as personal. He would probably have been willing that the opinions themselves should have been discussed, if no reason had been given why they were discussed; that is, if his works had not been alluded to. Thus it would be allowable to discuss the "origin of species," but "personal" to say that such a statement about it is contained in Mr. Darwin's writings. In like manner, probably, Dr. Hampden invited a controversy upon the abstract question, whether the "theological opinions" of Socinians are as much tenable upon Christian principles as those of any one else; but considered it "personal" to point out that it was maintained in his works that they are so.

The next indication of a gathering storm was the publication in Oxford of a pamphlet, entitled "The Foundations of the Faith assailed in Oxford: a Letter to His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, &c., by a Clerical Member of Convocation." This contained extracts from the publications of several of Dr. Whately's followers, chiefly Dr. Hampden himself, Mr. Blanco White (then an Anglican), and Dr. Hinds. It contained not one personal word, either with regard to Dr. Hampden himself or any one else, except in the sense already explained,—viz. that of giving extracts from their published works for the purpose of showing what their teaching actually was. This, however, seems at once to have deprived Dr. Hampden of all power of self-control. Then no

doubt he remembered the warning he had received, and suspected (which was not the case) that the pamphlet must have been by Mr. Newman. Accordingly he at once threatened Mr. Parker, the publisher, with awful consequences if he did not give up the author's name. This was forthwith sent him by the author himself (to whom Mr. Parker reported what had passed) in a letter in which he avowed that he had received assistance—whether from one person or many he did not say—in preparing it. Dr. Hampden was still hot in pursuit of Mr. Newman, on whose scent he flattered himself he had now got. He replied,—

The Principal of St. Mary Hall is obliged by Mr. M.'s candour in acknowledging himself the responsible author of the pamphlet entitled "The Foundation of the Faith," &c., though that candour is come so late, when the mischief of his anonymous slanders has already been working its way. [Then, after making the most of the point, of which all the Oxford world was well aware, that his opponents were junior to himself—he continued] the Principal however forgives him; but he requires that Mr. M. should make the connexion of his name with the pamphlet as notorious as the pamphlet itself, that it may, in some measure at least, carry its own antidote. Who the assistant in it is ought also be known, that each may have the merit which is his due. It is but common justice also that the Archbishop should know the name of both his officious correspondents.

This letter not succeeding, Dr. Hampden, two days later, wrote again—this time to Mr. Newman.

Mr. M. not having sent the name of his accomplice in that disgraceful publication, entitled "The Foundation of the Faith," &c., the Principal of St. Mary Hall is induced to trouble Mr. Newman, as the person through whom the pamphlet in question was conveyed to the Oriel common-room, with a request that he will inform him, if he should know the fact, who the other author of it is, in conjunction with Mr. M. It is but right that society should have its eye on persons who can so unfeelingly scatter their venom under a mask; that at least one may not mistake them for *friends*. The publication indeed is self-contradictory and foolish; but the mischief done is not always to be measured by the weakness of the instruments.

The boast is so often repeated by Dr. Hampden himself in the volume before us, that he had been uniformly mild and gentle in the whole course of the opposition to him,* that it may

* Thus, in a letter soon after the date of that just given, he writes:—"I have already (I hope I may say without arrogance) experienced in some degree how charitable views and conduct in the maintenance of one's convictions smooth the way amongst opposition—at least what advantage they give to the advocate by keeping him in the proper temper for defence, and

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be well to observe the change of tone between this letter and the last addressed by Dr. Hampden to Mr. Newman. Nothing had passed in the mean time, except that Dr. Hampden suspected that Mr. Newman might perhaps have been aware of what was said by Mr. M. (as a friend of his) in a pamphlet in which, without one single offensive word, some extracts were given from the published works of himself and others of his school.

We have enlarged on the circumstances connected with this pamphlet because its publication and the correspondence we have given, which took place a year before Dr. Hampden was made Regius Professor, prove the utter falsehood of the charge everywhere repeated in this book, namely, that Dr. Hampden's doctrinal statements were merely the "ostensible," not the real cause of the opposition to him, and that the real causes were "political and personal," chiefly his nomination by Lord Melbourne, and his wish to admit the dissenters to Oxford. His doctrinal statements were merely the pretext, so we are assured, for the gratification of "acrimonious feelings," which had really nothing to do with them. When we remember that the leaders of the opposition to Dr. Hampden were Mr. Newman, Dr. Pusey, and Mr. Keble, we incline to wonder that this charge did not carry its own refutation even to Miss Hampden herself. If anything more were needed, the date of the correspondence we have just given would of itself be enough. A little later the proposal was urged to abolish the subscription required from members of the University. Many pamphlets

the satisfaction of knowing that nothing has been done, at all events, which can vitally wound the cause of truth" (p. 46). In the inaugural lecture he says, "I am at all times ready to meet fair and free discussion, but to misrepresentation and clamour and violence, with God's help, I will never yield. I pray God to forgive those who may have employed such weapons against me, and to turn their hearts, and to grant them more of that mind which was in Christ Jesus" (p. 61). "The Professor was calmly minding his own business, not indifferent, but applying himself to his own work with the persistency which so essentially belonged to his character." "On the publication of a second edition of the Bampton Lectures," he says, "some may have thought that I have been wanting to myself in not entering into personal controversy with my adversaries, and may have expected that I should at least show some impatience under unmerited attacks" (p. 84). In fact Miss Hampden merely echoes her father, as in everything else, so when she says, "The difference of his theological opinions from those of the party who opposed his appointment was not in stronger contrast than the tone and temper in which he met the opposition." Again: "In no one instance was he known to be influenced by any feeling of resentment or ill-will towards those who opposed him." (Preface, p. viii.) We must beg our readers to bear these statements in their mind, in reading not only the letters given above, but those which are to follow.

were published on both sides, and the proposal was rejected. Mr. Newman then edited a collection of twelve pamphlets on the subject, in which Mr. M.'s was included. It must be repeated that none of these pamphlets contained anything personal. Dr. Hampden then sent the following letter, in reading which it should be borne in mind that when it was written Dr. Hampden had had no cause of complaint against Mr. Newman beyond his having acted as editor to a collection of pamphlets, in some of which his published writings were unfavourably criticised.

DR. HAMPDEN TO THE REV. J. H. NEWMAN.

St. Mary Hall, June 23, 1835.

SIR,—I have ascertained to my great disgust that you are the editor of a collection of pamphlets professing to be on the Matriculation question just put forth, and the author of some remarks prefixed to them. I say I have heard it with disgust, for no other feeling, I am sure, is so due to the conduct of a person who can act with the dissimulation and falsehood and dark malignity of which you have been guilty.

I charge you with dissimulation, because you have concealed your name in the background, and have only put it forward when it was extorted through your publisher. You have been among the "crafty firsts," who have sent their "silly seconds" to fight their mean and cowardly battles by their trumpery publications. You have worked the machine but hid yourself behind it.

I charge you with falsehood, because you have sent out to the public what you knew to be untrue. You have insidiously repeated the calumnies, originally advanced by Mr. M., both by placing his pamphlet in the collection and by your remarks prefixed to the whole, notwithstanding my indignant denial of the imputations conveyed in it. You have acted falsely again in including Mr. N.'s pamphlet (the only one which has any real merit) in the collection, when it had been expressly stipulated by Mr. N. that Mr. M.'s disgraceful pamphlet, and any others which might be personally offensive, should be excluded. Mr. N., greatly to his honour (and I sincerely respect him for it),* has distinctly disclaimed being a party to such a proceeding, and yet his name and authority have been shamefully applied to support the iniquitous cause. Further, the very title to your publication is false, four of the pamphlets being almost exclusively attacks on me, and the rest little to the purpose, nothing to the defence of matriculation-subscription.

I charge you with malignity, because you have no other ground of your

* The profound respect entertained by Dr. Hampden for Mr. N. at this moment, under a mistaken impression of his having objected to Mr. M.'s pamphlet, which led to the statement that his pamphlet is "the only one which has any real merit," did not prevent his writing of him two years later as "that namby-pamby N.," and rejoicing that he was not elected to a high office.

assault on me but a fanatical persecuting spirit. Have you (to take the lowest ground) acted towards me in the manner due from one gentleman to another? Would you have dared to act in such a way if you had not taken the advantage of the sacred profession? I should be sorry, sir, to bear in my heart such a practical refutation of my religious views as you have evidenced by your conduct. I would readily submit to the heaviest charge of erroneous doctrine which your proud orthodoxy could bring against me, rather than exchange your state of mind for my conscious satisfaction, at having neither willed, nor thought, nor done anything to hurt the feelings of a single person, by what I have written, or by any part that I have taken in the late question. I have been roused to resent injurious treatment, and to call improper behaviour by its right name, but I have not provoked resentment, nor have I shown my own resentment in any other way than becomes a man and, I trust, a Christian.

I require that your name should be put to the collection of pamphlets as the responsible author of the several anonymous attacks—or I may be induced to take further steps to expose to the public the shameful party-spirit which has been brought into play on this occasion. Why did you employ coadjutors if you are ashamed of them? and why should they be ashamed to own themselves the followers of such a master?

I am your humble servant,

R. D. HAMPDEN.

MR. NEWMAN TO DR. HAMPDEN.

Oriel College, June 24, 1835.

MR. NEWMAN observes, in answer to the Principal of St. Mary Hall's letter received yesterday, that he cannot enter at length into the details of it without doing violence to his own feelings of self-respect.

He makes the following remarks by way of protesting against some of the points contained in it.

He seriously and gravely protests, first of all, against the idea implied in the following sentence—"Would you have dared to act in such a way if you had not taken the advantage of the sacred profession?" words which he considers to convey an unjust reflection on Dr. Hampden's own principles and consistency as well as his own.

He altogether disallows Dr. Hampden's imputation that he has been "guilty" of "dissimulation and falsehood and dark malignity."

As to the charge of "dissimulation," he observes, with reference to his not having announced himself in print as the editor of the collection of pamphlets on the question of Subscription to the XXXIX. Articles at Matriculation now published by Mr. Parker, that although this is true, he cannot conceive that the fact of his being editor has been "extorted" from him, as Dr. Hampden asserts, considering that Dr. Hampden learned it without any difficulty immediately on his inquiring.

As to the charge of his having "concealed" his "name in the background," he refers Dr. Hampden, as far as Dr. Hampden himself is concerned, to the following extract from a note on the subject of Dr. Hampden's "Observations on Religious Dissent," frankly addressed to Dr. Hampden in

November last—"While I respect the tone of piety which the pamphlet displays, I dare not trust myself to put on paper my feelings about the principles contained in it, tending (as they do in my opinion) altogether to make shipwreck of Christian Faith. I also lament that by its appearance the first step has been taken towards interrupting that peace and mutual good understanding which has prevailed so long in this place, and which, if once seriously disturbed, will be succeeded by dissensions the more intractable because justified in the minds of those who resist innovation by a feeling of imperative duty."

He observes also that while announcing himself as the responsible editor of the collection of pamphlets, he nevertheless does not mean to own (as Dr. Hampden supposes), nor does he feel himself called upon to own, the authorship of "some remarks prefixed to them."

As to the charge of "falsehood," as far as grounded upon his including Mr. N.'s pamphlet ("the only one," as Dr. Hampden proceeds to say, "which has any real merit,) in the collection, when it had been expressly stipulated by Mr. N. that Mr. M.'s disgraceful pamphlet, and any others which might be personally offensive should be excluded," in consequence of which "his" (Mr. N.'s) "name and authority have been," as Dr. Hampden continues, "shamefully applied to support the iniquitous cause," Mr. Newman acquaints Dr. Hampden that Mr. N. had the remarks on Dr. Hampden's Dampton Lectures prefixed to the volume left in his hands *in proof*.*

As to the charge of "dark malignity," which Dr. Hampden asserts to be founded in Mr. Newman's case on "a fanatical persecuting spirit"; and Dr. Hampden's remark that he has "done no wrong or unkindness to" Mr. Newman "but on the contrary always treated him with civility and respect," he observes that he should rejoice at nothing more than a return to that state of good understanding with Dr. Hampden which he has before now enjoyed, and that he shall be ever watchful and eager to discern any approach to a removal of the differences which separate him from Dr. Hampden. At the same time he certainly does recognize as conceivable the existence of motives for approving or disapproving the conduct of another, distinct from those of a personal nature.

Mr. Newman protests against the "conscious satisfaction" which Dr. Hampden professes himself to feel, at not having "done anything to hurt the feelings of a single person by what" Dr. Hampden has "written"; believing, as Mr. Newman does, that Dr. Hampden's published statements of doctrine, running counter to received opinions, have much distressed a number of religious persons.

Less than a year after this Dr. Hampden was appointed by Lord Melbourne Regius Professor of Divinity. As Miss Hampden says, the announcement that such an appointment was intended at once kindled Oxford into a flame. A large

* These "remarks" not only expressly mentioned Mr. M.'s pamphlet, "The Foundations of the Faith," as being included in the collection, but defended a passage in it to which exception had been taken.

number of graduates, chiefly, but not exclusively, the younger men, met at Corpus Christi College, and chose a committee to draw up a "declaration" and an address to the Crown. It was at this time that Mr. Newman published the "Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements," from which we have already extracted a few words. Although his modesty restrained the author from putting his name on the title-page, it could hardly be considered anonymous, for it was stated at the commencement.

It may fairly be asked of any resident in this place, who at this time directs attention to Dr. Hampden's works, why he has not done so in the considerable interval which has elapsed since their publication. The present writer's plain answer to this demand would be that he had hoped to have been spared the necessity of an invidious task which pertained more to others than to himself—to those who were less connected by college ties with the author in question. He felt that he had no call of office or station that way, and that he could not put himself forward without an apology for doing so. Even now he cannot persuade himself to put his name in the title-page, though he makes no secret of it to those who choose to inquire.

We shall say no more of the exposition it gives of Dr. Hampden's doctrinal statements, but it may be well to quote the only passages which can possibly be considered "personal," as Dr. Hampden insists in the work before us that his own writings (of which we have just given a specimen) were contrasted with those of his opponents by the absence of a personal tone. After giving a passage in which Dr. Hampden quotes Scripture, he says—

It will be asked "What can one desire more?" Just thus much more,—proof which we may show to the whole world, not for our own satisfaction, that Dr. H. says something more than a Socinian; proof that he attaches some definite sense to Scripture, and that that is the Church's sense. People at a distance cannot be better for our private knowledge of him in Oxford (p. 29). He is a believer in the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation (as we might be sure beforehand from his position in the University and the subscriptions it involves), and considers them influential on conduct, though he does not believe them as revealed truths (p. 41).

We can find no other reference which can in any sense be said to be to Dr. Hampden himself, not merely to his works, in the whole pamphlet.

In reading Dr. Hampden's account of these proceedings, whether in his own words or his daughter's, what most strikes us is his utter incapacity to imagine that there might be at least some persons who were sincere in their solemn profession that they felt a conscientious objection to his statements

of doctrine. He was aware that he had written of such subjects as the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Sacraments in a manner wholly "new even to the great majority of studious persons," (that is his own statement,) and yet it never occurred to him as possible that any one of them should really object on religious grounds to his novelties. He was to the last as incapable as ever of "recognizing as conceivable the existence of motives for approving or disapproving the conduct of another, apart from those of a personal nature." Accordingly, assuming it as admitted that every person who declared against his appointment was actuated solely by personal malignity against himself, he was horrified to find among them many of his own acquaintances, nay, some of his intimate friends. This state of feeling naturally leads to the complaint—

He could not walk down the High Street without passing many whom he had been accustomed to greet in a friendly manner, who, without one note of warning, had set themselves to act against him to the utmost of their ability.

But he was even less pleased with those who did give the "note of warning" which he blames others for not giving. It is complained that he received letters "from those whom he had considered as friends, who wrote as a sort of salve to their consciences, to inform him that they had suddenly become hostile;" words which imply, of course, that every friend who acted against his appointment did violence to his own conscience; for if not hurt it would not have required a salve. Of these letters, and of the temper with which they were received, it may be worth while to give a specimen. Such things show the character of both parties. One of his friends, a man without any leaning to the Catholic Church, nearer his own age than the mass of his opponents, who had already ceased to reside in Oxford, and who was afterwards a dignitary in the Anglican Church, wrote to him as follows :—

April 9, 1836.

MY DEAR HAMPDEN,—There are occasions (happily but few) in one's life on which we are compelled to sacrifice private feelings to public duty. Your recent appointment to the Divinity Chair necessarily creates one of these painful occasions to all those who, while they object to that appointment, entertain towards yourself personally feelings of sincere regard and esteem. Of this number I am one—and I can assure you that on no occasion have I had so painful a struggle between conflicting feelings.

I have always misunderstood your character if I have not reason to feel assured that in such a case I should sink in your estimation if I allowed private feelings to take precedence of public duty. At the same time, while acting in the discharge of the latter, I feel more forcibly the other; and

with this feeling am induced to give expression to it while taking a public part against you.

I have felt it my duty to put forth a pamphlet on the subject of your appointment, in the form of a letter to Lord Melbourne, in which I have been obliged to express opinions, which, if you deem them worthy of any notice at all, may be calculated to give you pain. Of this I am aware. But I am not aware that I have said anything to *hurt* your feelings, or that I have used any expressions less softened than the peculiar nature of the case would admit of. If I appear to have done otherwise, it is farthest from my wish, and after the most careful endeavours to avoid it. I can only say now, as I should always have said, that while I would do anything consistent with the feelings of a gentleman and the spirit of a Christian to prevent your appointment in the first instance, or your continuance in it now, (and I am sure for your own happiness it is earnestly to be desired,) I would do anything in my power to serve you personally.

I did not like to appear against you in print without conveying to you personally these assurances, and with every wish for the welfare and happiness of you and yours, allow me both to subscribe and consider myself sincerely your friend.

To this letter Dr. Hampden made no reply. But as soon as he had received it, and without waiting to see what the pamphlet, which was not yet published, really contained, he wrote a letter containing the following passage to another friend of his, and a neighbour of Mr. O. in the country :—

April 11, 1836, Oxford.

MR. O. has just sent to inform me of his publishing a pamphlet against me in the form of a "Letter to Lord Melbourne." Now I have no objection to his writing or publishing what he pleases, because that I may read or not as I please. But it is rather too bad to send me private letters, at the same time expressing friendship and respect, and so forth, when there is nothing but war in the heart. I consider such a proceeding a gratuitous insult, and a mockery of one's common sense. As I do not mean to answer it, therefore, I thought I would at any rate write to tell you of the cause, that if you have an opportunity you may express my feeling on the case, though not, of course, in the way of a message from me ; as such conduct merits neither message nor reply. I am sure you will sympathize with my view of the matter, and feel for me as being the object of such mean, and I am tempted to say unprincipled attacks. It is like fighting with a party of gladiators armed with their nets and tridents, and knowing nothing of honourable war.

Some days later, when he might if he so pleased have read the pamphlet itself, he wrote again—

Pray disown for me Mr. O. as any intimate acquaintance. He never was any intimate of mine. I tried, at his request, to get him appointed examiner, but the proposal was rejected with great disapprobation. Henceforth, at least, he is no acquaintance at all of mine.

To appreciate the generosity of this letter we must add, from a memorandum made at the time by Mr. O., what the facts about the examinership really were. Mr. O. (who was a man of much distinction) had been public examiner in 1827-8. Since that he had "many times" been requested to take the office again, and had declined it. When Dr. Hampden was public examiner, he expressed to Mr. O. a wish that he would serve the office with himself. This Mr. O. was for several reasons unable to do. Moreover he had only just gone out of office. "Some time afterwards, being then able and willing to take the office again, I wrote to him to that effect, if there was a vacancy on the Board, and if he, being on the spot, would arrange it with the Vice-Chancellor or proctors."

Although the last of Dr. Hampden's letters was written when he might, if he pleased, have read Mr. O.'s pamphlet, yet he had not thought it worth while to do so. In a letter published in this volume he expressly states that he had never read it. Both these letters therefore show his feelings towards a man who had given him no provocation, beyond what may be found in Mr. O.'s letter given above.

The system of considering as a personal enemy every old friend whom he even suspected of not thoroughly liking the theology of the Bampton Lectures, he carried to a strange extreme in the case of Mrs. Davison, the widow of the well-known author of the "Discourses on Prophecy." Mr. Davison had been his tutor, and on leaving Oxford had sent him, as Miss Hampden shows, an affectionate letter and a flattering present. The friendship had been kept up, after Davison left Oxford, and Dr. Hampden had visited him in his country parsonage. He died after the publication of the Bampton Lectures, but before attention had been called to them. In Dr. Hampden's published "Letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury" he asserted that "Mr. Davison both read and expressly approved" them. The widow wrote him a private letter asking his authority for this statement. This he apparently took as a proof that she sympathized with "the party," "the persecution," "the gladiators." What followed will appear from her own letter to the "Christian Remembrancer," published in that Review in September, 1838.

SIR,—I presume to trouble you in consequence of a paragraph in a published letter from Dr. Hampden, the Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford, to his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, in which Dr. Hampden states that "the late Mr. Davison, the highly-gifted and excellent author of the 'Discourses on Prophecy,' had both read and expressly approved his Bampton Lectures."

I have the best reason for believing that Dr. Hampden is mistaken in his

impression upon this subject. I was never absent from Mr. Davison but for one short interval after the period of the publication of those Lectures, and am well satisfied they were not read by him. Mr. Davison never mentioned the work to me, with approbation or otherwise ; and I possess the presentation copy, received in August, 1833, which was *uncut* at the time of Mr. Davison's removal from me, with the exception of *two leaves* : and it remained so till the year 1836, when it was seen by several friends in its unopened state.

I have thought it hard upon me, and upon the friends of Mr. Davison, that his name should, at a distant period, be implicated in the controversy arising out of these Lectures ; and under the circumstances, I felt it to be due to his memory to ask of Dr. Hampden his authority for the assertion contained in the letter to the Archbishop ; but, to my surprise and mortification, I have had from him a *positive and final refusal*. I am therefore obliged to take the only means in my reach of relieving Mr. Davison from the responsibility in which Dr. Hampden has involved his name.

I shall feel obliged to you to give this letter a place in your *Christian Remembrancer* for the following month.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very obedient, humble servant,

MARY DAVISON.

College Green, Worcester,
7th August, 1838.

We are sure that if Miss Hampden had been aware of these facts she would not have republished her father's statement in the present volume without giving any proof of its correctness. Our conjecture is that Mr. Davison expressed the confidence, which he would naturally feel, that a volume put out by his friend and pupil would be useful, without having been able to read it, and that Dr. Hampden, erroneously, but without intentional falsehood, assumed that he must have read it. The whole question really was whether he had read it or not.*

Of course there was from the beginning no chance of preventing the consummation of his appointment. It was absolutely in the hands of Lord Melbourne, and we must admit that, upon Anglican principles, he did right in not giving way. What was orthodoxy or heresy in a case in which the will of the Sovereign had already been declared ? Lord Melbourne, it seems to us, could hardly have withdrawn a nomination

* We would take the liberty of suggesting to Miss Hampden, that she will best carry out her sound principle of allowing the subject of her notice to speak for himself if, instead of accumulating assurances of the extreme gentleness of Dr. Hampden during the opposition to his appointment, she were to publish with all the names, the letters we have given and any others bearing on the subject. She can easily obtain the necessary permission to do so.

already approved by the Sovereign, merely because the nominee was found to be a heretic, without sacrificing the most sacred principle of the Anglican Church. All that the University could do, therefore, was to protest, and protest it did very effectually, though in a very unsatisfactory manner. The Board of Heads would not have done anything if they could have helped it. The strong feeling of the University compelled them to act, and they acted on the whole as ill as was consistent with doing anything. Instead of bringing Dr. Hampden's doctrinal statements to a formal trial, as was desired by those whose pressure compelled them to act at all, they proposed a statute, which declared that, whereas the University had invested the Regius Professor with certain functions, beyond those which he obtained by the nomination of the Crown, and whereas the actual Professor has so treated theological matters that the University can have no confidence in him in that respect, therefore he shall be deprived of those functions until such time as the University shall otherwise decree. Such a statute, carried by the votes of the whole University, was no doubt a miserable way of censuring dangerous and false doctrines.

It is to be observed that those whom Dr. Hampden delighted to call "the Party," Mr. Newman, Dr. Pusey, Mr. Keble, and those who acted with them, were in no way responsible for it. They had never asked for it—they had never been consulted about it; nay, they were highly dissatisfied with it, and openly expressed their dissatisfaction—all they had to decide was, whether, on the whole, it was safer to vote for it or against it. Most of them thought that, if it were thrown out, the impression produced upon the country at large would be that the University approved Dr. Hampden's theology. They, therefore, reluctantly determined to support it; not as what they would have chosen, but as the best thing attainable under the circumstances. What followed is told by Miss Hampden. The statute was proposed, was supported in a Latin speech by one master of arts, who, if we remember rightly, strongly complained of its unsatisfactory character, pointing out that what ought to have been spoken about was *Fides*, while the statute spoke only of *Fiducia*. It was then put to the vote, and vetoed by the united voices of the two proctors. These are officers of the University who hold office for one year only, and have the power, when they are agreed, of vetoing any statute. Whether that power had ever before been exercised there was, we believe, no member of the University anti-quarian enough to know. A few weeks later, new proctors having come into office, the statute was : a o it forward

by the authorities, and carried by an overwhelming majority. It was to these proceedings that Mr. Gladstone referred, in a letter to Dr. Hampden, which was copied into all the newspapers, as soon as Miss Hampden's book was published. Mr. Gladstone did not actually vote, but when his attention was turned to the subject some twenty years later, he found, by consulting his journal, that he had intended to vote for it, if his attendance had not been prevented by an accident, and he thought it his duty to express to Dr. Hampden his regret at having taken any part in promoting "a condemnation couched in general terms, which did not really declare the point of implied guilt, and against which perfect innocence could have had no defence."

So far as the proceeding was a "condemnation" at all, Mr. Gladstone's language must be admitted to be strictly correct. It is another question, into which we need not now enter, whether, under the circumstances, the University being precluded by the Board of Heads of Houses (of which Dr. Hampden was himself a member, and in which his supporters were all but a majority) from bringing the question to any real trial, it was not well that those members of the University who were convinced that his teaching was subversive of Christianity, should accept rather than reject a vote which declared that "the University had no confidence in him as a theological teacher." What is important to observe is, that those whom Dr. Hampden stigmatized as "the party," "the persecution," &c., were only thus far and no farther responsible for what was done.

Some time later Dr. Hampden's supporters obtained a majority in the Board of Heads, and a proposal was made to repeal this statute, which was rejected by a large majority of the University.

Dr. Hampden was Regius Professor from 1836 to 1847. It is curious, but perhaps not surprising, considering that he had obtained the office by his opposition to tests in the University, to find that the only events which varied the usual routine of his professorship were two attempts made by him to extend the system of tests to a degree never before thought of. These were in the cases of Mr. M'Mullen and Mr. Ward.

In the first he adroitly availed himself of a practice, now nearly obsolete, but which had come down from the earliest times of the University. It had always been required that candidates for degrees in divinity should "hold disputations" on some points of theology. This was originally intended to be, and as a matter of fact always had been, merely a trial of their learning and talents. The idea of making it a test had

never occurred to any professor, Catholic or Protestant, High Church, Evangelical, or Puritan—it was Dr. Hampden's own. In fact it was an absurdity, because the old custom was, that one man undertook to defend certain theses, and any qualified person was allowed to come and argue as well as he could against them, the Professor presiding as moderator. In time, however, the disputation had come to be little more than a Latin essay read by the candidate. It seemed to Dr. Hampden that by requiring men to write on some subject in dispute between the parties in the Anglican Church and then refusing the degree if they did not take the side he liked, he could turn these disputations, into a test—and of all tests the most stringent, because, instead of being called upon to sign certain propositions, the candidate would have to agree with whatever the Professor might chance to hold. This was what he tried to bring about in Mr. M'Mullen's case, and he actually did succeed in keeping Mr. M'Mullen a long time out of his degree, by which he lost his place in his college. He seems, however, to have found that public feeling would not tolerate his establishing such a test as a general rule.

In the other case, Mr. Ward had published a book ("The Ideal"), many things in which shocked the Protestant feelings even of High Churchmen. The heads of houses accordingly proposed that he should be deprived of the degree of master of arts on the ground that men were required to subscribe the Thirty-nine Articles when they took the degree, and that his book was inconsistent with the Articles. We need not point out that this was carrying the principle of a test much farther than it had ever been carried before. Thousands of graduates had published books avowedly inconsistent with the Thirty-nine Articles and even with Christianity itself; yet no one had ever proposed to deprive them of their degrees once received. Yet Dr. Hampden, the great enemy of tests, strongly supported this proposal also. Moreover he had never ceased to complain that the censure against himself had been passed, not by a judicial body, but by Convocation—the general parliament of the University, consisting of all masters of arts. Yet he strongly supported the carrying of a far more severe censure against Mr. Ward by the same body. Lastly, one of his principal grounds of complaint had been, and still was, that he suspected (with great probability no doubt) that some of those who voted for the censure upon himself might not have read his own books, but only the extracts from them published by those who acted against him. But Miss Hampden, in her simplicity, published as a letter from Dr. Hampden, to his friend Mr. . . .

to vote against Mr. Ward, and particularly insisting that the fact that he neither had read nor intended to read a word of the book was no reason against his voting.

We are far from insinuating any charge of inconsistency either against Dr. Hampden for what he did in those cases, or against Miss Hampden, who so strongly approves it. No man, however steadfast, remains always rooted in details. All that can be expected of man is that he shall be consistent in his great principles. Now, Miss Hampden has one great principle, in which she is uniformly and most amiably consistent, and which she received from Dr. Hampden. It is, that whoever agrees with Dr. Hampden is not only right in opinion, but is also honest, good, deserving, and religious; while all who differ from him are not only in error, but also insincere, wicked, base, and irreligious. He was uniformly consistent in acting on this great principle. In the present instance it is worth remembering that Mr. M'Mullen had been among the ablest as well as warmest of those who condemned his works. Mr. Ward's name also appears appended to every protest against him. Miss Hampden naturally does not think this worth mentioning. Nay, she tells us, with a *naïveté* quite charming, that Mr. M'Mullen was regarded by the Doctor merely "as an ordinary candidate for a divinity degree," until a certain point in the Doctor's proceedings, when he objected to write on the subjects proposed by him. That anybody could be so malignant as to suppose that a mind so serene as that of Dr. Hampden could have entered on the affair with any prejudice against him, she evidently considers impossible.

These were, so far as appears, the first instances in which he in any way came forward against what was then called the Oxford school. This is worth noting, because his advocates have tried to explain the opposition to his appointment, by alleging the ill-will he had brought on himself by acting against it. It is a mere illusion; for he had done nothing of the kind. Indeed without inconsistency he never could do anything against it, as his fundamental principle was that no "theological opinions" are either better or worse than others. Why, then, should he oppose the "theological opinions" of Dr. Pusey, or indeed those of the Catholic Church itself? Of course the answer is that, like other innovators, when he spoke strongly against condemning any opinions, he meant to protest only against the condemnation of his own.

He carried out his principle in another instance not known till the publication of this volume. As Regius Professor, he

became a canon of the cathedral, and was bound to reside there. The consequence was that he left St. Mary Hall. He thought fit however, on excuses transparently frivolous, to retain the Headship. Whether there ever was any other instance of a non-resident Head, Miss Hampden does not say. We never heard of any. The Duke of Wellington was Chancellor, and with his views of discipline, disliked the notion. Miss Hampden assumes (she does not profess to know it) that the Duke must have been informed that he was non-resident by some unfriendly hand. Of course there was no baseness of which "the Party" were not ready to be guilty. She admits that non-residence was "not in strict accordance with the statutes." However she exults in the fact that "this somewhat curious correspondence had no result." The Doctor's comment on it is characteristic: "I wish he could not have destroyed my illusion as to his being a magnanimous person." Magnanimous indeed! How could any one suppose a man to be magnanimous, who actually ventured to think that Dr. Hampden ought not permanently to retain an important office, without any attempt to fulfil any of its duties; when he had already shown by his conduct that his opinion was the other way?

He was certainly unlucky in his persecutors. Even gentle, meek Archbishop Howley, who in all his life never said a severe thing of any one, ventured not to like the Bampton Lectures, though not to say so openly. Accordingly Dr. Hampden writes: "I received this morning a letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury. It clearly appears from it that the Archbishop has already taken his side, not having deigned even to ask me a question on the subject beforehand, and I find that I am to expect no sympathy or even fair play from that quarter."

But then he had his supporters. We have a strong testimony to his theology from Lord Melbourne, who told the House of Lords: "I do not think there is anything to be condemned in the writings of Dr. Hampden." He went on to say: "I know very little on the subject, and yet I believe I know more than those who have opposed the Doctor's nomination." Lord Melbourne defends this assertion by saying: "They are upon points of extremely recondite and difficult scholastic learning: very few of your lordships indeed have the means of forming any sound opinion upon such extremely difficult, abstruse, and obscure points as these." Considering that those "who opposed the nom" "Newman, Dr. Pusey, Mr. Keble, there "modest assurance in this estimate of h

When Dr. Hampden had

fessor's chair with the canonry and the rich rectory of Ewelme annexed to it by statute, and the Headship which he had annexed to it in violation of statute, he was nominated by Lord John Russell to the Protestant bishopric of Hereford. The opposition, of course, was renewed; the Dean of Hereford declared that he would not join in electing him, and Miss Hampden relates, with evident delight, Lord Russell's answer, in terms the curtness of which, as well as the date,—not Christmas Day but "December 25," were evidently intended for insult:—"Sir, I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 22nd instant, in which you intimate to me your intention of violating the law.—I have the honour to be your obedient servant." But elected he was, and then came the "confirmation" of the election. In this case, as in many others in England, an ancient form has been preserved, while care has been taken to show it means nothing. The Protestant Archbishop is obliged to name a day, on which he will sit, in person or by deputy, to hear all objections to the person nominated, calling upon all who know any such objections to come forward and state them, and pledging himself that they shall be heard. On the day appointed the Court sits, after solemn prayers for divine direction, then proclamation is made summoning all objectors to appear,—and ending, "and they shall be heard." In the Court thus held upon Dr. Hampden's nomination, three clergymen, one of whom at least held office in the diocese of Hereford, formally appeared by their proctor to urge objections, and the Archbishop's official decided that, despite the solemn promise of a hearing and the prayers for divine direction, neither he nor the Protestant prelate whom he represented had by law power to hear them. He therefore proceeded to confirm Dr. Hampden's election without hearing what was urged against it. This Dr. Hampden seems to have considered as a special glory to himself. The question whether the refusal of the official was right or wrong was then tried at law before the Court of Queen's Bench, and it was decided that he had been right; that the whole ceremony of confirmation—the prayers put up—the summons to objectors—the promise of a hearing—is merely a form; that the nomination of the Sovereign is all-in-all; and that if any person should be nominated whose unfitness might be ever so scandalous, either from heresy or immorality, the Protestant Archbishop has no alternative, but must proceed first to "confirm" his election, and afterwards with all due solemnity to "consecrate" him. It was expressly laid down that there was no exception whatever to this law, even if the person nominated were a convicted felon. The Lord Chief Justice indeed pointed out,

that if the conscience of the Anglican Archbishop would not allow him to discharge his office in such a case, his only alternative was to resign his see. This is the present law upon the subject; nor can we imagine that either the present or any future Protestant Primate could in conscience refuse to act upon it; as every Anglican clergyman solemnly engages at his ordination "always so to minister discipline as this Church and realm hath received it." There can be no doubt that the absolute nullity of this ceremony is one of the things which this "Church and realm hath received."

The opposition made to Dr. Hampden's appointment was, as the work before us shows in detail, most serious. But all that was said or done was marred by one fatal blot. Of all the Anglican authorities no one ventured to say that he had taught anything false or heretical. Thirteen Anglican bishops remonstrated with Lord John Russell against the appointment: but they grounded their remonstrance, not upon their own knowledge or belief that he had taught anything contrary to the truth, but only upon the fact that the University of Oxford had "declared by a solemn decree its want of confidence in the soundness of his doctrines." Lord John, of course, did not fail to hit so manifest a blot. In fact what they asked was not that a man known to be a heretic should not be obtruded into their body, but something widely different, namely, that a majority of the University of Oxford should have the right of disqualifying any man for the Queen's nomination, and that without assigning any reason against him except that they had not confidence in his teaching. Just the same had been the case when the opposition to him had been discussed in the House of Lords. The Protestant Archbishop had complained of his nomination, but had guarded himself by saying "the question is not whether the opinions maintained by Dr. Hampden are consistent with the doctrines of the Church of England. Upon this point I will abstain from making any observation now. I will not attempt to go into the subject." What then did he say? "These opinions were announced in several publications, and I believe they gave dissatisfaction in various quarters." No doubt the Anglican authorities behaved wisely and in a manner suitable to their position; for if they had declared Dr. Hampden a heretic, that would have shown only that he expressed one opinion and they another. Who was to decide between them? No one does not see how they could do so. What would be allowed to an objector? They dared not to assign any reason.

Dr. Hampden then :

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tion as Dr. Sumner, who succeeded to the Protestant Primacy almost immediately after his nomination, had to give. From that day his career, so far as appears, differed nothing from that of any ordinary High Church Bishop. He performed with the utmost decorum, but without giving himself any extraordinary trouble, the routine duties of his office, made himself very comfortable, spent a life of literary ease, provided well for his family, attained to a good old age—and died. We are not aware that there is anything more to be said.

The most grave charge upon his moral character, though at first sight established by the strongest proofs, may, we are glad to think, be dismissed by a deliberate and charitable judgment. It could not be denied that several times over, at different periods of his life, he changed suddenly from one of the schools in the Anglican Communion to another most opposite to it, and that every one of these sudden changes was made at a moment when it was most calculated to advance his own interest. Of course there were those who somewhat uncharitably concluded that he changed his doctrines in order to promote his interest. Early in his clerical career he was curate to Mr. Norris, of Hackney, a good man, renowned in his day, not only as the highest, but quite as decidedly as the driest of all High and Dry Churchmen. At the same time he was editor of an "Orthodox" magazine. After having for some years given full satisfaction to this school, and satisfied himself with it, he returned to Oxford just at the crisis when Lord Liverpool, whose Church appointments were exclusively High and Dry, was succeeded by a party whose avowed object was to "liberalize the Church of England," and he immediately came out, in the "Bampton Lectures" and the "Observations on Religious Dissent," as the broadest of the Broad or Latitudinarian school. The effect of this change unquestionably was that he was obtruded on the reluctant University as Regius Professor of Divinity. His appointment created a degree of indignation never paralleled, not only among High Churchmen, but quite as much among what called itself the "Evangelical" school, a body of men who represent the Puritans of the seventeenth century, and differ from the "Evangelical Dissenters" of our own day only in belonging to a higher social class, and having therefore more of the education and manners of gentlemen. This party was as opposite as possible to both those with which Dr. Hampden had up to that day identified himself. They had always specially, and not without reason, detested the coldness of the High and Dry school, whom indeed, very unjustly, they denounced as men, not Christians at all, but needing conversion to Christianity. As for Dr.

Hampden's newer school, they saw (with almost everybody else) that the direct tendency of his speculations was to Socinianism, which (together with all who cared about Christianity at all) they felt to be but another name for entire infidelity. Besides, they disliked that school for another reason of their own, namely, that it substituted a cold philosophical diction for the peculiar phraseology which they had inherited from the Puritans, and which, strangely enough, they had brought themselves so completely to identify with spirituality of mind, that they had come to think, not only that no man could be really spiritual if he did not use it, but that no man could fail to be truly spiritual if he did. Thus Dr. Hampden, as he himself wrote at the time, had the support of "no party" in the Anglican Communion. The "Evangelicals," represented by the "Record" newspaper, indulged (after their custom) in language of condemnation against him far more violent than would ever have been used by his more refined opponents of the Oxford School. His new friends (Whately and his school, and the Whig ministers), although politically powerful, were not then numerous enough in the Anglican Communion to be accounted a party at all. But a change was close at hand, far more startling than even Dr. Hampden's sudden defection from the "High and Dry" school to the Latitudinarians. He delivered and published an "Inaugural Lecture." In it indeed he expressly declared that he had changed none of the opinions he had expressed in the "Bampton Lectures" and the "Observations;" but to the astonishment of all men, it was written from first to last, not in the tone and language of either of his old or of his new school, but in the peculiar and unmistakable phraseology of the party which most violently denounced both of them, and was opposed by both—the extreme Puritan or "Evangelical" school. The effect was most remarkable. Although he most emphatically declared that he had changed and would change not one of his doctrinal statements, which statements up to that moment the whole of that school had most passionately denounced as utterly subversive of Christianity, yet as soon as he used the phraseology which they considered inseparable from spiritual religion, they went round like a weather-cock. From that hour they declared him (in their usual terms) to be "Evangelical," "converted," "enlightened," "experimental"—all of which terms, when translated out of their peculiar phraseology into simple English, meant merely "a man of our party." From that hour he had, as long as he lived, the warm support of the party, which (although always weaker in Oxford than anywhere else) was at that period

numerically far stronger throughout England than all other parties in the Anglican Communion put together; and with which, it is most obvious, he never had in his own feelings the slightest sympathy.

No wonder if those who witnessed a change so startling in its suddenness and so convenient in its effects, and who bore in mind that it followed close upon another change equally sudden and equally convenient (by which he, a prominent member of Mr. Norris's school, had obtained the patronage of the Liberal Government), naturally, although somewhat uncharitably, took for granted that he had, twice within four years, suddenly changed his theology in order to advance his interests. The existence of this feeling is acknowledged by Dr. Hampden himself, in a letter in which he mentions that "a graduate of the University" had written to him "that it is the opinion of many, that his inaugural lecture was got up merely to serve a present purpose, and that consequently all confidence in his sincerity should cease."

These two changes attracted attention, but they were quite as suddenly followed by a third, although from its nature it was little noticed; for from the day of his inaugural lecture to the day of his death, Dr. Hampden, as his daughter boasts, was neither a Latitudinarian nor an Evangelical, but an ordinary High and Dry professor and bishop, differing in nothing from those who had gone before him, except in his bitterness against those who had opposed his elevation, and the ingenuity with which he strained matters in order to devise new tests by which they might be deprived of their position in the University.

It must be admitted that the *primâ facie* appearance of these changes was much against Dr. Hampden, yet we do not believe he was conscious of anything dishonest in them. He will be unfairly judged if we allow ourselves to suppose that the distinctions between the contending schools of the Anglican Communion, from one to another of which he passed so rapidly, are really doctrinal. In truth they are much more either social or political. It must be remembered that the Anglican Communion itself has no theology. It neither has, nor possibly could have, any system answering in any degree to that marvellous science of Catholic theology, which, as ages have gone by, has gradually been developed by the action of minds, in natural powers the highest of each succeeding century, and elevated far above nature by supernatural gifts of sanctity, and by the Divine indwelling; a science which in each succeeding generation has conquered new realms, owing to the controversies raised by the false teaching of heretics;

but which, ever growing, has always been preserved from error, because the teaching, even of the greatest and holiest men, has been sifted by the infallible wisdom which dwells in the Church, which leads her into all truth, and distinguishes between opinions into which the greatest men have been led by the action of their own fallible minds, and the developments of the original deposit into which they have been guided by the Spirit which dwells in them. Such a theology no Protestant body either possesses or could possibly possess. Highly gifted men—nay, men of great genius, there have been in such bodies, and many of these have turned their minds to religious studies, but unless they have been guided by Divine grace to the One Church, the result has usually been, that they have thought out certain particular truths, parts of the Divine system, and that these, not being balanced by others, as they are in that system, have led them into extremes, and made them founders of some new heresy. At the very best, they have adopted an imperfect inconsistent Christianity, which those who have come after them, and who began by taking them as guides, have very soon laid aside, finding it incapable of satisfying the hunger of their souls. Of late, no doubt, a small section of Anglicans, conscious of the fact that Anglicanism has no theology, have given themselves to the study of the Catholic theology, and (as could not fail to happen in the case of intelligent and sincere students) have become enamoured of it. Yet how imperfect at best must be their apprehension of its bearing (even if they do not, as generally happens, study it only in fragments—one subject here, one there—not as a whole); for, not acknowledging in fact (whatever they may in theory) the infallible authority of the Church, they must of necessity turn their minds to it as critics, not as pupils.

In Dr. Hampden's time, the few who looked at all into Catholic theology did it avowedly as critics, and as critics alone. The extremest favour they ever thought of showing to a theologian, such as S. Thomas, was indulgently to patronize him. The whole attitude of their minds was that of a superior towards an inferior. If they saw (as able men could not help seeing) his wonderful ability, they satisfied themselves with trying to explain how it was that such a man could have adopted a system so absurd, and, of course, the solution was not far to seek, in the term, "the dark ages." Such, we cannot doubt, was Dr. Hampden's only feeling when he wrote on S. Thomas for the "*Encyclopædia Metropolitana*." Small marvel that a man totally ignorant of the first rudiments of theology should have learned little from dipping, in such a spirit as this, into the writings of that profound genius, that great saint.

What was called Anglican theology therefore was no system, either true or false, but chiefly, and first of all, arguments upon the evidences of Christianity. This was, with very few exceptions, the subject of all Anglican theological books for much more than a century before the rise of the Oxford movement. The exceptions were a few on the Socinian, and at one time a good many on the Calvinistic controversy, arguments in defence of a Church establishment; and, at an earlier period, the anti-Roman and anti-Puritan treatises. But in the earlier years of the present century all these had become obsolete, and had lost their interest. The little discussion there was, was chiefly about the Bible Society, which the Low Churchmen, joining with the Dissenters, supported; while the High Churchmen denounced it as dangerous to "our venerable Establishment." There was no controversy upon theology properly so called, chiefly because no one really knew or cared anything about it. In looking back, the only doctrinal difference seems to have been that the High Churchmen thought they held Regeneration in Baptism, which the Low Churchmen denied; but the difference was almost absolutely verbal. In effect they said, "Regeneration means nothing more than the ceremony of Baptism"; the other party said, "Regeneration means conversion," and Baptism is only a ceremony. But as to any real effect produced by Baptism, one party did not hold it more really than the other. That we are not mistaken in this, nothing can prove more clearly than Dr. Hampden's own career. The peculiarity of the Norris school (to which he belonged till he returned to Oxford) was "Baptismal Regeneration." Yet when he wrote his Bampton Lectures, he put forth the view, that the belief in the grace of Baptism originated in the notions of magic prevailing in the early ages. Nevertheless, he had no idea that he had changed his theology. It is evident, therefore, that he never had really believed in the grace of Baptism; and yet he would have been regarded as a heretic by the Norris school if he had professed to disbelieve "Baptismal Regeneration." It was, in fact, merely a question of words between men who had no real difference of doctrine.

In this state of things the difference between the schools in the Anglican Communion was really social rather than theological. The bishop, the dean, the archdeacon, and the wealthy rector were orthodox. So were those among the younger clergy who had received a polished education, and who aspired to follow their steps. Of those Low Churchmen who united with the Dissenters in the "Bible Society" and such institutions, very few were of the aristocratical class.

The chief visible difference was, that the Low Churchmen were much less reserved and fastidious both in their preaching and conversation. A clever writer says, "The 'High and Dry' rector used to preach 'Salvation by scholarship alone.' It seemed to his curate, sitting beneath him in the desk, as if he were trying to persuade himself that he had a religion, but could not succeed in doing so. His object appeared to be to strip religion of all charms and deprive it of all interest, in which he was uniformly successful." At the same time he seems to have held, almost as a secret in his study, those great truths of Christianity which Protestants had not formally denied. The Evangelicals differed from him in putting them forward. The same writer says of the founders of that school: "These men revived the grand but almost obliterated ideas of a personal God, of intimate relations between each soul of man and the Divine Redeemer, of a religion of love and obedience, while the nation was still slumbering, after the horrible stagnation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." But that "they lost their influence the moment they ceased to be the only earnest preachers, because they appealed to feeling more than to Faith or Reason, the first of which they confounded with mere religious sensibility, while they offended the latter."*

By degrees the Evangelicals became more educated and refined, and the Orthodox less afraid of speaking out; so that at last it came to this, that the more religious members of these two parties really differed little or nothing in their religious views and convictions. Neither of them had ever read any theology, or knew, in fact, anything about it. There was no standard of authority to which either of them looked up. Both of them, so far as they were personally religious, rested their hopes upon the same God and Saviour. Neither really believed more than the other, about any special way of access to Him, even through the two Sacraments which alone they both acknowledged, and which they both alike held to be nothing more than edifying ceremonies. The chief difference between them, assuming both to be equally religious men, was that one thought it right almost entirely to conceal his religious thoughts and affections, and even in preaching spoke of little else than moral duties and social virtues,† the other talked

* The "Comedy of Convocation."

† Cowper says,—

"How oft, when Paul has served us with a text,
Has Epictetus, Plato, Tully preached;
Men that, if now alive, would sit content
And humble learners of a Saviour's word,
Preach it who might."

and preached of his private religious thoughts and feelings more prominently than good taste would warrant, and perhaps sometimes forced himself into expressing even more than he felt.

Dr. Hampden, as we have seen, began his career among the drier of the Dry school. It was therefore taken for granted by himself and others, as this book tells us, that he must be specially orthodox. But, in truth, he did not know what orthodoxy meant. When he had to deliver Bampton Lectures, ill luck put it into his head to argue* that religion had nothing to do with "theological opinion,"—by which term he meant dogma; that it would be much better, if it were possible, to give up dogma altogether; that dogma was only chopping logic about "theological opinions"; and his speculations carried these notions into details, which seemed little less than blasphemous to the rising generation of Oxford clergymen, who had lately begun to turn their studies in a Catholic direction. Of course, there cannot be a doubt (and our subsequent experience would prove, if it had not before been clear) that these speculations, if they had been left unopposed, and if they had not fallen (as they very likely might) still-born from the press, but had been taken up by any number of thinkers, would have led them on to the wildest extremes of rationalism and infidelity. But we fully believe that, in his sovereign and +undisturbed ignorance of theology, he was not aware that this must be their necessary result, and much less desired it. There is something really pathetic in the eagerness of his assurances to the Protestant Archbishop and others, that he fully and heartily believed the doctrines of the Incarnation and the rest. We do not doubt that he was sincere in these protestations. We fully believe that he saw nothing in the Bampton Lectures inconsistent with the character of an orthodox High Church divine; but this, of course, was

* Miss Hampden says, "It has been repeated with a parrot-like pertinacity, that the Bampton Lectures were in part or wholly written by Mr. Blanco White." We never heard this, and greatly doubt whether it was ever said. The only authority she gives is a letter of Archdeacon Hare, who says that some anonymous writer in the *Times* writes that they are "as much the product of Mr. Blanco White's mind as certain works penned by Xenophon and Plato are virtually the thoughts of Socrates." This does not imply that Mr. Blanco White wrote a word of them, for Socrates certainly did not write the works either of Xenophon or Plato. But it is well known to persons who were at Oriel while the lectures were being delivered, that Mr. Blanco White openly congratulated himself on having introduced Dr. Hampden to certain French books, by which much that appeared in the lectures was suggested. We suspect, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Blanco White over-estimated his share in them.

only because he had never really understood what orthodoxy meant, or seen its connection with any dogma. To him it had hitherto meant merely dignity, stiffness, "our venerable Establishment," and the like phrases; and no doubt if he had been asked, when at Hackney, what difference there was between himself or Mr. Norris, and the lowest Churchman in their neighbourhood, whom he did not esteem a Churchman at all, he would have had nothing to say, except that the man he denounced supported the Bible Society; or at the utmost, that he taught the necessity of regeneration for careless Christians—although he himself would have held the same thing, and only expressed it in other words.

He was unaware, therefore, of any inconsistency or any change, when he, the most orthodox of Churchmen, came forward to declare all dogma to be an evil, even when it is a necessary evil; and, in fact, there was no real change in him. But neither, we trust, was he any more conscious of any real change when he came forward in his inaugural lecture with all the characteristic phraseology of the Low Church school. For, finding that men of all parties agreed in supposing that he did not believe in Christianity at all (and this, indeed, was the natural conclusion of any man who supposed that he saw the meaning and effect of his own words), he resolved, as he wrote at the time to Dr. Arnold, to make a sort of public profession of his own orthodoxy, *i.e.* to display his real religious thoughts, feelings, and hopes. Now, being merely Protestant, and differing, as we have seen, from the Low Church school only in belonging to a set of men who made much less open profession than they of such hopes, and fears, and affections, even when they really felt them, the natural consequence was, that when he forced himself for once to speak out, he spoke in the peculiar phraseology of the Low Church school. It would be uncharitable to suspect him of any intention to deceive them in doing so, when his conduct is easily explained by his own statement without such a suspicion. And this being the state of his mind, nothing could be more natural than that, as soon as things became quiet around him, he should once more evidently be what he had really been all along, an ordinary High and Dry clergyman, quite unconscious what dogma might mean.

One thing only has pained us in this volume. It is not the almost blind passion to which Dr. Hampden was stung in 1836 by the opposition to his preferment. It is that there is not the least appearance that that passion ever cooled in the course of the many happy, prosperous years which followed after the struggle was over. The letters which we have given above show how he felt at the time. We are sorry also

to learn, from the volume before us, that he read and approved, before it was published, the article on "the Oxford Malig-nants," in the "Edinburgh Review"; an article written throughout with a degree of passion and violence, both in praise of himself and in abuse of all who opposed him, excusable by the infirmity of human nature in a man of im-petuous feelings, who was writing in defence of a friend, but which one hopes few men would have been found to sanction in their own case. But the painful thing is that, so far as we may judge from this volume, his intense animosity never diminished to the very last. The only term by which he de-scribes the conduct of any one who expressed an opinion against his own is "the persecution." Those who differ from him are always "the party." There were two Professors of Theology at Oxford, and although the other, on the whole, agreed less with those whom Dr. Hampden so designated than with himself, yet he was not his out-and-out sup-porter, and therefore is named "the party's Professor." Time came when he had what he felt a real triumph. Mr. Newman, Mr. M'Mullen, Mr. Oakeley, and others, the most earnest of his opponents, became Catholics. He is never weary of re-ferring to this as explaining their opposition to himself; not without reason, for, no doubt, those who maintain the neces-sity of dogma at all, must, if they are consistent, sooner or later become Catholics, just as those who maintain his views must, if they are consistent, sooner or later abandon Chris-tianity altogether. But not even the step which removed them so decidedly out of his way diminished his intense bitterness against them. Years afterwards the new Catholic Hierarchy was appointed. England, as all the world still remembers, fell into one of its occasional fits of no-Popery frenzy. The Pope and the Cardinal were the objects of universal abuse; and the mob, feeling by a true instinct that it could do nothing else so painful to all Catholics, proceeded publicly to burn in effigy our Blessed Lady and (who can write it without shuddering?), even our Divine and Crucified Redeemer. They knew not what they did. The insult was intended, not for Him, but for the Catholics. But in all this hubbub, Bishop Hampden was unable to see, hear, or think of anything but of the men he so unrelentingly hated. He wrote, in November, 1850:—"As to the aggression of the Pope, it is, no doubt, the doing of the apostates from ourselves. They mean by it to replace them-selves in that importance which they have lost by going over to a dissenting body. But they will find out that they have made a wrong move." It is to be remembered, that the con-verts at that time were not, as they now are, a large body—

they consisted only of a handful, chiefly of Oxford men ; some of whom had very recently become priests. Nothing could be more absurd than to attribute to their influence any step taken by Rome. But even that did not content Dr. Hampden, without (according to his usual custom) imputing to them base and personal motives. What cared Mr. Newman, Mr. Faber, Mr. Oakeley, Mr. M'Mullen, and the rest, for the interests of the Catholic Church, the salvation of their countrymen, the cause of truth ? Dr. Hampden knew better. Not only had he "no doubt" that all the mischief was their doing, but he had as little doubt they were throwing their country into confusion and risking the safety of all Catholics in the British empire merely for the lowest personal motives—to regain the importance they had lost by going over to a dissenting body,—so was the great Catholic Church designated in scorn by the great champion of liberalism in 1836, by the man who hated dogma only because he so tenderly longed for union among all Christians, and who held that the points on which he differed from Catholics were no part of revelation, but merely human opinions, as to which they were quite as likely to be right as he. But the real object of all this bitterness was not the Catholic Church, but the men whom he so intensely hated.

In reading Miss Hampden's touching account of his last days, it is impossible not to long for something like an expression on his part of a wish that he had not been altogether so "good a hater." Unhappily, she speaks in a manner in which she could not possibly have spoken if he had ever expressed any feeling of the kind. This is to us the painful part of the volume before us. Long-continued prosperity usually softens the heart to old animosities. He could hardly speak as he did of "the persecution," without remembering, that its effect had been to raise him from an obscure position to one which certainly would never have been offered, at a moment when the Liberal party especially wanted the support of able speakers on the Episcopal Bench, to a man who sat one and twenty years in the House of Lords (in times when the most momentous questions—political, social, and religious—were under daily discussion) without even venturing to open his lips, if the reputation of being an heresiarch had not made him a man of note. To "the persecution" alone he owed a seat in the House of Peers, a great income, large patronage, a place at the head of his profession, a palace on the banks of the silver Wye, and nestling beneath the shadow of a glorious Cathedral, "just what I should have chosen," as he writes (p. 165), "had I had all fair England before me," a feeling, his

daughter says, "which remained with him all through his life, increasing rather than diminishing with a nearer acquaintance." Neither could he be ignorant that among those whom he called "the party" there were scores who, beginning life with brighter prospects than his, had forfeited, simply for their religious convictions, all that this world can take away; not merely the hopes of rising in it; not merely wealth and ease, but friends—nay, their nearest relations. Yet "the persecution" seems to the very last to have rankled in his soul with a bitterness which must have been a sad drawback upon his great worldly prosperity. This is, indeed, a painful object of contemplation.

Most men of any eminence have some one thing which seems to be their special vocation, the object of their existence. What that object was in the case of Dr. Hampden there can be no doubt. Nay, he seems to have gloried in it. It was, to be the man in whose case the boasted independence and Catholicity of the Anglican Church were brought to trial—the man who proved, first, that it has no control whatever over the doctrines taught in its chief theological schools, so that the minister of the day can intrust the religious training of its clergy to whomsoever he will, whatever he denies and whatever he holds—and next, to be the man who proved that it has no means of checking or opposing the nomination of any person whatever to be one of its bishops, even (as was expressly laid down) if that person should be "a convicted felon." In both these things Dr. Hampden seems to have felt an especial pride, because they were triumphs over those whom he was pleased to call "the party." He thought it an honour to be the man in whose case these two facts were forced upon the notice of a great and noble nation, of high aspirations, just at a moment when it was awakening from its long sleep, and beginning to inquire into the real nature and merit of every one of the institutions which it has inherited. This seems to have been his especial triumph, and he was unquestionably entitled to it. Whether it was any great ground of self-congratulation is a further question, upon which we should not be of one mind with him.

ART. IV.—THE FALL OF PARIS.

Les Odeurs de Paris. PAR LOUIS VEUILLLOT. Paris : Palmé.

FOR a twelvemonth of days, the reading public in these islands has been literally hanging in suspense on telegrams and daily newspapers. The absorbing news of each morning has been, first, preparation for war, then war declared, then the clash and collision of deadly strife. And this again as prelude to a series of defeats on the one side, successes on the other, with a uniform repetition, a rapidity of succession, a completeness of result, without parallel between the armies of two nations supposed to be so equally matched. Germany, our cousin in blood, dialect, and national stamp; France, our neighbour always, our friendly ally for a long half-century, have fought it out between them to the end, within a few hours' steam from our own capital.

From the victory of Saarsbruck and the disaster of Sedan to the capitulation of Paris, the problem was in process of being worked out, of which we are now to note some of the data. From the capitulation of Paris, again, to the victorious German troops, until the extinction of the Commune by the army of Versailles, the demonstration was rendered yet more complete. We are to endeavour to ascend from results past to the causes that have produced them. The results being so great and so appalling, the causes must be surely commensurate.

In this great tragedy of two acts, we may distinguish the successive movements or (so to speak) scenes. A vaunt of military glory pervading a whole nation, a boastful demand to measure swords with an old and successful antagonist, an enthusiastic rush into arms without a justifying cause, and thus a campaign commencing with a moral wrong. Then come in the Eumenides, and tell us, as in chorus, how one signal defeat after another had followed that wrong, until the spiked helmets defile under the Arc de Triomphe, and some three hundred and fifty thousand French prisoners have been deported over the Prussian frontier. The "baptism of fire" which the Emperor, little knowing what he said, had promised to his boy, received a hideous fulfilment, hardly contemplated, perhaps, by the oracle that uttered the boding words. Then came siege, famine, surrender of the capital,—all crowded

into the first act of the terrible drama, which would not, however, be complete without an interlude—one scene which, to our minds, interprets the whole. It is the public unveiling of the statue of Voltaire, the great enemy of God, of man, and of France, with all governmental honours attending the ceremony, and by the Minister of the Interior, under an Empire even then doomed to its fall. That solemnity has a special relation to the grim dance of the Furies, who shake their torches at the Paris that gloried in a deed so execrable.

And the second act? What is to be said of the internal dissensions which arise almost before the heavy pressure of the German's foreign hand has been withdrawn? What of the outbreak of revolt against so much of government as could be hastily thrown together, to fill the gap left by an Emperor in captivity? The men of order, the *République sage*, are without the city; the men of Red revolution, the *République sociale*, are cooped up, like wild beasts, within. The shells thrown by Frenchmen into French dwellings are responded to by frantic cries of rage against God and governments. The Reign of Terror is born again. Nay, the old names and symbols of the First Revolution, after eighty years, reappear and gibber in the streets. There is "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity:"—*Liberté de mal faire; Egalité de misère; Fraternité, comme Cain avec son frère*. There is denunciation of religion, monarchy, capital. Nor are these the empty cries of a momentary convulsion, or curses that expire in the sound. Witness the fall of the Vendôme Column: witness the massacre of the Archbishop and his fellow-victims in La Roquette: witness the palaces, not Imperial only, but municipal, of gay and beautiful Paris, fired by incendiaries, maddened, despairing, and suicidal. Fill up the picture with bloodshed and atrocities beyond estimation, corpses uncounted, *pétroleuses*, fiendish women, slaying and then slain, fiendish children pouring destruction with their tiny hands.

But the causes of this accumulation of national crimes? They are not far to seek; and we may enumerate the chief of them.

(1.) The false civilization of a godless metropolis. To speak of Paris is, indeed, in another sense than that of a popular writer, to tell "a tale of two cities." There is Paris that recognizes and serves God, and Paris that insults or ignores Him. Since just Lot and his household dwelt among the reprobate in the plain of Jordan,—since Rome contained alike the Paganism of the Cæsars on the Palatine, with Jupiter on the Capitol, and the struggling infant Church in its cradle of the catacombs,—never, perhaps, have good and

evil so dwelt and energized side by side. There was the Paris of a vigorous Catholic life interpenetrating Paris of the theatres,* the *cafés chantants*, and every other conceivable appliance of frivolity, sensuality, and sin. What can present a greater contrast than the component elements of these two cities rolled into one? Religious communities and pious associations, devoted with French energy and concentration to every good work of corporal and spiritual mercy, confraternities, *œuvres*, foreign missions, a fecundity of Catholic literature, and many other excellent things and people: these make up the salt of Paris, and have redeemed it from being one seething, reeking mass of corruption. They are the ten just, found in the abandoned city, that has been hitherto spared for their sake. We do not draw the reverse of the picture. It is well known in general; for particulars, an able hand has offered "*Les Odeurs de Paris*" to such as may wish, by an *applicatio sensuum*, to make closer and more disagreeable acquaintance with them. But our point is, that the accumulating evils of Paris have grown up under the specious name of civilization. It was pre-eminently *the* polished

* "It would argue great ignorance of Paris and the Parisians to suppose that the closing of the Opera would have no more effect on Paris life than the closing for a season or two of the Italian Opera in London. The Grand Opera in Paris is as much an institution there as are the Clubs in Pall Mall. In its [precincts] you meet—you used to meet, I should say—all the most noteworthy men in Paris. Ministers had always a stall or box at the Opera, just as they belong to a club in England. On a first night you met with men of 'every world.' Boursiers and danseuses, bankers and men of letters, artists and journalists, met and exchanged sentiments. If all this be suddenly swept away, it will leave a void in Paris life which will be greatly felt by the Parisians, who, after all, do so much to give the key-note to political parties. We have it on good authority, that it is dangerous to let Paris suffer from *ennui*, and that she will so suffer there can be little doubt, if her chief theatres are to be closed. I do not speak here of the number of hard-working people that the closing of the Opera would throw out of employment. Then there is the Théâtre Français, which has hitherto been in the receipt of 250,000 f. a year, or £10,000, as subsidy from the State. It is now proposed to reduce this sum to 150,000 f. The prosperity of the Théâtre Français means the prosperity of the dramatic art in France, for to it all eyes turn for example, and on the playing of its actors all performers endeavour—of course with varying success—to model their style throughout France, or might we not almost say throughout the world? . . . *Paris est mort! Vive Paris!* We have forgotten our woes and our wrongs, our battles and our defeats, for has not the fine *l'été* begun? Is there not a roaring farce at the Palais-Royal, &c. ? . . . *Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we have to pay taxes.*" We are unable at the moment to give an accurate reference to the paper from which these words occur in the Paris correspondence of the *Daily Tel* the course of June last.

capital of Europe, the centre from which emanated the good tone, the stamp of society, elegance, fashion, whether in phrase, deportment, dress, the art of conversation, or even the culinary science; in a word, for our rude English tongue cannot so well express it, the *savoir vivre*. Now, the important lesson which every reflecting man must draw from the downfall and prostrate humiliation of this gay place is, the utter insufficiency of mere polish and civilization to preserve a people from corruption and from the atrocities that always, like an unfailing Nemesis, wash out corruption in blood. This is saying too little. The pseudo-civilization of Paris has been intimately allied with vice. The inherent offensiveness of immorality has been carried off and partly deodorized, if you are to believe its votaries, by the art of sinning gracefully. Vice was supposed to lose half its evil by losing all its grossness. Who does not remember the flowing period, to that effect, in which the great rhetorician of the age of George III. winds up his account of the old *régime* in France? What would Burke have thought of his aphorism at this day? He would have appreciated, as we are enabled to do, the point at which extremes meet. The viciousness of Paris has been seething for generations, as in the cauldron of the prophet's vision; and we have seen the dregs boil over in the unutterable excesses of the Commune in the hour of its dissolution.

In truth, there is no greater fallacy, though we see it all around us in our day, than the theory of polishing man without the hand of his Maker. A godless civilization has always vaunted the elevation of humanity, while, in truth, it has degraded man. It proclaims itself to be his regeneration, and it returns him to the condition of the fallen Adam. Culture, and progress in the arts of life, or the "art of living,"—that is, of living apart from the restraining, elevating influence of Divine grace,—tend simply to vicious softness, luxury, effeminacy. The hardy virtues perish under the touch of a polish that is not from God. It stunts and dwarfs man, makes him shrink into pettiness and meanness. It renders him, in a word,—for here again we have a French phrase for an idea which France has realised to her cost,—a *petit maître*. Godless civilization is the Capua after Cannæ, and the prelude to defeat. This enervation, indeed, by Parisian luxury, which had become the topic of a very misplaced Parisian self-glorification, may account for the unprecedented collapse of an army of great prestige. The collision between the opposing forces was as point-blank as between two knights of ancient tourney. Both combatants were armed cap-à-pied; both well skilled in use of their weapons; each animated with the same intense

desire of victory. In the shock of battle, it was simply the more vigorous arm that bore down the weaker. But what had nerved that conquering arm? We may cite in illustration a fact reported by those who, wearing the red cross of peaceful and brotherly help, went up and down among the prostrate forms when

War and battle fled before,
Wounds and death remain'd behind.

They tell us, that whereas, in the knapsacks of many of the French soldiers they found photographs of a debasing kind, the German was provided with the hymn-book that spoke to him at once of God and of home. We do not know a more significant commentary on the fate of the campaign. It is, *mutatis mutandis*, Cromwell's psalm-singing Ironsides against the gay, debauched cavaliers; it is stern Balfour of Burley measuring swords with the swash-buckler Bothwell. The contrast even suggests the dignity and calm intense vigour of Sir Galahad, whose "strength is as the strength of ten, because his heart is pure."

(2.) Intimately connected with the prevalent luxury of a metropolis, is the feebleness and decay of family life. Here, again, we are forced upon a contrast between the two nations of which the fighting men of the one have simply borne down those of the other. The life of Paris, and not of Paris alone in France, has been a life spent away from under the domestic roof; or at least apart from its influences. It was, and is again, so soon as the immediate pressure of national calamities is removed, a life in clubs, in casinos, cafés, theatres, anywhere you please, only not at home. Indeed, the very language of France (it is no new remark), expressive as it is, in a high degree, of every idea that belongs to human life and society, has absolutely no one word expressing *home*. We are reminded of what the novelist himself, who gives it in a popular work of fiction, well calls "a heartless anecdote." Heartless it may be, but no less suggestive and typical. It is that of the Frenchman who had been long accustomed to spend his evenings at the house of an intimate friend and his amiable wife. The friend died: and mutual acquaintances then suggested to him the fitness of a proposal of marriage to the widowed lady, for whom he was known to entertain a great and honourable regard. "True," he answered, "that might be well; but, then—*where should I spend my evenings?*"

This on the one side. On the other, no one who knows anything of Germany can fail to know how deeply the cherished thoughts of home and family exist in the national heart. The

old and truly Saxon proverb among ourselves, against which Charles Lamb has launched one of the light shafts of his playful and innocent satire,—“Home is home, be it never so homely,”—conveys an intensely German sentiment. It is the breathing of the Teuton. A topographer and antiquary would tell us how many places in Germany and England, how many quiet hamlets, that may or may not have grown up later into important centres of life and energy, were named by their “rude forefathers” so as to include the expression of their being respectively, the “ham” or “heim.” The German’s “heim” is not merely the four walls and roof, to which he is compelled to return at night to sleep, and recruit for another day of clubs and cafés. It is the cherished shrine of his affections, strong and pure. It forms the cynosure to which his longings turn, from foreign campaigns, or foreign exile:—“there are his young barbarians, all at play; there is their Dacian mother.” The Gaul is the hereditary foe, revolutionary, godless, who trampled on his hearth, a generation back, and stained it with blood and crime. For that hearth, his domestic altar, if for nothing still holier—*pro aris et focis*,—he will fight and fall: nay, he will fight and win. He will stand in this Thermopylæ: they shall not pass it, but over his corpse. “They shall not have our German Rhine,” nor penetrate to his German home. “*A Berlin!*” is the enthusiastic cry of the most brilliant soldiery in the world. No! Not if husbands, fathers, brothers, sons, can stay them. And stay them they will, against all odds. They are a married Landwehr, sober and steadfast; they are *patres familias* turned into stern helmeted soldiers for all they hold dear on earth. They fight with the deep, fierce determination of men who fight for home.*

It is no mere imagination, we think, to read in these two opposite attributes the history of the brief, emphatic campaign. The moral force that grows up under the roof-tree,

* Whose heart has not responded to the stirring lines of the battle-song in which Tennyson has put this very feeling? A guardian of his own home stands prepared for the battle, on the issue of which depends the fate of those whom he has left there:—

Thy voice is heard thro’ rolling drums
That beat to battle where he stands;
Thy face across his fancy comes,
And gives the battle to his hands:
A moment, while the trumpets blow,
He sees his brood about thy knee;
The next, like fire he meets the foe,
And strikes him dead, for thine and thee.

no less than the weight of arm, and the endurance, unimpassioned and unflinching, which marks the German character and thence the German soldier,—it was this that won the day. If we turn, again, to what we have called the second act of the French tragedy, and contemplate Paris torn by internecine strife, the weakness is as plainly manifested, which follows on a depression of family life and influence. Who are these *pétroleuses*, who have so unsexed themselves, and fought and killed, and been killed in turn, with the relentless ferocity of tigresses athirst for blood? They are, says the demon spirit of the Commune, *citoyennes* as yet imperfectly emancipated; on their strong limbs are still the remains of those shackles which had been riveted there “by the priests and by a putrid civilization.” Let us hear the Paris correspondent of the “Daily Telegraph,” June 14:—

In England, some have been accustomed, I perceive, to approve, in a modified sense at least, the programme of the Commune; and to admit that, so far as they merely demanded municipal rights for Paris, they were advancing a demand which, in its very nature, ought to meet with the sympathy of freely-governed and freely self-governing Englishmen. But the outcry for municipal rights was a mere cloak to cover the infamous designs of the Socialists—designs which, in their fullest scope, would not merely have fulfilled the dreams of those who would abolish society, but the most impious aspirations of those who would abolish even the idea of God. It would be a subject of rejoicing if we could believe that the sentiments expressed in the speech made by Citoyen Vésinier—a member of the Commune, and its secretary—had been misrepresented. As it is, we cannot forget that he spoke thus:—

“We must conquer or die. To that end, we must boldly deny God, family, and country. We must withdraw our children from the stupefying influences of priests, of kings, and nationality. (Applause.) To deny God, is to proclaim man the sole and veritable ruler of his own destinies. It is to slay the priest, and abolish religion. In the denial of divinity, man only asserts his own strength and independence. (Tremendous applause.) As to the family, we reject it with our utmost might, in the name of the emancipation of the human race. To the ideas of family it is that we owe the enslavement of woman and the ignorance of children. The child belongs not to his parents, but to society. It is for society to instruct him, to rear him, to make him a citizen. To deny the family is to affirm the independence of man, even from his cradle—to snatch woman from the thralldom into which she has been cast by the priests and by a putrid civilization.” (Frantic applause.)

We may accord to such an orator the merit of being at least outspoken. His avowal is worth a volume of platitudes, which more timidly, and from some imaginary neutral point, or with distinctions and limitations which are nothing but words,

would half suggest, what he here wholly insists on. The family, and the social principle on which it is based, forms one great bulwark to uphold in men's minds the idea of God and of duty. We accept the axiom, and, not being prepared to deny "God and country," we hail every remaining symptom among us of hallowed associations with family. In this we are supported by one who, without the full light of faith, still held principles which might have led him up to its conclusions. One of the most meditative and distinctively philosophic of our poets, Coleridge, winds up a tragedy with words so apposite, that we must forgive their poetic dress for the sterling truths which they embody :—

Scenes so awful
 With flashing light force wisdom on us all.
 E'en women at the distaff hence may see
 That bad men may rebel, but ne'er be free :
 May whisper, when the waves of faction foam,
 None love their country but who love their home :
 That freedom can with him alone abide
 Who wears the golden chains, with honest pride,
 Of love and duty by his own fire-side :—
 While mad ambition ever doth caress
 Its own sure fate in its own restlessness.*

And so, indeed, it is. Our Heavenly Father is He "of whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named." He has inspired His apostles to develop this intimate analogy between the hallowed things of earth and the eternal truths.

Being subject one to another in the fear of Christ. Let women be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife ; as Christ is the Head of the Church. He is the Saviour of His Body. Therefore, as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let the wives be to their husbands in all things. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it. . . . He that loveth his wife, loveth himself. For no man ever hated his own flesh ; but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the Church. For we are members of His Body, of His Flesh, and of His Bones. For this cause shall a man leave his Father and Mother, and shall adhere to his wife : and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament ; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. . . . Children, obey your parents in the Lord : for this is just. Honour thy father and thy mother, which is the first commandment with promise. . . . Servants, obey your carnal masters, with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as Christ. Not serving to the eye, as it were pleasing men, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the

* Coleridge, "Zapolya," s. f.

heart : with a good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men. . . . And you, masters, do the same things to them, forbearing threatenings : knowing that the Lord both of them and you is in heaven : and there is no respect of persons with Him.*

No one can read these inspired words and not see that Almighty God presents Himself as the archetype of the family. He is the Father of all His children, by creation and grace : He is the Husband of His Church, which He has purchased by His Sacrifice, and unites to Himself by charity and sacraments. He is the Master of servants, to whose approval their service is to be directed. He is the future Judge, and distributor of praise and blame to each member of His universal family. Take away this idea, as the tendency of Parisian life has been to remove it. We may say as Cicero says of those who deny the care of the Divinity for the affairs of men : "Quorum sententia si vera sit, quæ potest esse sanctitas, quæ pietas, quæ religio?" Nay, we may add, what national prosperity, what stability, what true cultivation, or progress, or happiness, what success in peace or in war?

(3.) A want of sympathy, common interest, and mutual assistance, among the classes of society. We will not stay to inquire how far this great and fatal evil may be said to arise out of the want of family life, and feebleness of the domestic tie. At all events, it has accompanied it, again and again, in the history of a nation's decline and fall. Notably, the two evils have gone hand in hand in the course of events which have now prostrated Paris. It may be answered, that this is simply an inherent danger in every human government. The utopian condition of things is that in which every department of the body politic remains united and in harmonious working with the rest. It is the temporal and human reflection of the Church itself, the mystical body of the Divine Head, "from whom the whole body, compacted and fitly joined together, by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body, unto the edifying of itself in charity." On the other hand, the state of revolution and anarchy is that in which the ranks and departments of society are in opposition, diametric and irreconcilable. It is true that the extremes of political good and evil may be thus stated. The former of the two conditions has been of rare occurrence on earth. Some halcyon period may be named, as in France with S. Louis on the throne, when the influence of the Church, the unselfish patriotism of the Crown, the Catholic *esprit de corps*, the concurrence of peace and—in the

* Eph. iii. 15 ; v. 21—33 ; vi. 1—9.

lower order of blessings—of plenty, have combined for awhile to produce an exceptional union and solidity in the body politic. The opposite extreme has been passing, almost under our own eyes, in Paris, and needs neither defining nor description.* But between these opposite poles, kingdoms and constitutions are for the most part in fluctuation; they tend to unity and prosperity, or to the convulsions of anarchy, in proportion as the several classes composing them are in good understanding or mutual distrust. Selfish oppression in the upper and governing ranks, disaffection in the lower, are the natural inherent dangers in the social order of fallen man.

Over these elements of evil, and “dangerous classes,” whether above or below, the Church casts the harmonizing power of Christianity. The Church belongs essentially to no class, and therefore is at home with all; as the tribe of Levi was to have no special inheritance, but to be sprinkled among the tribes of Israel. The Church interpenetrates, and, where not resisted, leavens, the entire mass of society. This is her ideal, though man will not have it to be fully so. Hers is more than the influence which has been assigned to an exceptional potentate, a Cæsar or a Cid, here and there in history :

The birth-hour gift, the force Napoleon,
Of leav’ning, fusing, moulding, wielding, blending
The hearts of millions, till they move as one.

The Catholic priesthood is, in a sense, of the order of Melchizedek, “without father, without mother, without genealogy, having neither beginning of days nor end of life, but likened unto the Son of God.” Who is that man, who walks apart, yet always at hand, severed absolutely from the personality of social ties, and therefore intimately linked, not with the in-

* Signor Mazzini is a witness beyond suspicion, at least of any leanings to Legitimism or Bonapartism. In an article on “The Commune and the Assembly,” in the *Roma del Popolo*, quoted in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of June 16, he writes as follows :—“The orgy of fury, of vengeance, and blood, of which Paris has offered the spectacle to the world, would fill our soul with despair, if we had merely an opinion, and not a faith. (!) A people which wallows about as if drunken, raging against itself with its teeth and lacerating its limbs, while howling triumphal cries; which dances an infernal dance before the grave it has dug with its own hands; which kills, tortures, burns, committing crimes without sense, aim, or hope; which vociferates like the fool who sets fire to his own pile before the eyes of the foreign foe against whom it did not know how to fight—such a people puts us in mind of some of the most horrid visions of Dante’s Hell.” This writer notes the effect. It did not perhaps so well suit him to ascend to the cause—the disintegration of French society, produced by his own principles, together with other concurrent motive powers.

terests and doings of a class or a clique, but of all? Who is he—the friend, counsellor, sympathizing ear into which the tale of human miseries and weakness is poured; bound by his fidelity to rich and poor, to gentle and simple—bound to advise, to define, to adjudge, to cheer, to warn, to determine? It is one who reports the legislative, decides the judicial, and administers the executive of a tribunal before which kings and peasants alike must bow, or be broken. He is therefore the connatural antagonist of those who hate “God, family, and country.” He is the link between class and class, as between the individuals composing each. He represents the great conservative power, which, while it moves and acts on the unerring grooves of right, is equally *pro rege, lege, grege*; indifferent, comparatively, to the special form of government, so that the government, as being just and hallowed, can represent the divine; indifferent, wholly, to parties and sectional politics, so long as the balance and oscillations between them leave undisturbed the pivot of immutable law.

No wonder that, during the brief hour when Revolution has the upper hand, it seizes the priest, places him against a wall, bids the firing party level at his breast. It acts thus in accordance with an instinct, call it natural or preternatural. It is saying, in act: “One of us two: there is no room for both.” And truly. For Communists and Socialists are the men who dissolve society by disintegrating it; the priest represents the power and the system that conserve the social order. They would put asunder what God has joined; the priest’s blessing has knitted and hallowed the sacramental union of man and wife, of father and mother. Socialism professes to emancipate woman from her thralldom alike to the moral and social law. The priest has inculcated that her true dignity and freedom consist in her likeness to the type of Nazareth. Socialists claim the children of a nation, as being theirs to indoctrinate. He has already baptized them into their inheritance of truth. They cry: “Down with capital!” He rejoins: “Up with rights and law!” Their very words are the same in sound, and all the more antagonistic in sense. “Liberty!” Yes: but not that of “the sensual and the dark,” who “rebel in vain:—slaves, by their own compulsion.”* “Equality!” Most amply: before God, and in the things of God—in graces, sacraments, hopes, rewards, responsibilities, and judgment to come. “Fraternity!” Ay, to the fullest extent, to the free and generous self-sacrifice of those who “know the love of God, that He laid down His life for us: and we ought to lay

* Coleridge.

down our lives for the brethren." Hopeless, impracticable man:—away with him! He is of "the old order of society:—he must perish; *shall* perish!" * "Because he is not for our turn; and he is contrary to our doings, and upbraideth us with transgressions of the law, and divulgeth against us the sins of our way of life. He boasteth that he hath the knowledge of God, and calleth himself the son of God. He is become a censurer of our thoughts. He is grievous unto us, even to behold: for his life is not like other men's, and his ways are very different. Let us examine him by outrages and tortures, that we may know his meekness, and try his patience. Let us condemn him to a most shameful death: for there shall be respect had unto him by his words." †

(4.) We have reached the last of those capital sources, from which most thinking men, we believe, with whatever modifications and additions, will derive the present afflictions of Paris. It may be stated, as an intense, intelligent, and energetic unbelief in religion. Intelligent, because it has been formed by its professors into a system, and rests, not on dull, passive negation, but on the "oppositions of knowledge falsely so called." Intense and energetic, because, like most evil things, and most French things for good or evil, it has aimed at proselytism. The said professors have been *doctrinaires*, and have scattered broadcast the petroleum of their destructive infidelity on all around. We do not say that the present age has seen the rise and commencement of this fatal operation. It has been of long growth, and gradual increase. One generation has sown the dragon's teeth, another has reaped the harvest of bloodshed and of death; of death temporal, social, spiritual. The infidelity of France has followed on the train of its fashions, and has been eagerly accepted by the surrounding races; who have mistaken licence of morals for independence of soul and character, and profane

* Manifesto of the *Internationale*: Paris Journal, June 16:—

"Workmen! rally round the International Association of Workmen. That society alone can lead you to freedom, and set you clear from capital and the priests. The International Association of Workmen is at this moment the great offender. All the capitulators, all the incapacities of the capital, lay to its charge the misfortunes of France and the conflagration of Paris. As regards the misfortunes of France, we cast back the responsibility on the Trochus, the Jules Favres, and the rest. As to the burning of Paris, we accept the responsibility for that. The old order of society must perish and shall perish. A gigantic effort has already made it totter, and a last effort ought to overthrow it completely. The reaction has taken from us our weapons; it has not taken from us our voting tickets. Forward, forward! Vive la République Sociale! Vive la Commune!"

† Wisd. ii. 12–20.

raillery for polished wit. Some of the sources, indeed, or tributaries, of this Parisian plague are traceable higher up the stream of history than would at first appear. We might assign its early development to the influence of the so-called Reformation, half-consciously imbibed in the French Court, in the middle of the sixteenth century. Francis I., contemporary of our own Henry VIII., is said, first of all the kings of France, to have set to his people the example of a recognized, and—it might almost be termed—an official immorality. What was the influence of the Duchesse d'Étampes, and the tone of the doings and writings of that king's sister, Margaret of Valois, may be left to the historical student. We trace the same deterioration in the lilies, once of St. Louis, the same combined weakening of faith and relaxation of morals, through the reign of Henry IV., and during the convulsions and insane caprices of the Fronde. The long days of Louis XIV. and XV., when "the monarchy was growing very old," speak for themselves. That "old régime" was a Reign of Terror by the upper ten thousand; a period which saw serfs ground down, and nobles, men of cruelty and corruption, rioting over them; a period of moral anarchy, and kingly despotism; the slavery of a people, and boasted "Gallican liberties." But among all the powers at work during that essentially lawless time, there was one, more subtle and unperceived, sapping the foundations of the altar, the throne, and the platform of society. It made its way, like the waters of a rising flood, till the moment came when it appeared simultaneously at every point, and carried all before it. This influence need hardly be named. It was the scoffing levity, the keen, cold, reckless, nay,—to use a word not too strong,—diabolical satire of Voltaire. That spirit of evil appeared in Paris at a time when laxity in morals and rationalism in religion had gone hand in hand before him, and prepared his way. Court preachers had condoned the vices of a king: an effeminate nobility had copied them. The privileged classes considered themselves practically exempt from the laws alike of God and man; and Vice sat enthroned and glorified. Who does not see that such a man as Voltaire, with powers concentrated on the annihilation of a Christianity manifesting itself so feebly, was as the spark to kindle a train long and unconsciously laid by the later Bourbons? Who that has seen his ninety volumes, or many of them, and the numerous kindred works to which they have given birth, exposed in the bookshops, in the second-hand stalls on the quays, of the Paris of yesterday, accessible to rich and poor, can fail to wonder that, with such elements at hand, the ex-

plosion was so long delayed? Who that remembers the public crime against religion and morals in the official honour paid to him, at the moment when the French and German guns were levelled, can be astonished that the German leaders, who went to battle with the Name of God on their lips, should prevail, that the disciples of Voltaire, His blaspheming enemy, should succumb, in the conflict of which we have been unwilling spectators?*

ART. V.—THE OPINIONS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE.

Œuvres inédites du Comte JOSEPH DE MAISTRE. (Mélanges.) Publiées par le Comte CHARLES DE MAISTRE. Paris: Vaton Frères. 1870.

Lettres et Opuscules inédits du Comte JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, précédés d'une Notice biographique par son fils le Comte RODOLPHE DE MAISTRE. 2 vols. Paris: A. Vaton. 1851.

Mémoires politiques et Correspondance diplomatique de JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, avec Explications et Commentaires historiques, par ALBERT BLANC, Docteur en Droit de l'Université de Turin. 2e Edition corrigée. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères. 1859.

Correspondance diplomatique de JOSEPH DE MAISTRE (1811-1817), recueillie et publiée par ALBERT BLANC. 2 vols. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères. 1860.

THE De Maistre family cannot but feel indignantly surprised at the attempts which have been made of late years to falsify and misrepresent the ideas of their illustrious progenitor. For a long time it was the fashion with writers of a hostile school to treat him as an amiable enthusiast—as a

* We append a commentary furnished to the *Times'* Paris Correspondent by one who may be described as an International left behind by his party. Notwithstanding, this moderate man thus delivers himself:—"Christianity, whatever may have been its merits eighteen hundred years ago, has become a superstition both in Catholic and Protestant countries, where it retards moral as well as social progress. The family, as it at present exists, pits the natural ties of relationship against the divine tie of Brotherhood, puts the woman in a false position, and concentrates the energies of a man on his own personal surroundings, instead of on the well-being of society, which has the first claim upon him; and the idea of patriotism is a barbarous sentiment, very useful among savage tribes, but out of place when men have learnt to look upon each other as brothers, and every country as their own."—*Times*, June 26, 1871.

man who, educated in the traditions of mediæval times, and suddenly brought face to face with the portents of the French Revolution, had shrunk back with almost childish terror from events whose causes he did not understand, and had fled for refuge to monuments that were in ruin and to institutions that could not be restored. Yet, somehow, this champion of denounced opinions and exploded ideas had caught a fast hold of some of the best minds in the generation that succeeded him; had inspired generous and gifted spirits with his own convictions and desires; had grappled with and even overthrown the dogmas (as one might call them) of men previously recognized as sound teachers and safe guides. It was bold of a poor gentleman of Savoy to call Bossuet to account; but it was wonderful to find the countrymen of Bossuet owning that there was reason in what he said, and overcoming their natural prejudices so far as to listen, with ever-increasing conviction, to the arguments he addressed to them. Then, all at once, another tide set in. Our Divine Lord warned His disciples that nothing ever so hard would be said of them which had not first been said of Himself. This thought would have consoled Joseph de Maistre if he had lived till now, and would console him still if he were in a condition to need such consolation, for the last strange vicissitude of his fame. It is possible that Camille Desmoulins intended to be complimentary when he blasphemously spoke of the Redeemer of mankind as *le bon sans culotte*. It is also possible that those eulogists who wrote some ten years ago, in the interest if not in the pay of Camille de Cavour, thought that they were rescuing De Maistre's name from obloquy and rehabilitating him in the opinion of their contemporaries, when they endeavoured to place him in the extraordinary and unexpected position of an apologist of revolution in France and an apostle of revolution in Italy. It is true that he was neither the fanatic nor the absolutist which men of their school had previously assumed him to be. If it was in his Ultramontane opinions that his fanaticism was supposed to lie, he certainly gave very good reasons for the faith that was in him; reasons which, then as now, it is much easier to ignore or to mis-state than to confute. If it lay in the fact that he was that "rare bird" amongst the statesmen of his time, a sincere and devout Catholic, that did not hinder him from gaining and retaining, during his long residence in a country separated from the unity of the faith, the respect and confidence of the sovereign and many of the first men of the court, while consistently living all the time up to his own standard of religious duty. He made converts too, no doubt, and among persons of con-

siderable mark ; but it was not because he pursued any system of propagandism, to which his disposition in no way prompted him, and which his official character necessarily interdicted. His life and example had much to do in inclining those who knew him intimately to inquire into those truths which he was so well able to explain and defend. Such inquiries he helped and favoured : he could do no less ; but he did no more. We shall see presently, in referring to the first work on our list, in what his absolutism consisted. His ideas on that point are expressed with his usual clearness and force, and defended with reasoning which it is not easy to controvert. But it is enough to say here, that, in the ordinary and invidious acceptance of the term, he was no more an absolutist than he was an Abyssinian. It was a hardy thing, however, for men writing in the cause of revolution, to claim him as an accomplice, when all the deeds of his active and laborious life, all his public services and private studies, from the first outbreak of the French Revolution to his death, were directed to the very opposite end. There is no colour at all for the assertion that he favoured in any way, consciously or unconsciously, the revolutionary movement in France ; that he approved in any way of its causes, its progress, or its results. Common sense, doubtless, of which he possessed an unusual share, taught him that some of the things it had destroyed could not be restored again ; and no one was more ready to admit or even to proclaim facts which he saw to be indisputable. As to Italy, the case is somewhat different. He was undoubtedly an enemy of Austrian domination in the Peninsula. A zealous servant of the House of Savoy, he noted that the dynasty he served, notwithstanding the closeness of family ties, was little regarded at Vienna, and was looked upon as an obstacle in the way of Austrian aggrandisement. He was in favour, too, of Italian independence ; but his opinions on that subject, strong, deliberate, and decided as they were, yet were perfectly consistent with the rights of Italian sovereigns, and above all, with the undisturbed authority, civil as well as ecclesiastical, of the Holy See. To place the schemes of Cavour and the acts of his reckless and shameless subordinates under the shadow of De Maistre's stainless name, is to do it an unpardonable wrong. The time is coming (very soon we hope) when Cavour's work will be undone. Then, and not till then, will De Maistre's ideas of Italian rights and Italian interests come to be recognized and perhaps realized.

Count Charles de Maistre declares that one of his reasons for publishing those previously unpublished portions of his grandfather's writings which he collected last year, was " to

explain the *Diplomatic Correspondence* of the statesman writing to his Court by the solitary meditations of the thinker." Upon this we may be permitted to observe, that however thankful we are for this publication, it was scarcely needed for that purpose; and that, in fact, it contains no ideas which can be called new to those acquainted with Joseph de Maistre's other works. About 130 pages, entitled "*Bienfaits de la Révolution Française*," are substantially little more than extracts from a commonplace book—chiefly passages from revolutionary writings which he intended to hold up to ridicule or detestation—with the rudimentary form of the comments upon them which he was afterwards to develop and enlarge. Much of the same character are some sixty pages devoted to an "*Examen d'un Ecrit de J.-J. Rousseau*." In both these papers, however, as in all the rest of the volume, there are many things of considerable point and interest, some of them very applicable to the circumstances of the present time. The other essays, more complete, though compendious, may be taken as partly suggesting, partly supplementing, chapters in his "*Considérations sur la France*," and in his "*Essai sur le Principe générateur des Constitutions politiques*." The volume opens with three short essays, or "*Fragments*," on France: 1. On the Character and Influence of the French Nation; 2. On the Moral State of French Society in the years preceding the Revolution; and 3. On the French Republic and its Legislators. The first of these contains, in less than a dozen pages, what seems to us the true philosophy of French history. It was written apparently about 1794. He was writing then at the close of a century during which the fortune of the French in war had been a good deal checkered by defeat, yet, even under those circumstances, few at the time, and still fewer half a dozen years after, would have agreed with him in thinking that—

This people would be terrible for others if it could be a conquering people; but it has not received that mission. Invincible in its homes, if it carries its arms against foreign nations, we see its armies, the victims of their own victories and of the faults of the national character, melt and disappear from the astonished eye, like a light vapour. The Frenchman is not made for retaining a conquest: his character alone tears it from him; upon which the *Ami des Hommes* has rather wittily said that "the warriors who succeed in driving the French out of a conquered country may take their place in the temple of memory beside the geese of the Capitol."

It is true, he did not foresee the victories of Napoleon; but, even if he had foreseen them, he would have predicted with no less confidence that their results would not last, and,

indeed, at the time they were dazzling the world, he uttered that very prediction. He seems chiefly to refer to the conquests of Charles VIII. in Italy, at the beginning of the sixteenth century. He gives in a note an extract from Barclay's "*Icon Animorum*" in confirmation of the opinion we have just quoted, and to it appends a sagacious remark, to which it is just now worth while to call attention :—

In reflecting on these truths, so striking and so well expressed, one will feel convinced that the political influence of France was very useful to Europe, in that it sufficed to maintain the general equilibrium, and did not disturb it in a sensible manner. The very faults of the French deprived their influence of the danger it might have had. If Europe recovers her former position, she will lose infinitely in seeing substituted for such influence that of other nations more calm, more reflecting, more obstinate, more fitted to be conquering.

The real and invincible influence which France has always exercised over foreign nations is, he thinks, that of opinion. The chief source of her supremacy in this respect is her language; "like steel, the most intractable of metals, but that which of all others takes the finest polish when art has succeeded in subduing it, the French language, handled and controlled by real artists, receives in their hands the most lasting and most brilliant forms. What is called the art of speaking is eminently the talent of the French, and it is by the art of speaking that men are ruled." The gift of good taste is also distinctively French: "the art of saying what is right, and when it is right, belongs to the French alone; method and order are their distinguishing qualities; and those men, so light, so impetuous, so heedless, are, with pen in hand, the wisest of all." In the various forms of eloquence, he awards the crown to France, and without a competitor. Englishmen will certainly think this unfair, though it was written so long ago, but let us remember that he is not a Frenchman, and let us hear what he says :—

In all kinds of eloquence, the French have no rivals. That of the bar, which has produced among them masterpieces of the first order, does not exist elsewhere. Italy and Spain, so religious, and mistresses of two languages so sonorous, have never been able to produce a sermon that Europe would read. Hume, whose testimony cannot be questioned, says somewhere that he is ashamed to confess that a French advocate pleading for the recovery of a horse is more eloquent than the orators of Great Britain discussing the gravest interests of the nation in the Houses of Parliament. The inestimable talent of which I speak is so particularly the appanage of the French, that it never forsakes them, not even on the occasions when it forsakes all other men. The most dismal sciences have no thorns which they

cannot remove : physics, natural history, astronomy, metaphysics, erudition, politics ; they have explained all, embellished all, brought all within the reach of ordinary good sense ; and probably nothing is well known in Europe until the French have explained it. Eloquence applied to the most serious matters, and the art of throwing light upon everything, are the two great talents of this nation. The bulk of mankind, constantly repelled from the sanctuary of the sciences by the harsh style and detestable taste of the scientific works produced by other nations, cannot resist the seduction of the French style and method. Scarcely has foreign genius brought forth something interesting when French art seizes on the discovery, works it up in a thousand ways; compels it to receive forms at which it is amazed and of which it grows proud, and sends it throughout the whole world on the wings of the universal language. Those books seek out the germs of talent, scattered over the globe, warm them, fertilize them, and bring them to maturity. They teach little to real men of science ; but, what is better, they make such men be born.

We find the substance of this essay reproduced some eighteen years after, in a *mémoire* written at St. Petersburg, with the date of December 29, 1812, for the guidance of the King of Sardinia in his political conduct at that epoch. The ideas of the writer are but slightly modified by his intervening experience, and the conclusion he draws is one of some practical importance, which M. Albert Blanc and his friends will do well to ponder.

There is no century, perhaps (he says), in which the flattering hope was not indulged of crushing or parcelling out France. What hopes were not conceived in this respect at the beginning of the last century ! Everything indicated that they were on the point of succeeding, and many Frenchmen, even among the wisest, began to lose courage ; yet all was changed in the twinkling of an eye, the throne of Spain remained to the Bourbons, and the French territory continued notably increased. At the present moment, when we see France exhausted of men and money, when Bonaparte has lost in four or five months five hundred thousand men, a thousand pieces of artillery, and his own reputation, it is natural to speculate anew on the weakening of France and to hope that all is over with her pre-eminence ; yet people would be mistaken to-day, as they were then ; and so much the worse for the neighbouring powers who have based their plans on that vain hope.”—(Corres. Diplom., t. i. p. 276.)

In the essay on the “Moral State of French Society in the years preceding the Revolution,” he traces the general corruption back to the “infamous Regency.” From that period up to the Revolution, what was exceptionally and unprecedentedly bad in French society was, that the whole talent of the country was perverted and dedicated to immoral and irreligious ends. Science, literature, and art conspired to deprave the whole mind

and the whole heart of France with such unhappy success that in those classes, that is to say the highest, where their influence was soonest and most widely felt, the corruption was rapid and almost universal. He signalizes the remarkable fact that the most celebrated men, the greatest intellects, in one word the "philosophers" themselves, were as vile in character as they were exalted in talent. We pass over the essay on "the legislators of the French Republic" and the collection of notes on the "benefits" of the Revolution. They are worth reading, and contain many passages worth quoting, but we may, for the present, occupy ourselves more usefully with the most important part of the present collection, entitled an "Etude sur la Souveraineté."

It is perhaps owing to the immethodical manner in which its chapters are strung together, being written, without much regard to arrangement, at different periods between 1794 and 1796, that the author did not include this "Etude" in the works published during his life, though he incorporated parts of it with some of his other writings. The very irregularity, however, with which his remarks are noted down gives it a freshness and a raciness more than sufficient to compensate for what is wanting in its form. The same ideas, though better digested and more consecutively arranged, occur in the "Essai sur le Principe générateur des Constitutions politiques"; but there is a greater abundance of illustration in the earlier sketch. The works of Rousseau were active elements of mischief at the time, and he gives more consideration to them on that account than their intrinsic importance deserved. Two weapons which De Maistre wielded with power were especially formidable to the intellectual imposture which he was called to combat—accurate knowledge and close reasoning. He demonstrates in almost all his writings how shallow were the pretensions of those who were worshipped as the lights of their age. He pitilessly exposes the ignorant blunders of encyclopædists and the intellectual weakness of *esprits forts*. At one time it is no less an authority than Diderot who is stripped of his peacock's plumage and exhibited as a very denuded daw, when it is proved that he knew so little Greek as to misunderstand the epithet *Anadyomene* applied to the famous statue of Venus. At another time Voltaire himself is convicted of gross ignorance; * for

* In the "Soirées de St. Pétersbourg" (*Sixième Entretien*), De Maistre proves to a demonstration that Voltaire could not have read Locke's "Essay on the Understanding," of which, nevertheless, he had expressed the most formal and emphatic commendation. He adds that "Frenchmen of letters

which De Maistre charitably accounts by showing how little time that illustrious personage (though he was *ex-officio* bound, like our "Able Editors," to know everything) had for learning anything about those matters upon which he was enlightening the world. But Rousseau is especially the mark for his indignant and contemptuous satire. No man ever more fully proved the force of Pope's saying, "A little learning is a dangerous thing," in a sense far more serious than its author meant; for the amount of evil done by what Rousseau wrote was out of all proportion to the very limited knowledge he possessed respecting almost every subject upon which he was pleased to dogmatize. It is in the "Contrat Social" that his crude and baseless theories are most completely developed, and that is the work which oftenest receives correction at De Maistre's hands.

The study of political philosophy, or, as he preferred to call it, political metaphysics, was De Maistre's favourite pursuit. He did not start with a preconceived theory and then go in search of facts, or invent them if they could not be found, or wrest to his purposes, by a process of torture, such facts as would not fit of themselves. On the contrary, he examined the history of mankind, in various countries and under various conditions, and he discovered in it the operation of certain general laws, which he traced to a divine source. As he humorously said, he knew nothing about, he had never met, that being whom the philosophers called "man"—an *ens rationis*, or, we may rather say, *sine ratione*; though he had met "men" of various nations. He had studied their life, habits, and history, and based his conclusions upon what those studies had taught him. This is the true "philosophy teaching by example," which history was defined to be by one who knew how to write it. It is upon such principles that the most solid and useful historical works of this century have been constructed. It is De Maistre's plan and method

read very little in the last century; first, because they led a very dissipated life; secondly, because they wrote too much; lastly, because their pride did not allow them to suppose that they wanted any help from the thoughts of others. . . . It is a great mistake to suppose that, in order to quote a book, with every appearance of having mastered the subject, it is necessary to have read it, at least completely and with attention. You read the passage or the line required; you read some lines of the index, on the faith of an index; you pick out the passage required in support of your own ideas, and that is all you want; what matters the rest? There is also an art in making those speak who have read; and that is how it is quite possible that the book of which one speaks most is really the least known by reading?" Those who are familiar with the "Soirées" will remember the powerful denunciation of the arch-blasphemer in the *Quatrième Entretien*.

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that such writers as Guizot in France, and Bancroft in America, have followed; certainly with the result (whatever errors and imperfections the writers themselves may have been liable to) of giving an intelligible and rational account of the growth of institutions which no speculator, like Rousseau, could have devised, and no constitution-monger, like Sieyès, could have proposed. It is a fundamental truth of De Maistre's system, that no constitution can be written *à priori*. In his view, political constitutions are like physical; in their origin the work of God, in their development the growth of time. France, which by her disasters for a hundred years past, has taught other nations almost every moral, teaches them this also. The host of empirics who have compiled, for her misfortune, some eighty forms of constitution in as many years, most of which did not live much longer than the time it took to print them, and all of which have resulted in failure, were ignorant of this truth, or studiously kept it out of view. We wish we could persuade ourselves that their example will warn those who at present are emulous of similar distinction, to refrain from such experiments. If we may use a familiar illustration, political constitutions resemble trees, which, though their generic properties are the same, differ very much in form and size and in the conditions necessary for their favourable growth.

*Fraxinus in sylvis pulcherrima, pinus in hortis,
Populus in fluviis, abies in montibus altis.*

The oak and the chestnut are both fine trees, but with essential differences of form and fibre, which no power or art of man can alter. It might, however, enter into the head of a lunatic to strain the branches and snip the leaves of a chestnut into the nearest possible imitation of an oak, and the result of his labours would be so far successful that, for a season, no one would know what to make of it. But the leaves would fall in autumn and they would grow again in spring, and there would stand the chestnut as plain as ever, though perhaps a little injured by what it had gone through.

"The sovereignty of the people" is an expression which seems to De Maistre to involve a contradiction in terms. Over whom are they sovereign? Themselves apparently. Therefore they are subject. But to be at the same time sovereign and subject is impossible. With his usual clearness and good sense, however, he extricates the question from the confusion of terms, and puts it thus:—

It has been warmly disputed whether sovereignty came from God or from men; but I do not know if it has been observed that both propositions may

be true. It is most true, in an inferior and gross sense, that sovereignty is founded on human consent : for, if any people whatsoever agreed all at once not to obey, sovereignty would disappear ; and it is impossible to imagine the establishment of a sovereignty without imagining a people which consents to obey. If, therefore, the adversaries of the divine origin of sovereignty only mean to say that, they are right, and it would be very idle to dispute it. God not having thought proper to employ supernatural instruments in the establishment of empires, it is certain that everything has had to be done through men. But to say that sovereignty does not come from God because He employs men in establishing it, is to say that He is not the Creator of mankind because we have all a father and a mother. All the Theists in the world will doubtless agree that he who violates the laws opposes himself to the Divine Will and renders himself guilty before God, even though he violate but human ordinances ; for it is God who has made man sociable ; and since He has willed society, He has also willed sovereignty and the laws without which society cannot be. The laws, therefore, come from God, in the sense that He wills that there should be laws and that they should be obeyed ; and yet those laws come also from men, since they are made by men. In the same way sovereignty comes from God, since He is the author of everything, evil excepted, and is in particular the Author of society, which cannot exist without sovereignty. And yet this same sovereignty comes also from men in a certain sense, that is to say, insomuch as this or that form of government is established and declared by human consent. The partisans of Divine authority cannot, then, deny that the human will plays some part in the establishment of governments ; and the partisans of the contrary system in their turn cannot deny that God is, by excellence and in an eminent manner, the Author of those same governments. It appears, therefore, that these two propositions : "Sovereignty comes from God" and "Sovereignty comes from men" do not absolutely contradict each other, no more than these other two : "Laws come from God" and "Laws come from men."

He quotes Montesquieu's authority for the opinion that "every form of government does not suit every country ; liberty, for example, not being a fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of all peoples." He shows that Rousseau's notion of a "primordial contract" is extrinsically unfounded, as well as intrinsically absurd, and remarks that no historian has ever mentioned the "primary assemblies" of Memphis or Babylon.

Let us see now what De Maistre's "absolutism" was. He lays down the general principle that "every species of sovereignty is absolute by its nature ; place it on one or on many heads ; organize its powers as you will." But the illustration he gives shows what he means :—

Take, for example, the English Government : the sort of political trinity which constitutes it does not hinder the sovereignty from being one there, as

elsewhere ; the powers are balanced, but once they are in accord there is no longer but one will, which cannot be opposed by any other legal will ; and Blackstone was right to say that the King and Parliament of England together can do everything.

It is one thing to lay down a correct and, as we think, indisputable legal and political principle, which De Maistre does here, and it is another thing to proclaim, or avow, or indicate, as he nowhere does, a preference for a form of government giving the will of one man absolute control over the lives and liberties of multitudes. Sovereignty in England does not wholly reside in the person called the Sovereign ; but wherever it resides, there it is absolute, and there is no power above it to nullify, or to modify, or to question its decrees. It can revise them itself ; which is an attribute of all sovereignties, except, we suppose, that of the Medes and Persians of yore. The basis of such a sovereignty can be disturbed only by insurrection ; and when an insurrection is successful, it erects a sovereignty of its own as absolute as that which it has overthrown. Much the same truth was perhaps unconsciously spoken by the member of Parliament who lately taunted the Government with having substituted for the divine right of kings "the divine right of ministers" ; and, at many periods of history, there have been those who believed even in the divine right of mobs. The absoluteness of sovereignty consists in this,—that subjects must obey its commands without disputing its authority to issue them. If they were free to do that, the sovereignty would be null, and, if it admitted that it might be disobeyed, that would be an act of abdication. Therefore De Maistre's principle that "every sovereignty is absolute by its nature" can hardly be disputed when once it is understood.

Whether by study or experience, De Maistre knew a good deal about every form of government existing, or which had existed in his lifetime, not to speak of those recorded in history. He never disguised his admiration of the British Constitution, and still more of the public spirit in which it had its roots. But he approved every form of government which grew up naturally among the people who lived under it, and disapproved of all attempts, however well meant, to substitute forms that suited other lands, however good in themselves, or however preferable under circumstances favourable to their gradual and healthy development. Certainly, the Turkish system, especially as it existed in the last century, had no partisan in him ; but what, he asked, were you to do with people whose ideas are so different from ours ? It was

easy enough for a disgraced Vizier or Pacha to escape from the country and take refuge in Western Europe with a share of the treasures amassed during his term of power. But they never thought of such a thing. They waited for the bow-string with stoical tranquillity, and their families were proud of fathers who had died in such a way. He thought it a fault in Alexander I. that he was not monarchical enough or Russian enough for his people. He did not object to the Republic which he saw growing up beyond the Atlantic. It was the natural result of the ideas which the original colonists took with them from Europe, of the character and position of their successors, and of the habits which their life developed. Not foreseeing, however, the continued outflow of European labour in the same direction, he anticipated changes of an aristocratic tendency which have not taken place. Codfish, it is true, has given place to shoddy, which in its turn has been overthrown by petroleum; but no interest has succeeded as yet in establishing political predominance. He speaks with great favour of the hereditary aristocracy of Venice, a government which lasted for thirteen hundred years, declining only when the wealth and influence of Venice declined, not from political causes, but from the gradual loss of commerce consequent upon the discoveries of Vasco de Gama and the diversion of Eastern trade into other channels. But he evidently thought that a strong monarchy was the only government for France; and, when he saw the ruin to which the philosophers had reduced her, he could not help recalling the days of her greatness, when Louis XIV. held the sceptre and, with all his mistakes as a monarch and his vices as a man, made her queen of the nations.

What spectacle (he says) is comparable to that of the age of Louis XIV.? An absolute and almost adored sovereign, doubtless no one restrained him in the distribution of favours, and what man chose men better? Colbert regulated his finances; the terrible talents of Louvois presided over war; Turenne, Condé, Catinat, Luxembourg, Berwick, Créqui, Vendôme, Villars, led his armies by land; Vauban fenced France all round; Dugay-Trouin, Tourville, Jean Bart, Duquesne, Forbin d'Oppède, d'Estrées, Renaud, commanded his fleets; Talon, Lamoignon, d'Aguesseau, were seated in his tribunals; Bourdaloue and Massillon preached before him; the Episcopate received at his hand that same Massillon, Fléchier, Bossuet, and the great Fénelon, the honour of France, the honour of his age, the honour of humanity. In his royal academies the talents gathered under his protection shone with singular lustre; it was he who made France the true country of every kind of talent, the arbiter of renown, the distributor of glory. Perhaps it will be said that chance having placed under his hand a crowd of great men, he had not even the merit of selection. What then? Does any one imagine that

his age was deficient in men of small ability, thinking themselves fit for everything, and asking for everything? That species pullulates in all parts and at all periods.

France under Louis XIV. was indeed at the summit of her greatness. He was the monarch to whose sway the national character most perfectly adapted itself, under whom France was France as she had not been before, and as she was never after quite to be. In some sense, however, it is true that he still rules in France, and probably will rule till "chaos is come again." It is clear that Napoleon III. had studied his system profoundly, and whatever was successful in the Second Empire was borrowed from it. But, alas! for Colbert one could only see a Fould, and for Louvois a Lebœuf, and for Vauban the men who let his fortresses be taken. Other comparisons we will not draw, though some of them would not be wanting in consoling aspects.

The spirit of rebellion dates from before the angels' fall, and can be traced in human history back to the days of Adam. But in the form which makes it terrible in our own days, it had its rise at the birth of Protestantism. This thesis is maintained by De Maistre in an essay written in 1798, and entitled "*Reflexions sur le Protestantisme dans ses Rapports avec la Souveraineté.*" There is nothing, perhaps, which he has written calculated to give a greater shock not merely to modern liberalism, but even to opinions held by many who are not consciously unfaithful to Catholic teaching. We will add that, though accepting his principles, we are not bound in all cases to adopt his application of them. But the clearness and force with which he states his case may afford gratification even to those who differ from him,—at least as much gratification as one can feel who finds some cherished ideas not merely contradicted, but encountered with arguments likely to disturb, if not his old convictions, at least the satisfaction with which he has entertained them. That is one of the inconveniences which people who are content to take their opinions at second-hand, or who accept upon insufficient grounds a doctrine to which they have a personal inclination, are exposed to, when they fall in with some one accustomed to look at things from quite an opposite point of view, and well supplied with solid reasons in support of his conclusions. To the question, "What is Protestantism?" this is De Maistre's reply:—

It is the insurrection of the individual reason against the general reason, and consequently the worst thing imaginable. When Cardinal de Polignac
1 to the too-celebrated Bayle, "You say you are a Protestant; that word

is very vague : are you Anglican, Lutheran, Calvinist, &c. ?" Bayle answered, " I am a Protestant in all the force of the term : I protest against all truths." That celebrated sceptic thus gave the true definition of Protestantism, which is the essential enemy of every belief common to a number of men ; and that is what makes it the enemy of the human race, because the welfare of human societies rests but upon beliefs of that sort.

The essential and distinctive evil of Protestantism, therefore, he considers to be, that it is not only a religious heresy but a civil heresy, because it substitutes the pride of individual opinion for authority, and discussion for obedience. " It is born a rebel, and insurrection is its habitual state." He shows how entirely opposite is the spirit of Christianity, which never made any attempt against public authority or order, even when the number of Christians had become so large that they might have constrained their rulers to submission. When Christianity, however, mounted the throne (so to speak),—when the civil authority governed in the Christian name,—the state of things, of course, became different. But Protestantism, on the contrary, was born with arms in its hands ; it respected the civil authority only so long as it was gathering strength to overthrow it, and as soon as it could rebel it did so. Civil wars of the most sanguinary atrocity were its first fruits in Europe, and the excesses with which it reproached those who defended themselves against its attacks were, however deplorable, the consequences of its own crimes. Power, no matter of what sort, can only be exercised on earth by men, who are not beings of pure and impassive reason, and, when they have to defend their rights by arms, use those arms like all other men.

De Maistre thinks it very inconsistent in men who justify insurrection as a means of abolishing tithes or feudal privileges to dispute its morality in the case of the League, who opposed the succession of Henry IV. on far higher grounds :—

If Henry IV. had wished to impose a tax of a penny in the pound without the consent of the people, they would learnedly prove that the people had a right of resistance ; but when there was question of putting on the throne a detestable and deadly sect, of degrading the prevailing religion to the second place, of giving its rival an habitual and almost invincible means of seduction and of conquest, of raising a wall of separation between the sovereign and the great majority of his subjects, of kindling an unquenchable fire in the State—all this is but a trifle ; the rigid defenders of the rights of the people change parts at once ; St. Paul himself is not more eloquent than they on the right of sovereigns, and it is an inexcusable crime in the French to make the slightest opposition to the *Bearnais*.

Montesquieu authoritatively lays down

would be a good law, when the State is satisfied with the religion already established, not to permit the establishment of another; but when another is established, it should then be tolerated. This principle is criticised by De Maistre in a passage which it is impossible to condense, and which we are sure our readers will not think too long:—

If I had lived (he says) in the time of this great man, I should have liked to put him a few questions. First, when is a religion *established* in the State? When a sect wishes to introduce itself into a country, it does not stop modestly at the frontier, and send a message thence to ask if it will be received. It glides in silently like a reptile, it disseminates its doctrines in the shade, unknown to the sovereign, and all at once it suddenly rises up, *caput a cæli regionibus ostendens*. Is it *established* then? Doubtless that is not what Montesquieu meant to say: otherwise, there would have been no distinction to make. This great man therefore means to speak of a legal admission founded on an express law, or on a tacit concession declared by time and prescription. Up to that it is not established, and he would not permit it to be established. Then it must be resisted: but how? That would be my second question, which appears to me very important. Should it be requested by proclamation to be good enough to leave the State? I am afraid that would not do. It would therefore be necessary, in order to follow Montesquieu's maxim, to command, compel, and punish. But up to what point is severity lawful, and what is that at which it becomes a crime? What can be said for certain is, that all needless severity is criminal, and that every severity is innocent if it is necessary. It can also be maintained with full certainty that the reaction of the sovereignty which defends itself ought to be proportioned to the action of the enemy who attacks it. On this principle, which cannot be contested, we are forced to be very economical of our pity respecting great acts of rigour which were really only misfortunes. You see this dead body stretched on the high-road; the murderer is beside it; he excites your indignation. But when once you learn that this murderer is a peaceful traveller, and that the other was a highwayman who has fallen the victim of a just defence, pity disappears. Right, though enlarged, is always the same. It is not by their severity, but by their necessity, that we must judge the morality of the executions by which a sovereignty defends itself when attacked. All that is not indispensable is criminal; but the utmost imaginable severity is lawful if there be no other means of defence. Let no one come and say to us, "I have seen deceit and fury on both sides." Yes, undoubtedly; human passions are indestructible, and men, even for the right, fight like men. But it is not a case for comparisons. If, in a war stirred up by rebels, there perish on each side a hundred thousand men, on the side of sovereignty have been caused a hundred thousand *deaths*, and on the other have been committed a hundred thousand *murders*. Truths so simple can escape no one.

He maintains that it was by a certain instinct of self-defence that Louis XIV., whose intolerance was so much denounced

by the philosophers, did his best to extirpate Protestantism from his dominions. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes was justified, according to him, by the irreconcilability of the Calvinist sect with the French monarchy. Their conspiracy had divided France into "circles" (we suppose it was from them Mr. Stephens borrowed the name), and worked unceasingly against the established order of things. The King said one day to one of the leaders of their party, "My father feared you, my grandfather loved you; for me, I neither fear nor love you." It is true that, with the distractions of his amusements and his vices, he had many things to think of besides a general plan of anti-Protestant policy; but he aided his ministers and magistrates in the acts of repression which they thought the safety of the country required. The aristocratic mind of De Maistre sees only a "shopkeeping" objection in the argument that there was a loss to France of 400,000 men, who took to other countries their talents, their arts, and their manufactures, and made those countries richer at the cost of their own. He does not, however, look upon the Reformation as having produced in all other countries as evil consequences as in France, on account of the larger proportion of the elements of the old religion which some of those countries retained. The idea occurs here which is expressed more fully in the concluding chapter of his work "*Du Pape*": "The Anglican Church is more Catholic than she thinks herself, and one may believe that it is what is Catholic in her that has saved the State." It will be interesting and profitable to those who have the book to peruse that chapter again, and see how much is foreshadowed in it of the progress of subsequent events in England. But, as relevant to the points we have been referring to, we may mention here his *tu quoque* addressed to those who object to the deposing power—a "bugbear" as he justly calls it—that, in point of fact, the Protestants of England themselves do that which they say Catholic subjects cannot lawfully do; for they depose their sovereign if he does not hold their creed. It is a condition precedent to, and inseparable from, the inheritance and possession of the Crown.

It is evident enough that the opinions of Joseph de Maistre, as they may be gathered from the volume published by his grandson, justify the latter in saying that Revolution cannot claim him "either as an accomplice or an initiator." But the aims and agencies of the revolutionists of France and Italy are even more explicitly condemned in some of his previously published works. Because he was an enemy of Austria, and because Austria was, a few years ago, supposed to be the

Pope's best friend, many persons rushed to the conclusion that there was something heterodox in De Maistre's views, and that he could be claimed as identified in ideas and in policy with recent advocates of Italian unity. Now, one of the things De Maistre hated Austria for was precisely that she had robbed the Pope. In fact, she was not particular, he thought, about whom she took territory from, and his constant labour was to keep his royal master's eyes open to the dangers he ran from those imperial kinsmen upon whom he was sometimes too much inclined to rely. De Maistre, of course, drew delicate distinctions between the "family" and the "cabinet," and seemed to have great respect for the former, while holding the latter in entire distrust. It may be owned that this was a diplomatic affectation, and that, in matters of State policy, he did not really think much better of the Emperor Francis II. than of his ministers. In the reconstruction of Italy, which he foresaw as inevitable at the fall of Napoleon, he wished that the House of Savoy should become a strong power in the North; that the House of Bourbon should recover its continental territory in the South; that they should be united in a strict league with each other, and that they should incline towards France in foreign policy. By this means he believed that Italy would be delivered from Austrian predominance, and would have a happier destiny than when divided into a number of petty states. He held that the Pope should be restored to his dominions in their integrity, and that "his claims were, without contradiction, the most just of all." * These views, which he constantly urged upon the King of Sardinia as well as upon the Emperor of Russia, were not without effect upon the latter sovereign, and it was undoubtedly to De Maistre's influence that the former owed the addition of Genoa to his hereditary dominions. Austria, who would not have given him anything, and perhaps would have taken something away, prevented his getting any more.

So far from there being any presumption that De Maistre would have been in our days at one with Cavour, it is very probable that he would have taken no part in Italian affairs, unless, perhaps, the part that Rossi took, and with Rossi's fate. He was devoted to the House of Savoy, but it is more than doubtful that he would have served the House of Carignan. He certainly would not have been a Minister of Charles Albert, not merely from his dislike to paper constitutions, but also because Charles Albert was a conspirator and a traitor before he was a king. Victor Emmanuel II. has very little in com-

* "Corresp. Diplom." t. ii. p. 129.

mon with the predecessor whose name he received in baptism ; not even near consanguinity, except through his Hapsburg mother ; but it might have done him good at an earlier period of his life to read these remarks, addressed to Victor Emmanuel I. on the 7th of June, 1811 :—

We receive also at this moment the news of the convocation of the Council of Paris, with the threatening letter of Napoleon, who has broken the ice and openly threatens to depose the Pope. This is a new order of things, and who knows what we shall see ? It seems to me impossible that some opposition, some sublime protest, should not be raised on some side or other. However this may be, your Majesty is receiving with us one of the greatest lessons of experience that can occur on this subject. Never has any sovereign laid his hand on any Pope whatsoever (with or without reason, is a point I do not examine) and been able to boast afterwards of a long and happy reign. Henry V. suffered all that a man and a prince could suffer. His unnatural son died of the plague at the age of forty-four, after a very troubled reign ; Frederick I. died in the Cydnus at thirty-eight ; Frederick II. was imprisoned by his son after being deposed ; Philip the Fair died of a fall from his horse at forty-seven. My pen refrains from less ancient instances. "That proves nothing," it will be said. Very well : all I require is that the like should happen to another, even though that too would prove nothing ; and that is what we shall see. (Corresp. Diplom., t. i. pp. 14, 15.)

De Maistre was right ; the like did "happen to another," and the world saw what he had foreseen. Let us add another sentence : it is from the last chapter *Du Pape* :—

Catholic sovereignties have sometimes appeared to apostatise ; for it is an apostasy to lose sight of the foundations of Christianity, to shake them even, by openly declaring war against the Head of that religion, by overwhelming him with disgust, with bitterness, with shameful chicanery, which Protestant powers perhaps would not have permitted themselves. Among those princes there are some who will one day be inscribed in the rank of great persecutors. They have not made blood flow, it is true, but posterity will ask if a Diocletian, a Galerius, or a Decius did more evil to Christianity.

We shall be glad if our present review turns the minds of Catholic readers in these countries to the other works of this great writer, more important in many respects than that with which we have been chiefly engaged. They form a part of the education of every Continental Catholic who desires to understand the work of God in history, and they shed a most valuable light upon all the great questions of our time. They might, with propriety, be placed even by Englishmen who are not great Conservatives but the light of

comprehension which he applied to the solution of political problems. But we can hardly suppose that there are any longer Conservatives in England of the school of Burke and De Maistre, while the great party that usurps the name is led by one whose two latest works—an Act of Parliament and a novel—were produced in the interest of the International Revolution.

ART. VI.—GALILEO AND THE PONTIFICAL CONGREGATIONS.

The Pontifical Decrees against the Motion of the Earth considered in their bearing on the theory of advanced Ultramontaniam. London: Longmans.

IN our April review of this pamphlet we argued against the author's amazing statement, that Paul V. condemned Copernicanism *ex cathedrâ*; and we flatter ourselves we showed that such a statement is not less than extravagantly mistaken. So much as this then is already established; viz. that no kind of argument can be deduced, from any supposed *ex cathedrâ* utterance of Paul V., against that dogma concerning Pontifical infallibility which has been defined by the Vatican Council.

In truth there are two facts which stand so simply on the surface throughout the Church's whole dealings with Galileo, that, had it not been for the case of our present opponent, we should have thought it impossible for any candid inquirer to miss them. These facts are: that on one hand no Pope ever condemned Copernicanism *ex cathedrâ*; and that on the other hand nevertheless a number of successive Pontiffs considered that theory repugnant to Scripture, and used every means in their power, short of an *ex cathedrâ* condemnation, to discountenance and repress it.

If we are to judge from one or two communications which have reached us, we should say that some few excellent Catholics wish us to leave the matter where it stood in April; and to ignore the *second* of the two facts just mentioned. They deprecate, as paradoxical and savouring of mere subtle refinement, our eulogy of the Congregational Decree against Galileo, and our allegation that a certain firm interior assent was due from all Catholics to its doctrine. They even think that so "eccentric" a line of argument as ours may injure Catholic interests,

by prejudicing candid inquirers against any high doctrine of Pontifical infallibility.

We have given the best consideration in our power to this very intelligible view; but we must say plainly that such consideration has only strengthened our conviction on the other side. It is most certain that there are various truths of vital moment on the Church's teaching authority—which may very possibly indeed be in some shape defined by the Vatican Council before its close—entirely over and above the mere infallibility of Pontifical *ex cathedrâ* pronouncements. For instance, all loyal Catholics earnestly desire, not merely to accept infallible definitions, but to *think with the Church*; “*sentire cum Ecclesiâ*.” This is the “sacrifice of intellect,” which Dr. Döllinger considers a “delusion;” but which S. Ignatius, as is well known, regarded as an object of such importance, that he laid down express “rules” for its attainment. Now most certainly all Catholics in Galileo's time, who laboured to “think with the Church,” would have rejected Copernicanism as anti-Scriptural: for the Church exhibited her “mind” on the subject in every possible way, short of a definition *ex cathedrâ*. Then again one reason which induces some Catholics to dislike our line of argument about Galileo, is their opinion that it is intolerable tyranny to claim interior assent as due to a fallible judgment. Yet there is no fact more certain in all history, than that Paul V. and Urban VIII. did regard a certain interior assent as due to the doctrinal declaration of 1616. Is it a light thing then to admit, that Popes acting in their official capacity—acting with full deliberation and with fullest accordance of their legitimate ecclesiastical advisers—were guilty of intolerable tyranny? Lastly,—as the pamphlet before us points out,—Pius IX. has expressly declared, that full adhesion cannot be secured from scientific men to revealed truth, unless they yield interior assent to the doctrinal decrees of Pontifical Congregations. We heartily agree with our opponent, that such is the undeniable sense of the Munich Brief; and we shall argue in union with him for this view in the course of our article. Now it is an historical fact denied by no man, that one of these doctrinal decrees condemned Copernicanism as false and contrary to Scripture; and surely therefore any Catholic treatment of the Galileo case would be most lame and impotent, which should not fully confront this teaching of Pius IX.

We may further add that, of the six “anti-Ultramontane” inferences, (as our opponent has shown,) with which he concludes his pamphlet, one only (the first) is correct.

by the reasoning of our April number. Yet the remaining five are surely very serious. They run as follows:—

1. Rome—i. e. a Pontifical Congregation informed by the Pope—may put forth a decision scientifically false and doctrinally erroneous.

2. It does not follow from the Church's having been informed that the Pope has ordered a Catholic to abandon an opinion altogether as indefensible and untenable, that the opinion may not be true and sound.

3.

4. The Pope may command a Pontifical Congregation to promulgate, as a portion of the teaching of the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church, that which is scientifically false and doctrinally erroneous.

5. The true interpretation of our Lord's promises to St. Peter permits us to say, that a Pope may, when acting officially, confirm his brethren the Cardinals in an error touching the matter of faith, and use his authority as Pope to indoctrinate the Church with a false opinion respecting Holy Scripture.

6. It is not always for the good of the Church that Catholics should think as Rome does, even on a point of doctrine.

It will be involved in the argument of our present article, that no one of these five inferences can be legitimately deduced from the Church's way of dealing with Copernicanism and with Galileo.

But more may be said even than all this, in defence of the course we are pursuing. It is necessary to enter on such considerations as those of the present article, in order to defend the very Vatican Definition; in order to uphold the infallibility of *ex cathedrâ* Acts themselves. For our opponent alleges—and we on our part are cordially of his mind—that the Munich Brief, with its strong doctrine on the authority of Pontifical Congregations, was strictly *ex cathedrâ*; and that it is in the number therefore of those utterances, which the Vatican Council has defined to be infallible.

Nor can we admit for a moment that there is anything paradoxical, eccentric, over-refined, or subtle, in our own mode of dealing with the Galileo case. On the contrary, it seems to us that our view represents successive Pontiffs as having acted throughout with the simplest common sense. Had it not been for the extraordinarily brilliant career which Copernicanism ran through after Galileo's death, all Catholics of the present day would see how violently anti-Catholic was the position of that astronomer.

Our main contention shall be, that a certain firm interior assent was due from all contemporary Catholics to the doctrine of that Decree against Copernicanism, which was issued by the Congregation of the Index in 1616. In the course of our argument for this thesis, we shall be led to con-

sider nearly all the points raised by our opponent, which remain unnoticed from our former article; and what few still remain behind, shall then be separately treated. We must introduce our argument by three preliminary explanations.

1. The very notion has sometimes been denied as extravagant, that firm interior assent can be due to a fallible judgment; and yet there is no more ordinary and every-day phenomenon. I feel ill; and send for a physician of first-rate eminence, with whose integrity I am intimately acquainted. "Your case is distressing," he says, "but very simple: you have a rheumatic fever; there is no doubt about the matter." I must be very strangely constituted, if I do not yield firm interior assent to this judgment. My relations perhaps, who do not like to think me so ill, cry out: "Oh, but Dr. X. is not infallible." I readily admit this; I readily admit that the fact of my having rheumatic fever is not absolutely certain in the strictest sense of that term: yet I hold the conviction that such is my illness, no one whit less confidently than I did before. Such precisely is the assent which, as we maintain, is due to the doctrine of a Congregational decree: a firm interior assent, ordinarily not accompanied by any doubt whatever, yet not so firm as to be *incompatible* with the co-existence of doubt.

2. Then, when we say that such assent is due to such doctrine, we by no means mean that it is obligatory under pain of *sin*, whether mortal or venial. We have before entirely avoided this question, and we shall continue to avoid it now. So in the previous illustration. When it was said that my assent is due to Dr. X.'s dictum, this did not mean that I should *sin* in refusing assent, but that I should act unreasonably and like a fool in so doing; that such assent is my one reasonable response. We say in like manner, that firm interior assent was the one reasonable response of contemporary Catholics to the doctrine set forth by the Pontifical Congregation.

3. The essence of an *ex cathedrâ* Act is, that the Pope therein commands all Catholics to accept some given doctrine with interior assent. Whenever he gives such command, he speaks *ex cathedrâ*; whenever he speaks *ex cathedrâ*, he gives such command.* If it be further asked, what *indications* may assure Catholics that in this or that pronouncement he

* We do not for a moment forget, that in many instances there existed a strict obligation *sub mortali* of avoiding some heresy — Arianism, Pelagianism, Nestorianism, Eutychianism, Monothelism — from the moment when it first sprang up. Still even in these instances, an *ex cathedrâ* condemnation added a fresh obligation to that already existing.

sider nearly all the points raised by our opponent, which remain unnoticed from our former article; and what few still remain behind, shall then be separately treated. We must introduce our argument by three preliminary explanations.

1. The very notion has sometimes been denied as extravagant, that firm interior assent can be due to a fallible judgment; and yet there is no more ordinary and every-day phenomenon. I feel ill; and send for a physician of first-rate eminence, with whose integrity I am intimately acquainted. "Your case is distressing," he says, "but very simple: you have a rheumatic fever; there is no doubt about the matter." I must be very strangely constituted, if I do not yield firm interior assent to this judgment. My relations perhaps, who do not like to think me so ill, cry out: "Oh, but Dr. X. is not infallible." I readily admit this; I readily admit that the fact of my having rheumatic fever is not absolutely certain in the strictest sense of that term: yet I hold the conviction that such *is* my illness, no one whit less confidently than I did before. Such precisely is the assent which, as we maintain, is due to the doctrine of a Congregational decree: a firm interior assent, ordinarily not accompanied by any doubt whatever, yet not *so* firm as to be *incompatible* with the co-existence of doubt.

2. Then, when we say that such assent is due to such doctrine, we by no means mean that it is obligatory under pain of *sin*, whether mortal or venial. We have before entirely avoided this question, and we shall continue to avoid it now. So in the previous illustration. When it was said that my assent is due to Dr. X.'s dictum, this did not mean that I should *sin* in refusing assent, but that I should act unreasonably and like a fool in so doing; that such assent is my one reasonable response. We say in like manner, that firm interior assent was the one reasonable response of contemporary Catholics to the doctrine set forth by the Pontifical Congregation.

3. The essence of an *ex cathedrâ* Act is, that the Pope therein commands all Catholics to accept some given doctrine with interior assent. Whenever he gives such command, he speaks *ex cathedrâ*; whenever he speaks *ex cathedrâ*, he gives such command.* If it be further asked, what *indications* may assure Catholics that in this or that pronouncement he

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intends to issue such a command,—we have always replied that no general answer can be given ; and that this issue must be determined by the circumstances, intrinsic and extrinsic, of each particular case. We consider ourselves however to have established conclusively in our last number, that Paul V. did *not* speak *ex cathedrâ* in his condemnation of Copernicanism.

Now it is plain that a Pope can very importantly influence the Church's doctrinal course, by methods entirely distinct from that of an *ex cathedrâ* pronouncement. Our present subject leads us to insist on one of these ; viz., a disciplinary command of some Congregation, proceeding avowedly on a doctrinal basis. The same doctrinal *reasons* were expressed in the Decree of 1616, which might very possibly have been expressed in an *ex cathedrâ* Act ; but the *command*, founded on those reasons, was essentially different in the two cases. Had Paul V. spoken *ex cathedra*, he would have said in effect : “ Since the anti-Scriptural theory of Copernicus is rapidly spreading, I hereby command that all Catholics shall *accept with interior assent* the geocentric theory.” By sanctioning the *Decree of the Index*, he said in effect : “ Since the anti-Scriptural theory of Copernicus is rapidly spreading, I hereby forbid Catholics from *writing or reading Copernican books*.” Those who maintain—as we ourselves strongly maintain—that firm interior assent was due from contemporary Catholics to the doctrine of this Decree, cannot at all events say that such assent was an act of *obedience to Papal command* ; because no Papal command of interior assent was ever *issued* to contemporary Catholics.

Here then we are brought to our direct subject. There are various doctrinal declarations, officially put forth by Pontifical Congregations, approved by the Pope, and made by Pope and Congregations the basis of disciplinary enactments. We allege that firm interior assent is due from contemporary* Catholics to these declarations. On what *grounds* do we rest this allegation ?

We gave various reasons in our article of 1865 ; and as our opponent has attempted no reply,† we must begin with merely referring to them again.

* We introduce the qualification “ contemporary,” with a special view to the case of Galileo ; and before concluding our article, we shall explain ourselves distinctly on the reasons of the qualification.

† He says generally (p. 25, note) that “ we have not succeeded in vindicating our doctrine on the subject ” ; but gives no reason for his opinion. He considers that our doctrine is irrelevant to the Galileo question, because, on his (most strange) view, Paul V. condemned Copernicanism *ex cathedrâ*.

1. Firstly we based our conclusion ("Doctrinal Decisions" pp. 134-6) on the maxim "*cuique credendum in suâ arte.*" There is a very large multitude of Pontifical judgments, which are *ex cathedrâ* and infallible; far more than can be apprehended and mastered, otherwise than by sustained and intelligent labour directed to that end. Those who have devoted themselves to the task, will have their minds imbued with a vast body of infallible truth, to which other Catholics are comparatively strangers. Now the members of a Pontifical Congregation are precisely a body of men, who make it their business and profession to master methodically this body of truth; and who moreover, from position and association, are singularly free from all sinister and non-Papal influence. What can be more unreasonable, we had almost said more impudent, than that in any ordinary case a private Catholic should pit his individual judgment against theirs?

We gave the following illustration of our argument:—"I have never studied medicine systematically; but I am fond of experimentalizing in a quiet way, and have come to an opinion that a certain remedy would be serviceable for a certain disease. I publish my opinion, with its grounds; and find it repudiated by every one, young or old, who has gone through a medical education. All combine to assure me, that I am quite mistaken, and that my reasoning is absurdly insufficient to establish my conclusion. No one alleges that God has endowed the medical profession with infallibility: and yet it would not be so much presumption as actual insanity, so soon as I am satisfied that they have really pondered what I have written, if I hesitated to abandon my own opinion in deference to theirs; and this, though I were wholly unacquainted with their reasoning, or could see no force in it."

2. Then secondly these doctrinal declarations are ordinarily the exposition of Roman tradition. "In which" [Roman Church], says Pius IX., "always remains the infallible magisterium of the Faith, and in which, therefore, *Apostolical Tradition has always been preserved.*" "In which [Roman Church] alone religion has been inviolably preserved, and from which all other churches must borrow *the tradition of Faith.*" Surely much more is implied in these large statements, than the mere infallibility of Papal *ex cathedrâ* pronouncements; however numerous the latter may justly be considered. Such statements ascribe a certain singular authority to the endemic tradition of Rome. But of that tradition, the various officials of the Pontifical Congregations are, under the Pope, the special depositaries and guardians. Where they speak, the voice of Rome is heard. "I am convinced," says Zac-

cariæ,* "that it appertains to Providence not to permit that Rome, even apart from cases where the Pope speaks *ex cathedrâ*, should condemn as erroneous a doctrine which is not so." And Delahogue † gives a very pertinent reason for this view; viz., that the Roman Church has "received pure doctrine from the continued series of Peter's successors." Nor is it only *material* purity of doctrine (if we may so express ourselves) which so remarkably characterizes Rome, but a subtle and refined doctrinal *sense*; whence results a ready discernment of what under given circumstances is perilous or otherwise to the pure Gospel.

3. Our next argument would require an article for its due development and elucidation; but a few words will sufficiently indicate its bearing. We will begin with a parallel. A devout Catholic is not content with performing those duties which are of actual obligation, but goes forth into various pious acts which are not strictly commanded; and for doing so is all the more pleasing to Almighty God. In like manner an *intellectually docile* Catholic is not content with accepting those doctrines, which are taught *ex cathedrâ* and cannot be doubted without mortal sin; he labours at studying all indications of the Church's entire mind, and bringing his own intellect into harmony therewith. Many doctrines (to use the modern expression) are proposed by the Church which she does not impose; and God is better pleased, in proportion as a Catholic more unquestioningly accepts these doctrines. "*Sentire cum Ecclesiâ*"—as we have already urged—is always accounted a signal intellectual excellence.

Now, short of an obligatory definition, there can be no surer indication of the Church's mind, than a doctrinal declaration expressly put forth, as the basis of an universally binding disciplinary enactment. Take the very instance which has led to these remarks, that of Galileo. Here was no case, such as often occurs, of a Pope imposing silence on both sides for the sake of peace. Catholics were encouraged to oppose Copernicanism, while they were peremptorily prohibited from defending it; and this on the avowed ground that it is "false and contrary to Scripture." If a procedure of this special sort does not conclusively prove the Church's present "mind," there *can* be no such proof, except an *ex cathedrâ* definition; and the "*sentire cum Ecclesiâ*" becomes an unmeaning sound.

4. Moreover it has always been recommended by authority as the reasonable and docile course, to accept interiorly such

* Quoted from Bouix, "Doctrinal Decisions," p. 132, note.

† Quoted in "Doctrinal Decisions," p. 137, note.

doctrinal teaching. Galileo himself was enjoined by Paul V. and by Urban VIII. to "desist from" "depart from," "desert" his "false opinion." Nay, as our opponent has importantly pointed out, very strong expressions were used by the Holy Office in 1638: "In no way," says that Congregation, "can an opinion be probable, which has been already declared and defined as contrary to Divine Scripture." * Surely this is a very strong declaration, as implying a claim to interior assent. If a Congregational condemnation deprives a tenet for the time of all probability, the one reasonable course for contemporary Catholics must be, to renounce that tenet *interiorly*; and not merely to abstain from *defending* it. † Then—going beyond this particular case of Galileo—it is universally considered "laudable" that a Catholic, whose work is condemned by the Index, shall "submit himself" interiorly to the decision. "Laudabiliter se subiecit" is the form always used; nor does any one doubt, that the "se subicere" here means "to subject the *intellect*." We will give one instance out of a thousand illustrating the same principle. When Mgr. Hugonin a few years ago was nominated Bishop of Bayeux, the Holy Father required him to retract certain philosophical doctrines maintained by him, which favoured the seven ontologistic propositions, condemned—not by the Pope speaking *ex cathedra*—but by the Holy Office: and he readily obeyed the requisition. And

* We showed in April, how impossible it is to think, that these words describe geocentricism as having been *infallibly* defined.

† Our readers will be interested to see the following opinion of Caramuel, the well-known theologian, occasioned by this very Galileo case, and quoted by M. Bouix (de Papa, tom. ii., pp. 461-2):—"Quam sint certæ et indubitatæ declarationes Cardinalium. . . . Ego auctoritatem practicam a speculativâ distinguo: et licet condendi articulos fidei, hoc est sentiendi et credendi, potestatem *soli Pontifici ex cathedrâ loquenti* concedam, condendi *practicos* articulos loquendi, docendi, concionandi, dictandi et operandi auctoritatem concedo dominis eminentissimis, quos ad Ecclesiæ regimen practicum adsumpsit sanctissimus Dominus noster. Aio eorumdem auctoritatem esse duplicem, interdictoriam et condemnatoriam. Quando liber vel sententia *interdicitur*, non asseritur esse improbabilis sed neque esse probabilis; sed, jussa manere in gradu probabilitatis in quo antea, ob bonum publicum vel privatum nec dictari nec defendi præcipitur. . . . Quando aliqua sententia ab eminentissimis dominis *condemnatur, practice* condemnatur. Propositio sic condemnata non pertransit in hæresim, sed perdit omnem extrinsecam auctoritatem et redditur improbabilis *practice*. Quid si condemnatur tanquam *hæretica*? Tunc vi hujus condemnationis non fiet hæretica, quæ antea non esset hæretica: sed quæ antea erat hæretica, condemnatione declarabitur esse hæretica; idque tantâ certitudine, ut *eandem non esse hæreticam maneat improbabile*. In hoc et similibus casibus habet i
interdicendi, præcipiendi, abjurandi: et
obedire, sincere jurare. Ergo in
externi per se, et interni per:

indeed all good Catholics—even those who have clung to the name of “ontologists”—have universally professed to reject interiorly those seven propositions, from the very time when the Holy Office declared “that they could not safely be taught.”

In all the cases we have named, the whole Episcopate has expressly or tacitly concurred with the Holy Father. And if the *Ecclesia Docens* is, by God’s gift, the Catholic’s infallible guide in faith and morals, his one reasonable course must be to adopt that line of conduct which she approves and recommends.

5. But the most conclusive argument of all is derived from Pius IX.’s words in the Munich Brief; a Brief which we heartily concur with our opponent (p. 38) in accounting *ex cathedrâ*. As this is a very important pronouncement on our present theme, and as there has been much discussion on its exact significance, we will begin by translating the whole paragraph.

“We give deserved praise to the men of this [the Munich] Congress, because, rejecting (as we understand them) the false distinction between philosophy and the philosopher, concerning which we have spoken in another Letter, they know and have declared that all Catholics in their treatises are bound in conscience to obey the dogmatical decrees of the infallible Catholic Church. And while we thus justly praise them for professing a truth which necessarily arises from the obligation of Catholic faith, we wish to believe that they did not intend to limit that obligation, whereby Catholic teachers and writers are entirely bound, within [the sphere of] those matters only, which are proposed by the Church’s infallible judgment as dogmata of the Faith to be believed by all. And we also persuade ourselves that they did not intend to declare, that that perfect adhesion towards revealed truths, which they have acknowledged as altogether necessary to achieving true progress of the sciences and to refuting error, can be obtained, if faith and obedience be only given to the dogmata expressly defined by the Church. For even if there were only question of that subjection which is to be yielded by an act of divine faith,—that nevertheless should not be confined to those things which have been defined by express decrees of Œcumenical Councils or Roman Pontiffs and this Apostolic See, but should be extended to those things also which are taught as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed over the world, and which are therefore recognised by Catholic theologians with universal and constant consent as appertaining to the Faith. But since the question is [rather] of that subjection, whereby all those Catholics are bound in conscience, who labour in the

speculative sciences that they may [thus] by their writings produce fresh benefits to the Church,—therefore the men of this Congress should acknowledge that it is not enough for cultured (*sapientibus*) Catholics to receive and venerate the dogmata of the Church, but that it is also necessary for them to submit themselves, as well to those doctrinal decisions which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations, as also to those heads of doctrine, which are held by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain, that the opinions contradictory to those heads of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure.”

In dwelling on this momentous utterance, we will begin with a question, which has no direct bearing indeed on our argument, but which nevertheless cannot be possibly passed over by those, who would understand the force of this passage in its completeness. It might appear on the surface, that Pius IX. here makes no mention of certain ecclesiastical teachings, which are far more authoritative than two of those which he does mention. We refer to definitions infallibly put forth by the Church, which are not definitions *of faith*; definitions which infallibly declare, not revealed truths, but subordinate and ministrative Catholic verities; definitions which condemn the errors branded by them, not as *heretical*, but as deserving some *minor* censure.

We shall find however, on attentive consideration, that these minor infallible definitions are by no means passed over in the above-cited paragraph. The Catholics assembled at Munich had frankly confessed, that “all Catholics are bound in conscience to obey the dogmatical decrees of the infallible Catholic Church.” There are two different errors however, says the Pontiff in effect, which are not necessarily disclaimed by this profession. For (1) those who utter it may possibly intend to admit no obligation of avoiding any tenet, in deference to the Church, which is not denounced by her as actually *heretical*: or (2) they may intend to imply, that they do enough by merely assenting to every truth which has been expressly *defined* by the Church, whether as a revealed truth or as a subordinate Catholic verity. These are two totally distinct errors; and both are compatible with the strict *wording* of the profession of the Congress. Those who fall into the *first* error, confine their assent to what the Church teaches *as of faith*; those who fall into the *second*, confine their assent to what she teaches *by way of express definition*. In the former error, the Pope proceeds to lay down principles. Firstly, even as r

Catholics are bound to accept with such assent, not only the revealed truths which have been expressly *defined*, but all those which the Church magisterially teaches as revealed.* And secondly,—whereas there are certain *further* verities which must be firmly held in order to secure the due *preservation* and *protection* of revealed truth—these verities are by no means confined to those which have been expressly defined by the Church in her infallible judgments, but cover a much larger area. It is this interpretation alone, as our readers may see by attempting any other, which gives full intelligibleness and cohesion to the whole passage.

We may add that there is an evident allusion to the Church's two classes of infallible definitions, in the words "if faith and obedience be only given to the dogmata expressly defined by the Church." *Faith* is due to definitions of *faith*; interior *submission* and *obedience*, but not perhaps faith, to the Church's minor doctrinal judgments.† But faith,—so the Pope teaches,—is due to *other* revealed truths, and interior obedience to *other* Catholic verities, over and above those which have been expressly defined.

These Catholic verities, we have said, cover a much larger area than the Church's minor doctrinal definitions. What is that area? Let Pius IX. himself answer the question:—"It is necessary for educated Catholics to submit themselves, as well to those doctrinal decisions which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations,‡ as to those heads of doctrine which are held by the common consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain, that the opinions contradictory to those heads of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure." Now what is the meaning of this phrase "submit themselves"? "Submit their *intellect*"? or only "submit their *will*"? The sentence itself would almost decide. "Subjiciant se" governs equally two different datives: viz. (1) "to the doctrinal decisions of Pontifical Congregations"; and (2) "to those heads of doctrine, which are unanimously held by Catholics in a certain special way." Now no one can possibly doubt, that the

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"submission" due to these "heads of doctrine" is submission of *intellect*: hence one would naturally think that it is submission of *intellect* which is *also* due to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation. The same conclusion however is made absolutely certain by an earlier sentence. For the Pope declares, that the submission of which he speaks is necessary for "perfect adhesion towards revealed truth;" and evidently it is some *intellectual* process, which alone can give increased adhesion towards revealed truth.

Nor should we fail carefully to observe the peremptoriness of Pius IX.'s language. "All Catholics are *bound in conscience*," he says, to the "submission" of which he speaks. All Catholics then who give themselves to intellectual speculation, if they would really promote the cause of truth, should submit themselves with interior intellectual assent to every doctrinal decree of a Pontifical Congregation which concerns them. God so watches over those decrees, as to provide that such intellectual submission is a momentous security for the Catholic's more perfect "adhesion towards revealed truth." And we need hardly add, that the anti-Copernican Decree of 1616, in its bearing on contemporary Catholics, was precisely one of those to which the Munich Brief refers.

Of the various objections which have been raised against our thesis, some apply to the special case of Galileo, others to the general doctrine. We will begin with the latter class, as they can be far more briefly despatched.

I. Our opponent argues (p. 38) that the Munich Brief "apparently bids us to attribute the same authority to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation, as to those heads of doctrine which Catholics are bound to account theologically certain": and that by so doing it claims for those decrees *theological certainty*. He does well however "not to press this point." Pius IX. teaches that intellectual submission is due to both the classes which he mentions; but he neither says nor implies, that their authority is exactly equal *in degree*.

II. "At all events," it may be rejoined, "it is impossible that increased adhesion towards revealed truth can be obtained from Catholics, by their acceptance of a *false* doctrine. It follows therefore from the Munich Brief that all doctrinal decisions of a Congregation are *true*; or in other words, that the Congregations are *infallible* in such decisions."

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We reply firstly, that a doctrine, in itself untrue, may nevertheless be the legitimate consequence of all the premisses cognisable at some particular time; and it is not at all difficult to suppose that, on such an hypothesis, its acceptance is

a very important security for orthodoxy. We have in fact argued throughout, that the case of Galileo is here precisely in point. Had he submitted his judgment, as he should have done, to his ecclesiastical superiors, he would have preserved very far greater "adhesion" towards that part of "revealed truth," which concerns the Inspiration of Scripture and the reverence due to that sacred volume. His refusal to accept interiorly the Doctrine of 1616 both exhibited and fostered in him a most anti-Catholic, proud, and irreverent method of dealing with God's Written Word.

We do not mean, however, that the Munich Brief necessarily implies so much as this. Its words, we think, do not necessarily imply, that in every individual case a Pontifical Congregation will teach precisely that doctrine, which legitimately follows from the premisses then cognisable; but those words may be verified, *without* claiming for the Congregations so very signal a prerogative. Let us suppose merely so much as this; that, through God's superintending Providence, the body of such decrees taken together contains immeasurably more truth than falsehood. If then we compare together the respective state of those who *accept* all those decrees as such and those who *reject* them as such, it will be found that the former have imbibed a very far larger amount of Catholic truth, than is (so far) possessed by the latter. "The youthful son," we said in a former article, "gains immeasurably more of real knowledge by accepting without hesitation the whole of his father's instruction, than he could possibly gain by questioning and sifting it, and believing nothing on his father's authority. In like manner, a Catholic would gain far more spiritual knowledge by interiorly accepting all these decrees, than by declining such acceptance; even though it might happen, on certain very rare occasions, that they led him into error."

At the same time we expressed in our article of 1865 (p. 186),—following part of his way that great theologian Zaccaria—a pious opinion or augury, that though the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation have no *promise* of inerrancy, yet we may humbly hope and expect that God will at no time permit them to err, regard being had to the circumstances of the time." Since these words were first written, we have seen no reason whatever for abandoning this pious opinion or augury, but much the reverse.

III. Some have maintained, in opposition to our view, that it never can be prudent to accept an opinion which in fact is false. But this notion is so very paradoxical, that it is difficult to regard its upholders as having quite considered what

they say. Whether there be question of a rustic instructed by his parochus or a hundred similar cases, it would be universally recommended that the instruction be accepted without question as a whole : though, as being fallible, there is almost a certainty of its comprising some subordinate mistakes. But the case may easily happen, in which there shall even be obligation under mortal sin of holding an untrue opinion. A. B. is accused of some crime, which he has really committed. I have no reason however of any kind for thinking ill of him, and I see that the alleged proofs are ludicrously insufficient. I am bound under mortal sin then to account him innocent ; and if I accounted him otherwise, I should show myself by that very fact to be actuated by uncharitable or otherwise reprehensible motives.

IV. Much more plausibly, a certain modification of the preceding has been suggested to us as an objection. Catholics, so it is argued,—through the Church's inalienable prerogative of passive infallibility—can never be unanimous in regarding a false opinion as a truth of their religion. But, so the objector continues, if interior assent could be due to a mistaken theological judgment—and this *must* be possible if such assent is due to a *fallible* judgment—all Catholics who act loyally and reasonably, would be unanimous in holding a false opinion as a truth of their religion. On our view then, such is the final inference, the Pope might lawfully and wisely sanction a decree, from which it reasonably results that the Church shall lose her inalienable privilege of passive infallibility. Quod est absurdum.

We can reply very unanswerably, without going beyond the particular case which has led to this whole discussion. It is a notorious fact, denied by no one, that for many centuries all Catholics did unanimously account geocentrism to be a truth of their religion, as being declared in Scripture. Such unanimity therefore cannot possibly be inconsistent with any inalienable prerogative of the Church.

In fact, while all theologians admit the existence of what is called passive infallibility, our impression is that they differ a good deal from each other in the sense they give that phrase; though the subject is so subordinate a one in their treatises, that it is difficult to speak on the matter with confidence. We would ourselves suggest a slight modification of that sense, which is implied in the present objection. Instead of a "*false opinion*" we would substitute "an opinion, which either contradicts revealed truth, or leads by legitimate consequence to such contradiction." With this alteration, the Church's prerogative of passive infallibility will import, that Catholics can

never be unanimous in holding* any opinion, which either contradicts revealed truth or leads by legitimate consequence to such contradiction. If this view of passive infallibility be admitted, all difficulty vanishes. For no one will allege that the theory of geocentrism falls under either of these two categories; and one may be very confident that God will never permit a Pontifical Congregation to put forward any such heterodox opinion.

V. Lastly it has been objected, that the position we are here assuming invalidates one particular argument, on which we have heretofore laid great stress in vindicating the *ex cathedrâ* character of certain Pontifical Acts. We have argued again and again, that there are certain Papal pronouncements—such e.g. as the “*Unigenitus*,” the “*Auctorem Fidei*,” the “*Mirari vos*,”—of which it is manifest (so to speak) by an act of *eyesight*, that they are *ex cathedrâ*; because the Pope has expressly testified that he commands interior assent to their teaching. But if interior assent can be due to judgments which are *not ex cathedrâ*,—so runs the objection—the above-named argument falls to the ground. Our reply is most simple, and is contained indeed in the very definition we gave of an *ex cathedrâ* Act. “The essence of an *ex cathedrâ* Act”—we said a few pages back—“is that the Pope therein commands all Catholics to accept some given doctrine with interior assent.” We proceeded to point out, that those who claim ever so strongly interior assent as due to the doctrinal decree of a Congregation, cannot at all events say that such assent is an act of obedience to Papal command; because no Congregational decree, as such, implies any Papal *command* of interior assent. The argument therefore remains absolutely untouched, by which we established the *ex cathedrâ* character of the three Constitutions to which we have referred.

We are aware of no other objections to our view, except those derived from the particular instance of Copernicanism; and those objections indeed are reducible to one, though that very formidable. “If the DUBLIN REVIEW doctrine were admitted, it would follow that on one memorable occasion all Catholics who acted with the loyalty demanded by reason, were led by so doing to accept the false theory of geocentrism as a revealed truth.” We replied to this objection in Oct. 1865; and it is our business now to consider our present opponent’s *rejoinder* on that reply.

* In this version we omit one qualification while adding another; for we no longer say “*holding as a truth of their religion*.”

Our reply itself was substantially this (pp. 140—142): "Holy Scripture differs from all other books in the fact, that it is throughout the Word of God; that every proposition which it contains is infallibly true, in that sense in which God intended it." "No inconvenience however arises, nor is there any irreverence towards God's Written Word, though this or that text be understood in a very unobvious sense, if that sense be affixed in deference to some definite, tangible, objective rule, the reasonableness of which is sufficiently established." Now when science* has demonstrated the overwhelming scientific probability of Copernicanism, such demonstration may reasonably be accepted by the Church as God's authoritative explanation of His own language; even though it necessitate the understanding that language in a very unobvious sense. "But on the other hand, if a private individual may ascribe to any text of Scripture any unobvious sense he pleases,—not in deference to some definite objective rule proved to be reasonable, but according to his individual bias and caprice,—the same result would practically follow as from an actual denial of inspiration." In Galileo's time heliocentrism was nothing better than an arbitrary scientific hypothesis. If, on the strength of an arbitrary scientific hypothesis, "men are at liberty to contradict Scriptural texts as understood in that sense which is both the only obvious one and the only one hitherto heard of in the Church, what single text is safe? What is the difference of result, between openly denying the authority of Scripture in general, and explaining away every text one dislikes in particular? Such conduct is a very grave offence against faith." It was impossible then in Galileo's time to understand Scripture otherwise than geocentrically, without grave irreverence to the Inspired Word and grave offence against faith. That such was the one genuine interpretation of Holy Writ, was at that time the legitimate and reasonable inference from all cognisable data; and the Congregations did momentous service in authoritatively prescribing that interpretation.

Putting the matter more compendiously, our reply consisted of three propositions. Firstly, it is irreverent, unreasonable, unchristian, and uncatholic, to interpret Scripture otherwise than according to its one obvious and one traditional sense, except in deference to some definite, tangible, objective rule, the reasonableness of which is sufficiently established. Secondly, geocentrism was at that time the one traditional, as it

* Here, as on former occasions, for convenience' sake, we use the word "science" in the very limited sense of "physical science."

is always the one obvious sense of Scripture. Thirdly, the Copernican interpretation was by no means at that time a rule, the reasonableness of which was sufficiently established; but was on the contrary a violent innovation, gratuitously trumped up to favour an arbitrary scientific hypothesis.

Now, however undeniable is the ability with which our opponent has treated this part of his theme, we have nevertheless much ground of complaint against him, in that he has not directly confronted these several propositions. In particular take the first, which is the foundation of all, as to the due mode of interpreting Scripture. We had a right to expect that he would directly meet it with a "yes" or a "no;" whereas we can find no reference whatever to it in his whole text, and only one obscure criticism at the tail of a note. "The real question at issue," he says (p. 40, note), "was, are the expressions of the sacred writers in regard to the physical order to be judged by the same rule as those relating to things moral and spiritual?" But no one has ever given an affirmative answer to this question; and it cannot therefore have been "the real question at issue." In our article of 1865 (p. 144), we cited with full agreement the words of an earlier contributor to this REVIEW, in the negative direction. "The prevailing opinion in the Catholic Church as to what Scripture says on matters appertaining to *faith and morals*, "cannot be false, for it embodies the teaching of the authorized exponent of Scripture. But *it has never been denied*, that the common opinion of what is asserted in Scripture on *other points*,—such as belong, e.g., to the physical history of the universe—may be mistaken, and may be corrected and improved from time to time, by the progress of science, and the discoveries of history." This principle, however, was admitted by all the theologians who dealt with the Galileo case; and this therefore cannot be the distinction intended by our opponent. We might imagine him to mean, that the sacred writers are not *inspired* in their declarations concerning the physical order. But we cannot impute to him, without clearer evidence, an opinion which would so fatally affect his theological character. On this view, e. g., almost the whole first chapter of Genesis would be uninspired: although there is no single chapter in the Bible which more unmistakably *claims* to be a revelation from heaven (for the facts there set forth could not possibly be learned in any other way); and although God avowedly made those facts the basis for a permanent Jewish institution, the Sabbath.

We repeat then our fundamental principle; and we repeat without further argument, because our opponent has given

no substantial reply with which we can grapple. It is irreverent, unreasonable, unchristian, and uncatholic, to interpret Scripture otherwise than according to its one obvious and its one traditional sense, except in deference to some definite, tangible, objective rule, the reasonableness of which is sufficiently established.

Our second proposition is, that Scripture, in its one obvious and in what was then its one traditional sense, declares the geocentric doctrine. Catholics of the present day have become so habituated to Copernicanism, that, unless they take special pains, they can do no kind of justice to the violent shock which that theory inflicted, on the Catholic's most legitimate and laudable prepossessions. Scripture, whether taken by itself or interpreted by the traditional theology, would not lead its readers so much as to *dream* of any other idea, than that this earth, as it is the moral,* so also is it the physical centre of the visible universe. In Scripture statements, the earth is no satellite of the sun, but rather the sun is a satellite of the earth. "*In the beginning* God created the heaven and the earth:" whereas not till the fourth day did He create the sun; and then, "*that it might preside over*" the earth's "*day*," and "*shine over the earth*." Our opponent indeed fully admits this: he admits (p. 50) that "*the obvious earth of the Bible is an immovable earth*," lighted by a constantly revolving sun. Such is the representation implied from the first verse of Scripture to the very last.

As one instance of the extreme repugnancy presented by Copernicanism, both to the obvious sense of Scripture and to received theological views, take the ancient doctrine concerning *heaven*. Undoubtedly Copernicanism has not a word to say against the truth, that there is a certain place called "*heaven*," where God is present in some special sense, and which is inhabited by the Son in His Sacred Humanity, by the Blessed Virgin, by all the Beati. But Copernicanism does deny, what Scripture in its one obvious sense constantly affirms; viz., that this place is *above the earth*. It is physically

* In saying that, according to the obvious bearing of Scripture and theology, this earth is the moral centre of the visible universe, we mean to express such facts as these. According to that obvious bearing,—putting aside the angels who are immaterial—there are no living creatures, and much more no reasonable creatures, except on the earth. For man, and man alone, God became Incarnate: the blessed in heaven, the damned in hell, consist exclusively of angels and men. We are not here considering, whether those *actually contradict* Scripture who think that the other planets are inhabited by reasonable creatures; for that is far too serious a question to be treated *episodically*. But we are saying, that such an opinion is directly opposed to the *obvious bearing* of Scripture and theology.

impossible—since Copernicanism is true—that heaven can in any imaginable sense be “above” any given spot on the earth, for more than one instant in every twenty-four hours; while in regard to the earth’s surface *as a whole*, it is simply unmeaning in a Copernican’s mouth to speak of any place whatever as “above” it. Yet S. Paul says (Phil. ii. 10) by most inevitable implication that heaven is *above* the earth.* Our Blessed Lord “*raised up* His eyes to heaven,” when He most earnestly prayed to His Father; and declared “*I ascend* to my Father and your Father,” when He announced His speedy departure to heaven.

There is one very tangible proof, by which our readers may test for themselves, how lively a contrast exists between Copernicanism and the obvious sense of Scripture and theology. We believe that the great mass of pious men whether Catholic or Protestant, when engaged in meditation and prayer, entirely forget for the moment their speculative Copernicanism, and are under a strong unconscious impression that heaven is above them and hell beneath them.

In addition to this uniform drift and implication of Scripture, there are particular texts, which we cited in our article of 1865, and which our opponent so criticises (pp. 49, 50), as only to make our case the stronger. For instance, “*Firmavit orbem terræ, qui non commovebitur*” (Ps. xcii. 1). Our opponent replies (p. 49), that “the mere expression ‘non commovebitur’ proves nothing; for the Hebrew is radically the same in these: ‘perforce gressus meos ut non moveantur vestigia mea,’ and ‘non det in commotionem pedem tuum.’” Certainly the words “non commovebitur” *by themselves* prove nothing; only they do not *stand* by themselves, but in connection with “*firmavit orbem terræ.*” Again, “*Qui fundasti terram super stabilitatem suam, non inclinabitur in sæculum sæculi*” (Ps. ciii. 5). He replies that the word “*inclinabitur*” is different from “*commovebitur*” (p. 50, note): which matters however the less, as he has pointed out that the word “*commovebitur*” would *itself* prove nothing. But we laid our stress, as is evident from our opponent’s own citation of our words (p. 50), on “*stabilitatem.*” We gave various other citations; viz. Job xxxviii. 4—6; Ps. xvii. 16; Ps. lxxxi. 5; Ps. xcv. 10; Ps. cxxxv. 6; Prov. iii. 19; Prov. viii. 29: and with none of these has he attempted to deal.

* “Ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἰσχυρίων καὶ καταχθονίων.” All those of whom he speaks are, by the force of his expression, either *below* the earth’s surface, or *on* the earth’s surface, or *above* the earth’s surface. And this last class includes, at least as its principal member, the inhabitants of *heaven*.

He objects (p. 49) that "we give up all the passages on which theologians" contemporary with Galileo "mainly took their stand." We cannot admit this, except for argument's sake: but it is simply nothing to the purpose. We have alleged throughout, that Pontifical Congregations issue their doctrinal decrees under God's special guidance; and we have occupied ourselves with defending those decrees, not with praising up this or that theologian. They nowhere speak of one Scriptural text rather than another; but denounce Copernicanism generally as "contrary," "repugnant" to Scripture.

And in real truth it is indefinitely easier to show that Copernicanism is *contradictory* to the Scriptures in their *obvious* sense, than to show that it is *reconcilable* with them in *any* sense. We pointed out however in our article of 1865 (pp. 142-3) that there was a precedent of the very highest authority for a Scriptural exposition, even more forced and unobvious than that required for Copernicanism; and this moreover within the strict sphere of dogmatic theology: we refer to the Catholic interpretation of Mark xiii. 32. We fully admit then, that an unobvious exposition of the apparently anti-Copernican texts is possible; and indeed is (as we now know) the true one. We admit that our Blessed Lord, when He looked up to heaven and when He spoke of ascending to the Father, did but accommodate himself to existing physical beliefs. We admit that the Holy Ghost for wise purposes—as for instance that He might not violently interfere with the healthily slow progress of physical science—permitted the sacred writers to express themselves in language, which was literally true as understood by *them*, but was figurative in the highest degree as intended by *Him*. We only say, in accordance with our first proposition, that such an exposition of Scripture would be grossly irreverent, unchristian, and uncatholic, unless there were some overwhelming scientific probability to render it legitimate.

This then brings us to our third proposition. Copernicanism, we say, in Galileo's time, not only had no overwhelming scientific probability in its favour, but (to use a colloquialism) had no leg to stand on, in presence of such Scriptural evidence as we have adduced.

Our opponent speaks however in several parts of his pamphlet—see e.g. p. 46—as though the present writer had expressed some opinion of his own, on this part of the question; which certainly would have been absurd enough. But our words were unmistakable to the opposite effect:—"It is more straightforward and satisfactory to state at once, that the present writer has no knowledge of physical science,

which can warrant him in expressing any opinion of his own on such matters. He has taken, however, the best means in his power to insure scientific accuracy" (p. 145, note). We none the less however very confidently dissent from the opinion (p. 46), that M. Desdovits's argument, grounded on the gravity of the air, was "a pretty piece of confusion": because it is no disparagement whatever of our opponent's scientific attainments to say, that he is an indefinitely less trustworthy judge of such matters, than was the "Protestant gentleman of great scientific eminence" to whom, as we stated (p. 151, note), we submitted that argument. But it is a very fortunate circumstance on the present occasion, that we are not necessitated to pursue further the very unsatisfactory course of consulting scientific experts. And we are entirely exempt from this necessity, because we can desire nothing better for our argument, than our opponent's own appreciation of Galileo's scientific position.

Both heliocentrism and geocentrism, he says (p. 47), "could account for the celestial phenomena—the *latter nearly or quite as well as the former*; but the former was by far the simpler explanation." "It was known," he further adds, "that the planets were globular opaque bodies, like the earth deriving light from the sun, and that they moved round the sun; and *it seemed to be* the law that the smaller body should revolve round the larger."

We may fairly take the words "nearly or," in the first sentence, as pleonastic; and we understand accordingly our opponent to admit, that in Galileo's time no cosmical phenomena were known, for which geocentrism could not thoroughly account. On the other hand, to our mind the argument from *analogy* is of the vaguest and most shadowy kind; such as is next to worthless, when tried by those more rigid and true scientific tests which Mr. Mill has been instrumental in recommending.* And as to the argument from

* "An argument from analogy, is an inference that what is true in a certain case is true in a case known to be somewhat similar, but not known to be exactly parallel, that is, to be similar in all the material circumstances. An object has the property B: another object is not known to have that property, but resembles the first in a property A, not known to be connected with B; and the conclusion to which the analogy points, is that this object has the property B also. As, for example, that the planets are inhabited, because the earth is so. The planets resemble the earth in describing elliptical orbits round the sun, in being attracted by it and by one another, in being nearly spherical, revolving on their axes, &c.; but it is not known that any of these properties, or all of them together, are the conditions on which the possession of inhabitants is dependent, or are even marks of those conditions. Nevertheless so long as we do not know what the conditions are, they may

simplicity, we can only express surprise that our opponent has condescended to allege it. Considering the undeniable fact, that, as Mr. Mill expresses it, "nature in many of its operations works by means of a *complexity so extreme* as to be almost an insuperable obstacle to our investigations,"* it does amaze us that an able writer should gravely adduce the complexity of geocentricism as a reason against its truth. Finally, we pointed out in our article of 1865 (p. 152),—and our opponent has not attempted to gainsay our statement,—that the one argument, on which Galileo laid incomparably his greatest stress, was vehemently controverted by the great body of scientific men, and is now universally admitted to have been the merest delusion.

Such then was the scientific position of Copernicanism during Galileo's life. As regards himself, we can only call the theory a random scientific conjecture; for his principal argument was a sham, and he was only right by a happy accident. But what we would say applies to *all* contemporary Copernicans, and not merely to Galileo. Considering the intimate connection of geocentricism with (one may say) the whole length and breadth of the Sacred Writings, no one who duly reverences the latter would dream of doubting its truth, until there were at least some appearance of its conflicting with known phenomena. But in Galileo's time, on our opponent's own showing, there was no appearance whatever of its conflicting with known phenomena: its opponents were reduced to arbitrary theories about "analogy" and "simplicity." The doctrine therefore, legitimately deducible from all facts then cognisable, was that very doctrine which the Congregations declared; viz., that Copernicanism was contrary to Scripture and consequently heretical. Our opponent speaks forsooth (p. 17) of a certain argument "*compelling*" us to admit that Paul V. sanctioned these declarations. Why our very point has been throughout, that the Pontiff would have failed grievously of his duty, if he had *not* opposed vigorously the heretically-spirited Copernican movement.

And here we are obliged reluctantly to express dissent from

be connected by some law of nature with those common properties; and to the extent of that possibility the planets are more likely to be inhabited, than if they did not resemble the earth at all. This non-assignable and *generally small increase of probability*, beyond what would otherwise exist, is all the evidence which a conclusion can derive from analogy."—*Mill's Logic*, vol. ii. pp. 366-7. Seventh Edition.

* We quoted this sentence in our former article; and our opponent cites it in p. 43, without attempting to invalidate its force.

one opinion of M. de l'Epinois, who on the whole has done such signal service in the matter of Galileo. According to his view,* the Congregations spoke too absolutely: they ought only to have said, "contrary to Scripture *in the present state of science*." To us on the contrary it appears, that by so qualifying their judgment they would have fallen short of their duty. So soon as any one phenomenon had been observed, of which it was not easy to see how geocentricism could explain it—then, and not till then, should the ecclesiastical tribunals have officially admitted the possibility of that theory being mistaken.

We speak of *official declaration*; for the one *recognised principle* throughout was most indubitably that which we have set forth and defended. No doubt all theologians of the period were most strongly of opinion—and on what they had every reason to think abundantly sufficient grounds—that no scientific proof of Copernicanism would ever be forthcoming: but they were almost equally unanimous, that there was no absolute certainty that such might not be discovered; and that on that supposition the interpretation of Scripture must be changed into accordance with the new theory. If there be one theologian more than another who may reasonably be accounted exponent of the official view, it is most certainly Bellarmine; and Bellarmine (as we mentioned in our last number) distinctly admitted the possibility of some future Copernican demonstration, which should legitimise a change in interpreting Scripture. F. Grassi, S. J., another distinguished opponent of Galileo, expressed the same opinion. Long afterwards F. Faure called on Copernicans "to bring forward, if they can, any . . . astronomical observations which . . . are not explained by either hypothesis." Now F. Faure was so zealous a geocentrist, as to place Copernicanism on the same theological level with Unitarianism; † and yet even he implies, that he would withdraw his theological objections in the face of one crucial experiment. Lastly, the well-known theologian Amort lays down this as having been throughout the Church's recognised view; though he supposes, by a mistake of fact, that Urban VIII. had actually gone the length of *excommunicating* those who in his days professed heliocentricism. These are Amort's words:—

"Therefore it was that Urban VIII. prohibited under pain of excommunication the Copernican system, as temerarious and opposed to Scripture

* "Revue des Sciences Historiques," livraison v. p. 144.

† Notes on S. Augustine's "Enchiridion." Passaglia's edition, p. 49.

in its proper sense, until some demonstration be adduced by Copernicans which compels Catholics to recede, on a matter of such grave importance, from the proper sense of Scripture, consecrated as it is by the judgment of the whole world. For so is the *intention of the Pontifical Bull explained* by F. Fabri, S. J., *Canon Penitentiary of S. Peter's at Rome*, where he replies in these words to a certain Copernican: 'It has been asked more than once of your leaders whether they possessed any *demonstration* of the earth's movement? *They have never dared to assert this*. There is no reason therefore why the Church should not understand those texts in their literal sense and *declare* that they should be so understood, so long as there is no demonstration to prove the contrary. But if any such *demonstration hereafter be devised by your party* (which I do not at all expect), in that case the Church will not at all hesitate to set forth that those texts *are to be understood in a non-natural* (improprio) *and figurative sense*: according to the words of the poet, "*terræque urbesque recedunt*". This reply was inserted in the year 1665 in the acts of the English Royal Society." *

Amort's own work appeared in 1734; and we do not see how there can be any fair doubt, that such as he describes was the Church's recognized principle of action from first to last.

One unmistakable indication of this principle was, that she fully permitted the publication of every discoverable scientific objection to geocentrism. In our article of 1865 we described the position of a Catholic astronomer under the Congregational Decree; and we here reproduce the description, with one or two insignificant additions and corrections. "He was not permitted to express himself, as though"—taking into account the declarations of Scripture—"Copernicanism were an *actually* probable hypothesis. But he was permitted and encouraged to use the hypothesis most actively, as his clue to fresh scientific results; and to treat with most ample justice the scientific arguments for and against. He was fully permitted to maintain that Copernicanism was *scientifically* probable in the highest possible degree;" and to show that there were phenomena, readily explicable on that theory, for which no geocentrist had been able to account. "But he was not (we imagine) at liberty to say in so many words, that it had received absolute and irrefragable scientific proof." His liberty then, as a man of science, was hardly curtailed in the slightest degree; for to attempt any discussion on the *absolute*

* Quoted by Bouix de Papá, vol. ii. p. 465. We had not met with this passage when we wrote our article of 1865; and we are much struck with the coincidence between Amort's or Fabri's statement of the case and our own. We had spoken of the one *obvious* and the one *traditional* sense of Scripture; and so Fabri refers to the *proper* sense of Scripture, and that consecrated by the *judgment of the whole world*.

truth of Copernicanism, was ipso facto to play the theologian.*

Our opponent, however (p. 53), thinks that we have stated the case too strongly. He admits indeed that a scientific man was at full liberty to "point out the weakness of this or that anti-Copernican objection;" but maintains that he was *not* permitted "to show that there were facts which nothing but the earth's motion would explain." And as this is an issue of much importance in appreciating the Church's attitude towards Copernicanism, we must by no means pass it over.

It seems to us that there is irrefragable evidence against our opponent on this particular. Bellarmine was undoubtedly the chief theological representative of the view taken by the Congregations; and he declared (as is well known) that if a scientific proof of Copernicanism were discovered, Scripture should then be Copernically interpreted. He said this moreover in 1620; viz., at a time when, according to our opponent, the Congregations had forbidden that any scientific proof of Copernicanism should be *adduced*. Then F. Fabri, as has just been seen, asks the Copernicans, and says they have frequently been asked, whether they possess any demonstration of their theory: but it is simply impossible he could so have spoken, if—as our opponent thinks—it was a notorious fact that astronomers were not suffered to publish any such demonstration.

* We say in the text that to discuss the *absolute* truth of Copernicanism is to play the theologian; for it is to debate, whether this or that degree of scientific probability warrants this or that degree of violence to the obvious and traditional sense of this or that Scriptural text. It must be remembered that, even at this day, Copernicanism is not proved in the strict sense of that word. One of the most eminent scientific men in England told the present writer, that he considered the probabilities in favour of Copernicanism to be about ten thousand to one. (We think it was ten thousand; certainly not a *higher* figure.) Well—it is not *axiomatic* that a scientific probability, estimated by contemporary physicists as ten thousand to one, should fix the sense of Scripture: this is a question for theologians and the Church. As we said in our article of 1865 (pp. 171, 172),—"There may be some declaration of Scripture or the Church so peremptory and unmistakable, as to out-balance any amount of scientific likelihood; and to engender absolute certainty, that of such proposition there will never be discovered a scientific proof. We are far from meaning that such a case has ever existed, but it is imaginable in the abstract." Suppose, e.g., contemporary men of science estimated the probability as ten thousand to one, against mankind being descended from a single pair: the Catholic would nevertheless hold with the certainty of divine faith that men *are* so descended, and that there will never be *demonstration* to the contrary.

The present writer, when he published his article of 1865, was not aware that no strict scientific proof of heliocentrism has yet been given; but was under the contrary impression. We have in one or two places altered accordingly the quotations from that earlier article.

Then consider what was in fact permitted. Even Copernicus's book was allowed with a few verbal changes; but there is another instance still more remarkable. Was *Newton* an obscure or feeble advocate of the Copernican cause? On the contrary it was precisely from him, according to our opponent (p. 3), that "Rome has learned to recognise" heliocentric "opinions as true and sound." Yet two religious were suffered to publish his whole treatment of the question; with no other reserve, than that of explaining that they did not themselves intend to treat heliocentrism except as an hypothesis. We gave their words in our article of 1865, p. 175. Before such facts as these, the arbitrary dictum of the two private theologians cited by our opponent shrinks into utter insignificance. We do not see how it is possible to doubt, that scientific men were allowed to do their very utmost for Copernicanism,—so long as they explained clearly that they confined themselves to its *scientific* probability, and left to theology and the Church all concern with its *absolute* truth or falsehood.

Our opponent indeed (p. 54) cites Galileo's trial of 1633 as corroborating his view. But it is plain on the surface of facts, that Galileo was always arguing for the *absolute* truth of his theory; and that he utterly set at naught Bellarmine's exhortation, that he "would keep outside the sacristy." Nor could his offence have been legitimately dealt with in 1633 as less than one of heresy; because he directly contradicted the one obvious and the one traditional sense of Scripture, at a time when (as we have seen) there was no pretext for doubting that this was also the one true sense.

Our opponent (p. 54) protests against our "quietly taking for granted" that the decree of 1633 "was purely personal to Galileo." But nothing can be plainer than that such was the fact, though it is not worth while to spend words on a matter so entirely irrelevant. We are the last to deny that, according to the Munich Brief, geocentrism was at that time the only legitimate belief for Catholics; and we are the last to deny or to be ashamed of the fact, that *any* astronomer of that particular period might have been tried for heresy, who advocated the absolute truth of Copernicanism: and this is all which our opponent desires here to establish. We should add, that one particular of the process had no bearing whatever on any one except Galileo. He had been forbidden, as a personal penalty, to treat Copernicanism in any way whatever, i.e. even as an hypothesis; and he could find no excuse for having indubitably violated *that* command, except by saying that he had really quite forgotten all about it.

And here we will consider one portion of our opponent's

argument, which we ought to have noticed in April, but accidentally omitted. He alleges that the Abjuration, required of Galileo in 1633, describes geocentrism as part of "that which the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church holds, preaches, and teaches." Well, most certainly this is not said in so many words; and he can only mean therefore that it is implied. We reply, that indubitably it is *not* implied. Both in the Judgment and in the prescribed Abjuration the Cardinals state distinctly, what (according to their view) constitutes the *heresy* of Copernicanism; viz. its opposition to the *Written Word*. That dogma of the Church then, which they treat Copernicanism as contradicting, is not geocentrism, but the Inspiration of Scripture.

Lastly, our opponent objects (p. 38) that "the Decree of 1616 was in full force in 1687;" and that consequently, on our principles, interior assent was due from all Catholics to the geocentric doctrine, at a time when Copernicanism had received an overwhelming increase of scientific probability.* But Paul V., in sanctioning the Decree of 1616, merely forbade Copernican *books*: he did not command that interior assent should be given to geocentrism. We pointed this out at the beginning of our article; and we explained, that the interior acceptance of geocentrism, due from contemporary Catholics, was not due from them as an act of obedience to Papal command, but as an act of loyal and reasonable submission to the Church's evident mind. Now, as we have just been saying, from the very beginning of the Galileo controversy it was cognisably and indisputably the Church's mind, that whenever (if ever) Copernicanism should receive what might reasonably be called a scientific demonstration, the relevant texts of Scripture might legitimately be interpreted in a heliocentric sense. And it is simply preposterous to suppose Pius IX. to have claimed, that the doctrinal decree of a Pontifical Congregation should be understood in a different sense, from that which the said Congregation cognisably and indisputably intended. In proportion therefore as scientific proof accumulated, the Church's most loyal children reasonably thought it less and less improbable, that the Church might finally sanction a change of Scriptural interpretation. On this head we will quote a passage from our article of 1865, with some slight alteration of its wording.

* Our opponent's words are: "when every one up to the science of the day, knew the decision was false." But no one, even at this moment, *knows* that geocentrism is false; though all astronomers think this in the very highest degree *probable*.

"To simplify our statement," we said, "we will make the grotesque supposition, that one single man of science—an excellent Catholic—lived and pursued scientific studies through the whole period. He has the deepest deference both for the obvious and traditional sense of Scripture, and also for the Decree of 1616; and he enters therefore on his investigation with the fullest expectation,—nay, he considers it almost a matter of course,—that Copernicanism will be sooner or later disproved. Still it is his duty to fix his eye carefully on every vestige of scientific argument, on one side no less than on the other; and he thus finds to his amazement, as years go on, that the scientific presumptions in its favour are rapidly accumulating, while no fresh difficulty is discovered. This circumstance compels him to ask himself, what is the theological weight in the opposite scale. He has well known from the first that the Decree was no infallible pronouncement; and, again, he is either himself aware, or learns from theologians, that there is more than one text in Scripture, which the Church has always understood in some more or less unobvious sense. He also learns from them the Catholic principle, which we have already stated; viz., that the received and traditional sense of Scripture, on scientific or historical matters, is far less authoritative than on matters of faith and morals. Gradually therefore he comes more and more to think, that Copernicanism may very possibly turn out to be true. Yet, however great its scientific likelihood,—while remaining mere likelihood,—he will shrink from forming a decided and confident opinion of its truth, until the Church gives him some sanction for such opinion. It is her office, not his, to determine the sense of Scripture. We fully admit indeed that, supposing there had been an absolute scientific demonstration, there could be no further room for doubt; since that cannot be theologically false, which by a rigorous scientific demonstration is established as true." But then, from Galileo's days to this, no such rigorous demonstration has hitherto been given. Our astronomer then would not venture to hold confidently that Copernicanism is absolutely true, until the Church warranted his confidence by some such sign, as was given in Benedict XIV.'s suspension of the Congregational Decree.

If we have done what we intended in this article, we have shown that, throughout the whole Copernican controversy, the Church acted on one intelligible and consistent principle, and that principle the true one. The one obvious and the one

traditional sense of Scripture—such was the actuating motive of her whole conduct—must not be set aside, except in deference to some tangible rule, the reasonableness of which has been fully established. But no such rule was obtained in behalf of Copernicanism, until an overwhelming scientific probability had been found to exist for a theory, which was *à priori* so incredible to the Scriptural student. Moreover, it was for the Church and for her alone to decide, when scientific probability had reached that point, that this change of interpretation might be lawfully advocated by her disciples. We cannot see how anything done by her retarded the progress of physical science; because the most loyal Catholics had the fullest liberty of exhibiting scientific Copernican arguments in their very strongest light. But even if such a result had ensued, this would be no disparagement to the Church's procedure. It is immeasurably less important that physical science should advance rapidly, than that Scripture should be reverently handled; and gross irreverence would have been encouraged towards the sacred volume, if Galileo's contemporaries had been permitted to advocate as true the Copernican theory.

After two centuries and a half, a similar shock has come on Catholics of the present day; the shock of an apparent conflict in various particulars between Scripture and physical science. In one respect Catholics are now taken at a much greater disadvantage, than were Galileo's contemporaries; because European thought has been in the interval so deplorably decatholicized. Yet they have an inestimable benefit in the experience acquired from the earlier crisis. If they would obtain the true clue for guiding their steps through so bewildering a labyrinth, they will find that clue, in studying the principles which animated the Church throughout the arduous and anxious controversy on the earth's motion.

After the preceding article had been sent to press, we received F. Franzelin's treatise on Divine Tradition and Scripture; containing a scholion on the Subject and Object of infallibility, which we translate in another part of our number. This scholion contains one or two statements bearing on the Galileo question, which this will be our best place for mentioning. Thus as to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation, F. Franzelin lays down that, though they do not possess infallible *truth*, yet at the time of their promulgation they possess infallible *security*; in such sense, that contemporary

Catholics cannot refuse them interior assent, "without violating the submission due to divinely appointed authority."

We have ourselves often said that, in sanctioning such decrees, the Pope acts as the Church's "gubernator doctrinalis." F. Franzelin's expression is, that the Pope therein exercises "the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision." There are three kinds of assent, he adds, here to be considered: (1) the assent of *immediately divine faith*, due to revealed truths; (2) the assent of *mediately divine faith*, due to non-revealed Catholic verities infallibly defined by the Church; and (3) *religious assent*, due to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation and to other similar pronouncements.

F. Franzelin also quotes a remarkable passage, from the well-known Gassendi, which strikingly illustrates the view taken by those of Galileo's contemporaries who were loyal Catholics, of the authoritative anti-Copernican declarations. We italicise a few words.

"For myself I reverence the decree whereby certain Cardinals are said to have approved the earth's stationariness. For though the Copernicans maintain that those texts of Scripture, which attribute stationariness to the earth and motion to the sun, are to be explained (as they speak) concerning the *appearance* of things and [as said] by way of accommodation to the vulgar understanding and mode of speech,—nevertheless since those texts are explained differently by men whose authority (as is manifest) is so great in the Church, for that reason I stand on their side and do not blush on this occasion to *hold my intellect captive*. Not that on that account *I deem it an article of faith*; for (so far as I know) *that is not asserted by [those Cardinals] themselves*, nor is it *promulgated and received throughout the Church*: but [I submit my view to them] because their judgment should be accounted a presumption [præjudicium] which cannot but be of the greatest moment among the faithful."

ART. VII.—THE CASE OF LOUISE LATEAU.

Macmillan's Magazine, April, 1871.*Louise Lateau*. Par le Dr. LEFEBVRE. Louvain, 1870.

MACMILLAN is perhaps, next to the "Spectator," remarkable, for combining very decided Protestantism with a care, almost unknown among Protestants, not impatiently to deny patent and proved facts, if they appear to favour Catholics or the Catholic religion. In this number is an article entitled "Louise Lateau : a Biological Study, by George E. Day, M.D., F.R.S." Our readers have probably read accounts of the case which it details, in the Catholic papers. Louise is a peasant girl in an out-of-the-way village of Hainault, in whom the stigmata appeared April 24, 1868, when she was eighteen years of age, and have been, ever since the 17th or July in the same year, accompanied by a state of ecstasy, in which she witnesses the scenes of the Passion of our Divine Lord, but without hearing anything. The state of ecstasy lasts from between eight and nine every Friday morning until about six in the evening, sometimes till after seven, thus lasting between nine and twelve hours. The bleeding of the parts marked with the stigmata begins on Friday morning about one o'clock a.m., and lasts all Friday. As soon as she observed the first symptoms, which showed themselves on the left side and a week later on the feet, she mentioned them in confession to the Parish Priest, who encouraged her and bade her mention the subject to no one. When the bleeding of the hands developed itself, the matter could no longer be concealed, and crowds were attracted to the cottage to see her. The ecclesiastical authorities then felt it their duty to investigate the facts; and they requested Dr. Lefebvre, an eminent physician and Professor of Louvain, to "examine it with the most rigid scrutiny, and apply to it all the aids of modern science." "No better selection," adds Dr. Day (himself evidently a Protestant), "could have been made; for placed during a period of fifteen years at the head of the medical staff of two lunatic asylums, and having during those years regularly lectured on mental diseases, he was specially prepared by his previous duties, as well as by his personal tastes, to investigate a mysterious case of disturbance of the nervous system such as that

now presented to him. His attendance commenced on the 30th of August [1868], and has continued up to the present time." He informs Dr. Day by letter that he saw her on the 18th of January, 1871, and found her condition in all respects unchanged.

Dr. Day's account of Louise Lateau's case is taken, as far as we can see, entirely from a little volume by Dr. Lefebvre, entitled "*Louise Lateau de Bois d'Haine. Sa Vie, ses Extases, ses Stigmates. Etude Médicale, par le Docteur F. Lefebvre. Louvain: Ch. Peeters, Editeur. 1870.*" Dr. Lefebvre says that he was requested to confine himself rigidly to the *medical* consideration of the case; and he refers from time to time to the fact, that a religious examination of it has been going on at the same time. So far as we are informed, nothing has been published on this subject. This, no doubt, leaves us without some information which we would willingly have. So far as we are yet informed, Louise in her past life has been nothing more than a peasant girl, ordinary in all respects, except an exceptionally regular and diligent discharge of all social duties, and of the offices of charity towards her sick neighbours. Her father died when she was a few weeks old, and she, with her mother and two elder sisters, has lived a hard life. Dr. Day gives a short sketch of it:—

Her health is good, and she is free from any scrofulous or other constitutional taint. She has always been accustomed to hard work, and has shown a large amount of physical endurance; and though her understanding is represented as good, she is unemotional and without any imagination—a girl of plain common sense, of a straightforward character, without enthusiasm, and very reserved. Her education is very deficient, although she has added considerably to the elementary knowledge she acquired in five months' attendance at school; she speaks French easily and with some degree of correctness, reads with difficulty, and writes very little and badly. She has on different occasions proved that she can act with great patience, courage, and determination. In the midst of domestic troubles, often for days without sleep, suffering many privations, and liable to the temper-fits of an unreasonable mother, she was constantly cheerful, calm, dutiful, and obliging. When only a child she was always ready to help and attend on the sick, and during the cholera epidemic of 1866 in the village (when she was sixteen) she nursed many of the victims without any aid, staying with them till they died, and assisting to lay them in their coffins and sometimes even to bury them. From her childhood she was remarkably religious, her piety being practical and entirely free from affectation or display; her religion, like her domestic life, being simple, earnest, and straightforward" (p. 490).

She is free from any hereditary morbid tendency on either side.

Dr. Lefebvre's book contains, first, a biography of Louise Lateau, pp. 5 to 21. Next, a statement of the phenomena observed, as to the stigmata, from pp. 23 to 34; as to the ecstasies from pp. 35 to 51. Then a third part on "the reality of the facts—a discussion of the hypothesis of a fraud," from pp. 52 to 74. The fourth part contains a "medical discussion of the facts," and first as to the stigmata. In this he examines, first, all the known diseases which produce or are liable to produce spontaneous bleeding; afterwards, all the recorded cases in which any phenomena of the kind have occurred (setting aside other cases of stigmatisation, which are in fact the very phenomena to be examined), although they are not capable of being classed under the head of any known disease, but belong to what are called in medical works "rare cases," i. e., separate phenomena which as yet are not capable of being reduced to system. In this chapter he examines each of these cases, and shows that the mode in which they came on and their whole phenomena were totally different from those of the case before us. The next chapter, pp. 162 to 259, contains a "Medical Discussion of Ecstasy." In this, again, he examines in the same way both all known diseases which may produce a condition of trance, &c., and also all the recorded cases not as yet capable of being reduced to system; and sums up by showing that none of these cases, under either class, have the least analogy to that of Louise Lateau. A great number of cases and facts bearing more or less on different parts of the subject are thrown into an appendix extending from pp. 263 to 349.

Our space will not allow us to follow the very interesting details given by Dr. Lefebvre, and very honestly translated by Dr. Day. We regret this the less, because any reader may obtain the number containing Dr. Day's essay for a shilling, and Dr. Lefebvre's work for about three times that sum. We should add that Dr. Lefebvre, though his work is professedly medical, has been most careful to make it intelligible to non-professional readers, by explaining and giving the derivation of all terms of medical science he has occasion to use; and also by adding notes in which he explains the healthy action of the arteries, veins, &c., and how they are affected by different diseases. In fact the volume would even on this account (if on no other) be very interesting to any man who, without having received a medical education, feels an interest in such subjects.

The only important fact mentioned by Dr. Lefebvre, so far as we have observed, which is not related by Dr. Day, is the following; and we are glad to add that we do not suppose Dr.

Day to have intentionally omitted it. He probably overlooked it, because it does not come in its natural place in the narrative of facts, but in the medical discussion of trances, &c. The reason of this we take to be, that it was not witnessed by Dr. Lefebvre himself, but is given by him upon the written reports of two eye-witnesses, "one a statesman who ranks amongst the most eminent of our country; the other Mons. D'Herbomez, Bishop of British Columbia." They had been observing the sudden coming on of her ecstasy at a moment when, in obedience to her spiritual directors (who had told her in all ways to resist its approach, by talking of general subjects, by continuing her work, &c.), she was busy at her sewing machine, although the copious bleeding from the hands and head made it very difficult as well as painful to her. "The machine suddenly stood still, her hands were motionless, she was wrapped in ecstasy." After they had watched her for some time, the Parish Priest came in: he had been administering the Sacraments to a sick person, and had with him a silken bag in which were two silver cases; one of these contained the holy oils, the other he supposed to be empty, it had contained the Blessed Sacrament which he had given to the sick person. It had been observed, that when any blest object was presented to Louise when in ecstasy, her custom was to kiss it with great reverence and apparent pleasure, although quite insensible of any other external object.

The Abbé Mortier tried to present the case containing the holy oils to her lips. When it was somewhat above two yards from the chair on which she was sitting, there came over her an extraordinary trembling, great excitement [*élans*], and a transport of joy. She suddenly got up and threw herself on her knees in adoration, her hands clasped, trembling, and stretched towards the sacred vessels; her countenance was truly seraphic. The Abbé Mortier drew back a little, still holding in his hands the sacred vessels. As he slowly retired she followed him. She was half kneeling, half raised up, and leaning forward with her hands clasped. One would have said that she was being drawn as if by a magnet, and that she glided rather than walked. In this way the Abbé Mortier and Mgr. D'Herbomez caused her to go round the room. Whenever they stopped Louise fell on her knees in an attitude of devotion. When again close to her chair, they withdrew the sacred vessels, and she sat down, relapsed into her immovable condition, and the ordinary course of her ecstasies went on as on other Fridays.

M. D'Herbomez thought that some particle of the Blessed Sacrament must have remained in the case in which it had been, unobserved by the Curé, who had not had time to make the usual ablutions. To assure himself he separated the two sacred cases. He then presented to Louise first, the case containing the holy oils. It was brought to her without her moving, and when it touched her lips she gave a sweet smile, as she does when touched by any

blest object. But when the other case was presented, at the distance of more than two yards, the same scene of adoration on her knees and of rapture which has already been described was repeated completely.

On leaving the cottage, after five hours, Mgr. D'Herbomez, accompanied by the three other witnesses, went to the parish church, and there, in their presence, opened the case. It proved, that there was left in the sacred vessel a pretty considerable particle of the consecrated Host. This fact was attested by persons, whose testimony no one will call in question. These scenes went on moreover in the presence of three other witnesses, the mother and the two sisters of Louise (p. 219).

It occurred to M. Lefebvre that it might be imagined by objectors that Louise was a clairvoyante of extraordinary lucidity, and that she had seen through the silk bag the silver cases; the holy oil in one case, and the particle of the Blessed Sacrament in the other. He therefore caused the case to be completely purified, and that an unconsecrated Host should be put into it. It was then placed in the same silk bag. Had she been clairvoyante, she would have seen the Host in the case which she knew to be always used in taking the consecrated Host to the sick, and would naturally have been affected as before. It was presented to her, and "there was neither transport nor act of adoration: she remained insensible and motionless."

Dr. Lefebvre remarks on the extreme inconsistency of which most people are guilty, when they come to judge of facts such as these. With regard to them they are either utterly incredulous, whatever may be the evidence adduced, or at least they demand the most rigorous proof possible; and then they turn suddenly round, and profess to bring forward other cases quite as extraordinary: but these they are really willing to accept on any proof, or indeed, to speak truly, on nothing that can be called proof at all. This inconsistency has been curiously illustrated, in the medical comments on Dr. Day's article. He himself is content to say, "It is evident that, for the present, Louise Lateau must take her place among the 'rare cases'; but the fact that no precisely similar instance has been recorded is no evidence against its authenticity." To his credit he rejects as absurd and impossible the theory of "fraud." He goes on to say that he says nothing of "any of the previously recorded cases of stigmatization about seventy in all—from St. Francis, in whose history I have no faith whatever, to Maria Mörl, the Extatica of Caldarno, who was born in 1812, became marked with the stigmata in 1833, and died only three years ago,—because none of them had been submitted to so rigid a scrutiny as that of the girl who forms the subject of this article;" but he admits, "I am more inclined than I formerly was to admit that some of

these—especially that of Maria Mörl, to which Görres, Lord Shrewsbury, a German physician, and others have borne witness—may have a certain substratum of truth.” After all, is not the only reason why he disbelieves the history of St. Francis simply that he has never studied the evidence by which it is proved?

Next let us turn to the “Lancet” of April 22. It says the narrative is nothing extraordinary—

The only thing remarkable about the bleeding is the periodicity of its occurrence. The general law is quite clear, that the direction of attention upon any part or parts of the body may be followed by all manner of nervous and vascular changes; that this attention in order to be effectual must be automatic and complete; and that it most readily becomes so in uneducated persons, who have never gained from mental training the power to control the operations of the mind. Viewed in such a light as this, the history of Louise Lateau is sufficiently simple. A pious and good girl, of a reserved (i. e. introspective and contemplative) temperament, she was familiar with the details of the Passion, from the crucifixes and pictures which form so large a part of the apparatus of Roman Catholicism. The supposed approach of death had served to fix her thoughts upon sacred things, and her unexpected recovery only strengthened and deepened her religious impressions. With these there was in her little world nothing else to contend; and her meditations on the crucifixion, actively excited by the Friday, at last culminated in the flow of blood corresponding to that from the wounded side. Such an effect once produced, and as the narrative shows, brooded over for an entire week in silence, was *naturally enough* (italics ours) followed by the appearance of the other stigmata. The faculty of attention, growing and strengthened by use, soon attained the power of engrossing the whole force of the nervous centres, and the condition of ecstasy became developed. Such cases are *in no way extraordinary*; and they are only unusual, because the events of life so seldom leave any one set of feelings in the necessary predominance. Time and occupation and the various cares and duties of the home circle furnish the best remedies for ecstasy and analogous conditions; and these should not, as a rule, be encouraged, because they are capable of being turned to an evil account by the ignorant, the credulous, and the superstitious.

That is, the state of Louise Lateau is so far from extraordinary, that the real difficulty is to prevent people falling into it. “The general rule is quite clear.” Now Dr. Lefebvre examines all the cases, both those of classified diseases and those of “rare cases,” recorded in the books, and shows that, except the similar cases of persons having the stigmata, there is not one in the least like that of Louise Lateau, either as to the bleeding or the ecstasy; and more, that there is no one instance, in which a case of hemorrhage, even though quite unlike hers,

has been combined with a case of trance, even though again quite unlike hers. The "Lancet" does not attempt to answer his arguments, or to show that he is in error; all it does is, to assert that the case is nothing unusual or remarkable.

And then comes the "British Medical Journal" of May 6; which, after quoting the remarks of the "Lancet," thus proceeds,—

We believe that this explanation involves a physiological impossibility. It is common enough to see hemorrhage occur beneath the skin; but unless the cuticle be broken or ulcerated, no blood escapes through the skin; and with the ecstatic condition, closely allied as it is to some forms of hysteria, there is associated, as so often happens, a disposition to deceit, and especially to such forms of deceit as may excite the sympathy and surprise of the bystanders. In the ecstatic visions and bleeding skin of this Belgian hysterical woman, we are asked to believe that there is something opposed to or above the ordinary laws of nature. We protest against such a conclusion, as calculated to bring disgrace upon science and discredit upon theology.

That is, what the "Lancet" says is "quite natural" and "nothing extraordinary," the "Journal" says is impossible. But they are both agreed in resolving not to admit any facts, however clearly proved, which may look as if Almighty God really interferes with the events of the world. One avoids this, by saying that what is described is nothing out of the way, though without attempting to answer the medical arguments of Dr. Lefebvre, which prove that it is quite unexampled; the other says it could not happen naturally, and therefore says "it is fraud," without attempting to show how fraud could remain undetected by the tests he applied to it. What they both really mean is the same. They will not admit, upon any evidence whatever, the existence of any facts, for which they cannot account by the ordinary laws of physical science.

This is an instance of a state of mind painfully forced upon all who are obliged to observe how Protestants in general approach the consideration of any facts which may possibly bear upon the Catholic Church. Very few, indeed, are those who, rather than admit any fact which they only fear may tell in its favour, do not at once discard all the habits of thought upon which they have all their lives prided themselves. Men who delight in weighing evidence and observing exactly how much it really proves, and what it does not prove, at once admit as indisputable facts the wildest speculations, not merely on insufficient evidence, but, in truth, upon no evidence at all, if only they seem likely to explain away any recorded phenomenon the tendency of which they believe to be Catholic. Thus the

scientific writer in the "Lancet," beyond a doubt if he had been calmly considering any mere question of medical science, would have rejected with indignation the statement that the "direction of attention upon any part or parts of the body" could cause periodical bleeding like that of Louise. And yet in this case he assumes it as a first principle, without thinking it necessary to refer at all to the facts proved by M. Lefebvre that (setting aside the cases of *stigmata*, which are the phenomena to be explained), no one case has ever been recorded by any medical witness in any age or any country in which any bleeding analogous to hers, or the manner of its coming on, has taken place at all; by whatever it may have been caused; nor, again, has any one case been recorded in which the spontaneous hemorrhage, sometimes caused by certain rare diseases (utterly unlike as it is to hers in all other respects), has shown itself either in the parts of the body where alone hers are found (*i.e.*, the hands, feet, and side, all of which are covered by a complete system of skin), or on any other part similar to them. The hemorrhage in her case he shows to have first this characteristic, that it is accompanied by a condition of ecstasy (using the word in its merely medical sense). Now science knows of hemorrhage and of ecstasies, but there is no one recorded instance in which the two have ever been connected. Next, her hemorrhages have three characteristics: they are, (1) spontaneous, (2) periodical, (3) on certain particular parts of the body only. Now, he says, if I should require that any case put forward as parallel to hers, should show hemorrhage and ecstasy connected in the same patient; or, again, if even waiving this, I should require that the case selected should present these three characteristics, I might cut short my work at the beginning, for no one pretends there has ever been any one such case. The cases then which he examines are those in which there appears, at first sight, some analogy to some one of the characteristics he has already mentioned; and he shows that in each such case even that analogy totally fails.

Of course we do great injustice to the doctor's argument in thus compressing into a few words a medical treatise which occupies many pages of closely-condensed statements and arguments. But we have said enough to show that if the view of the subject taken by the writer in the "Lancet" had been merely medical and scientific, he would have felt bound to show some error in Dr. Lefebvre's statements or argument before he ventured to lay it aside. But his view of the case was not medical, but purely theological. And, therefore, he meets all the exact and detailed medical statements of the

Belgian physician by a general, vague, sweeping assertion, that "attention directed upon any particular part or parts of the body may be followed by *all manner* of nervous and vascular changes." That is, that rather than admit the facts stated, he departs wholly from science, from scientific terms, and from the scientific habit of mind, and has recourse to mere generalities.

So the other medical journal. Dr. Lefebvre shows in detail that no application known to science would produce the phenomena seen in Louise; that even if there were any which would produce them, she could not possibly have either known of their existence, or, without certain detection, either procured or applied them; and, lastly, that means were adopted which made it simply impossible that she should have practised any imposture, even if she had the means of doing so. The "British Medical Journal" does not even attempt to answer any of these facts or arguments, but contents itself with declaring that the explanation of the whole is "deceit."

We say nothing of the religious habit of mind which all this betrays. Our object is to note that nothing could be more contradictory to every principle of modern science. The first rule of science is to examine and ascertain with all care every fact and phenomenon, without troubling oneself with asking how they are they to be explained. If they cannot be explained by any known principle, they must, none the less, be examined, tested, observed with all possible accuracy, and recorded with minute exactness. Theory will come afterwards, in its turn, but to ascertain facts is the first object of science. Yet here are men professedly merely scientific, who read the description and analysis of the facts given in a purely scientific tone by Dr. Lefebvre. He draws no conclusions, whether religious or otherwise. He merely states the phenomena observed, and shows by a careful examination that medical books record nothing analogous to them. But they reject the whole without examination. And why? Most evidently because they fear that if they admit the facts they may be forced to admit an unwelcome religious conclusion from them. That is, they throw away all their own scientific principles lest if they retained them they should be found to admit what they do not like.

Protestant writers, we observe, commonly take for granted that ecstasies and visions, if they have to do with religious objects, are accepted as a matter of course by the Catholic Church as proofs of sanctity. M. Alfred Maury, a member of the French Institute, says (in a passage quoted by M. Lefebvre): "Theologians have regarded ecstasies as one of the

most signal favours ever accorded by the Creator to the creature ; and thus Rome has ranked among the Saints most of those who have experienced them." Our author says :—

Theologians in treating of the Divine ecstasy draw a distinction between an ecstasy of the understanding and an ecstasy of the will. In the former the soul is so completely absorbed in the contemplation of the *true* and the *beautiful*, that she remains as it were suspended in it, and wrapt out of the empire of the external senses. The ecstasy of the will is produced when the soul, drawn by the attractions of an object which appears to it to be good, is carried away out of itself to unite itself to that object.

It would be an error to imagine with M. Maury that the Church considers an ecstasy to be always a miracle, even when its object is God or some holy thing. Theologians say that God can give to a soul special graces to elevate it to contemplation or to the love of supernatural things. This contemplation and this love dispose it to the state of ecstasy ; and the ecstasy, if produced, is a natural effect of a supernatural cause. There is active co-operation on the part of the subject. This ecstasy is not considered a miracle. In a process of canonization it is admitted only as a sign of sanctity. The Church considers as a miracle (of the third order) the ecstasy in which the soul is suddenly *ravished* without previous meditation or contemplation, the subject being purely passive.

Theologians moreover distinguish between the natural ecstasy, the Divine ecstasy, and the diabolic ecstasy. (p. 223.)

We give these words as a specimen of the calm and sober spirit in which Dr. Lefebvre always writes in the few cases in which he is obliged to refer at all to the religious bearings of his subject.

We will conclude by saying that the ecclesiastical authorities by whom this remarkable case has been examined have evidently been as cautious as the medical men themselves. We read of their compelling poor Louise to resist by all possible means the access of the ecstasy. This prudence may perhaps make them think it undesirable that any account of the case in its religious aspect should be published, at least during the life of Louise.

ART. VIII.—BERKELEY'S LIFE AND WORKS.

The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne, including many of his writings hitherto unpublished. With Prefaces, Annotations, his Life and Letters, and an Account of his Philosophy. By ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1871.

THE character of Bishop Berkeley is one on which the mind of the scholar loves to dwell. It is full of sweetness and light, of *geist* and of *voûc*, gracious, studious, and good-humoured. Without assigning to him, as Pope did, "every virtue under heaven," he may be well called, in the words of the same poet, "an honest man, the noblest work of God." And apart from the eminent honesty of his character, the qualities of his intellect were rare and original, and especially so in the age and in the country in which he lived. He had genius and yet good-nature. He was not quite sure of the existence of matter, but he never doubted the existence of God. It is a reproach to English literature that more than a century has passed since the death of this great and good man without having added to our libraries a classic edition of his works, and without even the attempt to produce an adequate memoir of his mind and life. Of his philosophy we shall say very little. It was but a wanton liberty to assert, as Hume did, that Berkeley's writings "form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted." On the other hand, we can hardly accept Professor Campbell Fraser's dictum, that "Berkeley's philosophy in its most comprehensive aspect is a philosophy of the causation that is in the universe, rather than a philosophy of the mere material world," as altogether sufficient; but we may surely say that no one can read the *Dialogues of Alciphron* without being as impressed by their simple and gracious piety as by the subtle force and charm of their style. The style of Berkeley is indeed not the least choice of his gifts. "The simple and transparent beauty of Berkeley's style," says Professor Fraser, "is not less remarkable than the ingenuity of his reasonings. He emerged in provincial Ireland the most elegant writer of the English language for philosophical purposes who had then, or who has since, appeared, at a

time too when Ireland, like Scotland, was in a state of provincial barbarism. The greatest master of nervous English prose then living was no doubt also an Irishman. But Swift had been in England, and was for years in the family of Sir William Temple, who brought English style to perfection, and was accustomed to employ language that is less antiquated at the present day than that of any of his contemporaries. The case of Berkeley is unique." We cannot altogether agree with this criticism. The style may or may not be, as the French say, the man; but it certainly is to a considerable extent characteristic of the country to which the man belongs. The swiftly changing lights and shades, the easy breezy freshness, the picturesqueness which appears to be a distraction but in reality both illustrates and attracts, the deep natural earnestness of the tone, and the delicate melody of the periods in Berkeley's style, are to our mind essentially Irish, as, on the other hand, there is a fierce intensity of epithet, a downright energy in invective, and a wild exuberance in the quality of his not always too delightful humour, which, even if he had not been born in Dublin, would, we think, have led a keen critic to suspect that Jonathan Swift had, if not Irish blood in his veins, the Irish vein in his genius. Deduct the great Irish writers, Swift, Steele, Berkeley, Goldsmith, Burke, and Francis from the English prose of the last century, and the loss would be great; but in each case it is possible, we think, to demonstrate that the loss would be of qualities essentially characteristic of the Irish mind. Berkeley, too, like Swift, was an Irish patriot, not in the spirit of that fierce avenging indignation against the wrongs of his people which lacerated the heart of the dour Dean, but in the diligent sowing of seeds of thought, some of which have ripened since and some rotted, but all had the object of producing peace and, if possible, prosperity, in what was then, at all events, the most unhappy country on the face of the globe. In summing up his character, we must finally observe that the name of Bishop Berkeley is for ever associated with tar water. Tar water at least was to him an actual and potent reality. His devotion to it gives a ridiculous twist to a character eminently sober and gentle, much as if he had devoted himself to the search for the philosopher's stone. In the "*Siris*," a treatise which is on the whole, perhaps, the most characteristic display of all the qualities of his mind, its philosophy, its poesy, its learning, and its humour, everything nevertheless is touched with tar. The fame of tar water died away soon after Berkeley's death, but it may be submitted that the medical principle which he preached with such a fanatical and empirical zeal is perhaps the medical principle most in the ascendant at the

present day. It is the principle of antiseptic treatment; but in place of tar itself, figures one of its principal constituents, the by no means odorous deodoriser carbolic acid.

George Berkeley was born near Thomastown, in the county Kilkenny, on the 12th of March, 1684. His family claimed to be a branch of the Berkeleys of Stratton. Many Berkeleys had settled in Ireland, chiefly in the contiguous counties of Carlow, Wexford, and Kilkenny, during the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. While George Berkeley was yet in his childhood, Ireland was for the last time the scene of a great war; and its sounds were at least heard in the valley of the Nore, as the Irish army retreated from the Boyne to begin that stubborn struggle which only ended with the capitulation of Limerick in the following year.

In his twelfth year, young Berkeley was entered in the second class, at the school now called the College of Kilkenny, founded by Pierse, Earl of Ormond, in the sixteenth century, but which had been lately rebuilt by the great Duke. The class in which he entered affords a proof—for there were five classes in the school—that he had already received the rudiments of a classical education, probably from some Irish philomath of the hedge. In the same school, and in the immediately preceding generation, Jonathan Swift had been taught. His kindred, too, had settled in Kilkenny. Hence probably arose his great affection for George Berkeley, whom, in after-years, he introduced to his own patron, Lord Berkeley, in the following fashion:—"My Lord, here is a young gentleman of your family. I can assure your lordship it is a much greater honour to you to be related to him than it is to him to be related to you." Lord Berkeley at the time was Master of the Rolls in Ireland and, by a plurality of office almost inconceivable in the present day, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the same time. George Berkeley was a Junior Fellow of Trinity College. Scandal alleged that George Berkeley's father, or grandfather, was a natural son of a previous Lord Berkeley, an accident which, if true, would make the form of the introduction not less characteristic of Swift, and certainly not more flattering to the noble lord. But there seem to be really no grounds for the scandal.

Berkeley entered Trinity College in 1699, was admitted scholar in 1702, graduated Bachelor of Arts in 1704, and was elected Fellow in 1707. The salary of a junior fellow was then £10 a year, and the examinations were intended to reach the limits of general knowledge. Berkeley passed with distinction. He was already a celebrity of the University, famous among undergraduates for his genius and acquirements, and also notorious for a quaint and placid eccentricity. Anxious to ascer-

tain what were the exact sensations of strangulation, after having seen a man hanged at Kilmainham, Berkeley got his chum Conterini (the uncle of Oliver Goldsmith) to suspend him by the neck to the ceiling of his room. On a given signal, Conterini was to have cut him down; but owing presumably to the sudden flow of blood to the brain, Berkeley became instantly unconscious. Conterini waited in vain for the signal. At last observing that his friend's appearance was becoming decidedly cadaverous, Conterini cut the rope in a hurry. Berkeley fell to the floor. The shock brought him to his senses; and it is recorded that his first expression on recovering was, "Bless my heart, Conterini, you have rumped my band." Dublin and even Trinity College have altered in many ways within the last two centuries; but even now the man who would have the nerve to attempt such an experiment, and take its nearly fatal end so coolly, would not want for such esteem and sympathy as freshmen and sophisters have got to give.

The society of Dublin was not so barbarous in those days as Professor Fraser thinks. The Dublin Society had lately been founded by Mr. Molyneux, member for the University, who gave a remarkable impulse, not by any means adequately recognized in their histories, both to the political and scientific culture of his countrymen. He was an intimate friend of Locke, and to him is probably due the great and indeed inordinate repute in which the writings of Locke have always been held in the Irish University. His "Case of Ireland being bound by Acts of Parliament in England," was the opening of the modern Protestant movement for legislative independence, which achieved its apparent end in 1782, only to perish of its own intolerance and corruption in 1800. Mr. Addison was appointed Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant a year or two after Berkeley was elected Junior Fellow, and many of his best papers in the *Tatler* were written at the Castle. There never was a more popular Chief Secretary. "Come over again when you are at leisure," wrote Swift to him, "and we will raise an army and make you king of Ireland. Can you think so meanly of a kingdom as not to be pleased that every creature in it, who hath one grain of worth, has a veneration for you?" In an analysis of Berkeley's style, it is impossible not to recognize the chaste and neat influence of Addison. He had at least the opportunity of anticipating, almost in the presence of the master, the advice of Johnson,—“Whoever wishes to attain an English style familiar but not coarse, and elegant but not ostentatious, must give his days and nights to the study of Addison.” Mr. Addison no doubt was to be daily seen in Dame street, walking from the Castle to Parliament. Mr. Addison probably read

sometimes in the only library Dublin then contained, that of the College. Mr. Addison was writing from Dublin for Mr. Steele in the *Tatler*, and Mr. Steele was the son of a Dublin lawyer, who had been Secretary to the Duke of Ormond. Naturally the *Tatler* and *Spectator* would be read in Trinity College with a peculiar and familiar interest. At the same time, Doctor Swift was residing, twenty miles north of Dublin, at his living of Laracor. He was at the time regarded as a high Tory of course, but, above all things, as a staunch Irish Churchman. Dublin did not then afford such quarry as that to which his genius in its loftiest flights could soar; but it was an eagle which, for want of better prey, would swoop at the cock on his dunghill, and even stoop to carrion on occasion. Lord Wharton, then Lord-Lieutenant, was little loved by Swift, and would probably have heard with much more equanimity that a rising was apprehended in Connaught, than that a squib was about to be projected from the parsonage at Laracor. Swift had no great regard or respect for his own university; but, how we know not, he had learned during the years he spent near Dublin to love and esteem George Berkeley. The reputation in which Berkeley was held in England before any of his really great works were published was evidently due to the friendship and the authority of Swift. Referring to the introduction to Lord Berkeley, which preceded the publication of the "*Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous*," Swift writes in his *Journal to Stella*, "I went to court to-day on purpose to present Mr. Berkeley, one of our Fellows of Trinity College, to Lord Berkeley of Stratton. Mr. Berkeley is a very ingenious man and a great philosopher, and I have mentioned him to all the ministers, and I have given them some of his writings, and I will favour him as much as I can. This I think I am bound to—in honour and conscience to use all my little credit towards helping forward men of honour and worth in the world."

Berkeley was very fortunate in the time of his advent to London. It was in the spring of the year 1713, when Swift, though he had lately lost an English see by announcing the fact that the Duchess of Somerset had red hair, was nevertheless at the very height of his reputation and influence—the influence of a genius quite capable of attracting admiration, respect, even love, but which rather willed to inspire terror, and which the greatest were not ashamed to dread and propitiate. It was one of those periods of political transformation in which even a mean man, who happens to be an organ of opinion, can by studying opportunity produce extraordinary effects. But Swift was a man to whom all the forms of political thought, from the lowest lampoon to the highest state paper, were equally easy. In his amiable aspects he exercised

a surprising fascination ; and it pleased him to exercise it on Berkeley's behalf. So Berkeley was made at home with the statesmen and the poets between whom Swift divided his leisure. He was admitted to write for the *Guardian* ; and he wrote against Free Thinkers, in the capacity of a free-thinking Anti-Free-Thinker. His characteristic views of philosophy had been already outlined in the unfinished essay on the "Principles of Human Knowledge," which had been published, but had hardly attracted any attention, three years before. The essays in the *Guardian* gracefully insinuate the same views. But he had already composed the work which was to be the real warrant of his fame, and the publication of this book was no doubt the cause of his visit to London. It is probable that he believed the dry and systematic style of the "Principles" had prevented the due consideration of his philosophy by an age indisposed to serious studies ; and no doubt the example of Plato tempted him to attempt the difficult but seductive method of imaginary dialogue. It is certain, at all events, that he had composed the "Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous" before he came to London ; and the visit to Lord Berkeley was with a view to solicit his permission to dedicate them to the head of the philosopher's house. The noble lord graciously accepted the dedication, and also introduced his young kinsman to Bishop Atterbury. "Does my cousin answer your Lordship's expectation?" said the peer to the prelate when Berkeley had left the room. Atterbury raised his hands to his head and exclaimed, "So much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels until I saw this gentleman." After all, there is no testimony to Berkeley's character equal to the fact that all this praise by men so gifted and to him so venerable, administered too in such a sudden douche, did not for a moment spoil the homely sweetness and grave simplicity of his character. He was in his thirtieth year, and the fancy might well have seized him that were he to remain in London, a position hardly inferior to Swift's in intellectual influence, and whose sway might, unlike his, maintain its hold on the affections as well as the understandings of men, would gradually form itself for him. Why might not the shady side of Pall Mall and the coffee-room at Will's serve as well for the discussion of the new philosophy as the Palæstra of Taureas or the Porch of the King Archon did for the old ? But he does not seem to have ever wished to lead the city life, to dwell between the club and the crowd. The case of Swift, too, had its warning. It is related, and there has been much pathetic, some sarcastic comment on the incident, that after the Dean's death a lock of

Stella's hair was found among his papers, on the envelope of which he had written in the splenetic sadness of his spirit the words, "Only a woman's hair." To George Berkeley, in the May days of 1713, under the shade of tender green leaves in the Park, it is not improbable that he may have uttered the same words in a very different key. It was all because her Grace of Somerset had red hair—born two centuries too soon or two centuries too late to be reckoned a beauty—that he was now not merely to forego the mitre of Hereford, but to be banished to a dingy Deanery in the Liberties of Dublin. It is recorded that the Archbishop of York went, on the occasion of his nomination for Hereford, to the Queen's closet and warned Anne that before she made Dr. Swift a bishop, she ought to be sure he was a Christian. The Queen did not see so much harm in the "Tale of a Tub"; but when the Duchess of Somerset showed her the "Windsor Prophecy," she vowed she would never sign his *congé d'élire*. And so the reign of Jonathan came to an end. For three years he had used and abused in every conceivable way his versatile faculties, his vast capacity, and his unprecedented influence. The haughtiest peers humbled themselves before his dignified disdain. Women were fascinated by the half-mocking, half-tender gleam of his blue eyes. His writings again and again whipped Harley's discordant majority together. One of his pamphlets dissolved a formidable "Cave" (as we have learned to call it), the October Club. Another suddenly reconciled the English people, then in its most bellicose humour, to a not very glorious peace with France. In the journals of the House of Commons there are no documents more remarkable for their weight, precision, and dignity than the "Representation of the State of the Nation" and the subsequent "Address to the Queen." They were both written by the Irish parson, who loved to make ministers run his errands, who knew the secrets of the Cabinet before it met, who patronized those who exercised the patronage of the Crown, who could bend the will of Parliament with his pen, and who made friends for everybody, especially every poor poet or Irishman whom he happened to know, with almost as much zeal and assiduity as he made enemies for himself. No one spoke so well the language proper to Westminster, yet he much preferred to speak the language of Billingsgate. But why, it may even still be asked, why if the locks of that Duchess must be treated in verse, why aggravate the offence by the hardly less heinous imputation that she was privy to the murder of her first husband? Why not rather expatiate on their ruddy radiance, with the same melodious idolatry that Mr. Pope devoted to the lock of Belinda? In that case, Jonathan Swift

might have worn the horse-hair wig, the sleeves of lawn, the apron of silk, the claret-coloured cutaway coat, and all the mysteriously suggestive symbols of English episcopacy. The quarrel of Harley and St. John need not have ripened into the ruin of the Tories. The Irish nation might have been as well content with Wood's copper as they had been a generation before with James the Second's brass. Vanessa might have resigned herself to marry an alderman, and Stella died in a green old age of some commonplace complaint. But it was Swift's doom to return to Ireland; and hence all these tears and all these rows. Berkeley, on the other hand, neither wished to return to Ireland nor to stay in London. At this period of his life a strong desire possessed him to travel in the classic lands, through which Mr. Addison had lately shown the way in an elegant quarto. Swift's friendship secured for him the privilege of being included in the suite of a very remarkable person of quality, for whom, however, Swift himself was perhaps the only man of his age quite fitted to be a travelling companion,—that illustrious and captivating lunatic Lord Peterborough. In his Diary Swift records how one day at dinner at the Lord Treasurer's it was announced that Lord Peterborough had just returned from abroad, and how Harley and Bolingbroke rushed to the door to welcome him. But when he saw Swift he would not even wait to salute the Duke of Ormond, though he too had conquered Spain off-hand, but runs and kisses him before he speaks to any one else. The man of genius with a craze was drawn to his fellow rather than to his peers. But for the craze, Lord Peterborough would probably have been the greatest man in England. Soldiers may still study with advantage his Spanish war; for energy, originality, and dexterity it bears comparison with Napoleon's early campaigns; nor, when his mind was clear, did he give a less wise and weighty opinion on affairs of state than St. John himself. He was gazetted in 1713 Ambassador Extraordinary to Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, on his accession to the crown of Sicily; and he appointed Berkeley to the by no means onerous office of Chaplain to the Embassy. A Queen's Letter to the Provost and Fellows of Trinity College directed them to dispense with the usual statute which forbids a Fellow to be absent for more than sixty-three days in a year, and gave Berkeley "leave to travel and remain abroad during the space of two years for the recovery of his health and his improvement in learning."

In November, 1713, he started for Paris, where he spent a month. "I have some reasons," he says, "for declining to speak of the country or villages that I saw as I came along." The road from Calais, notwithstanding occasional poplars,

probably reminded him of some of the meaner aspects of Irish inland scenery. From Paris he proceeded to Italy, crossing Mont Cenis on New Year's day. "We were carried in open chairs," he writes to his friend Tom Prior, "by men used to scale these rocks and precipices, which in this season are more slippery and dangerous than at other times, and at the best are high, craggy, and steep enough to cause the heart of the most valiant to melt within him." What a vision it would have been to Berkeley of all men, that the Alps should be both tunnelled and scaled by steam-engines and wired for the language of lightning in the course of this century! Lord Peterborough visited Sicily in disguise, leaving his household at Leghorn, whence the Embassy was to proceed in state by sea. "I am here," Berkeley writes to Pope in May, "in quality of chaplain to the Earl of Peterborough, who about three months since left the greatest part of his family in this town. God knows how long we shall stay here." They appear to have stayed there until the Embassy came to an end, which happened on the death of the Queen in August. Then followed the great Hanoverian deluge. Harley and St. John had quarrelled utterly when Swift went to Ireland. He returned and made a vehement effort to reconcile them. It failed. The Queen died, and while their quarrel was at its height both found they were in imminent danger of the block. Peterborough, on the road from Paris to Calais, met Bolingbroke getting out of the way of impeachment, and cut him dead, not indeed because the late Secretary was suspected of being a traitor, but because Peterborough had discovered, while he was absent from England, that he had not been treated with complete confidence in the negotiations preliminary to the Peace of Utrecht. Berkeley, too, made his way but less rapidly back to London; and it would seem to Dublin also—but for a few months only. The passion of travel had fairly possessed him; and the Bishop of Clogher, Dr. Ashe, proposing to him to take charge of his eldest son through the grand tour, in 1715 he started for the Continent with two further years' leave of absence from his college.

At Paris he made the acquaintance, and (so to speak) "was the death" of Malebranche. An anecdote of the time relates that having called on the famous Oratorian, he found him suffering from inflammation of the lungs, but eager to discuss Berkeley's system with him nevertheless. "In the heat of the disputation he raised his voice so high and gave way so freely to the natural impetuosity of a man of parts and a Frenchman, that he brought on himself a violent increase of his disorder, which carried him off a few days after." Upon this sad, but (it must be added) not quite certainly authenticated catastrophe,

Berkeley vanishes from his biographer's gaze for nearly two years. Then he reappears in not the least characteristic and perhaps the most picturesque of all possible positions,—on the top of Mount Vesuvius, craning over the crater during an eruption, and evidently as free from fear as if he were only watching the chafing of the sea against Bray Head. No better description, we believe, has ever been written of the phenomena of an eruption, and we may quote part of it at least :—

With much difficulty I reached the top of Mount Vesuvius, in which I saw a vast aperture full of smoke, which hindered the seeing its depth and figure. I heard within that horrid gulf certain odd sounds, which seemed to proceed from the belly of the mountain ; a sort of murmuring, sighing, throbbing, churning, dashing (as it were) of waves, and between whiles a noise, like that of thunder or cannon, which was constantly attended with a clattering like that of tiles falling from the tops of houses on the streets. Sometimes as the wind changed, the smoke grew thinner, discovering a very ruddy flame, and the jaws of the pan or crater streaked with red and several shades of yellow. After an hour's stay, the smoke, being moved by the wind, gave us short and partial prospects of the great hollow, in the flat bottom of which I could discern two furnaces almost contiguous : that on the left, seeming about three yards in diameter, glowed with red flame, and threw up red-hot stones with a hideous noise, which as they fell back, caused the fore-mentioned clattering. May 8, in the morning, I ascended to the top of Vesuvius a second time, and found a different face of things. The smoke ascending upright, gave a full prospect of the crater, which, as I could judge, is about a mile in circumference, and an hundred yards deep. A conical mount had been formed since my last visit in the middle of the bottom : this mount, I could see, was made of the stones thrown up, and fallen back again into the crater. In this new hill remained the two mounts or furnace already mentioned : that on our left was in the vertex of the hill which it had formed round it, and raged more violently than before, throwing up every three or four minutes, with a dreadful bellowing, a vast number of red-hot stones, sometimes in appearance above a thousand and at least three thousand feet higher than my head as I stood upon the brink : but, there being little or no wind, they fell back perpendicularly into the crater, increasing the conical hill. The other mouth to the right was lower in the side of the same new-formed hill. I could discern it to be filled with red-hot liquid matter, like that in a furnace of a glass-house, which raged and wrought as the waves of the sea, causing a short abrupt noise like what may be imagined to proceed from a sea of quicksilver dashing among uneven rocks. This stuff would sometimes spew over and run down the convex side of the conical hill and appearing at first red-hot, it changed colour, and hardened as it cooled, showing the first rudiments of an eruption, or, if I may say so, an eruption in miniature. Had the wind driven in our faces we had been in no small danger of stifling by the sulphurous smoke, or being knocked on the head by lumps of molten minerals which we saw had sometimes fallen on the brink of the crater, upon those shots from the gulf at the bottom. But, as the wind

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With much difficulty I reached the top of Mount Vesuvius, in which I saw a vast aperture full of smoke, which hindered the seeing its depth and figure. I heard within that horrid gulf certain odd sounds, which seemed to proceed from the belly of the mountain ; a sort of murmuring, sighing, throbbing, churning, dashing (as it were) of waves, and between whiles a noise, like that of thunder or cannon, which was constantly attended with a clattering like that of tiles falling from the tops of houses on the streets. Sometimes as the wind changed, the smoke grew thinner, discovering a very ruddy flame, and the jaws of the pan or crater streaked with red and several shades of yellow. After an hour's stay, the smoke, being moved by the wind, gave us short and partial prospects of the great hollow, in the flat bottom of which I could discern two furnaces almost contiguous : that on the left, seeming about three yards in diameter, glowed with red flame, and threw up red-hot stones with a hideous noise, which as they fell back, caused the fore-mentioned clattering. May 8, in the morning, I ascended to the top of Vesuvius a second time, and found a different face of things. The smoke ascending upright, gave a full prospect of the crater, which, as I could judge, is about a mile in circumference, and an hundred yards deep. A conical mount had been formed since my last visit in the middle of the bottom : this mount, I could see, was made of the stones thrown up, and fallen back again into the crater. In this new hill remained the two mounts or furnace already mentioned : that on our left was in the vertex of the hill which it had formed round it, and raged more violently than before, throwing up every three or four minutes, with a dreadful bellowing, a vast number of red-hot stones, sometimes in appearance above a thousand and at least three thousand feet higher than my head as I stood upon the brink : but, there being little or no wind, they fell back perpendicularly into the crater, increasing the conical hill. The other mouth to the right was lower in the side of the same new-formed hill. I could discern it to be filled with red-hot liquid matter, like that in a furnace of a glass-house, which raged and wrought as the waves of the sea, causing a short abrupt noise like what may be imagined to proceed from a sea of quicksilver dashing among uneven rocks. This stuff would sometimes spew over and run down the convex side of the conical hill and appearing at first red-hot, it changed colour, and hardened as it cooled, showing the first rudiments of an eruption, or, if I may say so, an eruption in miniature. Had the wind driven in our faces we had been in no small danger of stifling by the sulphurous smoke, or being knocked on the head by lumps of molten minerals which we saw had sometimes fallen on the brink of the crater, upon those shots from the gulf at the bottom. But, as the wind

was favourable, I had an opportunity to survey this odd scene for above an hour and a half together, during which it was very observable that all the volleys of smoke, flame, and burning stones came only out of the hole to our left, while the liquid stuff in the other mouth wrought and overflowed as hath been already described.

He spent some time at Rome, and wrote a journal there, but it is somewhat commonplace. In a letter to Pope, a few months later, he gives a charming description of the island of Ischia, which he says is "an epitome of the whole earth, containing within the compass of eighteen miles a wonderful variety of hills, vales, ragged rocks, fruitful plains, and barren mountains all thrown together in a most romantic confusion." After describing the cornfields and vineyards, the chestnut groves and myrtle hedges, the limes and oranges, the streams and fountains, and the magnificent view from old Mons Epomeus, ranging from the promontory of Antium to the Cape of Palinurus, he extols the inhabitants. "The inhabitants of this delicious isle," he says, "as they are without riches and honours, so they are without the vices and follies that attend them; and were they but as much strangers to revenge as they are to avarice and ambition, they might in fact answer the poetical notions of the golden age. But they have got an alloy to their happiness—an ill habit of murdering one another on slight pretences. We had an instance of this the second night after our arrival, a youth of eighteen being shot dead by our door; and yet, by the sole secret of minding our own business, we found a means of living securely for three or four months among this dangerous people." This sentence is, we are afraid, decidedly Irish. An Englishman, who had had a lad shot dead at his door the day after he arrived in a strange island, would probably take himself off to some other island without delay, and would hardly hesitate to form a very strong *primâ facie* prejudice against the character of the inhabitants. But Berkeley was a philosopher, and, moreover, he was born in very nearly the latitude of Tipperary. Accordingly, he attended to his own affairs, and left the Ischians to indulge that one unfortunate ill habit of theirs, the sole streak of alloy in the perfect metal of their character. After this letter to Pope we lose his track again. It is known that he explored Sicily on foot, and probably found its brigands no worse than the contemporary rapparees of his native island. It was reported at Dublin that he had even ventured so far as Cairo. The College was obliged again and again to renew his term of absence. He spent in all seven years thus wandering about the Old World, and returned to England in the year 1720.

When he arrived in London he found the city in the agony of the earliest and the vastest of financial panics. The South Sea Company had collapsed. Hundreds of private fortunes were swallowed in the gulf. The credit of the whole kingdom appeared to be imperilled. Berkeley believed that the ruin of Great Britain was imminent, and wrote an essay towards preventing it, which had as great a run as the "Battle of Dorking." "I know it is an old folly," he said, "to make peevish complaints of the times and charge the common failures of human nature on a particular age. One may nevertheless venture to affirm that the present hath brought forth new and portentous villanies not to be paralleled in our own or any other history. We have been long preparing for some great catastrophe. Vice and villany have by degrees grown reputable among us; our infidels pass for fine gentlemen and our venal traitors for men of sense who know the world. We have made a jest of public spirit and cancelled all respect for whatever our laws and religion repute sacred. The old English modesty is quite worn off, and instead of blushing for our crimes, we are ashamed only of piety and virtue. In short, other nations have been wicked, but we are the first who have been wicked on principle. The truth is, our symptoms are so bad that, notwithstanding all the care and vigilance of the legislature, it is to be feared the final period of our State approaches." Professor Fraser is, we think, right in his conjecture that it was in the horror and disgust with which he contemplated and exaggerated to himself the state of society in England—so different from that of the Ischians, for example, with their one solitary peccadillo—that the resolution to attempt a great foundation to diffuse learning and virtue in the New World first took form in his mind. Compare with the sentences we have quoted the fine and famous lines which he wrote on the "Prospect of Planting Art and Learning in America":—

There shall be sung another golden age,
The rise of empire and of arts,
The good and great inspiring epic rage,
The wisest heads and noblest hearts.

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay,
Such as she bred when fresh and young,
When heavenly flame did animate her clay,
By future poets shall be sung.

Westward the course of Empire takes its way,
The four first acts already past,
A fifth shall close the drama in the day
Time's noblest offspring, the last.

Alas, had Berkeley only foreseen the brand-new golden age of shoddy and of greenbacks; the rise of those American arts, of which the manufacture of wooden nutmegs is the finest; the epic rage of Hans Breitmann in celebrating the achievements of his good and great Bummers; the days of Hard Shells, Copperheads, Know Nothings, Miscegenists, and Mormons, he would hardly have felt so happy as to the prospects of Time's last and noblest offspring! But the Yankee was yet in the womb of time. Berkeley applauded the Ischians, but the English revolted, nor did the Irish even altogether content his soul. Shocked by the bursting of that South-Sea bubble, which a New York speculator of genius would in our day regard as a trivial incident, which ought hardly to affect Wall Street for twenty-four hours, his thoughts and hopes turned steadily towards the great new world of the far West.

He returned to Dublin, however, in the summer of 1721; and there were not wanting inducements, if his own ease and distinction were to be considered, why he should be content to remain in Ireland. Lord Burlington introduced him to the Duke of Grafton, then newly appointed Lord-Lieutenant, and he was at once named a Castle chaplain. In his absence, he had been elected Senior Fellow of the University. He was appointed, on his return, Divinity Lecturer and University Preacher. The following year he was made Dean of Dromore; and about the same time appointed Hebrew Lecturer and Senior Proctor of the College. His income cannot at this time have been less than a thousand pounds. A year later occurred the tragic ending of Swift's intimacy with Miss Van Homrigh—the letter to Stella, the Dean's gallop down to Marley, and the scene which slew Vanessa. Berkeley is, as it happens, the sole authority for the fact of Swift's marriage to Stella. If Miss Van Homrigh had been moved to consult him instead of appealing to Stella direct, they might all have been saved some misery. She knew Berkeley so well, and so much esteemed him, that, when she cancelled the will she had made in Swift's favour, she left him half her property,—about four thousand pounds. Vanessa died in May, 1723. A year later, the best deanery in the Irish Establishment became vacant. In the April of 1724 the Duke of Grafton appointed Berkeley Dean of Derry. A moderate prosperity, such as one might suppose exactly suited to his tastes and temperament, thus continued to attend him. At that moment the Dean of Derry might have been reckoned a very fortunate man. He seemed to combine all the advantages of interest and of character. After wandering for seven years wherever his taste or his fancy led him, he returned to receive in swift succession all the rewards

due to assiduous labour and the diligent doing of duty. Every one seemed to be in the conspiracy to help the incorrigible but irresistible vagrant. In three years he had attained the highest honours and emoluments of his University, a Court chaplaincy, two livings, and two deaneries. Had he been the son of the Primate, or the cousin of the Chief Secretary, he could not have fared much better. The age in which it was his unhappiness to live was doubtless a very scandalous age; but we apprehend there must have been more good-nature among men in those days than there is in these. Junior fellows do not get seven years' leave to travel now, and even if they climb the Matterhorn, tramp the Ghauts, and find the Patagonians, but for a propensity or two, the pleasantest people on earth, Mr. Gladstone does not feel moved, immediately on their return, to send to their address a Crown living after a Regius Professorship, and deanery on top of deanery. Such good luck not always comes to so good a man; but good George Berkeley only looked upon what men called his good luck as a temptation of the Evil One. Whether the course of Empire was to wend westward or not, his feet willed to wander anew that way.

Berkeley's scheme of his Western mission was characterized by a grandeur of conception and a generosity of devotion, of which we do not believe there is another example in the history of the Protestant sects. He proposed to occupy the island of Bermuda, and to treat it as a base of operations, itself secluded from the corrupting influences of the great world, out of which to bring all the influences of civility, morality, science, and religion to bear on the new and vast Empire, recruited by the hardiest and most earnest spirits of Europe, which he foresaw was about to arise beyond the Atlantic. What the Irish schools and the Irish missions had been to the barbarous but not indocile inhabitants of France, Italy, and Germany in the fourth and fifth centuries, he and his disciples might hope to prove to the great people whose sway, within a century or two, should spread from ocean to ocean and from the Pole to the Equator. All that Judæa and Greece and Rome, and France and Italy and England, had hived of thought and of knowledge might here be preserved and condensed and transmitted, perhaps amplified and refined, under the influences of an air as clear and sunny as that of Athens, and a liberty as assured as that of Britain, while remote from the passions of party. The site and clime of Bermuda fascinated his imagination. Shakespeare and Waller had embalmed the image of its summer storms, its sun-loved coast, its strand of coral and ambergris, its woods full of fragrance and music and colour, its ocean-tempered air, its fruitful virgin soil. The orange and

lemon, the cocoa-nut, the arrow-root, the plantain had already been planted by nature, the vine and olive would soon be reared by man. But there were homely pleasures, dear to the habits of Berkeley, which he would have pined after on that gorgeous rock. He would have found it hard to get grass enough all the year round to make milk for his tea, and he would have been obliged to eat his mutton an hour or two after it was killed. As it happened, he never saw the island of so much promise. His apostolate of the West was a vision, not a vocation. His design was very noble, very liberal, very large, but, after all, it was a Protestant mission. It depended for its success, not on the grace of God and the zeal of holy poverty, but on the support of statesmen and on stated supplies of money. Still such enthusiasm and such gentleness have a magic charm. When he first went to London to prepare the way, Swift thus introduced him to the Lord-Lieutenant, Lord Carteret.

Your Excellency will be frightened when I tell you all this is but an introduction ; for I am now to mention his errand. He is an absolute philosopher with regard to titles, money, and power ; and for three years past has been struck with the notion of founding a university at Bermudas, by a charter from the Crown. He has seduced several of the hopefulest young clergymen and others here, many of them well provided for, and all in the fairest way for preferment ; but in England his conquests are greater, and I doubt will spread very far this winter. He showed me a little Tract which he designs to publish ; and there your Excellency will see his whole scheme of a life academico-philosophical (I shall make you remember what you were) of a college founded for English scholars and missionaries ; where he most exorbitantly proposes a whole hundred pounds a year for himself, fifty pounds for a fellow, and ten for a student. His heart will break if his deanery be not taken from him and left to your Excellency's disposal ; I discouraged him by the coldness of courts and ministers, who will interpret all this as impossible and a vision ; but nothing will do. And therefore I humbly entreat your Excellency either to use such persuasion as will keep one of the first men in the kingdom for learning and virtue quiet at home, or assist him by your credit to compass his romantic design ; which, however, is very noble and generous, and directly proper for a great person of your excellent education to encourage.

Lord Bathurst invited him to dine with the Scriblerus Club. He related afterwards that " they all agreed to rally Berkeley on his scheme at the Bermudas. Berkeley having listened to all the lively things they had to say, begged to be heard in his turn ; and displayed his plan with such an astonishing and animating force of eloquence and enthusiasm that they were struck dumb, and after some hours rose up all together with

Berkeley's Life and Works.

earnestness exclaiming, 'Let us all set out with him immediately.'" They were not, perhaps, the companions which Berkeley would have chosen to edify Puritans or convert Catholics. But they did what they could do. They commenced a subscription, which rose to five thousand pounds. They helped to state favour for his design. It is said that a Venetian Abbot whom he had known abroad, secured to Berkeley the ear of the king. He got a charter in June, 1725. He canvassed the House of Commons so effectually that in May, 1726, they adopted, almost unanimously an address to the Crown "praying such a grant for St. Paul's College in Bermudas, out of the lands of Christopher's, as might seem to his Majesty sufficient for the purpose." Sir Robert Walpole promised a grant of £20,000. What is rather more remarkable, he gave a private subscription of £200. In these negotiations Berkeley spent a period of years—in these negotiations, and also, it must be suspected, in the not less arduous enterprise of making love. He had got his charter in 1725, his Commons' address in 1726, but he did not sail for America until September, 1728. He never visited Derry at all. He visited Dublin, but with such precautionary mystery that one might have supposed he was a Jacobite envoy, a Jesuit provincial, or a crimp for the Irish Brig. "Now it is of all things my earnest desire" (he writes to his friend Tom Prior), "and for very good reasons, not to have it known that I am in Dublin. Speak not, therefore, on the subject of it to any mortal whatsoever. When I formerly desired you to take a place for me near the town, you gave out that you were looking for a retired lodging for a friend of yours; and which every one surmised me to be the person. I must beg not to act in the like manner now. . . . In this affair I consider convenience more than expense, and would of all things (what it will) have a proper place in a retired situation, where I may have access to fields and sweet air provided against the moment I arrive. I am inclined to think one may be better concealed in the outermost skirt of the suburbs than in the country or within the town. Wherefore if you cannot accommodate where I mention [at Ballybough], inquire for some other skirt or remote suburb. A house quite detached from the country I should have no objection to, provided you judge that I shall not be liable to discovery in it." This letter was written in April, 1728; on the 1st of August Berkeley married to Anne, daughter of the Right Hon. John Forster, sometime Chief Justice of the Irish Court of Common Pleas and Speaker also of the House of Commons. There can be little doubt, we assume, that she was the cause of those visits to Dublin shrouded in such elaborate secrecy, which appear to

somewhat retarded the civilization and evangelization of the continent of North America. The mysterious method of Swift in these delicate relations seems to have been studied and improved upon by his brother Dean. It is indeed curious, and, alas, comical, to conceive this truly zealous divine, whose whole soul was set on reclaiming from fanatical extravagance and sordid cupidity the children of the Pilgrim Fathers, and on shedding Gospel light through the dusky masses of the Indian race, suddenly vanishing from the sight of men, disguising himself in some smart suit, ruffles and rapier, flowing peruke, and embroidered vest (we may be sure he did not laud at Dunleary in the remarkable hat and solemn habiliments of a Dean), and so arriving at the place adjacent to "fields and sweet air" already provided by Tom Prior. In the character of Berkeley innocence and cunning were finely blended. Even from Tom Prior, the confidant of all his affairs, and the crony of his early affection, the romantic mystery was kept a strict secret. "To-morrow, dear Tom," he writes on the very eve of his sailing from Gravesend, "to-morrow, with God's blessing, I set sail for Rhode Island, with my wife and a friend of hers, my Lady Handcock's daughter, who bears us company. I am married since I saw you to Miss Forster, daughter of the late Chief Justice, whose humour and turn of mind pleases me beyond anything that I know of her whole sex." The marriage had, in fact, already taken place, according to Dr. Stock's memoir, more than a month before—where, it is not recorded, but evidently not in Dublin.

The long winter voyage came to its term. Near the end of January, 1729, Berkeley saw beyond the noble expanse of the Narragansett waters, studded with spacious and verdant isles, the low rolling green hills of Rhode Island, and rounding the long projecting point, sailed into Newport Bay. It was a holiday in the island. The pilot sent a letter from Berkeley to the minister of the Episcopal Church, which was delivered to him in the pulpit. He read it to the congregation, dismissed them with his blessing, and then "Mr. Honeyman with the wardens, vestry, church, and congregation, male and female, repaired immediately to the ferry wharf, where they arrived a little before the Dean, his family, and friends." *The New England Weekly Courier* adds: "He is a gentleman of middle stature, of an agreeable, pleasant, and erect aspect. He was ushered into the town with a great number of gentlemen, to whom he behaved himself after a very complaisant manner." Here he remained for three years, awaiting the fulfilment of Walpole's promises. Bermuda being his base of operations, he seems to have intended

make Rhode Island what soldiers would call his first decisive

strategical point. He cultivated cordial relations with all men, Quakers, Moravians, Jews, Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, sixth and seventh principle Baptists,—they were all there, it seems, and “as many others besides—four different sorts of Anabaptists,” he writes to Tom Prior: and the hues of a tricolor pervaded the complexions of the colony. There were white men, and red men, and black men. In a pleasant country house which he built in a green vale not far from Newport, where an easy stroll brought him to the shore of the Atlantic, and a neighbouring height allured the eye to peer far into the ruggedly undulating lands of Massachusetts, he dwelt,—waiting, not perhaps with the patience of a saint, but rather with the easy tranquillity of a Platonic philosopher, for the signal to go to Bermuda and commence his crusade. The serene and pleasing clime, the homely and verdant scenery, add a constant charm to the most beautiful and popular of his works, “*The Dialogues of Alciphron*,” which were written in this “*Eden of America*.” So Rhode Island is still called; and the time he spent at Rhode Island seems to have been to Berkeley in some respects a time of Eden. But it came to an abrupt end. In the winter of 1730 Gibson, Bishop of London, having jurisdiction under the Second George over the souls of men in the Western hemisphere generally, and being anxious that the enterprise of converting the American continent to Christianity should be simply on or off, put the question plump to Walpole. “If you put the question to me as a minister,” replied Walpole, “I must and can answer you that the money shall most undoubtedly be paid as soon as suits with public convenience; but if you ask me as a friend whether Dean Berkeley should continue in America, expecting the payment of £20,000, I advise him by all means to return to Europe.”

The twenty thousand pounds intended to enable Berkeley to establish Christianity and civilization in America went quite another way. It formed a fourth of the dowry voted by Parliament in 1733 to the Princess of Orange. Berkeley at Rhode Island heard at last the fatal news with unaffected serenity. He sold off his negroes, conveyed his farm to Yale College to endow three classical scholarships, waited a few months for the birth of his second child, finished “*Alciphron*,” and then set sail from Boston for England. The first page of “*Alciphron*,” which was probably the last written—for the book bears all the marks of long incubation and elaboration, and was almost certainly not composed in the interval between the communication made to him by Bishop Gibson and his arrival in London,—reveals the tranquil spirit with which he bade farewell to the

health and the love of retirement have prevailed over whatsoever ambition might have come to my share." Three days after he wrote the words, he had kissed the king's hands and was Bishop of Cloyne.

There was one of Berkeley's companions to whom (it may well so seem to us), for the sake of the supernatural and generous devotion with which he had embraced the scheme of the Bermuda College of St. Paul, it pleased God afterwards to give the grace of faith. This was Sir John James, of Bury St. Edmonds, a man of fine learning, and of a singularly noble and elevated nature. He was of the expedition to Rhode Island, and remained in America with Mr. Dalton, another of his companions, for several years after Berkeley's return, not altogether despairing of their enterprise perhaps. Many years thence the news reached Cloyne, apparently at about the same date, that Dalton had married for the third time, and that James was about to join the Church of Rome. The first item of intelligence Berkeley received with an exuberant delight, which, in our invincible ignorance touching what may be considered edifying as an expression of opinion on the part of an Anglican bishop in regard to the marriage of three wives, whether successively or simultaneously, we refrain from characterizing. "When," the Bishop writes, "I expected to have heard you were an exile at Rome or Paris, I am agreeably surprised to hear you are the happiest man in London, married to a young and beautiful nymph. *O ter quaterque beate* in this degenerate age, when so many are afraid to marry once, you dare to do it a third time. May all happiness and success attend your courage. Were I a dictator, there should be a *jus trium uxorum* for those who magnanimously endeavour to repair the late breaches made upon the public by famine, sickness, and wars." He follows up this jubilant epithalamiad with a letter to James, in which, having spoken of his own domestic happiness "with a wife, three sons, and a daughter—of star-like beauty—rejoicing literally under our fig-trees," he dwells on the example of the *ter quaterque beatus* Dalton. "Mr. Dalton," he says, "who, I expected, was abroad with you, is, it seems made happy the third time (*O ter quaterque beate*). I wish you could once [marry to have that natural comfort of children] dare to do what he does so often." But on that grave and gentle nature it had pleased God to lay the kindling touch of a higher grace, and to bless him with a blessing not to be numbered. "I know," wrote Berkeley to him then, "your making the *unum necessarium* your chief business sets you above the world. I heartily beg of God that He would give me the grace to do the same, a heart constantly to pursue the truth, and abide in

it, wherever it is found." He then writes at large on the subject, but in a rather uneasy and commonplace manner. The infallible authority of the Roman Pontiff seems to have been the point at which the conversion of James became decided. Berkeley, after telling him he will find no Popery in the Fathers, urges him to read a book of Lord Falkland's on the subject. "I have not read those writings," he however adds; "but on the reputation of Lord Falkland, venture to commend them to your perusal." And then in a passage which almost indicates that the gleam of the same grace had now and then flitted across his own mind, and had not been roughly rejected, he goes on:—

The years I have lived, the pains I have taken, and the distempers I labour under, make me suspect I have not long to live. And certainly my remnant of life, be it what it will, could be spun out delightfully in the sun and the frescos, among the fountains and grottos, the music, the antiquities, the fine arts and buildings of Rome, if I could once recommend myself to her religion. But I trust in God those . . . things shall never bribe my judgment. Dress therefore your batteries against my reason; attack me by the dry light . . . assign me some good reason why I should not use my reason, but submit at once to His Holiness's will and pleasure. Though you are conqueror, I shall be a gainer. In the work of truth I am ready to hear and canvass with best of . . . skill, whatever you shall be so good as to offer.

He adds, "My wife sends her compliments, but knows nothing of the subject of our correspondence. If she did, I doubt it would make her think better of the Church of Rome, in which she liked some things when she was in France." It does not seem that there was any further correspondence between the Bishop and Sir John James. The grace of faith was to that generous soul only the precursor of the Angel of Death. In the autumn of the same year, he was called to be *Beatus*, where it is written that they marry not nor are given in marriage.

Berkeley was Bishop of Cloyne for nearly twenty years, during which political economy and medicine exercised his mind more than philosophy, although it is to this period that we owe the "*Siris*," a book that may be regarded as his *Summa*. The ultimate residuum of his sublime American project, the one consolation which from so many years of visions and voyages he carried away with him to ponder upon under the ancient shadow of the Round Tower of Cloyne, was the prophylactic, tonic, alterative, curative, and restorative virtue of tar. While at Rhode Island he had visited a camp of the Narragansett Indians, and from some great Sachem of the red men he had learned that there was but one medicine in their pharmacopœia, but that that medicine was a panacea for all maladies, from small-

pox to delirium tremens, and that it was very simply made by steeping a quart of tar in a quart of water, and drinking of the infusion. Berkeley's health became unsettled upon his return to England, and after the manner of men who know a good deal, think a great deal, and are not over-occupied, he constructed a few theories as to the nature of his maladies. He had had gout, that was certain, and then gout complicated with colic; and for some time he seems to have been uncertain whether the gout was the inspiring cause of the colic, or the colic was the germinal source of the gout. Calculus for a while received all the attention and consideration it so well deserves. "I for a long time," he writes to Sir John James, "suspected my colic to be an effect thereof." But a new light dawned upon him in the course of the year 1741; and in the comforting conviction that he had at last reached the truth, he seems to have thenceforward abided. "Of late," he tells James, "I am satisfied that it is a scorbutic colic, and that my original disease is the scurvy." But whether for scurvy or gout, calculus or colic, there was one remedy, and only one—tar-water—the aperient, astringent, solvent, febrifuge, anodyne, cardiac, deobstruent, diaphoretic, anthelmintic, anti-spasmodic, anti-scorbutic, which contained in itself all the virtues of blue pill, laudanum, tartar emetic, asafœtida, Jesuit's bark, and Turkey rhubarb. If there was disease in the neighbourhood, it was good to drink tar-water to prevent infection. If there was none, it was at least a more wholesome drink than wine, or than beer, or even than water which had not enjoyed the advantage of being impregnated with that ever-exquisite aroma. It was good to take it for all sorts of maladies in all their several stages—good for teething infants, for sea-sickness, for the plague, for fits. It had been known to dispel a pleurisy and to expel a peripneumony. It was a famous cure for the dysentery. It had been observed to drive a cruel colic into the extremities, where that malady at once assumed the comparatively innocent and playful character of gout. In still more severe cases, possibly in hydrophobia or lock-jaw, it would be well to mix tar and honey into a sort of conserve or electuary, and to take it by the teaspoonful. Pounded resin, which, after all, is only crystallized tar, had also been observed to exhibit a rare inner energy in connection with sweet milk. The difficulty that first occurs to the reader, who gravely considers these remedies with their list of carefully-vouched cures, is the simple question how the dose was swallowed. Who in this degenerate age, were he in the keen agony of tic, or the doleful dumps of bile, or the shrieking stage of gout, could be tempted to the deglutition of a tea-spoonful of tar, or a thimble-

ful of pounded resin, or even to drink a quart of tar-water in the course of twenty-four hours? Chemistry first debased, homœopathy has since corrupted us. We no longer understand the penitential qualities of physic. In Berkeley's days a medicine was accounted of little or no use if it was not nauseous. Black draught is the last feeble link that binds us to the age when our great-grandmothers took their morning gulp of pitch and licked their rosy lips. Tar surpassed the electuary of Mithridates, and tar-water the elixir of Hoffmann. But was tar only and merely a drug? Was it not rather a vital principle, nay the very vital principle itself? Merely materially considered, tar-water blended principles supposed to be sharply discordant. It was both a soap and a vinegar. Then tar itself, being the highest form of vegetable juice, might perhaps be more exactly described as inspissated sunshine. So the "Siris" argues link by link. But what in reality is that fine subtle spirit peculiar to all vegetables, so as to be remarkable even in the commonplace character of cabbage and not altogether absent in the dull and vapid turnip? After all, it is something absorbed from the air, that common seminary of all vivifying principles. And what is that something? Is there not within the air itself a finer air, the pure ether, or spirit of the universe which operates in everything? Is the world an animal? and is its soul fire? Before now, men have worshipped fire, and Aristotle thought the heat of a living body to be somewhat divine and celestial, and Plato supposed that the tunicle of the soul was composed of pure ether. Is flame then life and life flame? Are both, if they be both and not one, only expressions of brimstone? Is sulphur, as Mr. Homberg thinks, the one universal active chemic principle? Not quite absolutely perhaps. Let something at least be said for tar—"whereas the luminous spirit lodged and determined in the native balsam of pines and firs is of a nature so mild and benign, so proportioned to the human constitution as to warm without heating, to cheer but not inebriate,* and to produce a calm and steady joy like the effect of good news, without that sinking of spirits which is a subsequent effect of all fermented cordials." Tar-water rightly considered is in truth the vehicle of a certain "benign and comfortable spirit." It assists the *vis vitæ*—it subdues the *fomes morbi*. It elicits things already "pre-existent, latent, and dormant in the soul," as Plato would say; and once in the company of Plato, even tar-water is for a time forgotten. *O Socrates, et Socratici viri! nunquam vobis*

* Mr. Cowper stole this phrase, and, adding insult to injury, applied it to the infusion of tea.

gratiam referam. So doubtless Berkeley often murmured the words of Cicero, as he paced up and down the lane which he had planted with myrtles in honour of the shade beloved by the sages of old—with myrtles, at the root of each of which however was set a ball of tar, and which grew forthwith “with no more trouble or art than gooseberry-bushes, to the height of seven or eight feet.” There, where the tall tower, the most sublime and enduring relic of the Irish arts, served as a not too careful dial of the time, and while he paced towards the mysterious cave which, in the days of the Druids, gave its name to Cloyne, and to the end whereof no man has penetrated, a ghostly train attended his steps--the wise of ancient Athenian days, “who still rule our spirits from their urns,” Callicles and Chærophon, Parmenides and Zeno, Theætetus and Crito, and Simmias and Cebes; and the great master who died so calmly the death inflicted of injustice; and the greater he, to whom they all owe their long and far-spread fame, and to whom, as the “Siris” is careful to show, God had even vouchsafed some not altogether vague conception of the awful mystery of the Trinity. Memory, too, brought back the half-real, half-ideal circle of scholars, who on the green hills that overlook the bright broad bay of Narragansett, and the motley throng of the streets of Newport, discussed “the minute philosophy,” while preparing to give a form and a soul to the genius of the Empire of the West—Euphranor and Lysicles, and Theages and Alciphron, and Crito come to life again in Massachusetts. And lo! of the vision and the voyage, only remained the mystery taught by the Red-skin Sachem—the mystery that the one true absolute *arcanum naturæ* is tar.

Berkeley's life at Cloyne was strictly recluse. He only attended one session of Parliament, and only made one speech as a spiritual peer, in support of Lord Granard's committee to inquire into the society of Blasters. The society of Blasters was founded by Peter Lens, of Dublin. Lord Granard's Report relates that “the said Peter Lens professes himself to be a votary of the devil; that he hath offered up prayers to him and foolishly drank to the Devil's health; that he hath at several times uttered the most daring and execrable blasphemies against the sacred name and majesty of God; and often made use of such obscene, blasphemous, and before unheard-of expressions, as the Lords' Committee think they cannot even mention to your lordships, and therefore choose to pass over in silence.” Berkeley smote the Blasters with a counter-blast. His “Discourse addressed to Magistrates and Men in authority” is said to have utterly extinguished the new Dublin sect of Devil-worshippers; but the tradition of their

incomparable skill in blasphemy seems, we submit, to have descended by direct inheritance to the Orange Society. The toast of "the pious, glorious, and immortal memory" has many marks of having been composed in a moment of complete obsession by some energetic, voluble, and accomplished Blaster.

The period of Berkeley's residence in Cloyne is perhaps the most melancholy in the whole history of Ireland. A few years before, the Penal Code had been completed by Primate Boulter's Act, depriving the Catholic population of all civil and political franchises whatsoever. The English Privy Council had, about the same time, refused to sanction an Act authorizing the infliction of a nameless penalty on the profession of the Catholic priesthood; but the refusal had not come from any serious disposition to interfere with the persecuting propensities of the Irish Parliament, but was due to the urgent representations of the French Government. The sky was at its darkest, and there was not a sign of the dawn. A whole generation was growing up upon whom the law of the land had imposed, so far as it could, the condition not merely of slaves but of savages, and not merely of savages but of heathens. It was a felony for any Catholic to teach another Catholic how to read and write. It was a felony for a Catholic priest to administer the rites of his religion. The Catholic had no right to hold property of free tenure, to carry arms, to vote, to practise any liberal profession, to belong to any civic corporation, or to serve the Crown in any capacity. He might be deprived of all he possessed by any of his children who chose to apostatize; and the character of his possessions soon came to be rigidly limited, so that he could not farm more than a certain number of acres, or own a horse of a higher value than £5, without being deprived of it by any Protestant who pleased to take it at that price. If a code, constructed upon such principles, had been imposed upon any other country conquered by England, upon India, for example—if it were made penal to belong to the order of Brahmins; if it were the law that the son of a Rajah, or even the son of a Ryot, who had been seen to eat animal food could depose or evict his father; if the temples were closed or confiscated to uses of English worship, the study of the Vedas and Puranas forbidden, caste solemnly abolished, purification made a misdemeanour,—who would wonder if, in one bloody massacre, every vestige of British authority between Cashmere and Travancore were swept away? In Ireland, after the Penal Code was completed, there followed, on the contrary, a period of ghastly tranquillity. The will of Parliament had it the law of the land, and there it stood, surround

solemn appanage of power, projecting its awful shadow over the daily lives of men in all the relations of society. But the Irish Protestant was not the compound of devil and wolf the Irish Parliament, when it made the law, supposed him to be. It was so wicked a law in its conception that it could not get itself steadily and persistently executed by men made in God's image. Nor could the thousands possibly execute it against the millions. The people, against whom its penalties were directed, endured it, ignored it, defied it to do its worst. None but a race which knew its religion was best represented by the Crucifix could have borne such a code for the space of nearly three generations without endeavouring to abolish it in blood on the one hand, or submitting and conforming on the other. The Irish did neither. They emerged at last from the long ordeal with faith intact, with spirit unbroken. They had even learned to love their persecutors, and they willingly gave to such of them as had the common qualities of Irish gentlemen some share of the loving loyalty that had united them so long to their banished and deposed chieftains. But, though the Penal Law could not extinguish the faith, or debase the gallant and generous temper of the Irish nation, its secondary effects sunk deep and spread far, and they are still to be felt and seen. At a time when England and Scotland were laying the foundations of the great industrial and commercial system which, within a period of a little over a century and a half, has increased their resources a hundred-fold, and changed the whole character and constitution of society, the law deliberately condemned the Irish Catholic to a state of ignorance, indolence, and poverty. He could not obtain a safe hold of any sort of solid property; he could acquire no certain guarantee for the enjoyment and investment of the produce of his industry. It was not until the year 1771 that the law was so far relaxed as to allow a Papist to reclaim bog on a lease of sixty-one years. Adam Smith says that in a country which has acquired its full complement of riches, it becomes the fashion to be industrious. "The province of Holland," he says, "seems to be approaching near to this state. It is there unfashionable not to be a man of business. Necessity makes it usual for almost every man to be so, and custom everywhere regulates fashion." If custom regulates fashion, law also enables custom to grow. But the custom and the fashion which were formed by the Penal Code in Ireland were very different indeed from those which Dutch policy produced.

"Do not the corruptions and villanies of men eat your flesh and exhaust your spirits?" said Swift to one of his friends in those days. He sympathized with the Catholics, but no digni-

tary of the Established Church, not even he, dared in those days openly attack the Penal Laws. What Berkeley may have felt in regard to their atrocity, and still more their absurdity, is to be inferred from the fact that he only for one session attended Parliament during the nineteen years of his episcopate. He lived in perfect peace with the inhabitants of his diocese, who were almost to a soul Catholics. He gave liberal, nay, munificent alms. He wore home-spun cloth and even a home-made wig. In times of distress—and he witnessed one fearful famine—he gave soup to the starving and tar-water to the sick. He did not meddle with the faith of the poor, but he once ventured to direct a pamphlet, which has the character of a Pastoral, to the Catholic clergy of Ireland. He urged them to preach the virtue of industry to their people. "Industry," he said, "never fails to reward her votaries. There is no one but can earn a little, and little added to little makes a heap. In this fertile and plentiful island, none can perish of want but the idle and improvident." He urged them to make the best rather than the worst of their situation. True, the laws "damp industry and ambition"—there is "small encouragement to build or plant on another's land with only a temporary interest"—"the hardness of the landlord cramps the industry of the tenant"—and "some of our squires and landlords are vultures with iron bowels"; nevertheless "the want of a spirit of industry is the true cause of our national distress"—"whether it be from the heaviness of the climate or from the Spanish or Scythian blood that flows in their veins, or whatever else may be the cause, there still remains in the inhabitants of this island a remarkable antipathy to labour. You, gentlemen, can alone conquer this innate hereditary sloth. Do you, then, as you love your country, exert yourselves." "Many suspect your religion," he concludes, "to be the cause of that notorious idleness which prevails so generally among the natives of this island, as if the Roman Catholic faith were inconsistent with an honest diligence in a man's calling. But whoever considers the great spirit of industry that reigns in Flanders and France, and even beyond the Alps, must acknowledge this to be a groundless suspicion. In Piedmont and Genoa, in the Milanese and the Venetian state, and indeed throughout all Lombardy, how well is the soil cultivated, and what manufactures of silk, velvet, paper, and other commodities flourish! The King of Sardinia will suffer no idle hands in his territories, no beggar to live by the sweat of another's brow. It has even been made penal at Turin to relieve a strolling beggar. To which I might add that the person whose authority will be of weight

with you, even the Pope himself, is at this day endeavouring to put new life into the trades and manufactures of his country." The answer to this was only too easy, unhappily, if any Irish priest of that day had felt disposed to controvert a sentiment felt or a word said by one who meant so well as Bishop Berkeley. Pope Benedict XIV. was endeavouring to increase the industry and prosperity of his people, and with good effect; but the Irish occupied a peculiar and indeed a unique situation among the nations of the earth, in this respect, that they lived under the rule of a Parliament all whose exertions were directed to their abasement and impoverishment. How much the national character of the Irish owes to the Spaniards, how much to the Scythians, is a nice ethnological issue, but it may be questioned whether history affords any instance of industry becoming in Adam Smith's words, "the fashion," and the hereditary habit of a race, which, having just emerged from a succession of civil wars, lasting for over a century and a half, finds itself interdicted from the possession of settled property, the acquirement of liberal knowledge, the use of civic rights, and the public profession of its religion. The time has come at last when Bishop Berkeley's political writings may be studied with complete practical advantage by all who have influence over the Irish mind; and a cheap unmutilated edition of them would be a true benefit to his countrymen. The priests of his own day read his Pastoral with openly-expressed thankfulness and wonder.

But how many a patriotic editor, who sounds the praises of Berkeley from time to time without having ever read a line of his writings, would be taken aback by some of the strongest opinions of the "Querist"! For example, "Whether we can propose to thrive so long as we entertain a wrong-headed distrust of England?" And again, "Whether it be not delightful to complain? And whether there be not many who had rather utter their complaints than redress their evils?" As also, "Whether my countrymen are not readier at finding excuses than remedies?" Again and again he urges the foundation of a National Bank, asking "Whether National Banks are not found useful in Venice, Holland, and Hamburg? and whether it is not possible to contrive one that may be useful also in Ireland?" Had he but lived in these days, he might have felt tempted to add the query—"Whether, in case a National Bank were founded in Ireland, there be not such a large capacity of mutual malignity among our countrymen that they would cheerfully see the one of themselves, who principally promoted its prosperity, deposed and cried down, even though they should only be damaging their own property all the while?" The "Querist," indeed, suggests such questions by the

score; but the "Maxims concerning Irish Patriotism" are indeed for all time. For example:—

A man rages, rails, and raves—I suspect his patriotism.

Gamesters, rakes, bullies, stockjobbers : alas ! what patriots !

He that always blames or always praises is no patriot.

It is impossible a man who is false to his friends and neighbours should be true to the public.

Every knave is a thorough knave, and a thorough knave is a knave throughout.

Where the heart is right, there is true patriotism.

We have no room for any sustained disquisition on the merits and demerits of Berkeley's philosophy. Such an attempt would occupy of itself a long article. We will very briefly only indicate the verdict which we should be disposed to give. Never was a writer on these abstruse subjects more easily to be understood, for his style is a marvel of lucidity and precision. And there are three especial doctrines, which in all philosophical history will be connected with his name.

First there is his repudiation of the then received theory on abstract ideas. The old-world controversy about universals is ever cropping up under fresh shapes. When Berkeley began to write, it was commonly held that the mind can form an "abstract idea"; can conceive a triangle, which is neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene; can conceive an animal, which is neither rational nor irrational; can conceive a colour, which is neither white, black, nor intermediate. This was Locke's express doctrine. Berkeley certainly did great service by finally exploding it.

Secondly, there is his theory on vision, to which we have referred in an earlier article. Whether or no his conclusions are likely to find ultimate acceptance in the precise shape he gave them, at all events he has effected an important philosophical progress by his speculations on the theme.

Lastly comes his peculiar theory about *matter*, which has led Hume and others to hail him as the very apostle of scepticism. It seems to us, that his general conclusion is, on Locke's principles, simply irresistible; and we must further confess, that his own most sincere effort to harmonize his view with his strong religious convictions is about the poorest piece of philosophical argument to be found in his writings. The fault really lay with the principles which he took for granted. It is sometimes imagined by non-Catholics, that the scholastic philosophy is in its foundation identical with Locke's; but this is a serious mistake. We cannot express the distinction more clearly, than in the words of a very able unpublished Catholic essay. "The

intellect," says the writer, according to S. Thomas, "reads by its own native light characters in the information of the senses, which they are powerless to perceive; just as the man of education perceives in the sentences read to him by a child all which they signify." When the senses perceive a group of material phenomena, the intellect cognises, not only a substance which is the substratum of those phenomena, but also externality and space. This is not the place of course for vindicating this doctrine; we are only explaining *where*, according to our view of the matter, lay Berkeley's philosophical mistake.

Nevertheless his philosophical works are full of interest and instruction, nor can any one be really informed in the controversies of the day who has not made them his study. And we should be guilty of gross injustice, if we did not express our sense of the great additional facility given to that study by Professor Fraser's admirable prefaces and notes. He is himself a philosopher of deservedly high reputation; yet he keeps himself entirely in the background, and devotes his whole energy to the task of illustrating his author. Seldom indeed in the annals of our literature have the duties of an editor been discharged with more thorough fidelity, conscientious care, generous zeal, and abounding industry.

In 1752, Berkeley, then in the sixty-eighth year of his age, felt again the longing which had animated so many years of his youth, no longer indeed as to a fountain of hope, but rather as towards a haven of rest. In the letter in which he endeavoured to dissuade Sir John James from joining the Church of Rome, he said, "I should like a convent without a vow or perpetual obligation. Doubtless a convent or monastery receiving only grown persons of approved piety, learning, and a contemplative turn would be a great means of improving the Divine Philosophy and brightening up the face of religion in our Church. But I should expect still more success from a number of gentlemen living independently at Oxford, who made divine things their study and proposed to wean themselves from what is called the world. . . . Oh, that you had a farm of a hundred acres near Oxford." As he grew old and feeble and friendless, and felt perhaps what a miserable mockery of the Apostolic ideal the best Bishop of such an establishment as the Irish Church must be, he desired to exchange his see for the headship of an Oxford college—and when he found that could not be managed, to resign the mitre of Cloyne absolutely. But when George the Second heard the unprecedented proposal, he declared that Berkeley should die a Bishop in spite of himself, but that he might live where he pleased. He chose to live—it was in truth to die—at Oxford. In that famous and beautiful vale, adorned

with so many palaces and churches, amid their groves and gardens, and fair streams, the old scholar arrived early in the autumn of 1752, to spend his remaining days. They were to be but a short span. He had been obliged to make the journey from Bristol in a litter. But he edited a volume of "Miscellanies" and prepared a third edition of "Alciphron" within the next few months; and he does not appear to have had any distinct warning of his approaching end. On the evening of Sunday, the 14th of January, 1753, his wife had been reading the 15th chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians to their children, while he explained now and then a difficult passage or phrase. He was resting on a couch, and the family waited for the evening meal. By-and-by, his daughter brought him tea. She thought at first that he slept. He was dead. But a few minutes before, and he had read, "Behold, I show you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump (for the trumpet shall sound) and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality."

ART. IX.—THE JUBILEE OF PIUS IX.

Civiltà Cattolica, June 17, 1871; Arts. "*The Conclave of 1846*," "*Pius IX. and the Church*," "*Pius IX. and Civil Society*." Florence.

TO those who hold, as we firmly hold, that the Apostolic See is in every way an object of God's very special providence, it cannot but appear a most remarkable event, that at length a second Pontiff has "seen the years of Peter." Such a fact would lead us confidently to anticipate, that the Pontiff in question is among the most remarkable who have ever occupied S. Peter's Chair; and this truth indeed all alike are ready to proclaim. Some thirty years ago, most non-Catholics thought that the Catholic Church had become in the nineteenth century a kind of ancient machine, which proceeds as it were spontaneously in its habitual steady-going course; and that the reigning Pope had no more anxious or critical task, than the performance of routine duties. § 1 a n n, as applied to any period, was utterly ; hnt as

applied to the reign of Pius IX. it would be ludicrous. At this moment externs are as ready to admit as Catholics to declare, that a personage of extraordinary power and resolution has come across the world; and that he will have left behind him when he dies, both on the Church and on society, a most special impress of his personal character.

We cannot be surprised then, that the "*Civiltà*" has devoted no less than three articles, on occasion of his Jubilee, to his character and history. For ourselves, we spoke on this subject at so much length last January in reviewing Mr. Maguire's volume, that little remains to be said on the present occasion. There is one characteristic however of the Holy Father, on which Mr. Maguire's biography did not prominently touch; and on which a few words may be here in place. We refer to that love of dogma and zeal for purity of the Faith, which has been evinced in his whole course of action as the "teacher of Christians."

We know not that any Pope in any age has ever put forth so frequent *ex cathedrâ* definitions as Pius IX. "No single year has passed," says the "*Civiltà*" (p. 670), "in which, with Consistorial Allocutions, and Apostolic Letters in the form of Briefs, and Universal Encyclicals, the voice of this supreme teacher of truth has not been heard, to warn the faithful of" errors and proclaim the relevant verities. Nor have even these been his only *ex cathedrâ* Acts. "Few Popes," proceeds the "*Civiltà*" (p. 678), have "occupied themselves with so much zeal in the canonization of saints and the beatification of servants of God. . . . Under his Pontificate very many of those long, wearying, and most grave processes have been brought to a conclusion; many have been started and are now proceeding with vigour." And the canonization of a saint, as our readers are well aware, is nothing less than an *ex cathedrâ* Act. But three special and (as it were) central instances may be named of his *ex cathedrâ* teaching: (1) his defining the Immaculate Conception; (2) his issuing the *Syllabus*; (3) his confirming the Vatican Definitions. Each of these instances presents characteristics of its own, on which it may be worth while briefly to dwell; and we will begin with the first-named.

If we consider that body of theology which is presented by the Church's formal definitions—such a body, e. g., as is contained in Denzinger's invaluable manual—we shall find, that on the one hand it is most harmonious in mutual balance and proportion, but on the other hand most irregular in its process of structure. Successive Popes, and the Councils which they summoned to aid them, were called on to analyse this or that

dogma, not at the precise moment when that analysis would be most serviceable to theological science or again to Catholic devotion, but at that moment when some emerging heresy required express counteraction. The Incarnation, e. g., was defined in the early centuries with a care and precision, immeasurably exceeding that bestowed on any other dogma, simply because Arian, Nestorian, Eutychian, Monothelite heretics succeeded each other with such disastrous rapidity. On the other hand those momentous dogmata which concern Divine Grace were less expressly defined in earlier than in later centuries, because Calvinists, Baians, and Jansenists belong to the later epoch, and only Pelagians to the earlier. Now, as has been repeatedly pointed out, it was no heretical outbreak which required that the Immaculate Conception should be defined. In fact this was the very first definition of faith, which ever was issued from motives (as they may be called) purely internal; for no other reason, than the advancement of Catholic devotion and theological science. In other words (looking at the matter from its human side), Pius IX. was impelled to his Act—not by any peremptory obligation such as would have been recognized by every conscientious Pope—but by his own personal zeal for dogmatic truth.

Never indeed was there a more peaceful definition than this. The whole Church received it with acclamation and delight; while no clamour was raised against it from without. The followers of Dr. Pusey indeed seem to have regretted it, as a kind of bar to their fantastic schemes of union: but the Protestant religious world regarded the doctrine with complete indifference, as the natural spawn of Antichrist; while the more intellectual non-Catholic accounted it as legitimate and suitable, that those who were already content to believe the Trinity and Transubstantiation, should go on to believe the Immaculate Conception. The whole question belonged to that sphere of dogmatic meditation and devotion, which is entirely alien to the world's practical life, and has no tendency to arouse the world's indignation. Catholics, says the "*Civiltà*" (p. 678), hailed the Pope as "Pontiff of the Immaculate Conception"; while non-Catholics entertained towards him, in consequence of his pronouncement, no parallel feelings whatever of repugnance and aversion.

Great was the contrast between this earlier Definition and the Syllabus of 1864. This, being aimed directly against those errors which most widely pervade modern thought and modern society, drew down on itself naturally the heartiest *detestation* from modern thought and modern society. True it did but recapitulate condemnations, which had

already in one shape or another been pronounced by the Pontiff; but those earlier condemnations had attracted very little attention from externs, whereas the Syllabus violently arrested—as it was intended to arrest—the attention of all. The Pontiff seemed to be throwing down the gauntlet—as in fact he *was*—against the most universally accepted maxims of this age. Nor even within the Church did the Syllabus receive by any means the same unanimous welcome, which had hailed the Definition of 1854. We will not here enlarge (see “*Civiltà*,” pp. 670-1) on the various anti-Catholic philosophical errors, with which divers excellently intentioned Catholics had been unwittingly imbued, and which they were startled to find thus publicly condemned in very bad company. But take such social doctrines as these: that liberty of worships and of the press is—not legitimate under deplorable circumstances—but in itself a reasonable and desirable arrangement; or again that the State is not subjected by God to the Church’s direct or indirect jurisdiction in things temporal, however intimately connected these may be with the welfare or ruin of souls. Such fundamentally anti-Catholic doctrines had not been advocated more earnestly by Mr. Buckle and Signor Mazzini, than by many a Catholic who had no intention of disloyalty to the Church; and such men were now compelled to choose, between ecclesiastical principle and their most cherished convictions. The Pontiff must have well known how violent a storm he was exciting; but his zeal for Christian doctrine, now on every side assailed—nay, and the more dangerously assailed when by devout and well-intentioned Catholics—would not permit him to abstain from energetic action.

And here a somewhat curious circumstance presents itself. Pius IX.’s holy predecessor had, in the “*Mirari vos*,” condemned the modern “liberties” with even greater emphasis and severity of expression, than the reigning Pontiff himself. Yet the French “liberal Catholics” were not restrained by this so indubitably *ex cathedrâ* Act, from the most unrestrained and unblushing advocacy of their characteristic errors. Montalembert’s unhappy speech at the Congress of Malines was long subsequent to the “*Mirari vos*.” But things have been far different since the Syllabus was published: the most disloyal Catholic would not venture for very shame to utter such thoughts; so patent throughout the world is the Church’s true doctrine on these subjects. We think that this change of feeling may be explained, by the circumstance on which we are insisting in this article. In the case of Pius IX. the Syllabus was no isolated Act: it was one of a long series, in which—unmindful of the temporal perils which he thereby incurred

—he was ever admonishing Catholics on the deadly tendencies of religious liberalism. It became more and more impossible for the most prejudiced, to misunderstand the mind of the Holy See.

The Syllabus was hardly in any point strictly dogmatical; for it dealt with the errors of this age, and this age is not religious enough for its errors to be dogmatical. Even those condemned on the doctrine of marriage, had not been advocated in any dogmatic interest, but merely as a means for enfeebling the Church's authority over civil society. On the other hand in his most recent dogmatic Acts—his confirmation of the Vatican Definitions—Pius IX. has retired within the purely dogmatical sphere; not however, as before, by adding to the structure, but by exhibiting and securing the foundation. If those doctrines on Faith, defined by the "*Dei Filius*," had not been implicitly received in the Church from her very origin, she could neither have gained her members nor retained them. Then again it is obvious on the surface, that the whole fabric of the Church's authority rests on her absolute supremacy in spirituals and on her infallibility. But as to this supremacy and infallibility—there is no imaginable theory which admits of being drawn out, which can be represented with the faintest plausibility as the doctrine of Scripture and Tradition, except the precise theory defined in the "*Pastor Æternus*." It is no slight glory in Pius IX.'s reign, that he has issued these two magnificent Constitutions.

At the same time, as regards the dogma of Papal infallibility, it does seem to us (but we speak entirely under correction) that in this case, unlike that of the Immaculate Conception, definition could not have been forborne without a violation of actual duty, such as that justly ascribed to Honorius. It does seem to us that those so-called Catholics, who denied the infallibility of such *ex cathedrâ* Pontifical Acts as are accepted by the Episcopate, were as simply heretics before the Vatican Council, as Arians were before the Nicene and Lutherans before the Tridentine. This fundamental subversion of Catholic dogma, so soon as it openly displayed itself some two years ago, was simply an overt heresy clamouring to be anathematised. Although therefore Pius IX. indubitably displayed his characteristic firmness when he so strenuously resisted the various solicitations made to him for postponing the Definition,—yet in issuing that Definition he did no more, than any Pontiff must have done under penalty of future reproach.

Was there ever in Christendom a more intellectually contemptible heresy and schism, than that started in consequence

of the Definitions by Dr. Döllinger? We can feel no bitterness towards one, who has done in his time much service to the Church, and whose personal position inspires no other sentiments than those of sorrow and compassion. But his intellectual stand-point is simply contemptible. His followers call themselves, as if by a fatality, "old Catholics," in contradistinction to those who accept the Vatican Constitutions: just as Catholics have been called by Anglicans "Tridentines," and by Eutychians "Chalcedonians." Now, how stand the facts? The whole body of Catholic bishops have accepted the Definitions, unless (which is quite uncertain) Mgr. Strossmayer be an exception.* How keenly the recent apostates feel this fact, is plain from their incredibly unscrupulous resistance to evident truth in the case of Mgr. Darboy. It is as certain as any historical fact can be, that this martyred prelate† expressed his submission to the "Pastor Æternus" as to an infallible pronouncement; and received the Holy Father's hearty congratulation on the occasion. And in fact no one,—Catholic, Protestant, or infidel,—can possibly deny, that (morally speaking) the whole Episcopate concurs with the Supreme Pontiff, in excluding every one from their communion who does not accept the Vatican Definitions with absolute and unreserved assent. The position then of Dr. Döllinger and his accomplices comes to this. He alleges that, according to the "*old Catholic*" view, Pope and bishops when teaching in harmony are so totally destitute of infallibility, that they may be permitted by God to exclude every one from their communion, who will not consent to hold with divine faith a tenet directly contradictory to revealed truth. Now our readers must remember very clearly, what *was* the "*old Catholic*" doctrine; i.e. what was the Church's doctrine two years ago. Was that doctrine such as Dr. Döllinger maintains? or was it not rather the very reverse? Dr. Döllinger himself cannot answer otherwise than as we do.

We cannot imagine in what quarter he expects to find recruits. He now denies explicitly, what he has long implicitly rejected, the existence of any living infallible authority. There may be a little coquetting between him and the followers of Dr. Pusey; but otherwise what can he expect? There is no

* The *Guardian* of June 28 ascribed to this prelate an oration, repudiating even S. Peter's primacy, and doubting whether S. Peter ever was at Rome. The ridiculous forgery has been exposed by the English translator of Quirinus's Letters.

† He may fairly be called, we think, by this noble appellation; for he fell a victim to his assassins' hatred of religion and of God.

doubt an extremely strong anti-Catholic current of thought at this moment; but what thinkers are there in the world, who will submit to such dogmata as the Blessed Trinity, Transubstantiation, the Inspiration of Scripture,—while they reject that doctrine of a living infallible authority, which alone can give to those dogmata full evidence, unity, and logical cohesion? What thinkers are there, who will accept as a revealed truth the divine gift to S. Peter and his successors of primacy over the whole Church, while *separating* themselves from that one communion over which the Pope is Primate? Dr. Dollinger himself cannot possibly stay where he is; and all who remember his past services, will earnestly pray that his movement may be upwards and not downwards.

Pius IX. then has carried through a dogmatic Definition, than which none more momentous was ever promulgated, with such success, as to carry with him the whole Episcopate, and to leave behind no more unfavourable symptom, than a schism numerically weak and intellectually contemptible. Nor is there any Act of his whole Pontificate which will have added greater strength to the Church, than the exclusion from her body of such treacherous and injurious members as the followers of Dr. Dollinger.

We have referred to the great Pontiff's actual dogmatic achievements; but those must not be forgotten, which have not yet travelled beyond the region of proposal and intention. It is well known that he considers others to be of much importance, because he has proposed others to the Vatican Council: one in particular, which was to contain much further teaching on the Church's constitution, and especially on that momentous question the objective extent of her infallibility. For ourselves, we have always expressed our humble conviction, that in these times even the conflict against Gallicanism* is less momentous than that against minimism. And even if—which God avert—circumstances still prevent any reassembling of the Council, we cannot but indulge a hope that Pius IX., before he is taken to his reward, may crown his course by setting this vital controversy finally at rest. It is evident that he feels most strongly the unsettlement of Catholic minds on this subject. In his answer to one of the French addresses on his Jubilee, he declared that Liberal Catholicism

* It must be remembered, as already mentioned in the text, that the extreme existing error condemned in the "*Pastor Æternus*" is one, which it would be as absurd to call "Gallicanism" as "Ultramontanism": for it denied infallibility to Pontifical *ex cathedra* Acts accepted by the Episcopate.

(Libéralisme Catholique) is a greater calamity to the Church, than even the existence of such men as composed the Paris Commune. Of course. The Church's strength is her doctrinal unity; and it is a greater evil—as regards the final triumph of God's cause—that the Church should be weak, than that the world should be wicked. Yet there are certain Catholics—thoroughly well-intentioned and pious Catholics—who shut their ears to the Church's most indubitable teaching, when the errors which she condemns are not strictly within the dogmatic sphere. As we said just now, the world is now not religious enough for its errors to be dogmatic; and on those very matters therefore which are now most critically and vitally momentous in their relation to religious truth, these Catholics actively support the Church's enemies against the Church's doctrine. We cannot but earnestly hope and pray, that the Holy Father may follow up his most seasonable admonition by some *ex cathedrâ* pronouncement worthy of his dogmatic antecedents.

We have been speaking of the great Pontiff's demeanour, in one only of the many offices committed to him by Christ: but one is a sample of all the rest. This great occasion of his Jubilee has shown, that the reverence and affection felt for him by his flock is so wide, so profound, so universal, as to take not externs only but even Catholics by surprise. It has resulted from the unprecedented length of his reign, that his thought and image have had time (if we may so express ourselves) to engrave itself on the heart of Catholics, and identify itself with their highest thoughts and noblest aspirations. Governments, called Catholic but imbued profoundly with antichristian and revolutionary principles, may play him false, as they are now doing. Half-hearted Catholics in high place may affect to deplore his conduct as "violent" and "injudicious." But the Catholic peoples throughout the world feel towards him a personal and devoted reverence, such as hardly one of his predecessors has excited. The other day a most pious English priest, who was at Rome on the recent occasion, told us that the Pope's presence seemed more like the presence of Christ Himself, than of Christ's Vicar. Nor can we better conclude our feeble remarks, than as the "*Civiltà*" concludes one of its articles; viz., with the Church's own prayer: "*Oremus pro Pontifice nostro Pio. Dominus conservet eum; vivificet eum; beatum faciat eum in terrâ; et non tradat eum in manus inimicorum ejus.*"

Notices of Books.

First Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on University Tests, Session 1871. London.

THE Evidence presented in this Report is so afflicting, that its memory might haunt the very dreams of one who loved Oxford as it was some thirty years ago. We hope in our next number to treat it, as illustrating the kind of education now imparted at that University; and on a future occasion to consider the light which it throws on the whole present state of English philosophical opinion. But we do not wish one quarter to pass, without drawing our readers' attention to the general subject.

"Cases have come *within my own experience*," says Canon Liddon (p. 69), "of men who have come up from school as Christians, and have been earnest Christians up to the time of beginning to read philosophy for the final school, but who during the year and a half or two years employed in this study have surrendered first their Christianity and next their belief in God, and *have left the University, not believing in a Supreme Being.*" A similar account is given by Mr. Appleton (p. 44). "I think it is quite impossible for any man to throw himself into the system of education for the final classical school, not as so much knowledge but really to assimilate it, without having *the whole edifice of his belief shaken to the very foundation.*" Other witnesses, even among those who detest the present state of things, think there is exaggeration in this statement; but the circumstances must be deplorable, under which any man of ability could be led to make it. And Mr. Appleton's evidence is the more remarkable, seeing he does not count this state of things an evil; because "the agencies which are brought to bear on the student not only destroy but *ultimately reconstruct* belief." This "reconstructed belief" must be quite a theological curiosity. There is no need however at present to quote more, from the great mass of evidence which establishes the fact we are pointing out; because we shall have so much to say on future occasions.

It should be explained indeed, that this unbelief is not *directly* imbibed, except in the school of classics and philosophy. "Almost all men in Oxford," says Mr. Appleton (p. 52), "who are under *religious influences*, go in for the *Law and Modern History school.*" At the same time we have this gentleman's testimony, for what otherwise could not have been doubted; viz., that the evil is by no means avoided by this course, though lessened. "Those who read" these soul-destroying books "are few; those who get their ideas from them indirectly by means of others, are many" (p. 56).

We shall have to revert to the whole subject again and again : for the moment we will content ourselves with three remarks.

1. It is not so long ago since it was said with at least much plausibility, that the Establishment serves as a kind of breakwater, against errors more fundamental than its own. This can no longer be said with any plausibility whatever. Oxford, the capital of Anglicanism, has given up the profession of Christianity in its educational capacity. "It would be quite ridiculous" indeed, as Professor Jowett, the Master of Balliol, says (p. 297), "to banish philosophical books" because of their theological danger ; but this is shutting his eyes to the real issue. Certainly in such times as these it is not the office of a Christian university to *banish* the books in question ; but it is precisely its office to train a student carefully in seeing through their anti-religious fallacies. No one witness has implied ever so distantly, that this is so much as *attempted* by those who give philosophical instruction. "In Roman Catholic seminaries," says Mr. Appleton (p. 51), a false "philosophical opinion is read with a view to *controverting* it ;" but there is nothing like this, he implies, at Oxford.

Now let the present state of things be carefully considered. At this moment philosophy is an enormous power in England ; and two anti-Christian philosophies in the very opposite poles of thought are striving for pre-eminence. These are transcendent and pantheistic Hegelianism on one side, and the phenomenism of Messrs. Mill, Bain, and Huxley on the other. The Christian holds most confidently that, if mental phenomena are accurately and exhaustively contemplated, they will be seen to testify, what is in profoundest harmony with Christian dogma, and what is irreconcilable with every anti-Christian philosophical theory. Christian parents and Christendom have a right to expect then, that every organization, professing to educate Christian youths, shall take special pains towards their mastering this fact in general and in detail. The system which deliberately neglects this task, is no system of Christian education whatever. Nor is there any sphere within which our Lord's words are more euphatically true, "he that is not with Me is against Me."

2. Such philosophical study as we have mentioned, is invaluable for mere discipline of the intellect. What is the substitute for it given at Oxford ? "Men have to read against time," says Canon Liddon (p. 68), "with almost physical pain, a certain number of writers, whom they master with difficulty, and whose words they reproduce without at all in many cases mastering their whole meaning." What intellectual profit can come from such a process as this ?*

3. The present efforts of Oxford liberals appertain to a movement, as simply *propagandist* as any *Catholic* movement could be : their whole exertions are

* We should have felt much greater respect for Canon Liddon's position, had it not been for his last public step : his proposing an Oxford degree for Dr. Dollinger. Finding himself unable to bring his University into any kind of unanimity even on the Being of a God, he has turned his efforts for the moment into the opposite direction. If Oxford will put forth no corporate protest against atheism, at least—such was his hope—it shall put forth a corporate protest against Papal infallibility.

directed to propagate the dogma, that dogma is unimportant. The mere admission of dissenters is valueless in their eyes. By such a plan, says Professor Jowett (p. 316), "I should have brought the Dissenters to a place called Oxford, where they might have a portion of the endowments and be examined like other persons, but *that would be all*: they would still be educated in Wesleyan, Independent, or Presbyterian seminaries." His object is to convert students from zealous Wesleyanism, Independentism, Presbyterianism,—still more, from zealous high-church or evangelical Anglicanism—most of all (if he had the chance) from zealous Catholicity,—to the dogma of anti-dogmatism.

The most distressing fact exhibited in the evidence is one with which we were otherwise acquainted. There are some few Catholic parents—thank God ! only a very few—who have had the amazing courage (if courage be the right name for so very undesirable a quality) to despise the urgent warning of ecclesiastical authority, and commit their children's highest interests to this slaughterhouse of souls.

Lord Howard of Glossop, who has conferred such signal benefits on the Church in the matter of poor-school education, has increased the debt of gratitude which Catholics owe him, by drawing emphatic attention to the facts declared in this report.

Since the above was in type, the "Month" for July has appeared, containing an excellent article on "Oxford in 1871," written apparently by some Catholic resident at Oxford. Liberalistic principles, says the writer (p. 113), "are accepted almost as axioms by the more influential teachers, and are practically adopted even by those who in theory disown them." According to these principles, "the young Catholic, if he is to reap the full benefits of the higher education, must begin by *ceasing to be a Catholic*." What possible safeguard could have been found (to speak of a project now condemned and abandoned) in the existence of a Catholic College at such a place? "The experiment" of the Keble College itself "is one of very dubious success; because *the whole spirit of Oxford* is destructive to" even "Protestant orthodoxy" (p. 117).

History of the Restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy in England. By the Right Rev. Bishop ULLATHORNE. London: Burns, Oates, and Co.

BEFORE our present number is issued, it is almost certain that the Ecclesiastical Titles Act will be repealed. It is thus the rare lot of the present generation of Catholics to have seen a penal law passed in a tempest of popular fury, with the common consent of both Whigs and Tories, after having remained on the Statute Book for twenty years quite inopera-

tively, withdrawn again by common consent, and passing through the various stages of its repeal with not so much noise as has often been made over a Turnpike Bill. It will ere long be our duty to review the history of this last, as we hope, of the Penal Laws—a history which is surely not without enduring interest for the Catholics of the United Kingdom.

To the ecclesiastical history of this period Bishop Ullathorne has made a valuable and most important addition. In a small volume of little over a hundred pages, he has reviewed the historical antecedents, the episcopal deliberations, the negotiations at Rome and in England which led to the establishment of the Hierarchy; and has discussed the character of the Pontifical Decree, the question whether episcopal titles are territorial, the policy of the Titles Act, and the fruits of the Hierarchy. The book, it need hardly be said, abounds in interesting historical anecdotes, and is written in the lucid and nervous style of which the Bishop is a master. It is in fact by far the most important contribution yet made to the history of these transactions. We barely record its publication now, having, as we have intimated already, the intention to devote an article to the topic which it treats ere long.

La Questione Romana nel Congresso, pel Barone di Letino Carbonelli.
Genevra Società della Indipendenza. 1870.

THIS pamphlet (of 113 pages) has reached us too late, for any such notice as it deserves in the present number. It is an argument against the existing state of things in Rome, by an Italian; and it is just one more proof of the want of practical liberty under the system imposed upon Rome by the Piedmontese invasion, that it has to be printed, like the Pope's own papers, at Geneva. That cradle of Protestantism is now the nearest place to Rome, where those who are faithful to the Church and the Holy Father are now allowed to publish their convictions. The author treats first, the Decree of October 9, 1870. He shows that, while declaring "Rome and the Roman province annexed for ever to the Kingdom of Italy," it goes on to guarantee to the Supreme Pontiff the dignity, inviolability, and all the personal prerogatives of a monarch; and promises that laws shall be passed "to secure together with territorial franchise the independence of the Supreme Pontiff and the free exercise of the spiritual authority of the Holy See." Then he shows, that the things which this decree declares it necessary to preserve to the Holy Father, really imply sovereignty: and that therefore it is clear that this very decree commits its author to solve what is called the Roman question in the opposite sense to that in which it was solved by iron and fire on the inauspicious 20th of September,—or "as the only alternative, that that act of the month of October is only the completion of the falsehood and infamy, which have been perpetrated for the last ten years in homage to the foul dreams of the Revolution." The next chapter is on the real impossibility of the separation of the Leonine city as a separate State. In fact,

the whole decree is an absurdity and a falsehood ; the real reconciliation of the Government of Victor Emmanuel and the Church is impossible. Then follows a discussion of the history of the Papacy :—that Rome never was at any time the capital of Italy, nor Italy ever one State :—and of the origin of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. Then follows a discussion of the general advantage derived by the civilized world, and by Italy in particular, from the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. The latter part of the pamphlet is occupied with a discussion of the late events,—the proceedings in the Chambers at Florence, Cavour, Garibaldi, Mazzini, &c. We have no space to enter into any of these particulars, but hope to be able to treat the pamphlet more at length in our next number.

Joannis Bapt. Franzelin, S. J., Tractatus de Divinâ Traditione et Scripturâ.
Romæ.

THIS volume of F. Franzelin's contains so much highly interesting matter, in reference to the most momentous theological discussions of the day, that we can do no kind of justice to it in a notice ; and we hope therefore in a very early number to publish an article on its contents. But there is one particular scholion, which contains a brief statement of very pregnant principles, on a matter with which this REVIEW has often been engaged : viz., the Subject and Object of Infallibility. We think our readers will be glad of our placing before them a translation of this scholion in our present number ; * and our present notice shall be entirely confined to it. It contains seven "Principles," and various "Corollaries" from each ; the first Principle referring to the Subject, the other six to the Object of Infallibility.

In regard to the former, F. Franzelin speaks according to what seems to us the more obvious sense of the Vatican pronouncement. He implies, that Ecumenical Councils are no otherwise infallible, than inasmuch as their confirmation by the Pope is a Pontifical *ex cathedrâ* Act. Infallibility, says our author (Corollary A), may be said to reside, either in the Pope regarded by himself, or the Pope regarded as ordering and informing the *Ecclesia Docens*. For, as had been just explained, the "formal cause" whereby the Successors of the Apostles are constituted as the *Ecclesia Docens*, is their union and consent with their visible head.

As to *ex cathedrâ* Acts, there is no determinate form (Cor. D) to which they are confined, and which may serve as a test of their *ex cathedrâ* character ; all that is requisite is, that the Pope shall in some way or other manifest his intention of obliging Catholics to assent. In fact there are various Pontifical Acts (Cor. E), in regard to which there is real doubt whether they are or are not *ex cathedrâ*.

* In this translation we have omitted two quotations given by F. Franzelin, because they appear in our article on Galileo.

Passing to the Object of Infallibility, F. Franzelin lays down (Prin. II. Cor. A) three classes of verities, contained in the strict Deposit of Faith : dogmatical, ethical, ecclesiastico-political. He adds however (Cor. C), that some of these verities at some given time may not be so sufficiently proposed, as that all are obliged to accept them with divine faith as revealed.

In addition to those verities which all are obliged to accept as revealed, there are others (Prin. III.) of the same three kinds (viz. dogmatical, ethical, ecclesiastico-political)—either not revealed, or at least not yet imposed *by the Church* as revealed—having nevertheless so close a connection with those which *are* revealed and sufficiently proposed, that without them the latter cannot be adequately protected. Among these protective truths, F. Franzelin instances such doctrines as those concerning the intrinsic sanctification of the Sacred Humanity and the like ; those which relate to the dogmatical sense of books ; historical facts, such as the Ecumenicity of some Council ; ecclesiastico-political facts, such as the moral necessity of the Pope's civil principedom. All these verities (Cor. B) are included in the Deposit, if that word be used in its widest and most proper sense.

Now it is the very fundamental dogma of Catholicity (Prin. IV.)—to deny it is the root of all heresies—that Infallibility extends over the whole Deposit in the *strict* sense of that word ; and from this truth it follows, that Infallibility extends over the whole Deposit in the *full* sense of that word. To deny this extension of Infallibility would at least be most grievous error ; and would, according to many theologians, be actual heresy. It would be a most grievous error to deny (Cor. A) the *ex cathedrâ* character of some Act, on the ground that the errors therein denounced are not condemned as *heretical*, but only as meriting some minor censure. Every proposition, on the contrary, infallibly deserves that particular censure, which the Pontifical Act declares.

Of these various verities, which are thus infallibly defined and yet not as revealed truths, it can hardly be said that they are believed simpliciter with divine faith (Cor. D) ; for they are believed, not as themselves revealed, but because of the revealed infallibility of the defining authority. They are believed, however, with a faith *mediately* divine.

Various human sciences (Prin. VI.)—philosophy, history, geology, ethnography, &c., &c.—contain matter closely connected with Revelation. These sciences therefore, when sophistically pursued, may be understood as involving results, which are in fact not only false, but injurious or even contradictory to revealed truth. The Church has no power of condemning them, if they are but *scientifically* false ; but she has that power, if they are contradictory or injurious to the Faith. Whenever therefore the Church condemns scientific error, she thereby teaches that the condemned error is in some way injurious to Revelation.

Lastly (Prin. VIII.), the Pontiff may authorize his Congregations to pronounce doctrinal decrees ; which are not indeed infallibly true, but which nevertheless demand from the faithful a certain interior assent. On this subject we need not further speak, having discussed it at so much length in our article on Galileo.

The Month. July—August, 1871. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE have quoted from this number in a previous notice. Our object in recurring to it is, that we may give all the currency in our power to some admirable remarks on Catholic education and literature.

"It is with literature as with education. Those who are most in need of each are the very persons whom it is most difficult to convince of their need; and, in consequence, there are two classes of men among us at present who are forced to labour, in season and out of season, to seem importunate, men of but one idea, hobby-riders, and the like, because they are also forced to din into ears more than half deaf the necessity of very great and united exertions on behalf of both the causes they have at heart. These two classes contain the few who are fully alive to our deficiencies in Catholic literature and our deficiencies in Catholic education. We speak at present only of the former. The cause of Catholic literature is happily not hopeless: but few are aware of the difficulties which beset those who try to serve that cause—difficulties which would be more than half removed by a hearty co-operation from Catholics themselves, which is now wanting, mainly on account, not of want of power, but of want of heartiness and zeal. The flourishing state of the literature of Protestantism in general, and of many various divisions and sects among Protestants in particular, who are in many cases not to be compared to Catholics in influence or numbers in this country, is the result of many combined causes. It is the result of a taste for reading, and reading not merely of the lightest and most frivolous kind, which taste is carefully formed and promoted by those who have the education of the young. There can hardly be a better test of the good quality of the education given to the younger members of any body whatsoever, than that which is furnished by the answer to the question, 'Do the boys and girls leave their schoolroom and go out into life with a real taste for reading, with some sort of thirst of knowledge, with some power of selecting subjects of interest, with some habits of digesting and assimilating what they read, and of giving an account of it to themselves and theirs?' And yet how is this question to be answered with regard to a great number of Catholic educators, who are in other respects deserving of all praise? How many young men and young women grow up to what seems, but is not, an age beyond childhood, with the idea that no day is well spent which has not seen some time devoted to mental improvement and the acquirement of knowledge, and that it might be a possibly laudable action to go without an extra pair or two of gloves, a superfluous bonnet, or a box of cigars, for the sake of buying a Catholic periodical or a new book? We have here touched upon one only of the many sources of that prosperity of literature which exists even among the members of various 'denominations' not by any means coextensive with the nation, as the Evangelicals, the Puseyites, or the Ritualists. There are of course many more: an *esprit de corps* which makes them support their own organs, their own booksellers, their own publishers, and so make it incumbent upon Messrs. Mudie and other potentates of the same class to beware of inflicting upon their magazines and other publications that ostracism to which Catholics tamely submit in the case of their own, and the like. We quite agree with the Preface, from noticing which we have been led to make these remarks. It costs in reality very little to guarantee to a Catholic writer or a Catholic book a sufficient remuneration to let the labourer have the reward he deserves, and in many cases grievously wants: and among the good works open to the men of our generation this is certainly not the last nor the least useful to society and the Church."

Secular Judgments in Spiritual Matters, considered in relation to some Recent Events. By the Rev. ORBY SHIPLEY, M.A. Masters. 1871. Pp. 88.

WE have read this pamphlet, and we give ourselves some credit for the patience it required. For the greater part of it is a legal argument, from statutes, &c., against the authority of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Anglican Church—the Judicial Committee of Privy Council. Now, a legal argument from a clergyman is seldom worth much. However, we do not say much about that, because Mr. Orby Shipley's argument really seems clear and ingenious. But it is impossible to read it without a strong sense of unreality. He argues, 1. Historically, that by the rules of the Catholic Church and of Christendom spiritual questions ought not to be decided by secular judges and in secular courts. During all this part we feel inclined to do as Lord Brougham is said to have done one Sunday in church, when he interrupted a preacher, who was going on with a lengthened argument to prove some self-evident point—“Well, sir, the court is with you so far,—proceed.” No one doubts that before the sixteenth century this was an invariable rule. Nay, we will add, that any one who knows the history of the so-called Reformation in England will fully admit that there was not the least intention of setting it aside. Henry VIII. and his ministers never thought of claiming for secular courts the right of judging of spiritual questions. What they said was, that the King, as supreme governor, was head both of the temporal and the spiritual in his dominions. A court which sat to represent the king in his temporal capacity had no right whatever to meddle with spiritual questions. No man would have resented it more than Henry VIII. if the Court of King's Bench had taken on itself to decide a question of heresy, because although it represented him and sat in his name, it represented merely his temporal authority. So the spiritual courts represented him as much as the King's Bench. But they would not have been allowed to judge upon a criminal suit, or one merely of property, because they represented him merely in his spiritual capacity. It is quite true that the first Act of Parliament which acknowledged this authority in him did recite that temporal questions should be decided by the temporality, and spiritual by the spirituality. But even then, any court, even if its members were all lay, would have satisfied this condition, if it represented the king's spiritual authority, because he was a spiritual person. And, accordingly, Cromwell, as his Vicar-General in Spirituals, sat in the House of Lords on the bench of bishops above the Archbishop of Canterbury. And a very little later the Act was passed which authorized the king to appoint delegates to hear all spiritual causes in his name, leaving it absolutely to him to name whom he would,—bishops, clergy, ecclesiastical lawyers, common lawyers, or men not lawyers at all; and this court remained the supreme judicial authority of the Anglican Church until 1832.

Mr. Orby Shipley argues at length and ingeniously that this court cannot have been intended to hear spiritual causes, because, as a matter of fact, none were brought before it for a century and a half, or until 1690. But this is

a fallacy. The reason was, because very soon after it was created, another Act authorized the king to exercise his spiritual authority by another court, which was found more convenient, because more absolute—the Court of High Commission. This court also was, according to Anglican principles, strictly spiritual, because it represented the king in his spiritual capacity, and before it all strictly spiritual questions came, till it was abolished by the Long Parliament. It is remarkable that the Act by which it was abolished fully recognized that its spiritual authority resulted, not from the fact of any of its members being bishops, but from the fact that the judges in it, be they who they might, derived “spiritual and ecclesiastical power by commission from the king.” After this, the Parliament, then Cromwell, and lastly Charles II., exercised a real headship; but we are not aware that (we speak under correction) judicial cases were brought before any supreme authority until James II. illegally restored the High Commission. This was again abolished at the Revolution of 1688, and immediately afterwards we find the first strictly spiritual case coming before the Court of Delegates. It is plain, then, that our Anglican ancestors understood that, according to Anglican principles, the royal authority is supreme both in temporal and spiritual questions. That the manner of its acting, and the persons by whom it should be exercised under the king, was from the first regulated by Parliament; that Parliament authorized, 1. the Court of Delegates, then, 2. the High Commission; and that when the second was abolished the first remained the only court in which the judicial authority of the king, in his spiritual capacity, could be exercised.

It is true, and is pointed out by Mr. Orby Shipley, that between 1690 and 1832 hardly any questions of the sort were brought before it; but that seems to have been because the nation was theologically in a deep sleep. As soon as it awoke, such questions were sure to arise, and if the Acts of 1832 and 1833 had not been passed, the Court of Delegates would most assuredly have come into active operation as a spiritual court long ere this.

In 1832 it was abolished (as far as relates to England, not to Ireland) by an Act which transferred its authority to the Privy Council, and next year that authority was further transferred to a Judicial Committee of the same body, which is still the supreme spiritual court of the Anglican body.

So far, then, from being anything new, or inconsistent with the principles of Reformation statutes, that court is strictly founded upon those principles. For it is a court which sits by the sovereign's authority to judge spiritual questions in virtue of the supreme authority over them, which it is the fundamental principle of the Anglican Communion to recognize in the sovereign. The whole, therefore, of Mr. Shipley's argument falls to the ground. He takes for granted that whatever is done by that court is done by “the State,” and that its authority is only “State authority.” Now this, on Anglican principles, is not the case. To deny that the king is a spiritual, as well as a temporal person, and to say that what he does in his spiritual capacity is done by the State, not by the Church, is to deny the first principle of Anglicanism. Catholics, of course, do deny it; so did the Puritans, in times past; so do the Protestant Dissenters now. But for a man who, like Mr. Orby Shipley, professes to be an Anglican, to take that line, is absurd and self-contradictory. It is true that the Judicial Committee has really only State authority; but it is

true only because the Anglican Communion itself is not a Church at all, but merely a body with State authority; and whatever spiritual authority it may be supposed to have, is certainly exercised by the Committee of Privy Council.

In page 50 Mr. Shipley raises a legal question certainly curious and interesting, and we incline to think he is right upon it. He argues that the Act under which the Committee acts does not authorize the sentence of suspension which it pronounced on Mr. Mackonochie, because it only authorizes it to advise the Sovereign what sentence she should pronounce, and not to pass any. Some lawyers say that it is inherent in the nature of a court to have power to punish contempts. We incline to think it could only do so by imprisonment, &c. But this is practically an unimportant question, because an Act of four lines long could unquestionably give the Committee the power, if it has it not as yet. There is an absurdity about the affair. Mr. Mackonochie was suspended for six months. If he had chosen to try at law whether the court had power to pass such a sentence, it is certain the six months would have been over long before the question could have been decided, and nothing real would have been left—except his lawyer's bill of costs. We are of opinion, therefore, that he did wisely in submitting.

As for the question whether the Anglican clergy (so long as they acknowledge the Anglican Communion as a Church) are bound in conscience to submit to the judgments of the Committee of Privy Council, we must own we are amazed that any honorable and honest man can doubt it. Every one of them promises at his ordination "so to minister the doctrine and sacraments and discipline as this Church and Realm hath received the same." Most unquestionably "this Church and Realm," so far as it is Anglican at all (of course no farther), has "received" both the principle that the Sovereign has supreme authority in matters spiritual, and that the mode of the exercise of that authority is to be regulated, from time to time, by Parliament. It is equally certain that Parliament has, as a matter of fact, authorized the Committee of Council to advise the Sovereign in all spiritual causes which come before her. It seems, therefore, to us that no Anglican clergyman can resist the authority of that court legally exercised, as long as he remains an Anglican clergyman, without violating his ordination vow. We are utterly at a loss to understand how any man can deny this by arguing, in open opposition to facts, that "this Church and Realm," *i.e.* the Anglican Communion, has not "received" the authority of the court; still less by arguing, what is really nothing to the point, that it ought not to have received it. Mr. Shipley does not agree with us. He writes:—

"Speaking for myself only, though I think others will agree with these principles, if I were in the position I do not fill—of a parish priest under prosecution, I should act thus:—Believing in my inmost being the rightfulness of my principles and the wrong which my opponent is doing, both to them and to himself, as well as to his God, I should leave no stone unturned to frustrate his endeavours. I should make every defence, short of pleading before the courts of the State, in my defence. I should take advantage of every accident in my favour to turn the flank of the enemy, to disappoint him, to wear him out and exhaust his supplies, and to do that by indirect methods which I was powerless to do directly. Any technical flaw I should grasp at.

Any legal quibble I should cling to. Any theological loophole I should pass through sideways. Any double meaning in language I should take advantage of. Any indefiniteness in the sentence or monition I should strive to make yet more indistinct; and, under the cover of a friendly cloud of mist, to make my escape. And I should, thus deliberately act, not as liking these bypaths, far from it, but because I am forced into them; from no innate love of subtilty, rather the reverse; but in order not to be caught with guile, I should act thus simply on the defensive; and as weaker than the law as at present administered, I should take refuge in the all-powerful defence of the weak. I should act simply on principle—the principle to do God's work as best I might under difficult circumstances, for His glory, and the good of my neighbour, and my own salvation" (p. 10.).

Remarks on some parts of the Report of Judicial Committee in the case of Elphinstone against Purchas, and on the proper course to be pursued by the Clergy in regard to it. A letter to the Rev. CANON LIDDON, D.C.L., from the Right Hon. Sir J. T. COLERIDGE. Murray.

THIS is a very interesting pamphlet on the same prolific subject. Sir John Taylor Coleridge is a man who has passed an active and laborious public life, not merely without stain or reproach but carrying with him the reverence of his country. He was a few years senior to John Keble at Oxford, and, being a member of the same small college, the two were thrown together from the first day when Keble, then a mere boy, came into residence. A close intimacy was maintained between them until Keble died, March 29th, 1866, aged seventy-four, and the senior of the two friends survived to write the memoirs of the younger. Sir John Coleridge has always united to distinguished talents, exquisite culture, and high principles, so much kindness of disposition and "flowing courtesy towards all men," that while respect and admiration for him have been general among his countrymen, personal affection has somewhat taken their place in the minds of all who have had the privilege of his personal acquaintance. Such a man, having had many years' experience of judicial duty, and having besides continued to serve as a member of the Judicial Committee of Privy Council after his retirement from the Queen's Bench, has a right to speak with special authority when the conduct of the judges in that court is called in question. With Anglicans he has a still higher authority, as being understood to represent the opinions of John Keble, the only man, not a king, whom the Anglican Church may in some sense be said to have canonized, in the three centuries of its existence.

This pamphlet was occasioned by a letter published in the *Guardian*, and written by Canon Liddon. Mr. Liddon had said:—

"The late Mr. Keble said to me, not many months before his death, 'Depend upon it, we shall never have God's blessing on our work in the Church of England, while we continue quietly to acquiesce in the present constitution of the Court of Final Appeal.' Mr. Keble had been dwelling on the contra-

diction which he held to exist between our Lord's own provisions for the maintenance of His Truth and authority in His kingdom, and the purely human device for dealing with these solemn interests which we have in the Final Appeal Court. He had also insisted on the further contradiction which is observable between the Court as recently constituted and the original terms of the Reformation settlement" (p. 3).

Here we must point out the contrast between this tone and that of Mr. Shipley in the pamphlet noticed above. Mr. Shipley treats the Court exactly as we Catholics should treat it if it presumed to lay down what our priests ought to teach, or how they should minister. He says, "It is a purely secular court, which has no authority whatever in things spiritual. In conscience I owe it no obedience, and if I pay it any, it is merely as a matter of prudence." Of course, if that were the case, the Anglican Church would have nothing to do whatever with the question, "How is the Court constituted." It would be merely an enemy and persecutor. Mr. Keble, on the other hand, assumes that the Anglican Communion is more or less responsible for the constitution of the Court. Therefore he assumes that it is an Ecclesiastical Court of the Anglican Communion, although not such as it ought to be. We insist on this, because, although the two views are really inconsistent—nay, actually contradictory—most of the writers upon the subject seem to us sometimes to adopt one, sometimes the other. We shall give examples of this below. Sir John Coleridge (as might be expected from his legal habits of thought) always assumes consistently that the Court is a Church Court; from which it follows, that, while it exists unchanged, Anglicans remaining such are bound—not merely in prudence, but in conscience—to obey its decrees; and also that the Anglican Communion shares the responsibility, if it be (as Keble lays down, and as we should have expected all earnest men to feel) unfit in its nature to exercise ecclesiastical authority.

Canon Liddon then went on to say: "I can only account for the different verdicts of the Court [in the case of the *Essays and Reviews* and that of Mr. Voysey] by supposing that, for the moment the Court adopts a popular, as distinct from an accurate and theological, estimate of the language before it." Then comparing the "Westerton" judgment with the Purchas judgment, he says: "It is *not* easy to believe that the Court is quite incapable of interpreting the documents before it by real or supposed considerations of policy! That, in short, it never regards these documents in the light of a plastic material which may be made to support conclusions held to be advisable at the moment, and on independent grounds." Canon Liddon then went on to say, that if things go on as they are, "Churchmen will, to a very great extent indeed, find relief . . . in co-operation with the political forces which, year by year, more and more steadily are working towards disestablishment."

This letter is the text of Sir J. T. Coleridge's pamphlet. He begins by a statement important from such a man: "I venture to say that I think Mr. Purchas has not had justice done to him in two main points of the late appeal—I mean, the use of the vestments complained of, and the side of the Communion Table which he faced when consecrating the elements for the Holy Communion" (p. 6).

Upon the first point he thinks the judgment may be "conclusively shown

to be wrong," and gives his grounds for thinking so. The law, he says, requires the use of such things as were in use "by the authority of Parliament in the second year of King Edward VI. And it is conceded in the Report" (as he correctly terms what is usually called the "judgment") "that the vestments, the use of which is now condemned, were in use by authority of Parliament in that year. Having that fact, you are bound to construe the Rubric as if those vestments were specifically named in it, instead of being only referred to." As to the "long inquiry" made in the Report into things which have passed since the second year of Edward VI.—

"I forbear to go through it—not, I am sure, out of any disrespectful feeling to the learned and reverend authors of the Report, but because it seems to me wholly irrelevant to the point for discussion. This alone I must add, that even were the inquiry relevant, the authorities on which they rely do not appear to me so clear or cogent, nor the analogies relied on so just as to warrant the conclusion arrived at. For it should never be forgotten that the defendant in a criminal case, acquitted as to this charge by the learned judge below, is entitled to every presumption in his favour, and could not properly be condemned, but by a judgment free from all reasonable doubt. And this remark acquires additional strength, because the judgment will be final, not only on him, but on the whole Church for all time, unless reversed by the legislature.

"Upon the second point [the position of the Anglican minister in reading the 'prayer of consecration'], I have less to say, though it seems to me much the most important. The Report, I think, cannot be shown conclusively to be wrong here, as it may in the other; still it does not seem to me to be conclusively shown to be right" (p. 9).

Sir John says his own *feelings* are for Mr. Purchas's practice on the second point, and against him on the first, so that he is more impartial in the judgment he gives.

But he writes, first, because Mr. Liddon's letter "speaks of the Court of Final Appeal in terms, and with a conclusion or view, to neither of which I can agree; and, further, you speak of the disestablishment of the Church in a way which I hope I may misunderstand, and, if I do not, I would implore your reconsideration of."

"The first point "was a subject, almost the only one, on which I had the misfortune to differ from my dear and venerated friend John Keble." Mr. Keble wrote that our Lord had appointed a judicial power as to "alleged offences against the Faith." The ex-judge pleads with touching modesty against this. It is plain Keble was thinking chiefly of the Faith, Sir John chiefly of the precautions necessary for the fair trial of an accused person. Then he defends the judges in the Committee of Council, in a manner equally beautiful, from the charge of "partiality and corruption"; and speaks, as a judge only could speak, of the difficulty of the judicial office and the qualifications for it. To us there is something not beautiful only and forcible, but really affecting in this part of the pamphlet, when we remember all the experience and feelings of the writer. Next he passes to the main points suggested by Canon Liddon's letter. First:—

"The necessity for a repeal of the law by which jurisdiction in case of alleged religious offences is given to the Judicial Committee. That is undoubtedly the

true point for those to aim at who agree with you generally. I am told indeed that many good men are united in a determination to resist the law while it remains unrepealed. I venture to think they can hardly have considered calmly the character or the consequences of that course, nor how mischievous an example they will be setting to their flocks" (p. 14).

Here it should be observed that the real difference between the judge and those of whom he is speaking is, that he consistently assumes (what to us is so clear that we marvel to find any honest man doubting it) that the Court (whether well constituted or not) actually is the Supreme judicial authority of the Anglican communion. They, on the other hand, (not we think always or consistently, but whenever they talk of disobeying it) assume that it is merely a secular court, which has no authority at all over their consciences, but whose interference is simply a tyrannical usurpation, as it would be, for instance, if the Court of Queen's Bench were to claim to give or refuse to Catholic priests in England facilities to say Mass or hear confessions.

Sir John then argues that the Church of England must have some supreme court, and that any of those suggested (especially one composed of all the Protestant bishops) would be worse than that which now exists.

Sir John therefore (while he thinks the Court mistaken in the judgment on Mr. Purchas) is yet of opinion—1. that while it exists the clergy are bound to obey its decrees for conscience sake. 2. That it would be impossible to substitute a better for it.

At the end of the pamphlet Sir John insists on the benefits of the Establishment, and exhorts the clergy not to join the attempt now making to overthrow it. Then he says—

"Disguise it as we may, ours is, in one sense, a divided Church. Within our pale are two great parties at issue on more than formal points—on points no less important than the 'two sacraments generally necessary to salvation.' This is a fact never enough to be lamented, yet which it is idle to attempt to conceal; but good and wise Christians have thought—and happily teach us—that considering how far we agree, and the mysterious nature of those points as to which we differ—our unhappy differences are not such as to prevent both parties from being united in one Church. . . . If we may so stand, may we not stand in peace with each other as to all things not essential to the Faith, and in charity even as to them? May we not cease to waste our energies in conflicts, such as have occasioned the Purchas litigation? I do not forget what is behind and thinly covered by it—the fear of Rome,—a fear, as I think, wonderfully excessive; but if there be ground for it, even against that danger we shall be more safe if, first, we are united among ourselves; and secondly, if we will, with one heart, direct all our energies against a worse enemy than Rome, and now, I believe, a more powerful one—I mean infidelity. That contest is enough for our day. You know as well as—perhaps better than—any man, how it presses,—where it touches us, whom among us it assails, under what colours it fights, and with what various weapons. You know how it troubles where it does not overthrow, how it weakens where it does not destroy; and every thinking man, I suppose, knows what misery, what destruction ensues where it conquers. . . . May not high and low meet in the discharge of their common duty? I believe that if the good men of both parties laboured together, shoulder to shoulder, in such works as these, they would come to know and love each other better; they would see the good more clearly, they would judge the

evil in each other more charitably, and have not merely a truce but a permanent peace, without unworthy compromise on either side" (p. 23).

We have dwelt at some length on this pamphlet, and in particular we have quoted this last page because we know nothing which will more clearly set before Catholics both the strength and the weakness of the Anglican communion. Its strength is the hold which it has got upon such men as Sir John Coleridge; its weakness when the utmost that such men can hope for is, that clergymen should agree to work together, while they are directly opposite to each other upon fundamental questions, such as that to which he alludes,—whether any grace is given in Baptism; and whether in the Holy Communion men "receive mere bread and wine in memory of an absent Christ," to borrow Mr. Liddon's phrase, or whether they receive their Lord and Saviour Himself. As long as the Anglican Communion was sound asleep, such differences might be left as open questions. Can they remain so when those who maintain both sides are in real earnest?

The Purchas Judgment. A Letter of acknowledgment to the Right Hon. Sir J. T. COLERIDGE. By H. P. LIDDON, D.D., together with a Letter to the Writer, by the Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D. London: Rivingtons. Pp. 71.

WE must treat this pamphlet more briefly than that of which we have just given rather a full account. It falls into the confusion which we have already pointed out. Canon Liddon pleads for making the whole Bench of Anglican bishops the Supreme Court of the Anglican Communion. He says: "The Queen would still judge spiritual causes, but though the spirituality, and the bishops would no doubt be assisted by legal advisers to prevent collisions with the civil law." We may then justly say, that if an Act of Parliament were passed giving the Queen power to settle all doctrinal questions which might be brought before the judicial tribunals of the Anglican Communion, and requiring her to refer them, not as now, to the Judicial Committee, but to the six-and-twenty Protestant Bishops, who should "report" to her their advice how the question should be decided—in that case he would be satisfied. Yet surely it must be clear to every thinking man who knows anything of ecclesiastical subjects, that if the Committee of Privy Council is really a "secular court," or "State court," that new court would be so no less. It might, or might not, be likely to give better judgments. That is not the question. But, first, it would derive its power, not from any ecclesiastical authority, but from an Act of Parliament, quite as much so as the present court; next the real supreme authority would be the Sovereign, not the Anglican bishops. Any one will see this at once, if he asks himself what would be said, if it were proposed that an Act should be passed making the Queen, in the same way, the supreme judge of all ecclesiastical, spiritual, and doctrinal

questions which might arise among her Catholic subjects, only requiring her to refer them to the thirteen Catholic bishops, who should report to her their opinion after hearing the cause. Every one knows that there is not a Catholic, who deserves the name, who would not resist to the death such an Act, and that if it passed it would be simply disregarded by them, because the principle it would involve would be that the Sovereign is a "persona mixta," head of the Church as well as of the State within her dominions. Canon Liddon then, in asking for such a court as satisfactory, distinctly admits the principle of the existing court (as much as Sir S. Coleridge) but proposes to reform it.

And yet he is inconsistent enough to say, in answer to the remarks of the Protestant Bishop of Gloucester, who advised those who could not in conscience obey the decrees of the court, to leave the Establishment—

"If the apostolical precepts about submission to the powers that he could apply to the case of a secular court dealing with strictly religious interests, there would be reason for part of this advice; but no one imagines that S. Paul would have submitted to a decision of Nero's on the subject of Justification, or in any particular which implied one or other doctrine about it" (p. 44).

That is, he assumes that the existing court has no more authority in the matter it judges, than would a heathen emperor. How inconsistent, then, to propose to reform it in detail. We are clear that our Anglican friends will only "beat the air," unless they begin by making up their mind whether the Sovereign, as such, has authority in spirituals. If so, then the present court is a spiritual court. If not, then the Anglican Communion has possessed, from the beginning, merely secular, and not any ecclesiastical or spiritual authority and jurisdiction. This question, we say, they must settle, one way or other, first of all. Men who keep going backwards and forwards upon so vital a question within the compass of a few pages will never really carry their object, because in truth they do not know what the object is which they want to carry. To go to other subjects, Canon Liddon explains that, in what he said in his first letter, he never intended to charge the judges in the Judicial Committee with

"Any dishonourable conduct. Any such insinuation would have been absurd on the face of it, and I claim no credit for not having been guilty of what the world would have deemed a blunder as well as a crime. But I did suppose, and meant to suggest, that the judges looked upon themselves as entitled to exercise a discretion which is more properly an attribute of the makers than of the administrators of the law. No one would imagine this to hold good in the case of any other English court of justice; but the anomalous circumstances of the Church appeared to yield an explanation of the apparent exception. . . . I certainly meant to impute no sort of 'dishonesty' to members of the Committee for taking a view of their duties which such circumstances would make sufficiently natural; and persons of very high authority who look upon these matters from an altogether different point of view from any that I could adopt, agree in this estimate of the functions of the court" (p. 19).

The Canon enlarges upon the contradictory character of the judgments given in proof of this, and examines them in detail with much ability, but at much

greater length than our space will allow us to follow. Upon this subject, as is very natural, the Canon does not feel that he is making any imputation upon the honour of the judges by a supposition which the ex-judge feels to imply a very intolerable one. He answers the argument of the judge that the clergy should "obey the law," by showing that the Protestant bishops themselves not only do not require the "Low Church" clergy to obey it, but openly violate it themselves, as *e. g.* the other day when they omitted a large part of the Marriage Service required by law to be read at the late royal wedding. This is a telling *argumentum ad hominem*. He says that when the Anglican Archbishop Tait tries to comfort the Ritualistic clergy by writing that—

" 'Not all the clergy are expected by their parishioners or required by their bishops rigidly to observe every point in the rubrics at all times and under all circumstances : ' he is keeping within the truth, since the statement probably applies to nine-tenths of the clergy of the Church of England. It is applicable in a very emphatic sense to the Low Church party, as every one knows who attends their ministrations and is moderately acquainted with the Prayer Book and its rubrics " (p. 27).

But he shows first, that the Anglican bishops will be obliged to "enforce the law" in all cases that are brought before them, and next that the leading members of the so-called "Church Association" call upon their members to bring before the Anglican bishop every case in which any clergyman practises any of the things for which Mr. Purchas was condemned. Its chairman calls upon them to "let the bishops have no peace till they interfere." The result, no doubt, is that what is called Ritualistic worship will be entirely impossible in the Anglican Communion if this judgment stands—and stand it must unless it is overthrown either by some future judgment of the same court, or by an Act of the legislature. The chance of either of these seems very minute. We therefore look upon Ritualism, as we have seen it of late years, as a thing gone by, in parish churches. Already, indeed, Mr. Orby Shipley and others are proposing to build churches which shall not be under the authority of the Anglican bishops ; and in these they may, if they please, follow minutely the Roman Missal, except, indeed, that, not being priests, all they do will be like what Catholic children are fond of doing,—playing at saying Mass. What a queer position, moreover, for Episcopal ministers to be building new churches on purpose that the "bishops" may have no authority in them. We think this likely to be carried out.

Canon Liddon says that, under these circumstances, disestablishment is not desired indeed, but may be inevitable. He adds, we are sorry to say, that "secession to Rome" is "out of the question," since the decrees of the Vatican Council ; although that was the way in which "some of the noblest and purest souls whom God has ever given to the Church of England" solved such perplexities as these in 1845 and 1851. We are comforted by remembering, that already many a man who honestly thought that resource "out of the question" has lived before very long to find it the only thing which solved all his difficulties, satisfied all his needs, and exceeded all his hopes. We have, must have, patience. Men's eyes are not opened at once, and when they begin to see, they see only "men as if it were trees walking."

Dr. Pusey's letter at the end of this pamphlet is highly characteristic of himself. He, too, falls into the confusion of desiring the reform of the existing court, and yet calling it a "State court" (p. 62). He fears that the doctrine of the Eucharist itself will be condemned when the Bennett case, now pending, comes on for judgment. The reform he proposes is that of Canon Liddon, that a "Provincial Council of Bishops" should judge. He does not seem to have asked himself by what authority does the present court sit, or by what authority would that which he suggests sit, and if one is a State court, what will the other be. Of disestablishment also he speaks as a probable result.

Queen Elizabeth v. the Lord Chancellor, or a History of the Prayer-Book of the Church of England in relation to the Purchas Judgment. By the Rev. W. WATERWORTH, S. J. London: Burns. 1871.

FATHER WATERWORTH comes to the rescue of the Ritualists by arguing, not that the Committee of Privy Council is not the Supreme Spiritual Court of the Anglican Communion—he is too clear-headed and too well read in history for that—but that its judgment in the Purchas case is clearly wrong. In this, it is to be observed, he takes exactly the same line with Sir J. T. Coleridge. The conclusion of the two pamphlets is exactly the same, viz., that the "ornament rubric," as it is called (i. e. that which orders that all ornaments of the Church and its ministers shall remain as they were by the authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward VI.), is part of the law of England, and cannot possibly be set aside by any neglect of the Protestant clergy to obey it, any neglect of the Protestant bishops to enforce their obedience, or any neglect of the civil government to compel the Protestant bishops to act. But F. Waterworth arrives at this same conclusion like a historian, Sir John T. Coleridge like a judge. The Judge says, I will not enter upon the events which have happened since the second year of Edward VI., except to that I do say not think they bear out the judgment. The historian goes at length into those facts, and proves what the other only asserts. The net result of this pamphlet is that there was a continued attempt on the part of Queen Elizabeth's Puritan bishops and clergy to get rid of the Catholic vestments and ceremonies authorized, nay, demanded, by this rubric, but that Elizabeth refused to give way. At last, however, custom prevailed over law—for *quid leges sine moribus?* But the late judgment is the first attempt of a court to set aside the law by making the illegal custom compulsory. This pamphlet is worth reading by those who care to know the real history of the Protestant Church in England, which F. Waterworth has studied far more accurately than the great majority of its own members and even clergy.

Galileo and the Roman Inquisition. A Lecture delivered on Wednesday Evening, April 11th, 1860, by the Hon. DANIEL BRENNAN. Charlotte's Town, P. E. I.

THIS lecture, delivered in 1860, has been forwarded to us for notice, apparently in connection with our April article on Copernicanism. We do not entirely sympathize with its line of argument as a whole ; but it puts together very interestingly the facts of Galileo's case.

To show how ludicrous is the claim made for Galileo of holding heliocentrism on reasonable scientific grounds, Mr. Brennan draws attention (p. 24) to the prominence given by the astronomer to his absurd argument drawn from the flux and reflux of tides. Galileo scoffs in one of his chapters at the sympathy shown by Kepler, in ascribing that phenomenon to "the moon's influence and other like *puerilities*."

In p. 28, note, Mr. Brennan quotes a long passage from a lecture of Cardinal Wiseman's, with which we were before unacquainted. "What was Galileo doing?" asks the Cardinal. "He was insisting on the Church to adopt a system, not demonstrable and contradictory to the words of Holy Scripture ; and he would have the Scriptures bend to his theory, rather than make his theory bend to the admitted view of the Holy Scriptures." This is at last the common sense of the matter.

Claims of the Irish College at Paris on the British Government in Virtue of Treaties with France. Cork : Mahony. 1871.

WE would call the attention of our English, and most especially that of our Protestant, readers to the facts exhibited in this pamphlet. It no doubt requires that a man should be a lawyer, or at least that he should have some turn for legal questions, in order that he may judge fully of some of the arguments of the writer. But the question is not one of dry law that is about to be brought before the imperial Parliament, the body which makes law and is in one sense above the law. And even if it should be the case, which we very greatly doubt, that as a question of mere law the claims of the Irish College are barred by the judgments given upon them many years ago by the Privy Council, even that ought not to be a conclusive argument with the British Parliament, if justice is clearly on the other side. The whole Irish policy of the present Government notoriously goes upon the principle, that the government of Ireland in times past, and most especially in the times when Lord Eldon was the ruling spirit in the administration, was both unjust and impolitic. On no other principle, manifestly, can the Irish measures urged by Mr. Gladstone and passed by overwhelming majorities of the present Parliament be defended. Even, therefore, if the sentence pronounced upon the claims of Irish College could be proved to have been demanded by the unjust laws passed in those times, it would by no means

follow that justice as well as liberality would not be violated by the present Parliament if it should avail itself of that sentence for the pecuniary advantage of the present Government and the loss of the Irish College.

The facts in few words are these. There existed in France, before the great revolution, several colleges, founded and endowed by Irish Catholics at their own expense, for the education of Irish priests, at a time when they were forbidden either to receive any education in the British dominions or to go abroad for it, at a time when Lord Macaulay says (if we remember right) that the life of a Catholic priest was less secure than that of a wolf. These colleges were purely and simply Irish, although driven by persecution from Irish soil. They were, and always have been, admitted by the French Government to be, not French, but Irish institutions. This had been admitted by every successive Government which had existed in France for the last three hundred years—by the Monarchy of the *ancien régime*, by the Revolution, by the first Empire, the Restoration, by the Monarchy of July, by the second Republic, by the second Empire, and by the third Republic as late as September 14, 1870. Nothing could more strongly prove this than the fact that when the property of all French colleges, churches, &c., was confiscated under the first Revolution “the Irish College was seized upon by the Government as being comprised in the decree confiscating all French ecclesiastical property. But Lord Gower, British ambassador at Paris at the time, and acting in that capacity, interposed, and claimed that the college should be exempted as being the property of the subjects of the British Crown. A committee on the part of the French Government was appointed to inquire into the matter, and it reported that the college should be exempted, as claimed by the British ambassador, from the general confiscation of French ecclesiastical property.” The great importance of this is that it proves that both the French Government and the English Government (and that at a time when they agreed in little else) agreed in regarding and treating the Irish College in Paris as belonging not to France nor to French subjects, but to British subjects.

And this was made more clear in 1793, when war broke out between Great Britain and the French Republic. The French Government then issued a decree confiscating all property belonging to English, Scotch, and Irish subjects in France, and in virtue of this decree seized upon the Irish College and its endowments, not as ecclesiastical property, but as the property of British subjects.

Peace came at length, and the Government of the Restoration agreed by treaty to compensate all British subjects whose property had been confiscated by the French Government since Jan. 1, 1793. A mixed commission, partly English and partly French, was appointed to carry out this treaty, and before it the Irish College made its claim, and that claim was admitted by the commissioners to be “legitimate, *i.e.*, to be within the meaning of the treaty they had to administer: they registered the claim as such, the only thing remaining being, according to the treaty of 1815, to verify the *items*, and ascertain the amount of the claims.”

In 1818, however, a change was made. The French Government paid over a large lump sum to the English Government to meet the demands (one

of which was that of the Irish College), and a commission exclusively English was appointed to pay the claimants out of that sum, it being especially provided by treaty that if the money paid was more than should be awarded, the balance was to be repaid to France.

It is almost incredible, yet we believe there is no question that it is true, that only a year later, an Act was passed by which the commissioners were to apply any balance "to such purposes as the Lords of the Treasury should direct," and the commissioners were expressly released from all accountability. This act Lord Truro declared in Parliament (see *Times*, August 22, 1853) to be "wicked, fraudulent, and unjust." What use was made of that Act we shall see.

Meanwhile claims were made before the committee both by the Irish and also by the English colleges in France. Of these latter we have not yet spoken, but it now becomes necessary to refer to them. The commissioners (no one can be surprised to find) rejected both claims. An appeal was allowed by law to the Privy Council, where the claim of the English College came on first, and Lord Gifford (then Master of the Rolls) decided against it on the ground that they were "French corporations, because, although their members were British subjects, and their property derived from funds contributed by British subjects," yet "they were locally established in a foreign territory because they could not exist in England. Their end and object were not authorised by, and were directly opposed to, British law, and the funds dedicated to their maintenance were employed for that purpose because they could not be so employed in England."

When the case of the Irish Colleges came on, Sir John Leach, then Master of the Rolls, held himself bound by this judgment, and adds, "Lord Gifford gives two reasons for that decision—one that the establishments were opposed to the law of England. It is, however, questionable whether that reason ought to prevail in the case, there being, as is argued, a difference in material respects between the laws of England and the laws of Ireland, and to that reason therefore we have not applied ourselves. The other reason is that they were French establishments, founded under the authority and with the permission of the King of France, and that they could not therefore be considered within the meaning of the term British subjects. Now it appears by the papers before us, that the French Government had at all times exercised a control of these establishments. We find first the control of the Convention—we find next the control of the Consulate—we find next the control of the Empire—and lastly we find the control of the Monarchy after the restoration in the edicts of Louis XVIII. This case comes, therefore, plainly within the reasons given by Lord Gifford for the prior decision. These colleges were French establishments, and that fact is conclusive. We are therefore most clearly of opinion, that we are precluded by the Douay case from any farther consideration of the subject."

We have quoted this judgment at some length because we wished to point out that Lord Gifford decided the Douay College to be a French institution because from the nature of the case it could be only either English or French, and could not be English inasmuch as its object (*i. e.* Catholic education) was forbidden by the laws of England; therefore it must of

necessity be French. Sir John Leach virtually admits that (whatever may have been the case in England) the Irish law allowed the college in question to be an Irish institution. The argument, therefore, by which Lord Gifford proved that the Douay College was not English did not apply in this case. To say that the French Government exercised "control," is only to say that the college was, locally, in France; and we have already shown that the "control" it exercised was that of a foreign Government over an Irish institution, not that of a French Government over a French institution. It does not, therefore, seem that this case was really decided by the Douay case.

It should also be observed that both in England and in Ireland Parliament has, of late years, allowed charities to be placed under the protection of the Charity Commissioners which, when they were founded, were beyond all question contrary to law. Therefore the grounds on which Lord Gifford decided the Douay case do not apply at all to prevent Parliament in the present day from giving redress in opposition to his judgment.

To all this we can foresee only one plausible objection, viz., that the petition to Parliament comes too late; that the compensation money has long ago been applied and exhausted; and that it is therefore unreasonable to ask now for a share of it, however strong the claim may have been fifty years ago.

But the answer to this is complete. The fund is not exhausted. We have already seen that the claim of the Irish College was formally admitted by the mixed commission (English and French), and that it must therefore have been one of those which were intended by the French Government to be liquidated out of the money paid by it to the English Government for that express purpose, and with a provision embodied in a treaty that if the money paid should be found to be more than was required for the purpose the residue was to be repaid to the French Government. We have seen also that an Act of Parliament called by Lord Chancellor Truro "wicked, fraudulent, and unjust," but which we prefer to suppose was passed by the British Government and Parliament inadvertently, the treaty stipulation being overlooked, directed that the commissioners should put this residue, if any, at the disposal of the Treasury, specially exempting them from any liability. The question is, then, first,—Was there any surplus? And next,—What became of it? It appears from our author's statements that no less than £718,292. 13s. 2d. were misapplied in virtue of this Act. Some of the items are, "for the coronation of George IV., £130,000; for the improvement of Buckingham Palace, £250,000." This last sum is said to have been repaid "in various instalments;" but our author adds, that a sum of £34,822. 10s. remains yet to be accounted for since 1827. We think therefore that no man will have the face to say that the British Parliament can plead the exhaustion of the fund as an excuse for not satisfying any claim which has so much as the least show of reason.

We leave it to lawyers to decide whether in strict law the fact of Lord Gifford's judgment having been given, on whatever grounds, and the subsequent judgment of Sir J. Leach, might be held to bar the legal claim of the college. Let it be assumed, if so be that such is the case. The question now is whether the Parliament which authorized the expenditure on such objects as the coronation of George IV. of many thousand pounds of French money

paid by France expressly to meet claims, of which that of the Irish College had been admitted to be one, by a mixed commission representing both France and England, is not morally bound to do more than could be demanded in strict law (if such is really the case) to meet that claim. It seems to us that there never was a case in which the honour of England was more directly implicated.

There is also another view which ought to be taken. This present Parliament has voted half a million to the Protestant Episcopalians of Ireland as compensation for the endowments given to the Irish Establishment since 1660. Mr. Gladstone himself, in proposing this grant, pointed out that it could not be doubted that a large part of those endowments had been intended by their donors, not for the Protestant Episcopal communion, but for the established religion, and that therefore in giving it to the disestablished sect Parliament was going beyond the intention of the donors. Yet the grant was cheerfully made, and we believe never opposed or even complained of by so much as one Catholic. This was a grant then equally beyond the enactments of the law and the intention of the founders. Shall the same Parliament be less liberal towards the communion which provides for the spiritual wants of all the poor of Ireland, when it remembers that the money applied by it (for it was the act of a British Parliament) to defray the expense of the coronation of George IV. was given at a period much later than 1660, and confessedly intended by the donors to be spent in educating Catholic priests for the people of Ireland? If this is refused is it possible that the Irish people should fail to see in the other grant an act of favouritism towards the religion of the few compared with that of the Irish people, and can they attribute that favouritism to anything else than the fact those "few" are the "English Colony," and their religion that of the ruling class of the English people?

We will only add that we have given a mere outline of the arguments of the able pamphlet before us, and that space has obliged us to pass over many important parts of it.

Christianity as taught by S. Paul. Eight Bampton Lectures in the year 1870; to which is added an Appendix of the continuous Sense of S. Paul's Epistles, with Notes and Metalegomena. By W. J. IRONS, D.D. Oxford: Parker. 1870.

THE author's main principle in this volume is, that inasmuch as S. Paul's writings are letters, those who would understand them must put clearly before themselves the condition and state of mind both of the people to whom they were written and of the writer—a most just principle, and one which, always kept in view, would have preserved those who have read and quoted S. Paul's writings from numerous errors. For instance, nothing is more common than to hear Protestants urge, that if the Catholic system were true

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we should have more distinct and positive statements of it in the New Testament. When they explain themselves, they mean by the "New Testament" the writings of S. Paul. And indeed this is so far reasonable that by far the larger portion of that part of the New Testament which treats of the state of men under the new dispensation is by him. The argument is commonly and truly met, by replying that in truth there are many passages in which those Catholic doctrines which Protestants deny are stated, or at least taken for granted; the reason why honest Protestants do not see the real meaning and force of these passages being only, that they have been trained up from their earliest years to read them, and to associate with them a different meaning, so that now that other meaning seems to them the natural, obvious, *primâ facie*, sense of the words, whereas any unprejudiced man who read them only for the first time would say that the Catholic interpretation is the natural one. But true as this is, it is a very small part of the truth; for it is also true that the Protestant objection assumes, as its first principle, that the New Testament (and especially the writings of S. Paul) must be expected to furnish such a systematic statement of the Christian system as will teach it to a man who comes to them for the first time with no knowledge of it. Now no man could possibly think this, if he realized to himself the unquestionable fact, that they are letters, written to men whose daily life for years more or less before they were written, had been that of members of the Church, and occasioned by one or other circumstance humanly speaking accidental. No man, for instance, would expect, that if letters from Mr. Gladstone to the chief members of his Cabinet should ever be published, he would be found to have laid down the first principles of Parliamentary government, or of the routine of business in the Government offices, as they would be detailed by a man who was drawing up a paper constitution which had never yet practically worked, for the benefit of the men who were to work it. Yet men do expect to find a detailed system of the working of the Christian Church, in letters written by S. Paul to men who had long been living under it.

Our author recognizes this (p. 101) where he says, speaking of the Epistles to the Corinthian Church—

"It may appear perhaps to some, that the account of the Christianity taught by S. Paul at this time has still but little of completeness. It certainly has nothing so definitely written as many might wish, either as to the Godhead which he adored or the mysteries of grace in Christ Jesus. It does not minutely explain how the Apostolate, 'as in Christ's stead,' was to reconcile men to God. No precise theory of Atonement or of the intermediate state can be found, and no anxious inquiry which is the true Church. The remark, however, is obvious, as has been said, that his Epistles here as everywhere, assume that his own teaching had preceded his writing. We have the whole range of Christian theology implied, mixed up indeed with the incidental expostulations and memories of informal letters, but standing there as the subject matter always. It is not for us to give incongruous additions to these Epistles, to make verbal utterances in our opinion more harmonious with the present. All that we can say is, that these Epistles were not everything known at Corinth, or inherited by us now. The society founded by S. Paul was there, the Church which he had personally instructed between two and three years."

The result, as the author says, is that if we look at the Epistles of S. Paul in this light, we find them strictly practical, i. e. going directly to the wants of those to whom he was writing, both as to faith and morals, but—

“ On the other hand we must have noticed that some supposed doctrines popularly connected with the name of S. Paul have not been met with. Endeavouring to take the direct and coherent sense of our Apostle's teaching, omitting nothing pertaining at all to its drift or its completeness—desiring, that is, to lose nothing and to add nothing—we simply have not encountered the antithesis of faith and merit, nor the incongruous supposition of faith as a substitute for righteousness, nor the notion of grace as license, nor of election as a warrant of personal security for heaven, nor of foreknowledge or predestination as implying a settlement of moral details beforehand. These ideas, whatever their worth, do not occur; and we have perceived they could not in these writings, without breaking the connection, and indeed destroying the whole course of thought ” (p. 144).

This is most true. Modern notions, so far as they are founded on a misinterpretation of Scripture, and not (as is often the case with thinking men) merely human speculations, for which their authors after having thought them out, then go to Scripture to find authority, are often come at by taking texts by themselves, without thinking how they came in the mind and intention of the inspired writer. Thus the notion that all acts of “ an unconverted man ” are but sins, is founded on the text “ Whatever is not of faith is sin,” although any one who considers the context must see at once that S. Paul was not thinking of that notion one way or another, either to assert or deny it. This way of using Scripture, which is very common in England, is really quite as absurd as the argument against “ the plurality of worlds ” from the text “ Nonne decem facti sunt mundi, sed ubi sunt novem ? ”

Thus the fundamental principle of the book is true and important. It should be added that it is evidently the result of long and conscientious labour, and of a real love for the glorious Apostle. Indeed how could any man study him without that love kindling into a flame ? Bampton Lectures we suspect have very often been written by men who having selected their subject, have studied more or less diligently during the year between their appointment and the delivery of the lectures upon topics bearing on it. It is evident that Dr. Irons took this subject because he had long and carefully studied it. His Appendix, as he says, is that “ on which the whole must rest.” It consists of what he calls “ the continuous sense,” a sort of paraphrase of each of the Epistles and speeches of S. Paul, arranged in what he considers their chronological order. To each is affixed a short preface. He says himself of this part—

“ In concluding this continuous sense of S. Paul's Epistles, containing so much that will seem new, it is impossible to avoid the consciousness that it falls far short in exactness and life-likeness of what was desired, yet it is believed that for every vital part of it may be alleged some judgment or interpretation of approved teachers of the Church, and that in no place is any authoritative doctrine of the Church contravened. It would not be issued but with the conviction that, with whatever defects, it really represents to the English reader the unequivocal teaching of S. Paul throughout ” (p. 497).

The notes which follow show much care and diligence. He first gives authorities upon a subject terrible yet most important, and of which it is impossible to give an adequate idea,—the moral degradation of Rome and the Empire at the time when God became Man to redeem the world. Another is on “Some Special Words and Phrases of S. Paul”; another on the use of twelve Greek words of the same family, *δικαιον*, &c., in which every instance in which they occur in S. Paul’s writings is examined.

We have no doubt that the volume is calculated to be extensively useful. But, alas! Dr. Irons wants at least one main qualification, if not the first, for forming the judgment which, as he truly says, is necessary. He misconceives in very many important respects what the nature of that system was which the converts of S. Paul had received from him, and, misconceiving this, he naturally and unavoidably falls into mistakes as to the meaning of the Epistles. For instance, he actually supposes, that the sense of the words with which the seventh chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians opens is this—

“I come now to the subjects of which you have written to me. And first, your proposition that ‘It is good for a man not to touch a woman.’ It would be far safer to affirm the very opposite, namely, that every man had better have a wife of his own and every woman a husband. Such is my advice at least, for I am not commanding all to marry” (p. 340).

“What must be the force of the prejudice against asceticism, which could make a learned and thoughtful man so paraphrase S. Paul’s words! In another place he speaks of the falling away of Europe from the Faith.

“Civilization is now hesitating, or seemingly hesitating, between two ways. It seems resolved to part company with that which has for ages passed as Christianity, that which has been, alas! without power to quicken the nations. The question is not at present who is to blame for this paradox of our Christian civilization. If Europe should ultimately reject a form of godliness which, though useful in many things, has supplanted individual conscience by external authority, let us hereafter remember that the catastrophe followed, and did not precede, some demoralization of Christianity itself” (p. 90).

How false a notion must he who could write this nonsense have formed of the system established by S. Paul!

In other cases he seems to us misled by his own care in fixing the exact sense of the words used by S. Paul. When he has satisfied himself that a word meant, in S. Paul’s use, this or that, he does violence to some passage rather than admit that it is used in it in a different sense. Thus, for instance, he lays down that the *μυστήριον* means “the secret of God’s moral government of the world,” by which the family of Abraham was first made His instrument, as the “first fruit” of His creation, and the Gentiles afterwards brought in. “Hence the word is used by S. Paul to describe the bringing in of the Gentiles, the union of Christ and the Church, and the final glory of the kingdom of God.” This is well drawn out; but the author is so rigidly bound by it that he actually explains the “mystery of iniquity” (in 2 Thessalonians ii. 7) in the same sense. “The *ἀποστασία* is the falling away of Judaism—the *μυστήριον* is the fulness of the Gentiles—the *ἀνομία* is the destruction of the Mosaic Law—the *ἀνομος* its Pagan destroyer—the *ναός* that at Jerusalem—the *καρίχων* Divine Providence.”

In the same way he always interprets ἄγιοι to mean only the Jewish converts, and the κληροὶ those called out of the Gentiles. It is strange that he could have gone over the passages in which the words occur (which he has diligently collected in Note E) without seeing that in S. Paul's time Christians, whether Jews or Gentiles, were already recognized as the Saints. Thus he interprets the salutation in Romans i. 7, "Gentile and Jewish believers alike," the words being κληροῖς ἁγίοις. Surely the old interpretation "called to be saints" was the Apostle's meaning. In the same way he paraphrases "the Israel of God," in Galatians vi. 16, "especially my own countrymen." Surely the argument of the whole of this Epistle and of that to the Romans requires that it should mean "those who are in Christ."

We have a misgiving whether we are not unjust in mentioning so many points in which we protest against Dr. Irons's translation, when there are so very many more in which he brings out the sense well. But this is the necessary consequence of giving a new rendering of words which have become dear to the reader by years of admiring and affectionate familiarity. Where the new translation does not really add something material to the rendering it is intolerable. On the whole Dr. Irons has conferred a great benefit on his countrymen, and we should heartily wish to see the same work done with equal care by one who can cast on the inspired text the full light of Catholic truth.

The Annual Address of the Victoria Institute, or Philosophical Society of Great Britain, May 22nd, 1871. By Rev. W. J. IRONS, D.D. London: Robert Hardwicke.

A SOCIETY that proposes as its end and object to investigate the bearing of modern science on Religion and Revelation, and to base its philosophy on faith in God, is deserving, so far, of all respect and encouragement. On looking over the list of papers that have been printed in the "Transactions" of the Victoria Institute alone (which has already been in existence since 1866), we find that the subjects which they treat are decidedly those about which the world is talking most at the present day; that is to say the physical and scientific theories of development, of geology, of physiology, of astronomy, of philology, &c., in their relations to Sacred Scripture, to Revelation, to Miracles, to Creation, to Morality, &c. The names of the authors are not, as a rule, familiar to us. That may be our own fault. We recognize Professor Kirk, Dr. McCausland (who does not seem to belong to the Institute), Dr. Irons, and one or two others. Dr. Irons undertakes, in the address before us, to reply to Professor Huxley on Protoplasm, and to Mr. Darwin on Man. Perhaps the subject is too large for treatment in a platform discourse of thirty pages. The author could not help being meagre and scrappy; and, accordingly, the Address is rather a protest than a reply. Our first curiosity was to find out what Dr. Irons's own principles were. As well as we can make out, he confines himself to four; viz., the existence of a Creator, gradual creation (or formation), life, which he calls "the indwelling

Activity of some creatures, as an endowment distinct from the visible structure," and the original supremacy of man over creatures. These principles he considers to be laid down in the Bible, and to them the Victoria Institute holds itself pledged. It does not seem very clear whether Dr. Irons is of opinion that the instantaneous successive creation of varieties of creatures, or of life, is to be found in the Bible. He argues as if he maintained the fact to be so, but he hardly asserts that the Bible says it; or, at least, he allows great latitude in details (p. 15). Farther on he admits, with regard to man, that there may have been human beings before Adam was placed in Eden (p. 17). A few lines lower down, however, he seems to assert that such pre-Adamites were not really human, but only apparently so, because they had not Adam's divinely-breathed "life." We should like him to have stated what, in his opinion, the Bible reveals about Adam's "body." It seems to us that the formation of the body out of the slime is given quite as explicitly as the in-breathing of the soul. If you can let the one go without derogating from Holy Scripture, why is it "a principle" to retain the other? We suppose that Dr. Irons, who is a controversialist of much experience, will not be surprised if we point out that people who interpret the Bible out of their own heads cannot object if other people refuse to accept their "principles." It is impossible to face science and its attacks, if you have nothing but the text of the Bible to tell you what is vital and what is not. On the one hand you will find yourself clinging to unnecessary details or mistaken translations; on the other hand, you will be sure to surrender essential truths. If Dr. Irons gives up the miraculous formation of the bodies of Adam and of Eve, we do not see why he holds to the Garden of Eden. And the unsatisfactory nature of his theological or biblical stand-point is matched by the more pardonable haziness of his psychology. What on earth is that "Generic Life" which is shared, in certain ways, "by the highest moral agent as well as by the lowest organic growth"?—a vitality which "we inhale bodily," and which is also "in the field-flower on which we gaze"? If this "unseen generic reality" is anything more than the continuation of the creative act of God, it would have been better not to have talked about "inhaling it bodily." This kind of vague and high-sounding language will only mystify the orthodox, and certainly not confound Mr. Darwin. Dr. Irons does not see that any clear and sharp distinction can be drawn between instinct and reason. He seems to grant that animals have a kind of reason, distinct from that of man only in degree. In our opinion, if this be granted, the whole question falls to the ground. If the brute have the power of which we are conscious—the power of viewing one thing as an attribute of another, or, as it is generally called, of forming "the universal," then there seems no reason why the brute should not have a spiritual and immortal soul. The proper answer to Mr. Darwin on this point, it seems to us, is to prove from consciousness the existence of this higher faculty in man, and to deny that it can be proved in the brutes from any of their actions whatever. And how can Dr. Irons admit that some animals have a "rudimentary knowledge, that some things *ought not* to be, and that some things *ought*?" (p. 28). The word "rudimentary" contains the difficulty. If it means that an animal has any idea whatever of the formula of morality, or the affirmation of

moral relation between two terms, then animal only differs from man in degree ; for Aristotle's *Ethics*, or S. Thomas's *Secunda Secundæ* are only a series of combinations of this primitive element. If, on the other hand, it only means that the animal has a sense or feeling, a want or an appetite, consequent on certain external and internal conditions, it is quite a mistake to call such a state knowledge proper, or rudimentary morality. It is no more the rudiment of morality, than a man's hair is the rudiment of his hat.

We are sorry that we cannot praise more unreservedly Dr. Irons's well-meant defence of revelation. But no Protestant can defend revelation effectively, because he cannot be sure what is revelation. He may defend a point of natural reason, such as the existence of a Creator ; but if he undertakes the Bible, where must he stop and what may he give up ? And even if Dr. Irons were sure of his own ground, he would not be a very effective apologist, for his style is heavy, laboured, and sometimes obscure. This we partly attribute to the natural haziness of all Protestant theology, partly to the necessity in which he here finds himself of keeping within his limits as the deliverer of an "Annual Address." But both of these reasons will hardly suffice to excuse such a paragraph as this one which we quote ; it is a very ploughed-field of reading, and few will get through it without heart-breaking toil. He is proving Mr. Darwin's "Development-theory" a logical contradiction :—

"If the lower *generate* the higher, in what respect was it lower ? It [what ?] may have existed *among* the lower, but was potentially higher. And how its potentiality was acquired in the lower group of beings where it was found, would still lead to the unsolved question. It is, perhaps, always more conceivable that vitality from a higher rank may first cast its force beneath, and thence re-act in the upper direction. But where is the proof of either assumption ? Anyhow, a careful thinker will perceive that the passage of life upward would imply a new and special element of power in the individual of a seeming lower class that led the ascent, so that, logically, the theory of evolution from below answers itself, and rather establishes the truth it sought to deny. The utmost that any evolutionist could say would be, that in a lower groove of being some individual appeared who, from some cause unexplained, *was* potentially higher than the rest, and proved it by rising to the higher sphere—a fact which confirms rather than opposes the original distinction of the grooves, the species themselves" (p. 25).

Meditations on the Life of the Blessed Virgin for Every Day in the Month—suitable for all Seasons and especially for the Month of Mary. Preceded by a Letter from Mons. DUPANLOUP, Bishop of Orleans, with a Preface by his Grace the ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER. Richardson.

THIS strikes us as a specially interesting and valuable work of its kind. The life of our Blessed Lady is divided into one-and-thirty meditations ; and although in one sense specially suitable for the month of Mary, there is nothing to make it less so in any month of the year. We do not

understand why the title-page does not state what appears in many parts of the volume itself, that it is founded upon a French original. We say founded, because there are passages here and there, for instance pp. 119 to 125, which refer so directly to England and the history of the Church in England as to show that the book is not exactly a translation. It seems to us eminently simple, practical, and suggestive of good meditations. The Bishop of Orleans says in his letter to the French author,—

“Accept my most sincere thanks for the pleasure with which I have read your little book. To turn to pages pure and fresh as these, amid all the struggles and labours to which my life is devoted, is like resting the eyes, after a long night of weariness, upon an image from which Jesus and Mary smile down on us surrounded by fresh flowers.

“Your book is excellent in thought, in style, in composition, in tone. I must say that I sometimes distrust books written in honour of the Holy Mother of God. Some authors try to imagine in her what it has pleased God not to reveal to us ; others hide her beautiful form under ill-chosen ornaments. There are very few pens, as there are very few pencils, which are capable of depicting the lovely and majestic simplicity of the Mother of God and of Men.

“You, Madame, have succeeded in avoiding these snares. I would wish to see your book in every Christian family, in the hand of every mother and daughter, and above all, on the little shelf near the crucifix, on which lie the two or three old works which form the whole library of the poor villager's cottage. It is especially for dwellers in the country that you have intended your ‘Month of Mary.’

“In the home evenings, in schools, in churches, it may serve as reading, at once useful, safe, instructive, and touching. With my whole heart I ask of Him its success, and sincerely desire you to receive, Madame, the assurance of my profound respect.”

The preface of the Archbishop of Westminster is on the devotion to our Blessed Lady itself. He sums it up by saying,—

“My object in what I have said is to offer three things. First, that the Author and Founder of the devotion to the Mother of God is Jesus Himself. Secondly, that the chief promoters of it were the Apostles and disciples of our Lord. Thirdly, that in nothing do we go beyond them. They believe of her Divine Maternity and of her Immaculate Sanctity all that we believe now ; they loved her and venerated her with more sensible and filial affection than we do in these chill and twilight days. I may add yet further that no one can be a true disciple of Jesus unless he love and venerate the Mother of Jesus, if not in the same degree, which is impossible, at least with the same affection in kind, after His Divine example. The devotion we bear to the Blessed Mother is a sign of the true child of Jesus Christ. The absence of it is a sign fatal to those who have it not. To speak evil of the love and veneration which the Church bears to the Mother of God, must be a sign of a heart cold, dim, and dark. It may even be a sign of reprobation ; for it is certain that if we love God as we ought,—if we bear to our Divine Redeemer tender and grateful hearts,—if we realize the communion of Saints and the living and loving relations which bind them to us and us to them,—if we be conscious of their love to us and their prayers for us,—if we have childlike hearts, lowly, loving, and filial towards our Heavenly Father,—then it is certain that, next after Jesus, our veneration and our love will be given to her whom He loves with all the filial reverence, and all the tender love of His Sacred Heart.”

We have so often to complain of the insufferable language (we cannot call it English) into which books are rendered from foreign languages, and we must say (for obvious reasons) none so much as French books, and of French books none so much as books of devotion, that, it is an unwonted pleasure, as well as an act of mere justice, to add that this little volume is a striking contrast to the great mass of them. The English is excellent throughout; so much so, that if subjected to the most trying test which it is possible to apply—that of reading out loud—we doubt whether there is a single passage which would suggest to the hearers that they are not listening to an original English book. It is not possible to bestow higher praise on any translation.

Bells of the Sanctuary. Mary Benedicta. By GRACE RAMSAY, Author of "A Woman's Trials," "Iza's Story," &c. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

IT is difficult to describe this brief, touching history of an elect soul without applying to it words which the author would not like. She does not mean it for a poem or a drama, and she has no thought of herself in the writing of it, but is filled with the contemplation of the miracle of God's grace which she records, and the wonderful beauty of the soul in which it was wrought. And yet this little book is a poem and a drama,—the poem of a beautiful life and an early death, the drama which all great artists have striven to work out, of the tremendous problems of thought and struggles of the soul to free itself from the "fleshy life" which "wars against it," and mount towards the God who created, redeemed, and is sustaining it. It is an unspeakably solemn book, and wonderfully simple; a convincing, unanswerable narrative of how a human being was called out of the life of the world to the highest order of sanctification, to the renunciation of everything in which she had taken delight, and how "she arose and went quickly." It is a story not to be read without wonder, awe, prayer, and tears.

It is not a narrative of whose beauty we can give a notion in an extract, but this is a passage we must quote, because it has such direct meaning for many to whom the severe action on family relations of religious vocations are trials and temptations.

"The world went on; the wheel went round, pleasure and folly and sin kept up their whirl with unabating force; all things were the same as when Mary Benedicta, hearkening to the voice from Sion, turned her back upon the vain delusions, and gave up the gauds of Time for the imperishable treasures of Eternity. Nothing was changed. Was it indeed so? To our eyes it was. We could not see the changes that were coming of it, nor the work which her sacrifice was doing, nor measure the glory that it was bringing to God. . . . What do we discern of all the mysterious travail of humanity in God's creation? The darkness and the pain, little else. . . . We think the world is irretrievably darkened and saddened by the sin and the misery, forgetting the counterpart that we do not see: the sanctity of repentance and the loveliness of compassion. We see the bad publican flaunt-

ing his evil ways in the face of heaven, brawling in the streets and in the market-place. We do not see the good publican who goes up to the Temple, standing afar off, striking his breast, and sobbing out the prayer that justifies. We forget that fifty such make less noise climbing up to heaven, than one sinner tearing down to hell. So with pain. When sorrow overtakes a man, turning his heart bitter and his voice sour, we find it hard to believe that any good can come out of it, so much dark let in any light. . . . One more virgin heart is given up to the Crucified, one more victory is gained over the kingdom of this world, one more life is being lived away to God, in the silence of the Sanctuary, and who heeds it? Who sees the great things that come of it, the graces obtained, the blessings granted, the dangers averted, the temptations conquered, the miracles of mercy won for some life-long sinner, at whose deathbed, miles away, with perhaps the ocean between them, the midnight watcher before the Tabernacle has been wrestling in spirit with God? Only when the seven seals of the Book in which the secrets of many hearts are written, shall have been broken, will these things be made manifest, and the wonders of sacrifice revealed."

Tales of the Childhood and Youth of Celebrated Men. London :
Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS is a useful and interesting little volume, of a kind which is much needed in Catholic literature, and which, we remark with pleasure, is beginning to be supplied. Books for children, which shall not be heavy, too exclusively religious, to afford them natural amusement, and which shall yet put forth the Catholic verity as the basis of all that is meritorious in effort and glorious in success, the motive and the crown of every career worth record and remembrance, are now to be found in rapidly-increasing numbers—a fact which cannot be too heartily welcomed.

The subjects of these Tales are admirably chosen, for they are connected with the sciences, the arts, and the professions in which it is the fashion of the world to believe, or to assert, that there lies the contradiction and the refutation of the Church of God. Here, for instance, we find a simple, beautiful story of the early years of Gassendi, the "young astronomer" and fervent Catholic, to whom it was at one time in contemplation to have confided the education of Louis XIV. Again, we have a beautiful incident in the boyhood of Ribera, the painter, when he was tended, after he had nearly lost his life in saving a drowning boy, by the Emperor Charles V., then a monk, not yet out of his noviciate (at sixty) at St. Just. The wonderful little scholar Amyot, whose immense learning was one of the boasts of the age, and who became Grand Almoner of France in the reign of Henry III., figures as a wilful little "vagrant" in these pages; and Watteau, the painter, and pride of Valenciennes, slates the roofs of the humbler houses of his native place not too zealously. Peter Paul Rubens, noble, painter, and ambassador, is introduced as a beautiful page; and the story of his illustrious life, as great in all respects as in that of his art, is followed by the famous episode of the discovery by Velasquez and Rubens of the splendid genius of the slave Juan de

Paréga, and his immediate emancipation by Philip IV. The celebrated scholar and antiquarian Valentine Broal is given as an example of the vast results which may be achieved by a diligent and persevering application to study, combined with the force of a powerful and energetic will, and as a beautiful instance of one whose great prosperity never diminished his humble modesty, whose scientific attainments never obscured his fervent piety. Charming anecdotes of the youth of Canova, Guttemburg, and Turenne, complete this comprehensive and instructive volume, which is calculated to realize the intentions and wishes of the writer.

A Memoir of Jane Austen. By her Nephew, J. E. AUSTEN LEIGH. Second Edition. To which is added "Lady Susan," and Fragments of the other unfinished Tales by Miss Austen. London : Richard Bentley and Son.

MR. AUSTEN LEIGH'S admirable memoir of his aunt, Miss Austen, was received with the alacrity and approbation which it so well merited, and he has now offered the public a second edition, containing a good deal of additional matter, for which no doubt his readers will be very grateful. He has earnestly endeavoured to supply the lacunes in the brief, interesting, and worthy story of the life of the gifted author of five immortal novels, and this narrative is considerably fuller than the former one. The writer says, with his usual expressive simplicity, that it is difficult "to record little facts and feelings which have been merged half a century deep in oblivion." He has surmounted the difficulty with much skill and success. The fragments which are now permitted to see light are most interesting, and convince us that the last work in which Miss Austen was engaged, and which is slightly sketched for us by Mr. Austen Leigh, would have been equal to those which we possess. There is a Mr. Parker in this sketch, who promised to be as amusing as Mr. Woodhouse, with his absolute faith in his own doctrine and entire disbelief in every one else's. Mr. Parker was an amiable man, with more enthusiasm than judgment, whose somewhat shallow mind overflowed with the one idea of the prosperity of Sanditon, a village on the Sussex coast, just struggling into notoriety as a bathing-place under the patronage of the two principal proprietors of the parish, Lady Denham and Mr. Parker. He entertains a jealous contempt of the rival village of Brinshore, where a similar attempt was going on. To the regret of his much-enduring wife, he had left his family mansion, with all its ancestral comforts, gardens, shrubberies, and shelter, situated in a valley some miles inland, and had built a new residence—a Trafalgar House—on the bare brow of the hill overlooking Sanditon and the sea, exposed to every wind that blows ; but he will confess to no discomforts, nor suffer his family to feel any from the change. The following extract brings him before the reader, mounted on his hobby :—

"He wanted to secure the promise of a visit, and to get as many of the family as his own house would hold to follow him to Sanditon as soon as possible; and, healthy as all the Heywoods undeniably were, he foresaw that every one of them would be benefited by the sea. He held it indeed as certain that no person, however upheld for the present by fortuitous aids of exercise and spirit in a semblance of health, could be really in a state of permanent health, without spending at least six weeks by the sea every year. The sea-air and sea-bathing together were nearly infallible; one or other of them being a match for every disorder of the stomach, the lungs, or the blood. They were anti-spasmodic, anti-pulmonary, anti-bilious, and anti-rheumatic. Nobody could catch cold by the sea; nobody wanted appetite by the sea; nobody wanted spirits; nobody wanted strength. They were healing, softening, relaxing, fortifying, and bracing, seemingly just as was wanted, sometimes one, sometimes the other. If the sea-breeze failed, the sea-bath was the certain corrective; and when bathing disagreed, the sea-breeze was evidently designed by nature for the cure. His eloquence, however, could not prevail. Mr. and Mrs. Heywood never left home. . . . The maintenance, education, and fitting-out of fourteen children demanded a very quiet, settled, careful course of life, and obliged them to be stationary and healthy at Willingden. What prudence had at first enjoined, was now rendered pleasant by habit. They never left home, and they had a gratification in saying so."

Lady Denham is quite admirable. The description of her is full of Miss Austen's rare, subtle, delightful humour. It is plain that the world has lost, by the incompleteness of Lady Denham, a worthy *pendant* to Mrs. Norris. There is another indication of this sketch of a precious gem of humour and character drawing, never to be disclosed. Mr. Parker has two unmarried sisters who live together; Diana, the younger, always takes the lead, and the elder follows. It is their pleasure to fancy themselves invalids to a degree and in a manner never experienced by others; but, from a state of exquisite pain and utter prostration, Diana Parker can always rise to be officious the concerns of all her acquaintance, and to make incredible exertions where they are not wanted. While there is no resemblance between those sisters and any of Miss Austen's world-familiar types, there is the same delicious humour and *finesse* in her portraiture of them. The following letter from Diana Parker to her brother is not surpassed by anything in "Northanger Abbey" or "Emma":—

"MY DEAR TOM,—We were much grieved at your accident, and if you had not described yourself as having fallen into such very good hands, I should have been with you at all hazards the day after receipt of your letter, though it found me suffering under a more severe attack than usual of my old grievance, spasmodic bile, and hardly able to crawl from my bed to the sofa. But how were you tended? Send me particulars in your next. If indeed a simple sprain, as you denominate it, nothing would have been so judicious as friction—friction by the hand alone, supposing it could be applied *immediately*. Two years ago I happened to be calling on Mrs. Sheldon, when her coachman sprained his foot, as he was cleaning the carriage, and could hardly limp into the house; but by the immediate use of friction alone, steadily persevered in (I rubbed his ankle with my own hands for four hours without intermission), he was well in three days. . . . Pray, never run into peril again in looking for an apothecary on our account; for had you the most experienced man in his line settled at Sanditon, it would be no recom-

mentation to us. We have entirely done with the whole medical tribe. We have consulted physician after physician in vain, till we are quite convinced that they can do nothing for us, and that we must trust to our knowledge of our own wretched constitutions for any relief; but if you think it advisable for the interests of the *place* to get a medical man there, I will undertake the commission with pleasure, and I have no doubt of succeeding. I could soon put the necessary irons in the fire. As to getting to Sanditon myself, it is an impossibility: I grieve to say that I cannot attempt it; but my feelings tell me too plainly that in my present state the sea-air would probably be the death of me; and in truth I doubt whether Susan's nerves would be equal to the effort. She has been suffering much from headache, and six leeches a-day for ten days together, relieved her so little that we thought it right to change our measures; and being convinced on examination that much of the evil lay in her gums, I persuaded her to attack the disorder there. She has accordingly had three teeth drawn, and is decidedly better; but her nerves are a good deal deranged: she can only speak in a whisper, and fainted away this morning on poor Athur's trying to suppress a cough."

No one will be inclined to doubt that Miss Austen would have made the novel in which such amusing people were to have played their parts, thoroughly successful; every one will echo Mr. Austen Leigh's belief that "it is probable these personages might have grown into as mature an individuality of character, and have taken as permanent a place amongst our familiar acquaintance, as Mr. Bennet, or John Thorp, Mary Musgrove, or Aunt Norris herself." In this selection from among her numerous characters, her nephew discovers his own predilections, and on the whole, we agree with him. Mary Musgrove has not been sufficiently appreciated—for humour, and for truth she is the equal of Mrs. Jennings.

All the additional particulars which now find a place in the memoir are of a tranquil, homely kind of interest, strengthening the reader's sense of the simple and refined worth and beauty of Miss Austen's character.

"The Watsons" is the title given to a fragment without a name, the composition of which is fixed, by the watermark on the paper, at a date prior to her removal from Bath, in 1805. It is very clever and amusing, but Miss Austen seems to have abandoned the intention of finishing it. Mr. Austen Leigh gives a conjectural explanation of her having done so, which is very characteristic at once of her and of his own mind, as it comes out in his treatment of his subject.

"My own idea is," he says, "that the author became aware of the evil of having placed her heroine too low, in such a position of poverty and obscurity as, though not necessarily connected with vulgarity, has a sad tendency to degenerate into it; and therefore, like a singer who has begun on too low a note, she discontinued the strain. It was an error of which she was likely to become more sensible as she grew older and saw more of society; certainly she never repeated it by placing the heroine of any subsequent work under circumstances likely to be unfavourable to the refinement of a lady." Such a scruple is to be regretted. Miss Austen might not have been able to work in a wider groove than her habitual one, but then she might. Her family have always believed "Lady Susan," a short tale now published for the first time, to have been an early production. "It is

scarcely one on which a literary reputation could have been founded," says Mr. Austen Leigh; "but it may perhaps be supported by the strength of her more firmly-rooted works." It is an admirable tale, and the workmanship of it is perfect, of a very difficult kind—a story told by means of letters. It abounds in humour and *finesse*, in common sense and just perception, and, only that it would be presumption to offer an opinion where her family have pronounced theirs, we should rather conclude it to be the production of the writer's maturity. The character of Lady Susan Vernon is too deep, too subtle, and too well sustained, helped and indicated as it is by slight touches of rare power and effect, to have been drawn by a "prentice hand." In one respect it is far stronger and more dramatic than anything Miss Austen did besides. The daring effrontery, the consummate falsehood, and the unblushing hypocrisy of Lady Susan, her coquetry, her avarice, her cold-heartedness and her utter want of principle, all disguised by a fascination which the reader is made to understand perfectly, if not to share, make up a character which flies higher and farther in the direction of the "villain" of fiction than any other drawn by the author. All the contents of this book, while they render us grateful to Mr. Austen Leigh for the efforts he has made to satisfy our curiosity and interest, increase our admiration for the great, simple, refined novelist, and make us more deeply regret the early termination of her life and labours.

On some Disorders of the Nervous System in Childhood, being the Lumleian Lectures delivered at the Royal College of Physicians in London in March, 1871. By CHARLES WEST, M.D., Fellow and Senior Censor of the College, Physician to the Hospital for Sick Children. London: Longmans.

WE have read this book, not indeed without feeling that in many parts we were getting out of our depth, as unprofessional readers, but with great interest. Throughout, it bears the strongest testimony to the author's possession of the qualities most necessary to a physician; among which we class almost, if not quite first, an observant eye (and there is no faculty in which men naturally differ from each other more than that); a strong sense of the narrow limits which science has attained; and hence an unaffected modesty, a determination not to veil real ignorance beneath learned language, nor to think that we understand diseases and their causes because we classify them; and perhaps more than all, a strong principle of humanity. Continual familiarity with suffering in all its shapes cannot fail to blunt the sensitive part of our nature. Were it otherwise, who could pass through a world, in which a whole generation of men are at every successive period hastening through sorrow, pain, and tears, to death and judgment, with the degree of calmness and self-command which is an indispensable condition to the exercise of active benevolence; but that active benevolence

is a habit formed and matured by practice, and no man has more opportunities of forming it than a medical man.

The little volume before us will be useful to intelligent persons, not professional, who have the care of children. If it does nothing else, it will impress upon them the extreme delicacy of the beings with whom they sometimes deal very roughly, and it will enable them to a considerable degree to judge whether the symptoms of a child are such as to make it desirable to call in medical aid. The author treats of "Neuralgia and Epilepsy," "Chorea and Paralysis," and in the last lecture of "Disorder and loss of the power of speech;" and of "Mental and moral peculiarities and their disorders." This last lecture is to a non-professional reader by far the most interesting. The facts observed by our author are exceedingly curious, especially as to that strange phenomenon—the loss of the power of speech. He is not ashamed to confess, that in many instances at least, the causes of this are as utterly mysterious to medical men as to other people.

We are specially struck by the peculiar fitness the author exhibits for dealing with children, among whom, as he says, "his life has been spent." He gives in the last chapter some cautions as to the method of dealing with them, which are well worth the study and consideration of every mother and nurse, as well as of medical attendants; for instance, as to "the importance of not ministering to the tendency to exaggerated self-consciousness by talking of children's ailments in their hearing, or by seeming to notice the complaints they make, as though they were something unusual, and out of the common way." This tendency he attributes to "the intense craving for sympathy so characteristic of the child;" and things which superficial observers would attribute to motives more natural in grown-up people, he, with real discernment, refers to this cause—

"It is this which often underlies the disposition to exaggerate its ailments, or even to feign such as do not exist; and in such attempts at deception it often persists with almost incredible resolution. Over and over again have I met with instances, both in private and in hospital practice, where the motives to self-deception were neither the increase of comfort nor the gratification of mere indolence, but the monopoly of love and sympathy which during some bygone illness had been extended to it, and which it could not bear to share again with its brothers and sisters. The feeling, too, sometimes becomes quite uncontrollable, and the child then needs as much care and judicious management, both bodily and mental, to bring it back to health, as would be called for in the case of some adult hypochondriac or monomaniac" (p. 129).

It is impossible to read without deep sadness the following words, to the absolute truth of which we can ourselves speak from experience.

"One word, and but one, I would add here, and I trust I may do so without incurring the suspicion of want of respect for religion, or of want of faith in its doctrines. Some of the most painful death-beds which I have ever witnessed have been those of children whose over-anxious friends have striven to force upon their minds the deepest verities of our faith in that definite form in which they are embodied in catechisms and formularies. It is easier to frighten than to console—the dark grave is realized, or at least imagined, more vividly than its Conqueror, and the little child driven to look within for the

evil which it does not know and cannot find, but vaguely dreads, and would be sorry for if it knew it, has moved me to compassion only less than that I felt for its broken-hearted torturers, who have failed to learn that the little children—of whom our Saviour said that of such were His kingdom—were not called on to recite any creed, to profess any faith, but, just as they were in their helpless ignorance, were deemed fit to be folded in His embrace, and to be held up as our example" (p. 119).

The author speaks as a man naturally may who, being religious, kind-hearted, and sensible, and having experienced the realities of death-beds, cannot help seeing that the religious teaching of Protestantism makes sad the hearts which God has bidden above all things to rejoice; and yet who, not knowing the reason, imagines that it must be because little children are taught more religion than is fit for them. If only he were accustomed to Catholic children, he would know by experience that the Calvinistic system of which he speaks, saddens those little ones whom God would have rejoice, not because it is intended for others but not for them, but because it is in itself the worst and most deadly kind of falsehood, the corruption and perversion of truth. Children are sad because they are taught that they need a new birth; that unless they have experienced it they cannot enter into the kingdom of God. The practical working of this is, that the child is taught to try to obtain what has already been freely given to it in its baptism (if, indeed, the poor little one ever was baptized), and which, except it had been freely given, it could never have attained. It is anxiously looking into itself for the signs of a new birth. It believes that if it has experienced it, there must have been some time before which it was a child of wrath, and after which it became a child of God. The mischief done by this false teaching is unspeakable. Many, very many, are the children to whom God has given a vivid faith in the unseen world, and a tender conscience, whose lives are made miserable by their having been taught these doctrines of men, and who would enjoy heaven upon earth, if they had been taught the Catholic truth, that they are the objects of the tenderest love of their Heavenly Father, members of the very Body of His Beloved Son; that the great change needful for them has been wrought for them, and in them, by His Almighty power; that they are now "fellow-citizens with the Saints and of the household of God"; and that if it pleases Him to call them hence, it is to take them into His own immediate presence in His kingdom.

And yet there are those to whom this detestable doctrine is far more injurious; those in whom it takes the form, not of fear and despondency, but of presumption, who are confident that they are regenerate, and those around them unregenerate, and under God's wrath. In a word, children suffer by it in the same manner as adults. It is, in its own nature, poison, although the poison acts in one way upon one, in another way upon another.

We can assure our author that if only he knew the best-instructed Catholic children, he would wholly lose the idea that the evil he sees and most truly describes, is caused by too much religious teaching. Nothing can be more bright and sunny than the religion of a thoroughly-instructed Catholic child.

WE are unable to notice in detail in our present number the exquisitely executed translation by F. Meyrick, S.J., of F. Genelli's most vivid and careful biography of S. Ignatius Loyola, lately published by Messrs. Burns, Oates, and Co. ; and we are obliged also to defer a notice of Dr. Melia's very interesting and affecting memoir of F. Pallotti. We must not omit to acknowledge, among several Catholic works of much interest lately issued, the publication by Mr. Washbourne of a second edition, with a new and very touching preface, of Mr. Allies's "S. Peter, his Name and his Office."

F. FRANZELIN ON THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF INFALLIBILITY.

(See notice in a previous page of *F. Franzelin's treatise on Tradition and Scripture.*)

WHAT has been so far discussed concerning the magisterial and ministerial means for preserving Tradition, seems to demand a more distinct statement of principles at least, concerning the Subject and Object of the power of infallibly teaching and judging. The full exposition and demonstration, however, of this most important point belongs to its own proper Treatise on the Church and the Roman Pontiff.

PRINCIPLE I.—Indefectibility in the truth of that Faith which is *one in Catholicity*, or *infallibility in believing* has been, by God, promised to and conferred upon the *Universal Church*, which is “the house of God, the pillar and ground of the truth” (1 Tim. iii. 15), “built upon a rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it” (Matt. xvi. 18). Whatever, therefore, the universal Church believes as of faith, that by Christ's promise and ordaining is evidently infallibly true. Of this *infallibility in believing*, which is commonly called *passive*, the Subject is the universal Church herself.

The Church is kept in the unfailling truth of one Faith by the Holy Ghost by means of an *authentic ministerial and magisterial power*, through the *Pastors and Doctors* whom Christ has given for the building up of the body of Christ (Eph. iv. 11, 12), to teach the Church of God with authority; to which was to be due from all the faithful, as corresponding effect, consent and “obedience of faith.” Wherefore to this magisterium instituted, by Himself, Christ promised and upon it He conferred *infallibility in teaching* all that He himself and the Holy Ghost had taught.*

The Subject then of this *infallibility in teaching* are all and only those, to whom has been entrusted by God the right and office of teaching with authority the Church Universal.

(α) Thus the *Teaching Church*,—that is the body of *Pastors and Doctors* in union, agreement, and subordination towards the visible head of the Church,—is infallible: and that (α) in her universal and consentient preaching of doctrine on faith or morals; (β) in her solemn judgments or definitions of the same doctrine. For to the Teaching Church so constituted has been said: “All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth: go ye therefore and teach all nations; baptizing them . . . teaching them to keep all things whatsoever I have

* Because the magisterium, furnished with this charisma of infallibility, by its ministerial action guards, proposes, developes, and protects revealed doctrine, and keeps all the faithful in unity of faith: hence *infallibility in teaching* is commonly called *active*, and has for its end indefectibility in believing, which through the “obedience of faith” is the *passive infallibility* of the whole body of the Church.

commanded you : *and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world*" (Matt. xxviii. 18, seq.). "And I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, *to abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth*. . . . He will teach you all things, and will suggest to you all things whatsoever I have told you (*ἀ ἐπὶ τὸν ὅμιλον*)" (John xiv. 16, 26).

These promises do not appertain to the individual successors of the Apostles, because individually they do not succeed the Apostles in the office of teaching with authority the whole Church ; an office which in the Apostles (excepting only Peter, head of the Church, who was always to continue in his successors) was not ordinary, but extraordinary and personal to themselves : but the promises were made to the body of the Apostolic succession in common, in so far as they are the Teaching Church. But they are not the Teaching Church, except in so far as they remain united, consentient, and subordinated towards the visible head of the whole Church.

Wherefore the *efficient cause* of the infallibility of the teaching Church, whether in its universal preaching or in its solemn definitions and judgments, is without doubt the promised assistance of the Spirit of truth ; but the *condition without which* the successors of the Apostles are *not* the Teaching Church, and the *formal cause* by which they are constituted as the Teaching Church to which has been promised Christ's guardianship and the assistance of the Spirit of truth in teaching, is the visible head of the Church set up by Christ, and the union and agreement of the members with that head ; just as the form of the unity of the visible Church in general is the Church's visible head itself. Hence it is that the ordinary office of infallibly teaching,—that is, the office instituted in the case of the Apostles to be passed on to their Successors,—was explained by Christ our Lord in words which were addressed, never to the individuals, but always to the entire College in union with Peter.

(b.) For the opposite reason, the words of Christ by which the primacy and infallibility of magisterium included in the primacy is promised and granted to Peter, designate him alone not only as expressly distinct from the rest, but also in relation to the rest as who should confirm and shepherd them. "Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona and I say to thee, thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. xvi.). "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not, and do thou turn and (*πιστεψας*) confirm thy brethren" (Luke xxii.). "Jesus says to Simon Peter : Simon, son of John, lovest thou me more than these ? He says to him : Feed my lambs feed my sheep" (John xxi.).*

Thus Peter, as ordinary endowment for himself and for each of his Successors, received from Christ the power and office of feeding and teaching the Universal Church in faith and morals, in such sort that this very power, conferred in the person of Peter upon each of his Successors, demands by divine institution the obedience of faith and consent of the whole Church ;

* In the published Greek the reading is Σίμων Ἰωάννης ; in other unpublished Codices, Ἰωάννου, or Ἰωαννου, or Ἰωαννά, or Σίμων only.

and that hence *the infallibility of the whole Church in believing cannot stand*, except in so far as upon the head of the Church, successor of Peter, together with such right of exacting consent of faith, there has been simultaneously conferred *infallibility in teaching*; when (that is) he proposes a doctrine on faith or morals, with such a definitive sentence as binds the whole Church to consent. The Subject then of infallibility is Peter's Successor himself; through the divine assistance which has been promised to him *per se*, as teacher of the Church, and not on condition of the concurrent judgment or consent of the other pastors and doctors who, *compared with the Pontiff so teaching the Church*, are the most noble part of the Church so built upon this rock that the gates of hell may not prevail against it, are brethren to be confirmed, sheep to be shepherded; although, compared with the faithful they continue pastors and doctors, to propose to the faithful, to teach and to defend with authority the defined doctrine itself.

"It is a revealed dogma of faith that the Roman Pontiff when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in discharge of his office as Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, he defines, in virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, is endowed, by the divine assistance promised him in Blessed Peter, with that infallibility with which our Divine Redeemer willed that the Church should be furnished in defining doctrine of faith or morals; and, therefore, that such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves and not in virtue of the consent of the Church" ("Definition of Vatican Council," Constit. I., de Eccl. Christi, cap. 4).

Corollary A.—There is not a twofold *adequately distinct* Subject of the infallibility promised by Christ to definitions of doctrine on faith or morals; but [the Subject of infallibility] is both the visible head of the Church regarded *per se*; and the same visible head taken as ordering and informing the body of the teaching Church, which, thus constituted, is itself infallible by the assistance of the Spirit of truth. This *inadequate distinction* in the Subject of infallibility is pointed out in the Vatican definition itself just before cited.

Corollary B.—Whatever is to be believed with Catholic faith or is to be held with theological certainty, on *the objective extent* of infallibility [de extensione quoad objectum] vested in the Church defining or in a general Council, the same, in the same way, is to be believed and held on the infallibility vested in the Roman Pontiff speaking *ex cathedra*. This is the *very* point defined by the Vatican Council.

Corollary C.—The antecedent consent of the Church may indeed be the objective means by which the Pontiff arrives at the knowledge of the definability of a doctrine: but it is not of itself and from the nature of the case the sole and necessary means of knowing; for doctrines on faith or morals may be recognized as definable from other sources and by other means as well, and questions hitherto doubtful and controverted even within the borders of the Church may be defined. And by no means is such consent of the Church or Bishops, whether antecedent, concomitant, or subsequent, necessary by way of authentic judgment concurring with the judgment or definition of the Pontiff. The Gallican opinion requiring this consent of the

Church as necessary to the infallibility of the Pontiff's definitions,—in such sort that the sole Subject of infallibility should be the body of the teaching Church, namely the Pope with the bishops,—is now a heresy directly and explicitly condemned by the Vatican Council. The subsequent consent of the whole Church, however, is always the *effect* of the Pontiff's definition.

Corollary D.—According to the declaration of the Vatican Council itself, the Pontiff is said to speak *ex cathedrâ* “when in discharge of his office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians he defines, in virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church.” For the *Apostolic Chair* is nothing else than the supreme authentic magisterium, whose definitive doctrinal sentence binds the universal Church to consent. This intention of *defining* doctrine, or of teaching with definitive sentence and with authority obliging consent of the universal Church, should be made plain and cognizable by clear signs. No settled form however, to be necessarily used by the Pontiff in making known this his will, is essential. For although there be certain solemn forms which of themselves express a speaking *ex cathedrâ*, and which accordingly the Pontiff uses only when speaking *ex cathedrâ*,—such as, for example, dogmatic Bulls,—yet this form is not so essential and exclusive, that without it the Pontiff cannot, as Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, define doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the whole Church, condemn in the same way errors opposed to it, and make plain his will to that effect.

Corollary E.—In the documents themselves of Councils and Pontiffs in which it is without doubt proposed to publish *definitions* of doctrine, there may be, and usually are, contained many things which it is not intended to define: *obiter dicta* which are usually enunciated indirectly; mostly, also, the arguments brought to prove the definitive sentence itself, &c. Although these things are of weighty authority, yet they are not infallible definitions.

So also there may be and there are public Pontifical documents, in which certain matters connected with faith or morals are the subject of warning, recommendation, or blame, or whose purpose is to forbid the spread of any opinion or error, but whose scope is not to proclaim a definitive sentence binding the whole Church, and which, for that reason, are not pronouncements *ex cathedrâ*. “For the Pontiffs often reply to the private questions of this or that bishop, by explaining their own opinion on the matters set forth, not by passing a sentence by which they will the faithful to be bound in believing” (Melch. Canus, l. vi., c. 8, ad. 7). To this category are justly referred, for instance, the two letters of Honorius I. to Sergius of Constantinople.* That doubt may arise as to whether certain Pontifical documents contain a pronouncement *ex cathedrâ* and *definition* of doctrine, we do not deny: but the same thing occurs sometimes in respect of Conciliar documents also; a fact of which we have an example in the diverse opinions which have existed and still exist in some quarters on the Instructions for the Armenians published in the Council of Florence, on the point whether the teaching therein contained, especially on the matter and form of the Sacraments, is to be con-

* In the Tract. de Incarnat. we have spoken of the (by no means heretical) sense of these letters.

sidered dogmatic or merely as practical instruction. Whenever such doubts occur, theologians properly warn us "that in discriminating these matters the judgment of wise men, and (more especially) the sense and consent of the Church, is of much force" (Tanner de Fide, q. 4, dub. 6, n. 262).

This will be sufficient for our scope on the *Subject of infallibility*. Our present treatise is more particularly concerned with the doctrine on the *Object of infallibility*.

PRINCIPLE II.—The Deposit of the Christian Faith, strictly understood, embraces all and only those things, which have been *explicitly* or *implicitly* revealed to the human race by God to be believed, done, or followed ; in other words, which have been made known by *Catholic* revelation (as distinct from *private* divine revelations) for the eternal salvation of mankind.

Corollary A.—In the Deposit of the Faith are contained theoretical doctrines (and among these also truths which, in so far as they are cognizable by reason, are commonly said to appertain to natural religion)—practical laws (and among these also the natural law written in the hearts of men as reasonable beings), as also certain perpetual and fundamental institutions, such as the Church, its power, its form of government, &c. In other words, these are contained in the Deposit, revealed and supernatural *dogmatics, ethics, politics* (πολιτικά).

Corollary B.—Only truths revealed by God, when duly proposed may and ought to be *believed with divine faith* ; because faith is assent on account of the authority of God revealing.

Corollary C.—In the Deposit of Faith may be objectively contained truths, not yet duly proposed, so that all should be bound to believe them as revealed with divine faith.

PRINCIPLE III.—With truths revealed and duly proposed are connected and related many things, without which those revealed truths themselves either could not, or could not so well, in all their fulness, be guarded, developed, and defended ; although these [connected truths] are either not themselves revealed, or are not yet duly proposed to be believed with divine faith.

Such are many theoretical and practical truths in that triple order, dogmatic, moral, and (so to speak) constitutive, which we have pointed out ; as truths theologically certain, e.g., on the procession of the Holy Ghost *by way of love* in connexion with the mystery of the Blessed Trinity ; on the sanctification of the humanity of Christ *by the created gifts also*, on its [enjoyment of] the Beatific Vision from the first moment of its existence, in connexion with the mystery of the Incarnation, &c. : then again certain circumstances bound up with revealed truths, when these are to be practically applied, e.g., if there is question of the genuine sense of texts in such and such books, in so far as they are agreeable or opposed to the Deposit of Faith ; facts again of themselves historical, e.g., the legitimate celebration of a particular Council, &c. ; furthermore, certain special dispositions of divine providence pertaining to the better estate and government of the universal Church, e.g., if there is question of the opportuneness or moral necessity of political independence and temporal dominion in the case of the Supreme Pontiff, in order to the [good] government of the Church, &c.

Corollary A.—The Deposit of Faith is violated ; not only by direct denial of revealed truths and by heresy, but may also be attacked, and in the mind of the faithful exposed to dangers, by errors contrary to truths, not in themselves revealed, yet connected with revealed truths, and consequently theological or religious.

Corollary B.—Although the Deposit of Faith strictly understood comprises revealed truth only, nevertheless the deposit *to be guarded* in its entirety, with all its outworks and modes of application, is of wider extent : “O Timothy, keep the Deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words” (1 Tim. vi. 20).

PRINCIPLE IV.—The authority (infallible under the promised assistance of the Holy Ghost) of that authority to which Christ has entrusted the office of infallibly keeping the Deposit, and of guarding it against threatening errors, appertains in the first place to guarding, setting forth, and developing the truths which, in the strict sense, make up the Deposit itself of the Faith ; that is to say, revealed truths : and by consequence, to warding off errors directly opposed to them,—in other words, to condemning heresies. This is the fundamental revealed dogma of the Catholic faith ; and hence its denial is not a heresy only, but the very root of all heresies.

Herein it is contained and hence it immediately follows, that the infallibility promised for guardianship of the Deposit reaches to the whole extent of the Deposit to be guarded ; that is, to truths even in themselves not revealed, in so far as they are in contact with revealed truths, and are needed to the custody, proposition, development, and defence of the latter. This extension of infallibility, by consent of all theologians, is a truth so certain in theology that its denial would be most grave error, or even, according to many, heresy : although up to the present time it has not been explicitly condemned as heresy. (Vide Card. de Lugo de Fide, disp. xx., n. 106, 114 ; Bañez, 2, 2, q. 11, a. 2, concl. 2 ; Suarez de Fide, disp. v., sect. 6, n. 4, 5, 8 ; sect. 8, n. 4.)

Corollary A.—Not only revealed truths, but also truths connected with revealed, in so far as the connexion extends, may be infallibly defined by the infallible magisterium ; and similarly, not only heresies may be condemned, but minor censures may be pronounced with infallible authority under the assistance of the Holy Ghost. Because therefore a doctrine is not defined as in itself revealed ; or because errors are not one by one condemned with the *note of heresy*, but are proscribed with no particular censure or with minor censures, or with several censures *in globo* ; for these causes, taken by themselves, it cannot be affirmed without grave error that a definition is not infallible, or is not a *pronouncement ex cathedra*.

Corollary B.—No Catholic may deny that [the quality of] infallible definitions [belongs to] the dogmatic Constitutions of the Council of Constance against the articles of Wycliffe and John Hus, confirmed by Martin V. ; of Leo X. against Luther (“*Exsurge*”) ; of Clement XI. against the Jansenists (“*Unigenitus*”), &c., in which propositions are condemned under different censures *in globo* ; as also the Constitution of Pius VI. against (the synod of) Pistoja (“*Auctorem Fidei*”), in which a very large number of propositions are severally proscribed under minor censures. And this Corollary, which is

certain on other grounds also, in turn demonstrates the truth of the Principle laid down, because without it the present Corollary itself could not stand.

Corollary c.—A quality which is *defined* to belong to a proposition, infallibly belongs to it in the sense and way intended in the definition. Hence those who are of opinion, for instance, that a proposition is said to be *temerarious* which is asserted against strong reasons and weighty authority without due foundation, also affirm that it is this quality, and not *per se* the falsehood of the proposition, which is defined in the censure of *temerity*. This same thing, —viz. that the definition does not touch the *falsehood* of the proposition, but some other quality worthy of condemnation,—they more especially affirm in the case of censures, by which propositions are branded as *scandalous, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears*. (Vide Card. de Lugo de Fide, disp. xx., n. 114 ; Canum, l. xii., c. 11, ad finem.) And at all events, when the Council of Vienne considered that an opinion (that about the infusion of grace and the virtues in the case of infants) was to be chosen as the *more probable*, this *per se* is not a definition of the truth (of the opinion), but only of its greater probability. (Cf. de Lugo, l. c. n. 115-129.)

Corollary d.—The Infallibility of the Church and of the Roman Pontiff is believed with divine faith, on the authority of God revealing ; an opinion proposed by the infallible definition of the Church or the Pontiff as true but not as revealed, is believed on the revealed authority of the proponent. Whence we may call *mediately divine* that faith, which some call *ecclesiastical*.

PRINCIPLE V.—If the Church is infallible in guarding the Deposit of Faith at least in the strict sense, and therefore in declaring the true sense of revealed dogmas,—she is, by this very fact, infallible in judging of the true sense, the import and extent (*intensione et extensione*), of her own authority and infallibility ; or, which comes to the same thing, in judging of the conditions and objects on which authority belongs to her by divine right and on which the assistance of the Spirit of truth has been promised her. For this authority and infallibility is undoubtedly a revealed dogma.

Corollary.—It involves a contradiction, to admit the infallibility of the Church in revealed dogmas, and at the same time to deny the authority of a definition admitted actually to exist, on the ground that the point defined is not a dogma of the Faith.*

PRINCIPLE VI.—As it is certain from the principles of revelation itself, as they are understood and proclaimed by the Church, that truth appertains to

* In order that I may not seem, in a plain matter, to be fighting against shadows, here is a proof of this contradiction, openly published in our own day by schismatical priests (*presbyteris sectariis*). "The conditions therefore required for the judgment of the Pope to be certainly infallible are two : 1st, that the judgment turns upon matter revealed ; 2nd, that it be accompanied by the consent of the Episcopate. Failing this second condition, it is not certain that the judgment is infallible ; failing the first, it is certain that it is not infallible. . . . However unanimous (which they are not) the Pope and the bishops might be in deciding that the Church has need at this time of the temporal power of the Pope, and in declaring excommunicate all who think otherwise, *this decision, as coming not from the teachers of the Church and the custodians of revealed truth but from private doctors, would have no authority to bind consciences.*"—Mediatore, August 9, 1862.

her infallible magisterium, and errors are subject to her infallible judgment, for no other end than the custody of the Deposit of the Christian religion, and its protection and advancement among the faithful ;—so is it equally certain, that in most sciences, as they are, and ought to be, cultivated by mankind on principles purely natural and from sources non-revealed, in philosophy especially, theoretical and practical, in history, geology, ethnography, &c. there are found truths, which are likewise revealed or are connected with revealed truths. The reason is, because revelation contains not only super-rational truths, but many cognizable by reason also and from natural sources ; in other words, because revelation and natural sciences have in many points a common object-matter. Equally is it evident, that in these sciences, not indeed by right use of reason, but by its abuse and through ignorance, hypotheses may be laid down as principles, and conclusions may be deduced, opposed, directly or indirectly, to truths of revelation, rational or super-rational ; and consequently (since truth cannot contradict truth) containing errors cognizable and capable of condemnation on revealed principles.*

The Church's magisterium therefore teaches truths of this sort, and may infallibly judge of errors of this sort, not by teaching human sciences on their principles, but by judging of them on hers.† Wherefore the infallible Church never judges, and in virtue of her promised infallibility the Holy Ghost can never even permit her to pass a *definitive* judgment, on truths or errors, except in order to the custody of the Deposit and in virtue of her divinely-imposed office of guarding the Deposit.

Corollary A.—Although philosophy and the other natural sciences rest on their own proper principles, which are known or so far as they are known, not from revelation and the authentic magisterium of the Church, but by reason and from natural sources ;—nevertheless the magisterium of the Church can, and indeed ought, from revealed principles, point out for avoidance errors opposed to the integrity and safety of the Deposit to be guarded. Catholic scientific men, therefore, should keep this standard before their eyes. Reason prescribes this course, lest they fall into error ; faith prescribes it, lest they fall into error contrary to the truths thereof.

Corollary B.—Those who profess themselves Catholics and consequently acknowledge the authentic magisterium of the Church, and yet affirm that philosophy, in the mode explained, is not subject to this norm, that the progress of science is impeded by the same, that the Church should let philo-

* "As theology (*sacra doctrina*) is founded on the light of faith, so is philosophy on the natural light of reason. Whence it is impossible that the truths of philosophy should be contrary to the truths of faith. . . . And whatever in the sayings of philosophers is found contrary to the Faith, that does not belong to philosophy, but is rather an abuse of philosophy arising from defect of reason."—S. Thom. in Boëth. Trin. Proleg., q. 2, a. 3.

† "The proper knowledge of this science (theology) is that which comes from revelation, and not that which comes from natural (objective) reason. And hence it does not appertain to it to prove the principles of the other sciences, but only to judge of them. For whatever in other sciences is found to contradict truths of this science, is wholly condemned as false."—S. Thom., i. q. 1, a. 6, ad 2.

sophy correct her own mistakes (Syllab. Pontif., propp. x., xi., xii., xiv.),—such men demand liberty to embrace error by an abuse of philosophy, and deny the Church's right and duty of providing for the integrity and soundness of the doctrine of faith.—Vide Con. Vatic. Constit. de Fide, cap. 4, can. 2.

PRINCIPLE VII.—The Holy Apostolic See, which has had committed to it the custody of the Deposit, the power of shepherding the universal Church for the salvation of souls, may prescribe theological opinions or opinions bearing on theology as to be followed, or proscribe them as to be avoided, not solely with the intention of infallibly deciding the truth by definitive sentence, but also *without* such intention; from the need and with the intention of looking to the *security*, absolute or relative, of Catholic doctrine. In such declarations, although there is no *infallible truth* of the doctrine, because by the supposition there is no intention of deciding such truth; yet there is *infallibly security*.* security, I mean, both objective of the doctrine declared (absolute or relative), and subjective in so far as it is safe for all to embrace it, and unsafe and incompatible with the submission due to the divinely-constituted magisterium to reject it.

Corollary A.—The authority of the magisterium instituted by Christ in the Church is to be regarded, in the present matter, from a twofold point of view:—*α*, as in individual acts it is aided by the Holy Ghost to define the truth infallibly,—in other words, as it is the *infallible authority*; *β*, as the same magisterium acts; with the pastoral authority indeed divinely entrusted to it, but not with all its intensity (if we may say so), nor as defining the truth in the last resort, but so far as shall have seemed needful or opportune and sufficient for security of doctrine; and the magisterium in this point of view we may perhaps call the authority of *universal ecclesiastical provision*.

Corollary B.—The authority of *infallibility* cannot be communicated by the Pontiff to others, as his ministers acting in his name. If at any time, therefore, an infallible definition is published by any sacred Congregation at Rome, the Congregation itself merely performs the function of consultor and ministerial promulgator, while the Pontiff alone defines. Here then must be found those tokens which, we have said above, make clear the Pope's intention.

The authority of *universal ecclesiastical provision*, as we have termed it, not indeed independently but in dependence upon the Pontiff, is communicable, and is by the Pope himself communicated with greater or lesser extension, to certain sacred Congregations of Cardinals.

Corollary C.—It is a mistake (to suppose) that the only authority to which intellectual assent is due, is that of divine revelation or of an infallible definition of the Church or the Pope. There are manifold degrees of religious assent. For our present purpose [it is sufficient to] distinguish *assent of faith properly and immediately divine*, on the authority of God revealing; *assent of faith* which we called above *mediately divine* on the authority of him who

* That these two things, infallible truth and infallible security, do not coincide, is clear even from the fact that otherwise no probable or more probable doctrine could be called sound and secure.

infallibly defines a doctrine as true, but not as revealed ; *religious* assent, on the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision in the sense explained.

This very doctrine has been clearly set forth by the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX., in his letter of December 21st, 1863, to the Archbishop of Munich, beginning, "*Tuas libenter accepimus.*" "We wish to believe that [those who attended the literary Congress at Munich] were not desirous of restricting the undoubted obligation of Catholic teachers and writers to those points only which are proposed by the infallible judgment of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all. . . . For, even though the question concerned that submission which is to be yielded in an act of divine faith, yet that would not have to be confined to points defined by express decrees of Ecumenical Councils or of Roman Pontiffs and this Apostolic See, but to be extended to those things also which are handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world, and are accordingly held to appertain to the faith by the universal and consistent consent of Catholic theologians. *But since the question concerns that submission by which all Catholics are bound in conscience who apply themselves to the speculative sciences with a view to conferring new benefits on the Church by their writings, hence the members of the same Congress should recognize that it is not enough for learned Catholics to receive and revere the aforesaid dogmas, but that they must also submit themselves to the doctrinal decisions put forth by Pontifical Congregations, and to those heads of doctrine held by common and consistent consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions opposed to those heads of doctrines, though they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure.*"

Further, although the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision (as we have called it, resides primarily and directly in no individual except the pastor of the whole Church, yet a *particular* [power of] provision, subordinated to the Chief Pastor, belongs to each bishop in his own diocese. Nay, in foro interno, and in order to the direction of the spiritual life, it belongs in a way to the directors of souls. And this example (as in general the evangelical counsel of obedience, not only of the will but also of the intellect) is perhaps the easiest way of explaining, how infallibility in him who gives a command is not a necessary condition [for the propriety] of intellectual submission and obedience.

Corollary D.—The infallible authority and supreme magisterium of the Pontiff defining, had never anything whatever to do with the case of Galileo Galilei, and with the Abjuration of opinions enjoined him. For not only did not even a shadow of a Pontifical definition enter into that case, but in the whole of that decree of the Cardinals of the Holy Office, and in the form of Abjuration, the name even of the Pontiff is never found expressed. The documents may be read in full in "John Baptist Riccioli Almagist," Nov., p. 11, l. ix., sect. 4, c. 40, p. 496, seqq. Nevertheless, in the then state of the question, the matter not having been yet cleared up, since the truth of the astronomical system, at that date by no means proved, supplied no foundation for interpreting the passages of Scripture in any other than the obvious sense, and since the most learned men of that time in physics and astronomy, as

Tycho Brahe, Alexander Tasso, Christopher Scheiner, Antonio Delfino, Justus Lipsius (*vide Riccioli*, l. c. p. 495), judged Galileo's opinion contrary to Scripture, it was certainly the business of the authority of ecclesiastical provision to take care that the interpretation of Scripture was not injured by conjectures and hypotheses, which seemed by no means likely to most people at the time. No examination of doctrine was instituted preparatory to its definition for the universal Church, for no one thought of such a thing; but a criminal process was held in the year 1633, in which, under these circumstances, no other judgment could be come to, than that which is contained in the final sentence of the judges. "In order that your serious and harmful error and transgression* may not remain altogether unpunished, and that you yourself may become more cautious for the future and be an example to others to abstain from such faults, we decree that the book of the Dialogues of Galileo Galilei be forbidden by public edict, and yourself we condemn to the common (formalem) prison of this Holy Office for a period to be fixed at our will; and as a wholesome penance we command that for the next three years you recite once in the week the seven penitential psalms; reserving to ourselves the power of moderating, changing, or taking away, wholly or in part, the aforesaid pains and penalties."†—*Vide* "Revue des Sciences Ecclésiastiques," 2^e série, t. iii., pp. 105 seqq. 217 seqq.

* Galileo had broken the command enjoined him in 1616, which he had promised to obey, to the effect that "for the future he should not be allowed to defend the aforesaid false opinion, or teach it any way by word or writing."—*Vide* "Riccioli," l. c. p. 498.

† This is not the place to speak of the falsehoods by which, long after the affair was finished and after Galileo's death, imaginary tales began (to be spread, about threats and tortures used against him. To refute them, it will be enough to read merely the narration of Vincenzo Viviani, Galileo's pupil and friend, in "Opp. Galilei, ed. Ticini," 1744., t. i., p. 64. See also "Marino Marini Galileo e l'Inquisizione." Roma. 1850. "La Vérité sur le Procès de Galilée," ("Mélanges Scientifiques, etc., de M. Biot." Paris. 1858, tom. iii. pp. 1, seqq.

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ART. I.—OXFORD, AS IT IS AND AS IT WAS.

*Two Reports from the Committee of the House of Lords on University Tests.
With Minutes of Evidence and Appendix. London, 1870-71.*

THE two great Universities of England have, been for some considerable time the subjects, not to say the victims, of experiments which have at length culminated in a complete academical revolution. Our present concern is with Oxford alone, where the course of change has been marked by three distinct stages. First came the University Commission, then the legislation consequent upon it, and then the various changes both in the University and in separate colleges, resulting from the power which the authority of Parliament had created. Among the more important of the modern reforms was the transference of the right of initiatory academical legislation from the board of Heads of Houses to a representative council elected by congregation; the extensive removal of restrictions upon the free election of fellows and scholars; the increase in the number and addition to the subjects of the public examinations; and a revision of the college statutes with the view of adapting them more closely to the requirements, or supposed requirements, of the present generation. There was yet one further change more important even than these. Subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles of religion, which had previously been required as a condition of matriculation, was henceforth to be exacted for the first time from candidates for the degree of M.A., so that undergraduates and bachelors of arts were no longer compelled to declare themselves members of the Church of England. Against some of these changes not a word of objection can fairly be advanced. The infusion of new blood into the body charged with the origination of academical measures was an obvious and much-needed improvement upon that theory and practice of legislation which placed an insuperable difficulty in the way of any wholesome reform. The liberality of founders and benefactors could no

longer be perverted to the endowment of aristocratic indolence or the encouragement of unscrupulous jobbery. Nor can it be thought otherwise than desirable, that, in the election to the benefit of college foundations, the accidents of birth or parentage should no longer have been allowed to outweigh the claim of superior moral and intellectual qualifications. The same may be said in favour of enlarging the sphere of literary distinction by the multiplication of rewards, and the opening of the schools for the encouragement of special aptitudes and acquirements. Many a student who has no taste for classics or mathematics may have a turn for the study of law or history, and it is certainly but fair that pursuits of so great social and professional utility should have their recognition in the honourable departments of a great English university. We have no wish to deny, but, on the contrary, every wish to acknowledge, that, in the articles of reform just enumerated, the Oxford of the present day contrasts favourably with the Oxford of the last generation. It would, on the other hand, be unfair to forget that some of these improvements, and especially the truer and higher estimate of electoral responsibility, date, at least in their spirit and partial operation, from a period antecedent to that in which they had been formally incorporated into the academical system. Yet, whether it be from the acknowledged difficulty of setting limits to the progress of reform, or from any cause more peculiar to the present case, certain it is that even the more beneficial changes which, in Oxford at least, have followed upon the liberal movement, have developed into evils which were certainly not in the contemplation of many who favoured them. Thus, in endeavouring to vindicate the claims of intellectual proficiency over the mere advantages of birth and social accomplishments, our academical reformers have incurred the opposite danger of looking too exclusively to mere literary qualifications in those who are to become the members of a social community and a governing body, the requirements of which are far from being satisfied by the conditions which are likely to insure success in a few days' literary examination. Results of a somewhat cognate but far more serious character have already sprung from the infusion of modern philosophy into the studies requisite for success in the final schools under the new system. We shall return to both of these subjects in a later stage of this article. In the mean time we proceed to make some remarks upon the most momentous and revolutionary of all the innovations recently introduced into the constitution of our two chief Universities. We refer, of course, to the abolition of religious tests, and the consequent disruption of the tie

which has hitherto bound the greatest educational institutions of this country to the Established Church of the nation.

The practice of the two Universities in regard to the application of tests as a condition of membership or academical privilege, has for a long time varied in an important respect. Oxford had maintained her conservative character by always keeping a step in arrear of her more liberal sister. She continued to require subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles at matriculation when Cambridge enrolled among her undergraduate members, Anglican churchmen, Protestant dissenters, and even Roman Catholics, provided that the nonconformist portion of the number were willing to comply with the religious discipline of the several colleges which required a daily attendance at the college chapel. Later on, Cambridge made a further move in the liberal direction by admitting nonconformists to the B.A. degree. All this time Oxford closed her doors against nonconformists from the first, but in consequence of the recommendation of the University Commission, sanctioned by Parliament, she relaxed the condition of church membership in the case of undergraduates and bachelors of arts. Cambridge on the same occasion outran her sister in the line of liberalism, and took off the test as a condition of the M.A. degree, removing the barrier from its former place and erecting it between the degree of M.A. and the privilege, which would otherwise have been its consequence, of a place and vote in the Senate which corresponds with the Oxford Convocation. It will thus be seen that until the passing of the new Act, nonconformists were debarred, at both Universities alike, from the privilege of a vote in the academical legislature, as well as from the higher degrees in law and all degrees in divinity. They were also practically excluded from all fellowships, because, although at Oxford the degree of M.A. is no condition of election to an ordinary fellowship, no person could remain on the foundation of a college without proceeding in the regular course to his Master's degree.

The reader will now be in a condition to measure the effect of the Act of Parliament which has this year received the sanction of the Legislature. By the provisions of that Act, all positions of influence and power in the University, with the exception of the Headships of Colleges and certain Divinity professorships, are thrown open to persons without distinction of religious belief, and without guarantee of any religious belief at all. Not only the legislative body of the University, but the society of each particular college, may include dissenters of every class, and, so far at least as the permission of an Act of Parliament can secure such a result, even Roman Catholics.

Thus it may conceivably happen, as was anticipated by more than one of the Committee whose report is before us, that, in a college in which the number of fellows is small, there may be in the social body at one and the same time a member of the Church of England, a Socinian, a Baptist, a Comtist, that is, to speak plainly, an Atheist, and (theoretically speaking) a Roman Catholic. This body would have to deliberate and decide upon the religious and moral government of the students, as well as upon the various questions of policy and action which come from time to time before a college in its corporate capacity. It would constitute the privy council of the Head, in matters belonging to his individual authority, besides forming his parliament in those which of right come under its cognisance, and are ruled by its decision. Above all, it would constitute the elective as well as the legislative body of the college, and might thus not merely give effect to the spirit by which itself was animated, but perpetuate that spirit for generations to come. The society which it would choose into its place would naturally bear a family likeness to itself; and although it would be for the present debarred by law from electing any but a member of the Established Church to the Headship of the college, it is not hard to see that this remnant of the exploded system will soon disappear under the pressure which has crushed so many more important features of that system; or that, even should it survive, the prevailing opinion of the community would go far towards neutralizing its effect.

It may be said that the case just supposed is an extreme and improbable one. We have no wish to press it beyond its just value. But if we must abandon it as a plausible hypothesis, we shall be tempted to substitute another which is equally formidable and, as we fear, much more probable. In suggesting the possible case of four or five earnest men of different beliefs finding themselves associated on a board of college government, the bugbear which the Conservative members of the Committee desired to set up appears to have been that of a social war, resulting in administrative inaction. What we rather apprehend as the probable effect of the Act, is that far more dangerous form of social life in which men of opposite religious views habitually ignore and suppress their points of difference with a view to active co-operation. One or other side of the alternative seems at any rate inevitable. In a household divided against itself by religious differences, whether in the domestic or the social order, either peace is sacrificed to conscientious conviction, or that conviction to peace; and, sad as is the mer case, it is incomparably preferable to the latter. In the too, as in the family, it is the dependents who suffer in

either case; the children in the one society and the students in the other. Parents who are of different religions, and both equally earnest in their several professions, in order not to give their children contradictory views, must either give them none at all, or, at all events, none of a distinctive character; and much of the same kind, as we fear, will be the hapless fate of students who are subjected to the instructions and moral influences of a body of tutors such as the new Act will have a tendency to produce, even without supposing so extreme a case as that by which its opponents illustrated their opinion of its probable effect. An academical society in which there is not religious unity must be a theatre of controversy, or will be apt to resemble the happy family of animals in which a languid and apathetic peace is secured by the removal of all the natural weapons of aggression and defence.

Our academical reformers, however, will probably answer that, after all, the relation between tutor and pupil is mainly a literary one, and that the religious views of the teaching party are therefore a matter of little or no importance. This brings us to one of the most serious although not one of the most conspicuous of the recent innovations on the ancient theory of academical education; we mean the merging of the collegiate in the university system, to the great injury of that domestic spirit which formerly prevailed in the several colleges, at least of Oxford, and which led to an intercourse of the most valuable character between the senior and junior members. We gather from the evidence taken before the Committee on University Tests, that it is no longer the universal practice at Oxford to assign students to particular tutors, who exercise over them somewhat of a moral and spiritual care, but that they are usually distributed amongst different teachers, not necessarily even belonging to their own college. We fully admit the importance of modifying the strictly tutorial theory, with the view of giving students the advantage of attending the lectures of men especially competent in the several departments of literature, but we deeply regret what seems to us the tendency of the new system in so many various departments, to substitute a purely intellectual for a combined intellectual and moral education. The distinction which formerly separated Oxford, and we think most advantageously, from the Protestant Universities of the Continent is now rapidly disappearing, and the consequence is that young men at the most critical period of their lives are in danger of being left without any other moral and religious control than such as their own consciences, often ill-trained and always liable to be warped by the most powerful influences, are likely to secure. At college they are not under the parochial

system, and they are far removed from the eye of their parents. The Catholic view on which our ancient Universities are based, regards the tutor as the vicerent of the father; and the very name by which he is known, in contradistinction from that of the mere teacher, contains the idea of a guardian and moral guide.

It may naturally be asked why it is that we, who cannot be supposed to have any especial attraction to the Thirty-nine Articles, should appear to regret the abolition of a test by which an academical *status* was made to depend on the act of subscription to them, and why we should regret a change in the law by which academical privileges and emoluments are, for the first time since the Reformation, brought within the grasp of Catholics as well as of other nonconformists. We reply, that the principle of requiring some definite belief as a condition of education as well as of the honours and advantages consequent upon it, appears to us incomparably more important than the form in which that principle is applied, and that we will never consent to purchase Catholic interests, or so-called interests, at the expense of a truly Catholic principle. We do not deny that if it be, as we think that it is, right and just in Catholics to uphold the securities for some definite religious education, even though in a form which they regard as erroneous, on behalf of the youth of this nation, it is also an act of generosity in them to do so. They have their own *gravamina* in abundance against any view of academical foundations and benefactions except that which gives full scope to the intentions of the Catholic founders and benefactors. Not the Thirty-nine Articles, but the creed of the Catholic Church ought, on every principle of justice, to have been the condition upon which the education contemplated and encouraged by Catholic founders and benefactors should have been conducted, and their liberality applied. It was simply monstrous that provisions of the ante-reformational statutes should be habitually disregarded by the recipients of the ante-reformational benefactions, and that the moment chosen for the abstraction of emoluments given on the faith of those provisions being complied with, should have been that very moment at which the possessor of those emoluments, by the act of submission to the Catholic Church, first became enabled to comply with the terms on which he received them. It is therefore generous on the part of such Catholics as Lord Denbigh or Lord Bute, to vote in parliament against the abolition of the test which gave to the Established Church of this country a monopoly in the privileges of the Universities, to the exclusion, not of dissenters only, but even of Catholics, who had alone an hereditary right to the enjoyment of Catholic

benefactions. Yet we are sincerely glad that those noblemen did not consider themselves debarred on any plea of justice or policy from a course which is as creditable to their wisdom as to their unsectarian spirit.

The weak point in the case of those who desired to maintain the University Tests, was the fact of their proved inadequacy to the purposes for which they were intended. They were designed as bulwarks of the established religion, and have not even formed safeguards against anti-Christian error. We shall presently quote the testimony of some of the Oxford witnesses before the Parliamentary Committee, with a view of showing what kind of teaching prevailed at Oxford even when the tests were in force, and what kind of opinions were professed by those who had subscribed them. The tests had in fact degenerated into the hollowest and most unmeaning of forms. We are far from denying that, even as mere forms, they had their use and value. If they were nothing else, they were at any rate witnesses to the principle of dogmatic religion. But the most sanguine of their advocates could hardly have expected that, in days like these, so purely abstract an argument could be successfully maintained against the facts which were proved in evidence before the Committee. It was constantly and most plausibly urged against the tests that, while they were stumbling-blocks to the conscientious, they formed no barrier against the unscrupulous, and the tests accordingly were made to bear the blame, and suffer the penalty, which ought to have fallen upon those who dishonoured them. Attempts were made by more than one member of the Committee to establish a precedent for the extreme laxity with which subscription to the Articles has latterly been regarded, in the theories of interpretation put forth thirty years ago by Mr. Newman and others. But a moment's consideration will prove the extreme unfairness of the comparison. Those who defended what was called the Catholic interpretation of the Articles openly propounded the sense, and the only sense, in which they could subscribe them. When that interpretation was repudiated by the Bishops and by the Ecclesiastical Court, they resigned their academical emoluments and privileges, and left the Church of England. What similarity is there between their case and that of men who plainly regarded subscription as neither a test of belief nor a pledge of teaching, and yet had not the honesty to tell the world under what view of duty they could so account of an act which, whether we look to its own nature or to the intention of those who imposed it, was undoubtedly designed to control over both thought and conduct? Or

again is there between any theory of subscription ever proposed in former times, and such a view of the meaning and obligation of a test as is justified in the following answers of a witness before the Committee? We draw attention by means of italics to the more memorable portions of the evidence.

This witness says:—

Unless I am mistaken, the test which is at present exacted for a Master's degree at Oxford, is to the effect that the signer believes that the doctrine of the Church of England is in agreement with the Word of God. That excludes a man who believes in the Word of God, but does not believe that the doctrine of the Church of England is in conformity with it, *whilst it includes not only the man who believes that they agree and that they both stand, but it includes also the man who believes that they agree and that they both fall.* (Second Report, p. 48.)

Lord Stanhope very naturally put the following questions to this witness:—"You have stated that persons who did not believe in revealed religion might take the test, if it merely declared that the formularies of the Church of England were conformable to the Word of God?"—Answer: "Yes, they might; but I did not mean to say that they did." Q. "Do you think that a person in that frame of mind could conscientiously subscribe to or sign a statement calling the Scriptures the Word of God?"—A. *"I think that he might fairly hold the only legal meaning of the words was the authorized version of the Bible, as distinguished from any other version, as for instance, that of Douai, with which the formularies of the Church of England are not in conformity."* Q. "You think that a disbeliever in the Scriptures could declare, nevertheless, that they were the Word of God?"—A. "I merely meant to say that the test, as it stands, might admit a person who chose to strain the meaning of the words, and who believed in the coincidence of the Bible and Prayer Book, and that both fell together. I did not mean to assert that there were any such persons in Oxford. All I meant to say was, that *so far as the words of the test go, it might be so taken.*" (*Ib.* p. 51.)

After this, we hope that we have heard the last of the "unnatural sense." But let us hear something more of the views maintained by the Oxford witness on the subject of subscription to the tests.

Q. "Is it your impression that the feeling has gained ground of late years that it is justifiable to take a very elastic and liberal view of the obligation of these tests?"—A. "Yes, I think as a general rule that there are two classes of persons who sign the test with reluctance; on the one hand, those in whom this negative process which I have spoken of has gone to some

extent, and who, when they sign the test, simply relapse into what is called undogmatic Christianity ; and, on the other hand, there are those in whom the test produces a powerful antipathy to all religious ideas, and who do not feel in the least degree bound by it. *The latter class of persons would explain their acceptance of the test by saying that these formulæ are formulæ which have become entirely obsolete in their character and language, and that, therefore, having no relation whatever to modern thought, they may be affirmed or denied equally bonâ fide.*" (*Ib.* p. 49.)

We can only trust that the views of this witness do not represent the average character of Oxford opinion on the subject to which they relate. It is fair to add that in the evidence which called them forth, unsatisfactory as at best it is, they stand out in somewhat strong contrast to the testimony of others on the same side. We shall have occasion at a later period to advert to the evidence of the same gentleman in another department of the subject, and we sincerely hope that his statements on matters of fact may be received under the same qualification as appears to be applicable to his theoretical views. Still, however, he must expect to be judged by the light in which he has represented himself. He is evidently an able man, and one sufficiently prominent in the University to be distinguished by a place among the select few who were invited, or who considered themselves able, to throw light upon a question of supreme importance raised and inquired into by the Legislature ; nor can it be doubted that the opinions of such a man, however charged with exaggeration by some of his contemporaries, are likely to have considerable influence on the juniors whom he instructs or with whom he associates.

We now return to the more important of the changes in the academical system which have followed upon the great reforming movement, begun more than twenty years ago, and brought to a crisis by the Act of the present year. We shall first refer to the modifications of the college statutes bearing on the election of fellows, and especially to that by which not only a paramount but almost exclusive importance is given to intellectual superiority as a qualification for enrolment on the foundation of the open colleges. The claim of poverty is now, as we believe, generally disallowed ; and, although we have no doubt that notorious immorality would still form a ground of exclusion from a fellowship, yet we imagine that conspicuous moral excellence would no longer, as of old, form a ground of preference. In the old statutes of Balliol College the word by which the moral qualifications of the candidate for a fellowship were denoted was "*morigeratus*" ; a word which implies a

good deal more than mere external morality, and extends to those graces of temper and general character which fit a man for the various relations of collegiate life; such as docility, tractability, courtesy, and the like.* In short, the framers of these statutes regarded the fellow of a college as one who was to be the daily companion of his seniors, and the possible instructor and guide of his juniors. Among minor duties involved in his new position may be mentioned that of hospitality. He may expect to be called upon to entertain, or at least unite in the entertainment, of distinguished guests, as well foreign as native, and not of men distinguished in the ranks of literature only, but of others. There are to be found, especially among the literary celebrities of foreign countries, men of polished manners and cultivated taste, who expect to meet in our English colleges with those who can converse with them, at least intelligibly and intelligently, in their own languages, and who are capable of extending to them the offices of a gracious and graceful hospitality. We very much doubt whether modern Oxford has consulted wisely for her literary reputation in discarding from her standard of social excellence those qualities which give to literature much of its charm and influence. But we also greatly doubt, which is still more to the point, whether the almost exclusive regard to merely intellectual qualifications in candidates for election, has resulted in any considerable accession of available talent to the staffs of the colleges whose statutes have been so far changed with the view of securing that advantage. Take, for instance, the case of Balliol, a society which, unlike Oriel, never professed to elect solely according to the examination. The statutes of that college formerly required three conditions on the part of a candidate for a place in the social body. They required that he should excel his competitors in the several claims of poverty, moral and social excellence (*morigeratio*), and literary proficiency. We make no doubt that the present and future fellows of Balliol are and will continue to be distinguished scholars. But we shall be surprised if the following list of men whom the annals of that college exhibit as having been elected into the social body from

* The present celebrity of Balliol as a place of education is mainly due to the devoted labours of Dr. Jenkyns, formerly Master of the College, and to the valuable assistance which he received from Mr. Ogilvie, now Regius Professor of Pastoral Theology and Canon of Christ Church. We were sorry to observe, and we know that our regret was shared by others, that, at the public dinner given to the present Master on his accession, no reference whatever was made to the services of either of his predecessors, Dr. Jenkyns and Dr. Scott, who so materially paved the way for any success he may achieve.

the year 1826 to the year 1840, should speedily be matched even under a mode of election more exclusively favourable to the intellectual qualifications of the candidate. Here then is the list, in which, omitting several names well worthy to be included in it, we have purposely confined ourselves to those whose claim to this distinction will be most generally recognized:—Dr. Moberly, Bishop of Salisbury; Dr. Tait, Archbishop of Canterbury; Dr. Lake, Dean of Durham; Dr. Scott, Dean of Rochester; Mr. (late Professor) F. W. Newman; Professor Jowett, the present Master of Balliol; Mr. Secretary Cardwell; Mr. R. W. Lingens; Mr. E. Karlake; Mr. E. B. Twisleton, and Mr. Herman Merivale. Dr. Temple, the Bishop of Exeter, was elected a fellow of the college during the same period, but as he came in on a close foundation, we do not include him in our list. It is also remarkable that all these gentlemen were elected in the days of religious tests, although it is a favourite argument with the opponents of those tests that they tended to keep down the intellectual standard of the Universities. A bold assertion this in the face, not only of such names as those which we have just recorded, but of others still more distinguished in the ranks of literature, whether theological, classical, or philosophical, since we should have a right to include in the catalogue the eminent men who have been educated at both Universities under the exploded system.

We arrive now at the most momentous of all the changes which have come over Oxford during the last twenty years. We allude, of course, to the introduction of modern intellectual philosophy into the final schools. In the Oxford of our own remembrance, which goes back nearly half a century, the requirements for honours in that branch of the examination which went by the name of science, were satisfied by a competent knowledge of the *Ethics* and *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, with the addition, perhaps, of some minor treatise of the same or some other author. Later on, it became the practice to take up the *Analogy* and *Sermons* of Bishop Butler in the way of commentary upon ancient ethics; and, about the same time, one or other of the treatises of Plato was commonly added to the list of books proposed by the candidates for the highest literary honours. At this period the philosophical teaching of the University was, in a very true sense of the term, dogmatic. The ethical system of Aristotle, as we need not say, forms what may be called the skeleton of Catholic moral theology; and, so far as any philosophy of a less standard character formed the subject of examination, it was introduced merely in the way of objection to be met and overruled by that which was regarded as alone scientifically true. By degrees Aristotle has been

more or less discredited or has changed sides with his opponents, and ceased to hold the place of the ascendant teacher. Thus, his beautiful treatise on rhetoric has wholly disappeared from the Oxford class-books, while the *Ethics*, though still taken up, no longer form the standard by which other philosophies are to be tried. Their place is shared, if not superseded, by various treatises of modern authors, whether English, French, or German, whose principles strike at the root of all dogmatic teaching even on the most elementary subjects of religious belief. That this their tendency, if not their object, has resulted in a very extensive success, is proved beyond the power of contradiction by the testimony of their advocates and opponents alike. Those who desire the fullest confirmation of this remark must be referred to the voluminous evidence contained in the blue books under review. The utmost which we can attempt is to transcribe a few of the more striking passages in the evidence taken before the Lords' Committee. We begin with that of Mr. Charles Appleton, the gentleman whose views on the question of subscription to tests we have already had occasion to notice.

There are about three hundred men who are, every year, brought under the influences of the philosophy of modern times, which might, and which does, as I think, materially undermine all existing beliefs. I think it is quite impossible for any man to throw himself into the system of education for the final classical school at Oxford, at the present time . . . (I mean not merely to study it *ab extra*) without having the whole edifice of belief shaken to the very foundation. (Second Report, p. 44.)

We now come to the Rev. Canon Liddon, one of the more prominent representatives of the dogmatic school of English churchmen. Mr. Liddon begins his evidence by confirming Mr. Appleton's statement as to there being persons in Oxford who subscribe to religious tests as an unmeaning formality, although he thinks that they are fewer than Mr. Appleton supposes (p. 61). With regard to the present philosophical studies of Oxford and their effect on the youthful mind, he says,—

Cases have come within my own experience of men who have come up from school as Christians, and have been earnest Christians up to the time of beginning to read philosophy for the Final School, but who, during the year and a half or two years employed in this study have surrendered first their Christianity, and next their belief in God, and have left the University not believing in a Supreme Being (pp. 69, 70).

The evidence which strikes us as the ablest in the volume

before us is that of the late Dean Mansel, who, while agreeing with other witnesses as to the injurious tendency of modern thought in Oxford, is disposed to attribute it to the personal influence of the tutors through whom the teaching of certain philosophical works is filtered, rather than to any influence which those works would have upon the minds of students if deprived of that assistance. He says:—

Part of the change in question is due to legislation, but by far the greater part to a prevailing current of opinion in the place. That opinion is the effect of the commentaries and criticisms as coming through the teacher. I do not think it is the substitution of a different set of books, though that has had some effect; but I think the principal effect has been produced by these books as filtered through the minds of the tutors; they being in many cases private tutors (p. 89).

We are warranted in concluding as the result of these several testimonies, that students at Oxford who aim at the highest literary honours, must follow out a course of reading which, partly from its own nature and partly from the influence of the teachers who aid it, is calculated to uproot all Christian belief, and which, according to the evidence of one intimately acquainted with the subject, does actually, and to an appreciable extent, issue in that result. When by the side of such a fact we set, on the other hand, the impressibility of the youthful mind, and the tendency of youthful passions to play up to any intellectual views which serve to weaken the sense of personal responsibility, we confess ourselves, in words which we have already used in reference to the same subject, perfectly amazed at the courage of those parents who can regard any advantages which the Universities can offer as worthy of being purchased at such a cost.

Let us pause for a moment to compare the picture of Oxford as it is, with that of the Oxford of thirty years ago, as engraven on the memories of the present writer and of many of our readers. No studies were then encouraged but such as were apt to open, to brace, and to refine the mind of the student. Philosophy, history, mathematics, poetry, all converged to one and the same object, and that object was to fit young men for the discharge of personal and relative duties, whether in public or private stations. One link in the chain was wanting; that firm grasp of Catholic doctrine, that deeper insight into Catholic morality, which would have consolidated and harmonized the whole. Yet even that link was partially supplied by guesses and aspirations which were afterwards in many cases to be exchanged for convictions. From the pulpit of S. Mary's, and from lips which

spoke with almost oracular power, there flowed a continuous and consistent stream of religious and moral truth, which found its way to the intellects and hearts of a docile and devoted auditory, and overflowed the limits of the University itself into ample pastures beyond them. The fruit of that teaching was manifest in the high, and we say it without hesitation, the Catholic tone which soon began to pervade large classes of the academical society. Conversation was purified and elevated; tastes were refined and even remodelled; recreations sanotified, and prayer became a privilege instead of a burthen, a voluntary act instead of an official necessity. It seemed good to the authorities of the Church and of the University to discourage this great revival and to proscribe its authors and promoters. Those authorities have sown the wind and reaped the whirlwind. The most melancholy portion of the picture which has followed is the apparent hopelessness of reversing it. We say it, Heaven is our witness, in no spirit of party triumph and with every desire to do justice to the truly admirable and exemplary men who are still to be found, here and there, in that once great but now degenerate University; yet say it we must, that, out of the Catholic Church, we can recognize no agency powerful enough to resist the spread of this poison, nor any within it which can be brought directly to bear upon the evil in the character of an antidote. Oxford, alas! is as intolerant of the remedy as her more faithful sons are of the disease. Yet within the camp of her best friends there are indications of a disunion ill fitted to confront the serried ranks of the enemy. The anti-liberal party at Oxford is divided into three classes:—the High Church Establishmentarians, the Low Church Establishmentarians, and the High Church Anti-Establishmentarians. The two former differ in doctrine but agree in policy; while neither class agrees either in doctrine or policy with the last-mentioned. There are also indications of a spirit, not generous and long-sighted, such as that which is demanded for the present emergency, but jealous and narrow-minded. We see, and lament to see, the staunch upholders of Anglican "orthodoxy" uniting with the most prominent advocates of liberalism in doing honour to those unhappy professing Catholics who have swerved, in greater or less degree, from their allegiance to the Church; apparently unconscious that they are thus sanctioning in others that very rule of self-reliance which is at the root of all the evils they so justly deplore. It was not during the years in which Dr. Döllinger laboured as an eminent scholar and distinguished author, though as yet without the drawback of heretical taint, that Oxford selected him as the object of honourable distinction. The moment which she chose for the bestowal of her favours

was that at which he had openly broken with the Church and done his best to rend the seamless robe of Catholic unity. Yet, still and far stranger is the fact, that the person of all others to propose him for this reward should have been the most distinguished of the witnesses to the fatal effects of rebellion against the judgment of ecclesiastical authority.

We have been told that, in the room of an eminent Oxford convert is to be seen a large engraving of the fairest of academic cities, with its corona of graceful spires and minarets and domes, and its long-drawn walks and goodly gardens, and that at the foot of the picture its owner has caused to be inscribed those memorable words of the prophet: "Son of man, dost thou think these bones shall live?" "O Lord God, Thou knowest."

We cannot close our review of the deeply interesting evidence before us without paying our humble tribute of praise to the ability, learning, and high moral and religious tone which distinguish the interrogative side of the examination, more especially on the part of the Conservative members of the Committee. We refer particularly to the questions of Lord Salisbury, Lord Carnarvon, and Lord Stanhope. The intimate acquaintance with their subject which these noblemen evince is no less honourable to them than is their obvious leaning to the side of dogmatic truth against that of free speculation. We are inclined to think that, in these days of intellectual license, there are few legislative assemblies in Europe which could have presented so gratifying a spectacle of true administrative wisdom, and it is not a little worthy of remark that the men who are the most strenuous advocates of the ancient traditional system of Oxford are also themselves among the most conspicuous examples of its practical value.

An excellent paper in the "Month" for July and August of the present year, under the heading of "Oxford in 1871," has been brought under our notice since this article was written. It is evidently from the pen of one who possesses a rare combination of advantages for the treatment of such a subject, in being at once a Catholic and a member of the University, intimately and experimentally conversant with the philosophical studies of the place and with their effects upon the minds of the students. We are glad to find our own impressions, as founded solely upon the Evidence of the Oxford witnesses before the Lords' Committee, entirely borne out by the testimony of so intelligent an observer. He concludes a most masterly essay by contrasting the depth and inveteracy of the evil to be combated with the shallow and superficial nature of the resources which alone lie at the command of the unhappy sufferers. As a Catholic, he

feels with us, that the cure is entirely beyond the appliances of a Protestant university. It is a sad, though for us a salutary truth. The more orthodox champions of Oxford are labouring in a desperate cause with a zeal worthy of all commendation. They have subscribed munificently to the building and endowment of Keble College; an institution which they fondly believe will prove a successful antagonist to the growing school of sceptical philosophy. We say, and say with reason, that the enemy will be more than a match for them, and that the key to the citadel of truth is with us, and not with them. Meanwhile, are we ourselves sufficiently alive to the danger which threatens us in common?

———— tua res agitur, cum proximus ardet

Ucalegon.

This we say in no querulous or desponding spirit, but under an ever-present sense of the magnitude of the crisis at which we have arrived. Peter must not sleep when Judas is on the alert.

The projectors of Keble College have proved, at all events, that they appreciate the power of the enemy and the character of the contest. They feel it to be a case in which the best kind of controversy is counteraction. It is a war, not of words, but of principles, and of principles most vivacious and energetic. The philosophy in which those principles are embodied is but the text-book of a great system; a kind of gospel of Antichrist. Hence the disease which has to be eradicated is no local formation which can be successfully attacked at its seat, but rather a sort of cancer, whose fibres underlie the surface, and spread themselves in countless ramifications. This must be apparent to all who study the Parliamentary evidence with attention. A philosophy which substitutes shifting phenomena for axiomatic principles of moral and religious truth, has its natural offshoots in the contempt of theology and theological safeguards, in the unbounded tolerance of doctrinal error, or rather in the disbelief in the existence of any error in the absence of a fixed standard of truth, in the preference of work to prayer, in the idolatry of intellect, and the depreciation of all supernatural virtue. The prerogative which man shares with the spirits of evil it exalts to the prejudice of the capacity he has received in grace of aspiring to the nature of angels. Nor is the fairer side of this practical philosophy the least dangerous of its aspects. As a general rule, it is prejudiced by no bitterness of spirit or language, caricatured by no extravagances, discredited by no immorality. Its professors are for the most part amiable, fair-minded, and conscientious

men, with whom it is pleasant to associate, and whom it is hard not to love: true though it be that

———— medio de fonte leporum
Surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angit.

To Catholics especially such society is naturally attractive, as a relief from the restraints which often hinder their free intercourse with Protestants of the older school.

Something, if not all, of this is evidently felt by those earnest men who have resolved on meeting the intellectual dangers of Oxford, not by pamphlets or treatises, but by a visible illustration of more orthodox principles. Whether they have done wisely in planting their model college within the zone of the infected atmosphere, is a question on which there may well be a difference of opinion. But in so far as their work is a noble sacrifice in a worthy cause, and a witness to the truth, that the cure of an infidel philosophy is to be found, not in abstract argument only, but in sound teaching, mental discipline, and habitual prayer, the Keble College is an effort which not only commands our sympathy but challenges our imitation.

ART. II.—MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF NECESSARY TRUTH.

An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART MILL. Third Edition. London: Longmans.

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. By JOHN STUART MILL. Seventh Edition. London: Longmans.

MR. MILL has set an excellent example, in singling out an individual writer (Sir W. Hamilton) as his special opponent. Even those philosophers who are most nearly agreed, differ from each other so considerably in their exposition of doctrine, that an antagonist, who attempts to answer them all directly, is unable to exhibit the full strength of his case. If he replies to them successively, he becomes tedious; if he encounters them collectively, he must use much vagueness and indistinctness of expression. A far more satisfactory issue will be reached, if he singles out for conflict one in particular; nor will he thereby be prevented from adding such supplementary remarks, as may be necessary for a complete

exposition of his view. All which he need consider is, that the particular opponent whom he selects may both be, and receive general *recognition* as being, a worthy representative of the adverse school. If Mr. Mill did well in this respect by choosing Sir W. Hamilton, much more shall *we* do well by choosing Mr. Mill.

In one respect, it is both easier and more hopeful to deal with phenomenists, than with their extreme opposites the transcendental pantheists. Phenomenists appeal honestly and consistently to the one legitimate standard, the observed facts of human thought; and there is therefore a really appreciable prospect, of conducting our argument against them to some definite result.* But Mr. Mill in particular is a more satisfactory opponent than any other of his school, in proportion as, more distinctly than any other of their number, he points to the precise psychical facts on which he would build, and the precise conclusion which he would infer from each. His singular power of clear exposition, of making easier what is difficult, of throwing light on what is obscure, benefits doubtless his own cause in the first instance, as is but fair: yet ultimately it greatly assists his antagonist; or rather assists the cause itself of truth, whatever that may be: and there is no other cause, we are thoroughly convinced, which he ever knowingly *desires* to promote. He is never led, by any latent consciousness of a weak point, to seek refuge in veiling his sense under a cloud of words; but on the contrary has no other aim in his language, than that of making himself as intelligible as he can. Then again there is no other phenomenist, who has carried out philosophical principles into nearly so large a field of practical application; and this is a farther advantage to the cause of truth. We cannot indeed admit that he is, in the fullest sense of that word, a *consistent* thinker; we cannot e.g. admit that his utilitarianism is the true philosophical correlative to that generous self-sacrificing philanthropy, which is so attractive a feature in his character, and which so often exposes him to the charge of visionary enthusiasm.† But he is almost

* "The man who seeks to enter the temple of Philosophy by any other approach than the vestibule of psychology, can never penetrate into its inner sanctuary; for psychology alone leads to and evolves philosophical truth, even though it is itself subordinate to philosophy. Moreover he who attempts to construct psychology by the aid and under the direction of a metaphysical system, contradicts the order by which both psychology and philosophy are developed and acquired."—Porter on the Human Intellect, p. 60.

† For ourselves we are so profoundly convinced of the intense social evils which result, here in England and in Europe generally, from the Church's loss of political pre-eminence, that we are by no means disposed to dub a

entirely free from those express and (one may even say) verbal self-contradictions, of which he has pointed out so many in Sir W. Hamilton; and even those of his works which are least philosophical, are evidently written under a vivid remembrance of his philosophical tenets. So far therefore as self-contradiction exists below the surface—as is, we think, by no means unfrequently the case—such a fact is a most legitimately available weapon against him in controversy.

The corner-stone of his system is that which we are to oppose in our present article; his denial that there is any truth cognizable by man as “necessary.” Were he once to admit that there is any one truth thus cognizable—his works might still be admitted to contain a large mass of good philosophical matter, as we think indeed they do—but his philosophy *as a whole* would be at an end. On such an hypothesis, we say, its whole framework and structure would be proved rotten; its materials, however valuable in themselves, would have to be detached and re-arranged; and his edifice would have to be reconstructed from its very foundation. It is amply sufficient then, if we establish in our present article that there is at least *one* cognizable class of necessary truths. By this means we shall have concluded the question of *principle*; and shall leave no more behind than the question of comparative detail, *what are* those propositions which justly vindicate to themselves that title. We will leave to future numbers this question of comparative detail; concerning ourselves here only with the question of principle. Since therefore we are to choose some special field whereon to join issue as a specimen of the rest,—there is one particular class of truths, which will be generally accepted as in every respect most fitted to effect a clear and salient result. Our direct argument shall be, that *mathematical truths* are cognizable by mankind as necessary.

This issue again may be still further narrowed. Mr. Mill will not of course deny that, if mathematical *axioms* be necessary, the validity of syllogistic reasoning must be also a necessary verity; and that the whole body of mathematical truth must possess the same character. Our thesis then shall be, that mathematical axioms (arithmetical, algebraic, geometrical) are self-evidently necessary truths. By the term “axioms,” for the purpose of our present article, we understand those verities,

man visionary and enthusiast, for the mere offence of advocating very fundamental social changes. Yet we do charge Mr. Mill with visionary enthusiasm, for expecting real social amelioration from such remedies as those, which alone, consistently with his principles, he can propose.

which mathematicians assume as indubitably true, and use as the first premisses of their science. And we are to assume the doctrine for which we argued in July; viz., that whatever a man's cognitive faculties indubitably declare, is known by him to be infallibly true.

In our number for July, 1869 (pp. 150-152), we expressed our own humble suggestion, on the true analysis of that idea "necessary," which is to be the theme of our present article. "The idea itself" however, we added, "is so pronounced and unmistakable, that every thinking person understands its meaning in a certain vague but practically sufficient way." Our present purpose accordingly will lead us only to attempt such a delineation and embodiment of this idea, as shall make clear the point at issue between Mr. Mill and all objectivists. When we call a proposition "necessary" then, we mean to say that its contradictory is an intrinsically impossible chimera; is that which could not be found in any possible region of existence; is that which even an Omnipotent Being* would be unable to effect. And in order to show that the human mind cognizes certain self-evidently necessary truths, we begin by putting out of court "tautologous" propositions; those which declare no more, than has already been expressed in the subject: for concerning *them* of course, Mr. Mill himself admits that their truth is known independently of experience; and mathematical axioms are not of their number. Our controversy with Mr. Mill is concerned, not with these "tautologous," but with what may be called "significant" propositions; with propositions which declare something not expressed in their subject. And our allegation is this. There is many a "significant" proposition" such that, to use F. Kleutgen's words, "by simply considering the *ideas* of the subject and the predicate, one comes to see that there really exists between them that relation which the proposition declares":† and every such proposition is self-evidently known as necessary.

Firstly then we say, that if there *are* such propositions, they are self-evidently necessary. Or we may express the same truth somewhat differently. If in any case I know by my very conception of some ens, that a certain attribute, not *included* in that conception, is truly predicable of that ens,

* We must not of course, in this rudimental stage of our argument against Mr. Mill, assume that there *is* an Omnipotent Being.

† F. Kleutgen explains, that such propositions are called by Kant "synthetical," but by Catholic philosophers "analytical" (Phil. Scol., n. 300). We believe that all non-Catholic philosophers without exception follow Kant's usage in this matter; and it will be more convenient therefore if we avoid the term altogether.

such predication is a self-evidently necessary proposition. Take for instance the axiom, that all trilateral figures are triangular. If, by my very conception of a trilateral figure, I know its triangularity,—and if (as we established in our last number) the avouchment of my faculties corresponds infallibly with objective truth,—then I know infallibly that a trilateral non-triangular figure is an intrinsically repugnant chimera; that in no possible region of existence could such a figure be found; that not even an Omnipotent Being could form one. All these are obvious and undeniable consequences of the fundamental proposition, that, by my very conception of a trilateral figure, I know its triangularity: and to admit therefore this fundamental proposition, is to admit that the triangularity of all trilateral figures is cognizable as a self-evidently necessary truth.

If this reasoning be admitted, what is our controversial position? In such case—taking the above-named axiom as our specimen instance,—all which we have to maintain against Mr. Mill is, that, by my very conception of a trilateral figure, I know that the attribute triangularity is predicable of every such figure. But we do not see how it is possible to make clearer so very clear a proposition; and our direct business therefore is merely to answer Mr. Mill's objections.

For these, we naturally turn in the first instance to his special philosophical work, his “Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy.” He treats the question from p. 318 to 326; and purports to account for the phenomena on which objectivists build, by what he calls “the association psychology.” By this term he denotes that psychological theory, which alleges that man's *belief* in necessary truth does not authenticate any corresponding *reality*, but results from past uniformity in the association of ideas. All my life long I have been seeing trilaterals which are triangular, while I have had no one experience to the contrary. So inseparable an association then—thus Mr. Mill argues—has been established in my mind between the ideas of trilateralness and triangularity, that I am deluded into the fancy of some *à priori* connection between them, independent of what is known by experience; I am deluded into the fancy, that by my very conception of a trilateral figure I know its triangularity. We shall have, as we proceed, to consider this argument in detail; but we will at once urge against it what seems an irrefragable argument *ad hominem*.

According to Mr. Mill, my having constantly experienced the triangularity of trilateral figures, is merely one out of a thousand sets of instances, in which I have observed the un-

exceptional uniformity of the laws of nature. There is no other experimental truth whatever, he thinks, which rests on nearly so large a mass of experience, as does this truth, that phenomena succeed each other in uniform laws.* To this universal uniformity, "we not only do not know any exception, but the exceptions which limit or apparently invalidate the special laws, are so far from contradicting the universal one that they confirm it." ("Logic," vol. ii. p. 104.) Now the fact of my having constantly experienced triangularity in trilateral figures, suffices (according to Mr. Mill) for my having knit the ideas of trilateralness and triangularity into such inseparable association, that I delusively fancy one to be involved in my very conception of the other. Much more certainly therefore—so Mr. Mill in consistency should admit—I must have knit into such inseparable association the two ideas, "phenomena" and "succeeding each other by uniform laws," that I necessarily fancy one to be involved in my very conception of the other. If, through my constant experience of triangular trilaterals, I am under a practical necessity of fancying that in every possible region of existence all trilaterals are triangular—much more, through my constant experience of uniformity in phenomenal succession, must I be under a practical necessity of fancying, that in every possible region of existence phenomena succeed each other by uniform laws. Now *am* I under any such necessity, or under any kind of approach to it? We summon the defendant into court as witness for the plaintiff. "I am convinced," he says ("Logic," vol. ii. p. 98) that *any one* accustomed to abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the purpose, will . . . find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one, for instance, of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, events may succeed one another at random without any fixed law." Put these two statements then together. I find insuperable difficulty against fancying, that in any possible "firmament" there can be non-triangular trilaterals; but I find no difficulty whatever against fancying, that in many a possible "firmament" phenomena succeed each other without fixed laws. Yet I have *experienced* the uniformity of phenomenal succession (according to Mr. Mill) very far more widely, and in no respect less unexceptionally, than I have experienced the triangularity of trilaterals. The impossibility therefore which I find in believing

* To prevent possible misapprehension, we should explain that we are arguing entirely *ad hominem*. We do not ourselves admit that the uniformity of nature is a truth, which experience by itself would suffice to esta-

the non-triangularity of any possible trilateral, cannot be in any way imagined to arise from constancy of experience. In other words, Mr. Mill's psychological principle breaks down.

We will now proceed to consider in order Mr. Mill's course of argument, from p. 318 to p. 325 ; stating it as far as possible in his own words. He begins thus :—

It is strange that almost all the opponents of the Association psychology should found their main or sole argument in refutation of it upon the feeling of necessity ; for if there be any one feeling in our nature which the laws of association are obviously equal to producing, one would say it is that. Necessary, according to Kant's definition, and there is none better, is that of which the negation is impossible. If we find it impossible, by any trial, to separate two ideas, we have all the feeling of necessity which the mind is capable of. Those, therefore, who deny that association can generate a necessity of thought, must be willing to affirm that two ideas are never so knit together by association as to be practically inseparable. But to affirm this is to contradict the most familiar experience of life. Many persons who have been frightened in childhood can never be alone in the dark without irrepressible terrors. Many a person is unable to revisit a particular place, or to think of a particular event, without recalling acute feelings of grief or reminiscences of suffering. If the facts which created these strong associations in individual minds had been common to all mankind from their earliest infancy, and had, when the associations were fully formed, been forgotten, we should have had a necessity of thought—one of the necessities which are supposed to prove an objective law, and an *à priori* mental connexion between ideas. (pp. 318-19.)

We have always thought this passage to be among the weakest which Mr. Mill ever wrote. Firstly, the two instances which he gives in no way exemplify a necessity of *thought*, but only a necessity of *feeling* ; the feeling of fear in solitary darkness, and of grief in revisiting a particular place or in thinking of a particular person. Now many wild theories have doubtless been maintained by considerable persons ; but who in the world ever alleged, that a necessity of *feeling* “proves an objective law and an *à priori* mental connexion between ideas” ? *

But a more important fallacy remains to be mentioned.

* In the first of the two instances Mr. Mill might possibly be understood to mean, that the timid person, so long as solitude and darkness remain, actually *believes* the presence of some danger. Even if this were psychologically true, it would plainly be nothing to Mr. Mill's purpose. But Mr. Mill does not really think it at all certain that there is even this temporary belief. “The emotion of fear may be excited, and I believe often is excited, simply by terrific imaginations. That these imaginations are even for a moment mistaken for menacing realities, may be true, but ought not to be assumed without proof.” —J. S. Mill's edition of Mill's “Analysis,” vol. i. p. 408.

Mr. Mill's whole reasoning turns on the phrase, "necessity of thought"; and yet he has used that phrase in two senses fundamentally different. A "necessity of thought" may no doubt be most intelligibly understood to mean, "a law of nature whereby under certain circumstances I *necessarily think* this, that, and the other judgment." But it may also be understood to mean, "a law of nature whereby I *think as necessary* this, that, and the other judgment." Now we heartily agree with Mr. Mill, that from a "necessity of thought" in the *former* sense, no legitimate argument whatever can be deduced for a necessity of objective truth. Supposing I felt unusually cold a few moments ago; it is a "necessity of thought" that I shall now *remember* the circumstance: yet that past experience was no necessary truth. It is a "necessity of thought" again, that I expect the sun to rise to-morrow: and many similar instances could be adduced. The only "necessity of thought" which proves the self-evident necessity of objective truth, is the necessity of thinking that such truth is self-evidently necessary.

This paragraph then exhibits from first to last a simple "ignoratio elenchi," such as we should not have expected from a writer like Mr. Mill. He proceeds however to say most truly, that Dean Mansel is a far more effective opponent of phenomenism than Sir W. Hamilton;* and accordingly, when he proceeds to answer *that* philosopher, he puts forth far greater strength than in the earlier paragraphs. Since we are here to enter on the most critical part of our controversy, we must begin with first distinctly setting forth (which we have not hitherto done) Mr. Mill's own theory, on the kind of certitude with which men hold the truth of mathematical axioms, and on the *ground* of that certitude.

This doctrine may be stated as follows. "I know the fact that all trilaterals are triangular, just as I know the fact that all wood floats on the water and that all stones sink therein. I have seen in my life a vast number of trilateral figures, and I have found them all triangular; all other men have had the same experience; and the same laws of induction, which prove that throughout the sphere of human observation wood floats on

* Almost immediately after the issue of our last number, Dean Mansel's sudden death was recorded. We are by no means unreserved admirers of his philosophy; and we regard with nothing less than profound aversion the general doctrine of his "Bampton Lectures" on man's knowledge of God. But (to speak of him only as a philosopher) he possessed great learning united with an original and very active and subtle mind; and he has done in his time much most important service in the particular controversy with which we are now engaged.

the water, prove also that throughout the sphere of human observation trilaterals are triangular. Whether either of these two propositions is true 'in distant parts of the stellar regions' ("Logic," vol. ii. p. 108), is a question on which I cannot form even a reasonable conjecture." *

For our own part we are confident, that the repugnance against this theory which will instinctively rise up in every intelligent mind—Mr. Mill himself admits that there *is* in the first instance this instinctive repugnance—is founded on reasoning much deeper than Mr. Mill's. Still when thinkers of such power as Mr. Mill and some of his supporters advocate a paradoxical thesis, the paradox must not be left to sink by its own weight, but must be assailed by explicit argument.

Now we shall not here consider the question one way or other, whether,—supposing *reason* did not prove mathematical axioms true in every *possible* region of existence—*experience* could by itself suffice to prove them true throughout the reach of *human observation*. Our purpose is to maintain the utter falsehood of the above hypothesis; to maintain that mathematical axioms are known by the light of reason to be self-evidently necessary. Dean Mansel has supported this view, to our mind, with absolutely irrefragable arguments. And we must do Mr. Mill the justice to say, that he has given so fair a representation of those arguments, that we have no wish to cite them except as they stand in Mr. Mill's own pages. We will place therefore before our readers a long extract from the "Examination of Hamilton," which will exhibit in close context the Dean's reasoning and Mr. Mill's attempted reply. The passage follows almost immediately that which we *last* extracted; and the *italics* are ours.

* We think Mr. Mill will admit that we have truly stated his theory; yet we will give a few references to his works. Mathematical axioms ("Logic," vol. i. p. 258) "are experimental truths: generalizations from observation." "The reverse of the most familiar principles of arithmetic and geometry might have been made conceivable *even to our present mental faculties*, if those faculties had co-existed with a totally different constitution of *external nature*." (On Hamilton, pp. 85, 86, note.) "We should probably be as well able to conceive a *round square* as a heavy square, if it was not that *in our uniform experience* at the instant when a thing begins to be round, it ceases to be square." (Ib. p. 85.) See also "Logic," vol. i. pp. 259, 283. In vol. i. p. 350, Mr. Mill speaks somewhat unexpectedly. "That a straight line is the shortest distance between two points," he says, "we do not doubt to be true even in the region of the fixed stars." But we do not see how to reconcile this with his statement (vol. ii. p. 108) that "it would be folly to affirm confidently" that "the special laws which we have found to hold universally on our own planet" prevail "in distant parts of the stellar regions"; and that "it would be idle to attempt to assign any" "probability" to such a supposition. We shall return to this in the text.

Mr. Mansel joins a distinct issue with the Association psychology, and brings the question to the proper test. "It has been already observed," he says in his *Prolegomena Logica*, "that whatever truths we are compelled to admit as everywhere and at all times necessary, must have their origin, not without, in the laws of the sensible world, but within, in the constitution of the mind itself. Sundry attempts have, indeed, been made to derive them from sensible experience and constant association of ideas; but this explanation is refuted by a criterion decisive of the fate of all hypotheses: it does not account for the phænomena. It does not account for the fact that *other associations, as frequent and as uniform, are incapable of producing a higher conviction than that of a relative and physical necessity only.*"

This is coming to the point, and evinces a correct apprehension of the conditions of scientific proof. If other associations, as close and as habitual as those existing in the cases in question, do not produce a similar feeling of necessity of thought, the sufficiency of the alleged cause is disproved, and the theory must fall. Mr. Mansel is within the true conditions of the Psychological Method.

But what are these cases of uniform and intimate association, which do not give rise to a feeling of mental necessity? The following is Mr. Mansel's first example of them: "I may imagine the sun rising and setting as now for a hundred years, and afterwards remaining continually fixed in the meridian. Yet my experiences of the alterations of day and night have been at least as invariable as of the geometrical properties of bodies. I can imagine the same stone sinking ninety-nine times in the water, and floating the hundredth, but my experience invariably repeats the former phenomenon only."*

The alternation of day and night is invariable in our experience; but is the phenomenon day so closely linked in our experience with the phenomenon night, that we never perceive the one, without, at the same or the immediately succeeding moment, perceiving the other? That is a condition present in the inseparable associations which generate necessities of thought. Uniformities of sequence in which the phenomena succeed one another only at a certain interval, do not give rise to inseparable associations. There are also mental conditions, as well as physical, which are required to create such an association. Let us take Mr. Mansel's other instance, a stone sinking in the water. We have never seen it float, yet we have no difficulty in conceiving it floating. But, in the first place, we have not been seeing stones sinking in water from the first dawn of consciousness, and in nearly every subsequent moment of our lives, as we have been seeing two and two make four, intersecting straight lines diverging instead of inclosing a space, causes followed by effects and effects preceded by causes. But there is a still more radical distinction than this. No frequency of conjunction between two phenomena will create an inseparable association, if counter-associations are

* We would ourselves rather say: "I do not fancy myself to cognise any *intrinsic repugnance* in the notion that the sun, after rising and setting for a hundred years, shall remain fixed in the meridian; or that the stone shall float the hundredth time."—Ed. D. R.

being created all the while. If we sometimes saw stones floating as well as sinking, however often we might have seen them sink, nobody supposes that we should have formed an inseparable association between them and sinking. We have not seen a stone float, but we are in the constant habit of seeing either stones or other things which have the same tendency to sink, remaining in a position which they would otherwise quit, being maintained in it by an unseen force. The sinking of a stone is but a case of gravitation, and we are abundantly accustomed to see the force of gravity counteracted. Every fact of that nature which we ever saw or heard of, is pro tanto an obstacle to the formation of the inseparable association which would make a violation of the law of gravity inconceivable to us. Resemblance is a principle of association, as well as contiguity : and however contradictory a supposition may be to our experience *in hæc materiâ*, if our experience *in aliâ materiâ* furnishes us with types even distantly resembling what the supposed phenomenon would be if realized, the associations thus formed will generally prevent the specific association from becoming so intense and irresistible, as to disable our imaginative faculty from embodying the supposition in a form moulded on one or other of those types.

Again, says Mr. Mansel, "experience has uniformly presented to me a horse's body in conjunction with a horse's head, and a man's head with a man's body ; just as experience has uniformly presented to me space inclosed within a pair of curved lines and not within a pair of straight lines" : yet I have no difficulty in imagining a centaur, but cannot imagine a space inclosed by two straight lines.* "*Why do I, in the former case, consider the results of my experience as contingent only and transgressible, confined to the actual phenomenon of a limited field, and possessing no value beyond it ; while, in the latter, I am compelled to regard them as necessary and universal ? Why can I give in imagination to a quadruped body what experience assures me is possessed by bipeds only ? And why can I not, in like manner, invest straight lines with an attribute which experience has uniformly presented in curves ?*"

I answer :—Because our experience furnishes us with a thousand models on which to frame the conception of a centaur, and with none on which to frame that of two straight lines inclosing a space. Nature, as known in our experience, is uniform in its laws, but extremely varied in its combinations. The combination of a horse's body with a human head has nothing, *primâ facie*, to make any wide distinction between it and any of the numberless varieties which we find in animated nature. To a common, even if not to a scientific mind, it is within the limits of the variations in our experience. Every similar variation which we have seen or heard of, is a help towards conceiving this particular one ; and tends to form an association, not of fixity but of variability, which frustrates the formation of an inseparable association between a human head and a human body exclusively. We

* Here again we would ourselves rather say : "I do not consider myself to cognize any *intrinsic repugnance* in the notion that a centaur should exist, but I do consider myself to cognize *intrinsic repugnance* in the notion that two straight lines should inclose a space."—Ed. D. R.

know of so many different heads, united to so many different bodies, that we have little difficulty in imagining any head in combination with any body. Nay, the mere mobility of objects in space is a fact so universal in our experience, that we easily conceive any object whatever occupying the place of any other; we may imagine without difficulty a horse with his head removed, and a human head put in its place. But what model does our experience afford on which to frame, or what elements from which to construct, the conception of two straight lines inclosing a space? There are no counter-associations in that case, and consequently the primary association, being founded on an experience beginning from birth, and never for many minutes intermitted in our waking hours, easily becomes inseparable. Had but experience afforded a case of illusion, in which two straight lines after intersecting had appeared again to approach, the counter-association formed might have been sufficient to render such a supposition imaginable, and defeat the supposed necessity of thought. In the case of parallel lines, the laws of perspective do present such an illusion: they do, to the eye, appear to meet in both directions, and consequently to inclose a space: and by supposing that we had no access to the evidence which proves that they do not really meet, an ingenious thinker, whom I formerly quoted, was able to give the idea of a constitution of nature in which all mankind might have believed that two straight lines could inclose a space. That we are unable to believe or imagine it in our present circumstances, needs no other explanation than the laws of association afford: for the case unites all the elements of the closest, intensest, and most inseparable association, with the greatest freedom from conflicting counter-associations which can be found within the conditions of human life.

In all the instances of phenomena invariably conjoined which fail to create necessities of thought, I am satisfied it would be found that the case is wanting in some of the conditions required by the Association psychology, as essential to the formation of an association really inseparable (pp. 320-5).

The first remark which we would make on this carefully-elaborated passage, is in itself of some importance. Mr. Mill distinctly admits that there is a real difference, between the kind of conviction wherewith I accept those truths which an objectivist accounts necessary, and those truths which he accounts contingent.* Mr. Mill of course attempts to explain this difference in some way consistent with his theory: but the admission which he so candidly makes is none the less observable.

Next we would point out, how importantly he misunderstands the objectivist position. In his view the objectivist appeals, not to the human reason, but to the human imagination; and argues that some given mathematical axiom is self-evidently necessary, on no other ground than that men are incapable of

* It can hardly be needful to explain that by "contingent" we simply mean "not necessary."

imaging to themselves its contradictory. Nor do we deny, as we have already implied, that Dean Mansel's language gives our author much excuse for his misapprehension; though we are convinced that the Dean had no such meaning as Mr. Mill supposes. I am to the full as incapable of *imaging* that mutual action of material particles which is called gravitation, as of imaging a quadrangular trilateral: yet I do *not* regard the former, while I *do* regard the latter, as intrinsically impossible. On this head we refer to some remarks in our last number, from p. 55 to p. 60. What an objectivist really alleges is, that the truth of any given mathematical axiom is known to me by my very conception of its subject; and consequently that, under the light of reason, I infallibly cognize that axiom as a self-evidently necessary truth. We have in an earlier part of our article set forth this argument. The only answer, given to it by Mr. Mill in the above extract, rests on the united force of two allegations. If either of these allegations be untrue, the whole answer breaks down; while for ourselves we are confident that *both* of them are untrue. The first is, that men never account any proposition self-evidently necessary, except one which they have repeatedly for an indefinite period observed by *experience* to be true. The second allegation is, that whenever two phenomenal facts are undeviatingly and unmistakably experienced in union, a thinker almost inevitably is deluded into the fancy, that there is some *necessary* connection between them. We will reply to these two allegations, in the order in which we have introduced them.

First then we confidently deny, that every truth, ordinarily accounted necessary, has been very frequently *observed* as true by him who thus accounts it. Take the very instance we have so often given. It is probable enough that I have very often seen trilateral figures; but have I often, consciously or unconsciously, observed the fact that they are *triangular*? Our impression is, that very few men observe this fact at all, except those given to mathematical study. A youth of fifteen years old is beginning to learn geometry; and his tutor points out to him, that every trilateral figure is triangular. Does he naturally reply, "Of course it is;—I have observed it a thousand times"? On the contrary, we believe that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the proposition will be entirely new to him; and yet (notwithstanding its novelty) will at once commend itself as self-evidently a necessary truth.* But there are many cases in which the student has

* "A mathematical friend told me he perfectly well remembered when a boy being taught without understanding it the axiom 'two straight lines

had no opportunity for previous observation. We wonder how many men there are, who have even *once* experienced the fact, that $2 + 9 = 3 + 8$. At all events the testimony given by every student will be this. I am told by my teacher that $2 + 9 = 3 + 8$. In order to show me that the fact is so, he does not dream of referring me to my past experience, but recommends a fresh purely mental experiment. He tells me, e.g., to fancy myself holding two pebbles in one hand and nine in the other, and then transferring one pebble from the larger to the smaller group. I thus cognize that in every possible region of existence $2 + 9 = 3 + 8$: and I arrive easily indeed at the more general proposition, that, in every possible region of existence, $(a + 1) + (b - 1) = a + b$; where a and b are any whole numbers whatever. Here is a large generality regarded by me as a self-evidently necessary truth, where no one can possibly say that the truth has been long and constantly experienced. And innumerable similar instances may be given, as is most obvious.

Secondly, we no less confidently deny Mr. Mill's *second* allegation, that the mere constant experience of two phenomenal facts in union leads men almost inevitably to fancy some necessary connection between the two. There is a certain phenomenon, constantly experienced by the inhabitants of this cold climate during far the greater portion of the day, throughout nearly three quarters of every year: we refer to the warmth-giving property of fire. Every Englishman has more frequent experience of this, than he has even of two and two making four, or of things equal to the same equalling one another. Nor is there any exception whatever to this property: there is no observed substance, which is brought near fire without its warmth being increased. Yet I see no intrinsic repugnance whatever in the notion, that in some other region of existence a substance may be found, which in every *other* respect resembles earthly fire—in consumption of coal or wood, in destroying or melting this or that other portion of matter—and yet which does *not* possess this particular property of imparting warmth. Nor again do I see any intrinsic repugnance whatever in the notion, that here upon earth, through preternatural agency, on one or other occasion fire may fail to impart warmth. I have never even once experienced the equality of $2 + 9$ to $3 + 8$, and yet am convinced

cannot inclose a space.' When the fourth proposition of Euclid was shown him, he remembers the universality and necessity of the axiom at once flashing on him."—Mahaffy's Translation of Fischer's Commentary on Kant, Introduction, p. ix.

that not even Omnipotence could overthrow that equality. I have most habitually experienced the warmth-giving property of fire, and yet see no reason for doubting that Omnipotence (if it exist)* can at any time suspend or remove that property. That which I have *never* experienced, I regard as *necessary*; that which I have *habitually and unexceptionally* experienced, I regard as *contingent*. Most certainly therefore mere constant and uniform experience cannot possibly account—as Mr. Mill thinks it does—for the mind's conviction of self-evident necessity.

There is another different road, by which we may no less securely travel to the overthrow of Mr. Mill's theory. Necessary truths may be most clearly distinguished from those merely physical, by one simple consideration. Putting aside the propositions of psychology, with which we are not here concerned,—the philosopher learns *experimental* truths no otherwise than by observing *external nature*; but he learns *self-evidently necessary* verities by examining *his own mind*. A proposition is discerned to be self-evidently necessary, whenever (once more to use F. Kleutgen's expression) "by simply considering the ideas of the subject and predicate, one comes to see that there exists between them that relation which the proposition expresses." So I judge it self-evidently necessary, that "the disobedience of a rational creature to his Holy Creator's command is morally wrong"; that "malice and mendacity are evil habits"; that " $a + b = (a - 1) + (b + 1)$ "; that "all trilateral figures are triangular." That these various propositions are not cognized by me as *experimental* truths, is manifest (we say) from one simple consideration; for in forming them, I have not been ever so slightly engaged in observing external nature, but exclusively in noting the processes of my own mind. We are not here to consider the two first of the above-recited propositions; but at all events, as regards *mathematical axioms*, no one can possibly say that they are *psychological* affirmations. Since therefore they are ascertained by a purely mental process, and yet are no psychological propositions, they cannot be experimental truths at all.

Now, in his "Examination of Hamilton," Mr. Mill apparently denies that the truth of any proposition (not tautological) can be known by my mere conception of its subject. But in his "Logic" he admits distinctly, that I *may* thus cognize the truth of *geometrical axioms*. These are his words:—

* We must again remind our readers that, in this early stage of our argument with Mr. Mill, we are not at liberty to assume the *existence* of an Omnipotent Being.

In the first place it is said, that if our assent to the proposition that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, were derived from the senses, we could only be convinced of its truth by actual trial, that is, by seeing or feeling the straight lines ; whereas in fact it is seen to be true by merely thinking of them. That a stone thrown into water goes to the bottom, may be perceived by our senses, but mere thinking of a stone thrown into the water would never have led us to that conclusion : not so, however, with the axioms relating to straight lines : if I could be made to conceive what a straight line is, without having seen one, I should at once recognize that two such lines cannot inclose a space. Intuition is "imaginary looking" ; but experience must be real looking : if we see a property of straight lines to be true by merely fancying ourselves to be looking at them, the ground of our belief cannot be the senses, or experience ; it must be something mental.

To this argument it might be added in the case of this particular axiom, (for the assertion would not be true of all axioms,) that the evidence of it from actual ocular inspection is not only unnecessary, but unattainable. What says the axiom ? That two straight lines *cannot* inclose a space ; that after having once intersected, if they are prolonged to infinity they do not meet, but continue to diverge from one another. How can this, in any single case, be proved by actual observation ? We may follow the lines to any distance we please ; but we cannot follow them to infinity : for aught our senses can testify, they may, immediately beyond the farthest point to which we have traced them, begin to approach, and at last meet. Unless, therefore, we had some other proof of the impossibility than observation affords us, we should have no ground for believing the axiom at all.

To these arguments, which I trust I cannot be accused of understating, a satisfactory answer will, I conceive, be found, if we advert to one of the characteristic properties of geometrical forms—their capacity of being painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality : in other words, the exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which suggest them. This, in the first place, enables us to make (at least with a little practice) mental pictures of all possible combinations of lines and angles, which resemble the realities quite as well as any which we could make on paper ; and in the next place, make those pictures just as fit subjects of geometrical experimentation as the realities themselves ; inasmuch as pictures, if sufficiently accurate, exhibit of course all the properties which would be manifested by the realities at one given instant, and on simple inspection : and in geometry we are concerned only with such properties, and not with that which pictures could not exhibit, the mutual action of bodies one upon another. The foundations of geometry would therefore be laid in direct experience, even if the experiments (which in this case consist merely in attentive contemplation) were practised solely upon what we call our ideas, that is, upon the diagrams in our minds, and not upon outward objects. For in all systems of experimentation we take some objects to serve as representatives of all which resemble them ; and in the present case the conditions which qualify a real object to be the representative of its class, are completely fulfilled by an object existing only in our fancy. Without denying, therefore, the possibility of satisfying ourselves that two straight lines cannot inclose a

space, by merely thinking of straight lines without actually looking at them ; I contend, that we do not believe this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another. The conclusion, therefore, is still an induction from observation. And we should not be authorized to substitute observation of the image on our mind, for observation of the reality, if we had not learnt by long-continued experience that the properties of the reality are faithfully represented in the image ; just as we should be scientifically warranted in describing an animal which we had never seen from a picture made of it with a daguerreotype ; but not until we had learnt by ample experience, that observation of such a picture is precisely equivalent to observation of the original.

These considerations also remove the objection arising from the impossibility of ocularly following the lines in their prolongation to infinity. For though, in order actually to see that two given lines never meet, it would be necessary to follow them to infinity ; yet without doing so we may know that if they ever do meet, or if, after diverging from one another, they begin again to approach, this must take place not at an infinite, but at a finite distance. Supposing, therefore, such to be the case, we can transport ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a mental image of the appearance which one or both of the lines must present at that point, which we may rely on as being precisely similar to the reality. Now, whether we fix our contemplation upon this imaginary picture, or call to mind the generalizations we have had occasion to make from former ocular observation, we learn by the evidence of experience, that a line which, after diverging from another straight line, begins to approach to it, produces the impression on our senses which we describe by the expression "a bent line," not by the expression, "a straight line." (*"Logic,"* vol. i. pp. 261—264.)

The reply to Mr. Mill's attempted solution of the difficulty is so obvious, that one wonders he can have missed it ; and we have implicitly given it in an earlier part of this article. He admits, it will have been seen, so much as this. I have formed in my mind the idea of a straight line ; and by merely contemplating this idea, I may arrive with absolute certainty at a conviction, that no two straight lines can inclose a space. Now let us suppose for argument's sake—the question is quite irrelevant—that my idea of a straight line was derived in the first instance from some physical object which I had observed. At all events I include no other property in my idea of a straight line, than those properties which appertain to every straight line found in any possible region of existence. If therefore, by contemplating my idea of a straight line, I may know certainly that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, this cognition of mine extends to all straight lines which can be found in any possible region of existence. Mr. Mill then will in consistency be obliged to admit, that in no possible region

of existence can two straight lines inclose a space; and that human thinkers know with certitude this impossibility. In other words, he will in consistency be obliged to admit the very proposition against which he is arguing; viz., that this mathematical axiom is known with certitude as a necessary truth.

But indeed it is quite curious to observe, how many openings Mr. Mill has left for criticism in the extract we just now gave. Thus, according to him, I must take two successive steps on my way to the conclusion, that earthly trilateral figures are triangular. First, I observe that the picture I form in my mind of a straight line has a close resemblance to earthly straight lines; secondly, I satisfy myself by mental experimentation, that every figure made up of three such straight lines, is triangular; then, thirdly, I infer that earthly trilateral figures inclusively are triangular. Now every one who looks carefully at the matter will see, that the first of these propositions does not at all inflow into the last by way of proof, but is simply and utterly superfluous. Yet it is this first proposition alone, which has so much as the semblance of appealing to *experience*, as any part whatever of my reason for holding that trilateral figures are triangular.

Then (2.)—whereas Mr. Mill purports to account for man's power of ascertaining axioms by mere mental experience—he bases that power on “one of the characteristic properties of geometrical forms.” But in so arguing, he has entirely left out of account *arithmetical* and *algebraic* axioms. I have fully as much power of arriving by mental experimentation at the knowledge that “ $(a - 1) + (b + 1) = a + b$,” as of arriving at the knowledge that “all trilaterals are triangular:” yet here there is no question at all of “forms” which can be “painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to the reality.”

(3.) “In all systems of experimentation,” says Mr. Mill, “we take some objects to serve as representatives of all that resemble them; and in the present case [that of geometrical axioms] the conditions which qualify a real object to be the representative of its class, are completely fulfilled by an object existing only in our fancy.” This view when drawn out will run as follows. If I observe that one single stone sinks in the water by its own weight, I legitimately conclude that *all* stones so sink: and yet objectivists themselves admit, that my knowledge of this general proposition is derived entirely from experience.* In like manner—so Mr. Mill argues—if I observe that

* Objectivists do not admit it; but let this pass for the present.

one mentally-pictured trilateral figure is triangular, I can doubtless legitimately infer that all trilaterals have the same property : and yet objectivists are bound in consistency to admit, that this fact does not negative the supposition, that my knowledge of this general truth may be derived entirely from experience. But *why*, we ask, do I conclude, from the case of one stone, to the case of all stones ? Mr. Mill himself gives as the reason, that experience has conclusively proved *the uniformity of nature* ; and certainly, unless this uniformity were proved in one way or another, we should proceed most illogically in arguing from the case of one stone to the case of all. Mr. Mill then is here in effect contradicting the very conclusion which he takes for granted. He takes for granted, that geometrical axioms can be securely ascertained by purely mental experimentation ; and yet he implies, that they can *not* be ascertained, until by experience of the physical world men have learnt the uniformity of nature.

(4.) To explain our next criticism, we will once more bring into juxtaposition two sentences of Mr. Mill's which we have already adduced. "That a straight line is the shortest distance between two points," Mr. Mill "does not doubt to be true even in the region of the fixed stars." ("Logic," vol. i. p. 350.) Yet (vol. ii. p. 108) "it would be folly," in his opinion, "to affirm confidently" that "in distant parts of the stellar regions, where phenomena may be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted," "those special laws" prevail, "which we have found to hold universally in our own planet." To hold otherwise, he thinks, would be "to make a supposition without evidence, and to which it would be idle to attempt to assign any probability." Which of these two conflicting statements represents Mr. Mill's real mind ? We can have no doubt that the *second* does so. It would be a blunder, of which thinkers far less clearsighted than Mr. Mill could not be guilty with their eyes open, to say that mathematical axioms are mere "generalizations from observation" ("Logic," vol. i. p. 258), and yet that a man can know them to hold good externally to the reach of *possible* observation. Mr. Mill then considers it impossible to know, or even to guess, whether "in the more distant parts of the stellar regions" there may not be quadrangular trilaterals, and pairs of straight lines each pair inclosing a space.

Yet, in the extract before us, he alleges confidently that two divergent straight lines will *never* meet. Let us concede that experience can tell that they will not meet within the reach of *human observation*. But what possible reason can he consistently allege for even guessing that they may *not* meet.

after they have passed beyond human ken and entered those inaccessible "distant parts of the stellar regions"?

We believe that a careful observer would detect many more parallogisms in the extract on which we have been commenting; but our readers will have had enough of this particular passage.

The only other argument which we can call to mind, as having been adduced by Mr. Mill against the self-evident necessity of mathematical axioms, occurs in an earlier part of his volume on Sir W. Hamilton; p. 87, note. He has avowedly adopted this argument from another contemporary writer, who has pressed into his service Reid's "Geometry of Visibles"; and the argument itself may be thus stated: "If mankind had possessed only the sense of sight and not that of touch, they would have accounted it a self-evidently necessary truth, that every straight line being produced will at last return into itself, and that any two straight lines being produced will meet in two points." Consequently, such is Mr. Mill's implied inference, men's knowledge of geometrical axioms depends, not on the immediate and peremptory declaration of their cognitive faculties, but on their possessing the sense of touch.

We must here say one preliminary word, on Mr. Mill's strange attempt to enlist Reid's authority on his side. He speaks of "*Reid's* conclusion that, to beings possessing only the sense of sight, the paradoxes here quoted and several others would be truths of intuition, self-evident truths." But it is quite impossible that Reid can have intended what is here implied, because notoriously he maintained that men cognize with certitude the self-evident truth of mathematical axioms. In p. 451. of the volume from which Mr. Mill quotes, he says (*sub finem*) that "mathematical axioms" possess "intuitive evidence"; and in p. 452 he proceeds to enumerate them among the "first principles of necessary truths." We are confident that Dr. Reid, in the passage on which Mr. Mill relies, intended the very truth, which it will be our own business to set forth in opposition to our present antagonist.

In order to the apprehension of Mr. Mill's argument, it is necessary to premise, that both he and Dr. Reid account differences of *distance* as made known to man, not really by sight at all, but exclusively by touch. They hold therefore, that, if any man possessing sight were without the sense of touch, he would account all the objects seen by him to be *equidistant*. We are perfectly willing to admit this doctrine for argument's sake; though (as we said in our last number, p. 52, note) we have no conviction of its truth.

This being laid down, Mr. Mill in effect thus argues : Let a planet be supposed, the inhabitants of which possess the sense of sight but not that of touch ; while their mental constitution is identical with that of the human race. The objects, which the planetarian sees at any given moment, are all accounted by him as equally distant from himself ; and accordingly as ranged on the inner surface of a hollow sphere, his eye being centre of that sphere. Let a straight line be placed before his vision : it will appear to him as the arc of a great circle of that sphere. He is told however on trustworthy authority that it is a straight line ; and he will therefore enounce, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that every straight line being produced will at last return into itself, and that any two straight lines being produced will meet in two points. Those geometrical axioms therefore—such is Mr. Mill's implied conclusion—which contradict these two propositions, are not known to man by his mental constitution (for the planetarian has the very *same* mental constitution) but by his possessing and exercising the sense of touch.

When once this argument is stated, there can hardly be any need of exposing its fallacy. The truth, which this planetarian regards as self-evidently necessary, *is* self-evidently necessary in the judgment of all objectivists : only he has learned to clothe it in non-human language. That form, which he has learned to designate by the name "straight line," is precisely that which *human beings* designate an "arc of a great circle of a sphere."

Whether such a planetarian *could* conceive the idea which men call a "straight line," is a question which we shall not here discuss ; but if he do conceive that idea—possessing as he does the same mental constitution with men—he will cognize as self-evidently necessary, that no straight line however produced can possibly return into itself, and that no two straight lines can intersect in more than one point. In what language he will have learnt to *express* this idea "straight line," we cannot of course guess.

We are not aware of any other reasoning of the least importance anywhere employed by Mr. Mill, in opposition to the objectivist doctrine on mathematical axioms. It seems to us, that in every instance the only effect he has legitimately produced, is to open out some fresh line of argument, which tells with irresistible force against his own conclusion.

We ought not however perhaps—considering the ultimate purpose of these articles—entirely to pass over a philosophical theory, which arrives at a goal substantially the same with Mr. Mill's, by a route precisely opposite. Our readers will

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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015.

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I intue, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that the new $5 + 6 =$ the old $4 + 7$: that not even Omnipotence could make the case otherwise. On reflection, I perceive that the same truth holds, not of *these* pebbles only but of *all* pebbles; not of *pebbles* only but of all numerable things. Still further, reflection enables me to intue the more general axiom, $a + b = (a + 1) + (b - 1)$; and the more general axiom still, $a + b = (a + m) + (b - m)$; where a , b , and m may be any whole numbers whatever, so only that m be not greater than b . *Capability* of being universalized is indubitably a characteristic of self-evidently necessary truths; but we shall be quite mistaken, if we fancy that they are ordinarily *intued* as universal. The immense majority of mankind, while again and again accepting them in their individual shape, seldom if ever universalize an axiom from the beginning of their life to the end.

II. There can be no need of employing words to prove the very obvious proposition, that if mathematical axioms are self-evidently necessary, the validity of syllogistic reasoning is no less so. But the whole body of mathematical truth is derived syllogistically from mathematical axioms; and it follows therefore, that the whole body of mathematical truth is strictly necessary.

III. Even were there no other necessary truths than those which (we trust) we have conclusively proved to be such in our present article,—let us observe what results from our argument. Entirely distinct from, entirely over and above, the experimental order, there is a body of what may be called “transcendental” truth; truth which transcends human experience.* We are not able yet to decide whether all transcendental truth is necessary: but anyhow all necessary truth is transcendental; for the knowledge of anything as *necessary*—Mr. Mill will be the first to admit—is wholly unattainable from mere *experience*. Further, among these transcendental truths are to be numbered the propositions of geometry,

* It will conduce to clearness, if we accurately distinguish between our use of the words “transcendental” and “intuitional.” We call those truths “intuitional,” which the individual accepts exclusively on the ground of mental intuition; and we call those truths “transcendental,” which are neither experienced facts nor *inferrible* from experienced facts. Thus the truths testified by *memory* are “intuitional,” but not “transcendental”: they are facts which have been experienced, and therefore are not “transcendental” truths; yet they are known to him who remembers them, exclusively on the ground of present intuition, and they are therefore “intuitional.” See our last number, pp. 45, 46, 51. On the other hand Euclid's theorems are “transcendental,” but not generally “intuitional”; because they are not accepted on the ground of intuition, but of *deduction* from *intuitive* truths.

remember that, towards the beginning of our article, we drew a distinction between "tautological" and "significant" propositions. A proposition of the former class declares no more, than has already been expressed in its subject. Suppose e.g. some one were gravely to enounce, that "every square is quadrilateral": "*of course*," I should reply; "for 'quadrilateral' is part of what is expressed by the very word 'square.'" Such nugatory propositions are of the form "A is A": and Mr. Mill would himself admit that they are known independently of experience; though reasonably enough he might refuse to dignify them with the name of "*a priori*" or "necessary." Now such a philosopher as we speak of, while admitting that mathematical axioms are cognized independently of experience, maintains that they are "tautological"; and consequently that no inference can reasonably be made from *them* to the case of "significant" propositions. He denies accordingly, that there are any "necessary" propositions of the latter class.

As this view is fundamentally opposed to Mr. Mill's, it is no part of our present business to reason against it at any length. We will but draw attention to the whimsical character of a theory, which alleges that a vast body of new truths can be syllogistically deduced from tautologies; and we will add one single argument by way of refutation. So far is it from being true that "triangular" is part of what is expressed by the word "trilateral,"—that on the contrary I have comprehended the *whole* of what is meant by "trilateral," before I have so much as asked myself the question, whether a trilateral figure has three angles or any angle at all. So far is it from being true that $3+8$ is part of what is expressed by the words $2+9$,—that on the contrary I have comprehended the whole of what is meant by the latter, before I have so much as *thought* of the former, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly.

Mr. Mill has some excellent observations on this theory, so far as regards arithmetical axioms, in his "*Logic*," vol. i. pp. 284—289.

We now, however, return to our general argument. From what has been hitherto said three inferences may be deduced, of much importance in their respective ways.

I. Mathematical axioms are not ordinarily intued at first in an universal but in an individual shape. Dr. M'Cosh has done very great service, by dwelling on this truth in the case of *all* intuitions; but our present concern is with mathematical axioms. I hold 7 pebbles in one hand and 4 in the other, and then transfer one from the larger to the smaller group.

I intue, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that the new $5 + 6 =$ the old $4 + 7$: that not even Omnipotence could make the case otherwise. On reflection, I perceive that the same truth holds, not of *these* pebbles only but of *all* pebbles; not of *pebbles* only but of all numerable things. Still further, reflection enables me to intue the more general axiom, $a + b = (a + 1) + (b - 1)$; and the more general axiom still, $a + b = (a + m) + (b - m)$; where a , b , and m may be any whole numbers whatever, so only that m be not greater than b . *Capability* of being universalized is indubitably a characteristic of self-evidently necessary truths; but we shall be quite mistaken, if we fancy that they are ordinarily *intued* as universal. The immense majority of mankind, while again and again accepting them in their individual shape, seldom if ever universalize an axiom from the beginning of their life to the end.

II. There can be no need of employing words to prove the very obvious proposition, that if mathematical axioms are self-evidently necessary, the validity of syllogistic reasoning is no less so. But the whole body of mathematical truth is derived syllogistically from mathematical axioms; and it follows therefore, that the whole body of mathematical truth is strictly necessary.

III. Even were there no other necessary truths than those which (we trust) we have conclusively proved to be such in our present article,—let us observe what results from our argument. Entirely distinct from, entirely over and above, the experimental order, there is a body of what may be called “transcendental” truth; truth which transcends human experience.* We are not able yet to decide whether all transcendental truth is necessary: but anyhow all necessary truth is transcendental; for the knowledge of anything as *necessary*—Mr. Mill will be the first to admit—is wholly unattainable from mere *experience*. Further, among these transcendental truths are to be numbered the propositions of geometry,

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There is another different road, by which we may no less securely travel to the overthrow of Mr. Mill's theory. Necessary truths may be most clearly distinguished from those merely physical, by one simple consideration. Putting aside the propositions of psychology, with which we are not here concerned,—the philosopher learns *experimental* truths no otherwise than by observing *external nature*; but he learns *self-evidently necessary* verities by examining *his own mind*. A proposition is discerned to be self-evidently necessary, whenever (once more to use F. Kleutgen's expression) "by simply considering the ideas of the subject and predicate, one comes to see that there exists between them that relation which the proposition expresses." So I judge it self-evidently necessary, that "the disobedience of a rational creature to his Holy Creator's command is morally wrong"; that "malice and mendacity are evil habits"; that " $a + b = (a - 1) + (b + 1)$ "; that "all trilateral figures are triangular." That these various propositions are not cognized by me as *experimental* truths, is manifest (we say) from one simple consideration; for in forming them, I have not been ever so slightly engaged in observing external nature, but exclusively in noting the processes of my own mind. We are not here to consider the two first of the above-recited propositions; but at all events, as regards *mathematical axioms*, no one can possibly say that they are *psychological* affirmations. Since therefore they are ascertained by a purely mental process, and yet are no psychological propositions, they cannot be experimental truths at all.

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To this argument it might be added in the case of this particular axiom, (for the assertion would not be true of all axioms,) that the evidence of it from actual ocular inspection is not only unnecessary, but unattainable. What says the axiom ? That two straight lines *cannot* inclose a space ; that after having once intersected, if they are prolonged to infinity they do not meet, but continue to diverge from one another. How can this, in any single case, be proved by actual observation ? We may follow the lines to any distance we please ; but we cannot follow them to infinity : for aught our senses can testify, they may, immediately beyond the farthest point to which we have traced them, begin to approach, and at last meet. Unless, therefore, we had some other proof of the impossibility than observation affords us, we should have no ground for believing the axiom at all.

To these arguments, which I trust I cannot be accused of understating, a satisfactory answer will, I conceive, be found, if we advert to one of the characteristic properties of geometrical forms—their capacity of being painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality : in other words, the exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which suggest them. This, in the first place, enables us to make (at least with a little practice) mental pictures of all possible combinations of lines and angles, which resemble the realities quite as well as any which we could make on paper ; and in the next place, make those pictures just as fit subjects of geometrical experimentation as the realities themselves ; inasmuch as pictures, if sufficiently accurate, exhibit of course all the properties which would be manifested by the realities at one given instant, and on simple inspection : and in geometry we are concerned only with such properties, and not with that which pictures could not exhibit, the mutual action of bodies one upon another. The foundations of geometry would therefore be laid in direct experience, even if the experiments (which in this case consist merely in attentive contemplation) were practised solely upon what we call our ideas, that is, upon the diagrams in our minds, and not upon outward objects. For in all systems of experimentation we take some objects to serve as representatives of all which resemble them ; and in the present case the conditions which qualify a real object to be the representative of its class, are completely fulfilled by an object existing only in our fancy. Without denying, therefore, the possibility of satisfying ourselves that two straight lines cannot inclose a

space, by merely thinking of straight lines without actually looking at them ; I contend, that we do not believe this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another. The conclusion, therefore, is still an induction from observation. And we should not be authorized to substitute observation of the image on our mind, for observation of the reality, if we had not learnt by long-continued experience that the properties of the reality are faithfully represented in the image ; just as we should be scientifically warranted in describing an animal which we had never seen from a picture made of it with a daguerreotype ; but not until we had learnt by ample experience, that observation of such a picture is precisely equivalent to observation of the original.

These considerations also remove the objection arising from the impossibility of ocularly following the lines in their prolongation to infinity. For though, in order actually to see that two given lines never meet, it would be necessary to follow them to infinity ; yet without doing so we may know that if they ever do meet, or if, after diverging from one another, they begin again to approach, this must take place not at an infinite, but at a finite distance. Supposing, therefore, such to be the case, we can transport ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a mental image of the appearance which one or both of the lines must present at that point, which we may rely on as being precisely similar to the reality. Now, whether we fix our contemplation upon this imaginary picture, or call to mind the generalizations we have had occasion to make from former ocular observation, we learn by the evidence of experience, that a line which, after diverging from another straight line, begins to approach to it, produces the impression on our senses which we describe by the expression "a bent line," not by the expression, "a straight line." (*"Logic,"* vol. i. pp. 261—264.)

The reply to Mr. Mill's attempted solution of the difficulty is so obvious, that one wonders he can have missed it ; and we have implicitly given it in an earlier part of this article. He admits, it will have been seen, so much as this. I have formed in my mind the idea of a straight line ; and by merely contemplating this idea, I may arrive with absolute certainty at a conviction, that no two straight lines can inclose a space. Now let us suppose for argument's sake—the question is quite irrelevant—that my idea of a straight line was derived in the first instance from some physical object which I had observed. At all events I include no other property in my idea of a straight line, than those properties which appertain to every straight line found in any possible region of existence. If therefore, by contemplating my idea of a straight line, I may know certainly that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, this cognition of mine extends to all straight lines which can be found in any possible region of existence. Mr. Mill then will in consistency be obliged to admit, that in no possible region

of existence can two straight human thinkers know with ce other words, he will in co very proposition against which mathematical axiom is known truth.

But indeed it is quite curious ings Mr. Mill has left for crit gave. Thus, according to him, steps on my way to the concl figures are triangular. First, I form in my mind of a straight line earthly straight lines; secondly, l experimentation, that every figur straight lines, is triangular; then, t trilateral figures inclusively are t who looks carefully at the matter these propositions does not at all inflow in of proof, but is simply and utterly superfloo first proposition alone, which has so much as appealing to *experience*, as any part whatever for holding that trilateral figures are triangular.

Then (2.)—whereas Mr. Mill purports to a power of ascertaining axioms by mere mental bases that power on “one of the characteristic *geometrical* forms.” But in so arguing, he has out of account *arithmetical* and *algebraic* axioms, as much power of arriving by mental experiment knowledge that “ $(a - 1) + (b + 1) = a + b$,” as o the knowledge that “all trilaterals are triangular.” there is no question at all of “forms” which can b in the imagination with a distinctness equal to the .

(3.) “In all systems of experimentation,” says Mr. take some objects to serve as representatives of resemble them; and in the present case [that of geo. axioms] the conditions which qualify a real object to representative of its class, are completely fulfilled by an existing only in our fancy.” This view when drawn c run as follows. If I observe that one single stone sinks water by its own weight, I legitimately conclude that *all s* so sink: and yet objectivists themselves admit, that *my k* ledge of this general proposition is derived entirely from exp ence.* In like manner—so Mr. Mill argues—if I observe t

* Objectivists do not admit it; |

one mentally-pictured trilateral figure is triangular, I can doubtless legitimately infer that all trilaterals have the same property : and yet objectivists are bound in consistency to admit, that this fact does not negative the supposition, that my knowledge of this general truth may be derived entirely from experience. But *why*, we ask, do I conclude, from the case of one stone, to the case of all stones ? Mr. Mill himself gives as the reason, that experience has conclusively proved *the uniformity of nature* ; and certainly, unless this uniformity were proved in one way or another, we should proceed most illogically in arguing from the case of one stone to the case of all. Mr. Mill then is here in effect contradicting the very conclusion which he takes for granted. He takes for granted, that geometrical axioms can be securely ascertained by purely mental experimentation ; and yet he implies, that they can *not* be ascertained, until by experience of the physical world men have learnt the uniformity of nature.

(4.) To explain our next criticism, we will once more bring into juxtaposition two sentences of Mr. Mill's which we have already adduced. "That a straight line is the shortest distance between two points," Mr. Mill "does not doubt to be true even in the region of the fixed stars." ("Logic," vol. i. p. 350.) Yet (vol. ii. p. 108) "it would be folly," in his opinion, "to affirm confidently" that "in distant parts of the stellar regions, where phenomena may be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted," "those special laws" prevail, "which we have found to hold universally in our own planet." To hold otherwise, he thinks, would be "to make a supposition without evidence, and to which it would be idle to attempt to assign any probability." Which of these two conflicting statements represents Mr. Mill's real mind ? We can have no doubt that the *second* does so. It would be a blunder, of which thinkers far less clear-sighted than Mr. Mill could not be guilty with their eyes open, to say that mathematical axioms are mere "generalizations from observation" ("Logic," vol. i. p. 258), and yet that a man can know them to hold good externally to the reach of *possible* observation. Mr. Mill then considers it impossible to know, or even to guess, whether "in the more distant parts of the stellar regions" there may not be quadrangular trilaterals, and pairs of straight lines each pair inclosing a space.

Yet, in the extract before us, he alleges confidently that two divergent straight lines will *never* meet. Let us concede that experience can tell that they will not meet within *the reach of human observation*. But what possible reason can he consistently allege for even *guessing* that they may not meet,

after they have passed beyond human ken and entered those inaccessible "distant parts of the stellar regions"?

We believe that a careful observer would detect many more paralogisms in the extract on which we have been commenting; but our readers will have had enough of this particular passage.

The only other argument which we can call to mind, as having been adduced by Mr. Mill against the self-evident necessity of mathematical axioms, occurs in an earlier part of his volume on Sir W. Hamilton; p. 87, note. He has avowedly adopted this argument from another contemporary writer, who has pressed into his service Reid's "Geometry of Visibles"; and the argument itself may be thus stated: "If mankind had possessed only the sense of sight and not that of touch, they would have accounted it a self-evidently necessary truth, that every straight line being produced will at last return into itself, and that any two straight lines being produced will meet in two points." Consequently, such is Mr. Mill's implied inference, men's knowledge of geometrical axioms depends, not on the immediate and peremptory declaration of their cognitive faculties, but on their possessing the sense of touch.

We must here say one preliminary word, on Mr. Mill's strange attempt to enlist Reid's authority on his side. He speaks of "*Reid's* conclusion that, to beings possessing only the sense of sight, the paradoxes here quoted and several others would be truths of intuition, self-evident truths." But it is quite impossible that Reid can have intended what is here implied, because notoriously he maintained that men cognize with certitude the self-evident truth of mathematical axioms. In p. 451. of the volume from which Mr. Mill quotes, he says (sub finem) that "mathematical axioms" possess "intuitive evidence"; and in p. 452 he proceeds to enumerate them among the "first principles of necessary truths." We are confident that Dr. Reid, in the passage on which Mr. Mill relies, intended the very truth, which it will be our own business to set forth in opposition to our present antagonist.

In order to the apprehension of Mr. Mill's argument, it is necessary to premise, that both he and Dr. Reid account differences of *distance* as made known to man, not really by sight at all, but exclusively by touch. They hold therefore, that, if any man possessing sight were without the sense of touch, he would account all the objects seen by him to be *equidistant*. We are perfectly willing to admit this doctrine for argument's sake; though (as we said in our last number, p. 52, note) we have no conviction of its truth.

This being laid down, Mr. Mill in effect thus argues : Let a planet be supposed, the inhabitants of which possess the sense of sight but not that of touch ; while their mental constitution is identical with that of the human race. The objects, which the planetarian sees at any given moment, are all accounted by him as equally distant from himself ; and accordingly as ranged on the inner surface of a hollow sphere, his eye being centre of that sphere. Let a straight line be placed before his vision : it will appear to him as the arc of a great circle of that sphere. He is told however on trustworthy authority that it is a straight line ; and he will therefore enounce, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that every straight line being produced will at last return into itself, and that any two straight lines being produced will meet in two points. Those geometrical axioms therefore—such is Mr. Mill's implied conclusion—which contradict these two propositions, are not known to man by his mental constitution (for the planetarian has the very *same* mental constitution) but by his possessing and exercising the sense of touch.

When once this argument is stated, there can hardly be any need of exposing its fallacy. The truth, which this planetarian regards as self-evidently necessary, *is* self-evidently necessary in the judgment of all objectivists : only he has learned to clothe it in non-human language. That form, which he has learned to designate by the name "straight line," is precisely that which *human beings* designate an "arc of a great circle of a sphere."

Whether such a planetarian *could* conceive the idea which men call a "straight line," is a question which we shall not here discuss ; but if he do conceive that idea—possessing as he does the *same* mental constitution with men—he will cognize as self-evidently necessary, that no straight line however produced can possibly return into itself, and that no two straight lines can intersect in more than one point. In what language he will have learnt to *express* this idea "straight line," we cannot of course guess.

We are not aware of any other reasoning of the least importance anywhere employed by Mr. Mill, in opposition to the objectivist doctrine on mathematical axioms. It seems to us, that in every instance the only effect he has legitimately produced, is to open out some fresh line of argument, which tells with irresistible force against his own conclusion.

We ought not however perhaps—considering the ultimate purpose of these articles—entirely to pass over a philosophical theory, which arrives at a goal substantially the same with Mr. Mill's, by a route precisely opposite. Our readers will

remember that, towards the beginning of our article, we drew a distinction between "tautological" and "significant" propositions. A proposition of the former class declares no more, than has already been expressed in its subject. Suppose e.g. some one were gravely to enounce, that "every square is quadrilateral": "*of course,*" I should reply; "for 'quadrilateral' is part of what is expressed by the very word 'square.'" Such nugatory propositions are of the form "A is A": and Mr. Mill would himself admit that they are known independently of experience; though reasonably enough he might refuse to dignify them with the name of "*a priori*" or "necessary." Now such a philosopher as we speak of, while admitting that mathematical axioms are cognized independently of experience, maintains that they are "tautological"; and consequently that no inference can reasonably be made from *them* to the case of "significant" propositions. He denies accordingly, that there are any "necessary" propositions of the latter class.

As this view is fundamentally opposed to Mr. Mill's, it is no part of our present business to reason against it at any length. We will but draw attention to the whimsical character of a theory, which alleges that a vast body of new truths can be syllogistically deduced from tautologies; and we will add one single argument by way of refutation. So far is it from being true that "triangular" is part of what is expressed by the word "trilateral,"—that on the contrary I have comprehended the *whole* of what is meant by "trilateral," before I have so much as asked myself the question, whether a trilateral figure has three angles or any angle at all. So far is it from being true that $3+8$ is part of what is expressed by the words $2+9$,—that on the contrary I have comprehended the whole of what is meant by the latter, before I have so much as *thought* of the former, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly.

Mr. Mill has some excellent observations on this theory, so far as regards arithmetical axioms, in his "Logic," vol. i. pp. 284—289.

We now, however, return to our general argument. From what has been hitherto said three inferences may be deduced, of much importance in their respective ways.

I. Mathematical axioms are not ordinarily intued at first in an universal but in an individual shape. Dr. M'Cosh has done very great service, by dwelling on this truth in the case of *all* intuitions; but our present concern is with mathematical axioms. I hold 7 pebbles in one hand and 4 in the other, and then transfer one from the larger to the smaller group.

I intue, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that the new $5 + 6 =$ the old $4 + 7$: that not even Omnipotence could make the case otherwise. On reflection, I perceive that the same truth holds, not of *these* pebbles only but of *all* pebbles; not of *pebbles* only but of all numerable things. Still further, reflection enables me to intue the more general axiom, $a + b = (a + 1) + (b - 1)$; and the more general axiom still, $a + b = (a + m) + (b - m)$; where a , b , and m may be any whole numbers whatever, so only that m be not greater than b . *Capability* of being universalized is indubitably a characteristic of self-evidently necessary truths; but we shall be quite mistaken, if we fancy that they are ordinarily *intued* as universal. The immense majority of mankind, while again and again accepting them in their individual shape, seldom if ever universalize an axiom from the beginning of their life to the end.

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* We must again remind our readers that, in this early stage of our argument with Mr. Mill, we are not at liberty to assume the *existence* of an Omnipotent Being.

In the first place it is said, that if our assent to the proposition that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, were derived from the senses, we could only be convinced of its truth by actual trial, that is, by seeing or feeling the straight lines ; whereas in fact it is seen to be true by merely thinking of them. That a stone thrown into water goes to the bottom, may be perceived by our senses, but mere thinking of a stone thrown into the water would never have led us to that conclusion : not so, however, with the axioms relating to straight lines : if I could be made to conceive what a straight line is, without having seen one, I should at once recognize that two such lines cannot inclose a space. Intuition is "imaginary looking" ; but experience must be real looking : if we see a property of straight lines to be true by merely fancying ourselves to be looking at them, the ground of our belief cannot be the senses, or experience ; it must be something mental.

To this argument it might be added in the case of this particular axiom, (for the assertion would not be true of all axioms,) that the evidence of it from actual ocular inspection is not only unnecessary, but unattainable. What says the axiom ? That two straight lines *cannot* inclose a space ; that after having once intersected, if they are prolonged to infinity they do not meet, but continue to diverge from one another. How can this, in any single case, be proved by actual observation ? We may follow the lines to any distance we please ; but we cannot follow them to infinity : for aught our senses can testify, they may, immediately beyond the farthest point to which we have traced them, begin to approach, and at last meet. Unless, therefore, we had some other proof of the impossibility than observation affords us, we should have no ground for believing the axiom at all.

To these arguments, which I trust I cannot be accused of understating, a satisfactory answer will, I conceive, be found, if we advert to one of the characteristic properties of geometrical forms—their capacity of being painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality : in other words, the exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which suggest them. This, in the first place, enables us to make (at least with a little practice) mental pictures of all possible combinations of lines and angles, which resemble the realities quite as well as any which we could make on paper ; and in the next place, make those pictures just as fit subjects of geometrical experimentation as the realities themselves ; inasmuch as pictures, if sufficiently accurate, exhibit of course all the properties which would be manifested by the realities at one given instant, and on simple inspection : and in geometry we are concerned only with such properties, and not with that which pictures could not exhibit, the mutual action of bodies one upon another. The foundations of geometry would therefore be laid in direct experience, even if the experiments (which in this case consist merely in attentive contemplation) were practised solely upon what we call our ideas, that is, upon the diagrams in our minds, and not upon outward objects. For in all systems of experimentation we take some objects to serve as representatives of all which resemble them ; and in the present case the conditions which qualify a real object to be the representative of its class are completely fulfilled by an object existing only in our fancy. Without denying, therefore, the possibility of satisfying ourselves that two straight lines cannot inclose a

space, by merely thinking of straight lines without actually looking at them ; I contend, that we do not believe this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another. The conclusion, therefore, is still an induction from observation. And we should not be authorized to substitute observation of the image on our mind, for observation of the reality, if we had not learnt by long-continued experience that the properties of the reality are faithfully represented in the image ; just as we should be scientifically warranted in describing an animal which we had never seen from a picture made of it with a daguerreotype ; but not until we had learnt by ample experience, that observation of such a picture is precisely equivalent to observation of the original.

These considerations also remove the objection arising from the impossibility of ocularly following the lines in their prolongation to infinity. For though, in order actually to see that two given lines never meet, it would be necessary to follow them to infinity ; yet without doing so we may know that if they ever do meet, or if, after diverging from one another, they begin again to approach, this must take place not at an infinite, but at a finite distance. Supposing, therefore, such to be the case, we can transport ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a mental image of the appearance which one or both of the lines must present at that point, which we may rely on as being precisely similar to the reality. Now, whether we fix our contemplation upon this imaginary picture, or call to mind the generalizations we have had occasion to make from former ocular observation, we learn by the evidence of experience, that a line which, after diverging from another straight line, begins to approach to it, produces the impression on our senses which we describe by the expression "a bent line," not by the expression, "a straight line." (*"Logic,"* vol. i. pp. 261—264.)

The reply to Mr. Mill's attempted solution of the difficulty is so obvious, that one wonders he can have missed it ; and we have implicitly given it in an earlier part of this article. He admits, it will have been seen, so much as this. I have formed in my mind the idea of a straight line ; and by merely contemplating this idea, I may arrive with absolute certainty at a conviction, that no two straight lines can inclose a space. Now let us suppose for argument's sake—the question is quite irrelevant—that my idea of a straight line was derived in the first instance from some physical object which I had observed. At all events I include no other property in my idea of a straight line, than those properties which appertain to every straight line found in any possible region of existence. If therefore, by contemplating my idea of a straight line, I may know certainly that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, this cognition of mine extends to all straight lines which can be found in any possible region of existence. Mr. Mill then will in consistency be obliged to admit, that in no possible region

of existence can two straight lines inclose a space; and that human thinkers know with certitude this impossibility. In other words, he will in consistency be obliged to admit the very proposition against which he is arguing; viz., that this mathematical axiom is known with certitude as a necessary truth.

But indeed it is quite curious to observe, how many openings Mr. Mill has left for criticism in the extract we just now gave. Thus, according to him, I must take two successive steps on my way to the conclusion, that earthly trilateral figures are triangular. First, I observe that the picture I form in my mind of a straight line has a close resemblance to earthly straight lines; secondly, I satisfy myself by mental experimentation, that every figure made up of three such straight lines, is triangular; then, thirdly, I infer that earthly trilateral figures inclusively are triangular. Now every one who looks carefully at the matter will see, that the first of these propositions does not at all inflow into the last by way of proof, but is simply and utterly superfluous. Yet it is this first proposition alone, which has so much as the semblance of appealing to *experience*, as any part whatever of my reason for holding that trilateral figures are triangular.

Then (2.)—whereas Mr. Mill purports to account for man's power of ascertaining axioms by mere mental experience—he bases that power on “one of the characteristic properties of *geometrical forms*.” But in so arguing, he has entirely left out of account *arithmetical* and *algebraic* axioms. I have fully as much power of arriving by mental experimentation at the knowledge that “ $(a - 1) + (b + 1) = a + b$,” as of arriving at the knowledge that “all trilaterals are triangular:” yet here there is no question at all of “forms” which can be “painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to the reality.”

(3.) “In all systems of experimentation,” says Mr. Mill, “we take some objects to serve as representatives of all that resemble them; and in the present case [that of geometrical axioms] the conditions which qualify a real object to be the representative of its class, are completely fulfilled by an object existing only in our fancy.” This view when drawn out will run as follows. If I observe that one single stone sinks in the water by its own weight, I legitimately conclude that *all* stones so sink: and yet objectivists themselves admit, that my knowledge of this general proposition is derived entirely from experience.* In like manner—so Mr. Mill argues—if I observe that

* Objectivists do *not* admit it; but let this pass for the present.

one mentally-pictured trilateral figure is triangular, I can doubtless legitimately infer that all trilaterals have the same property : and yet objectivists are bound in consistency to admit, that this fact does not negative the supposition, that my knowledge of this general truth may be derived entirely from experience. But *why*, we ask, do I conclude, from the case of one stone, to the case of all stones ? Mr. Mill himself gives as the reason, that experience has conclusively proved *the uniformity of nature* ; and certainly, unless this uniformity were proved in one way or another, we should proceed most illogically in arguing from the case of one stone to the case of all. Mr. Mill then is here in effect contradicting the very conclusion which he takes for granted. He takes for granted, that geometrical axioms can be securely ascertained by purely mental experimentation ; and yet he implies, that they can *not* be ascertained, until by experience of the physical world men have learnt the uniformity of nature.

(4.) To explain our next criticism, we will once more bring into juxtaposition two sentences of Mr. Mill's which we have already adduced. "That a straight line is the shortest distance between two points," Mr. Mill "does not doubt to be true even in the region of the fixed stars." ("Logic," vol. i. p. 350.) Yet (vol. ii. p. 108) "it would be folly," in his opinion, "to affirm confidently" that "in distant parts of the stellar regions, where phenomena may be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted," "those special laws" prevail, "which we have found to hold universally in our own planet." To hold otherwise, he thinks, would be "to make a supposition without evidence, and to which it would be idle to attempt to assign any probability." Which of these two conflicting statements represents Mr. Mill's real mind ? We can have no doubt that the *second* does so. It would be a blunder, of which thinkers far less clearsighted than Mr. Mill could not be guilty with their eyes open, to say that mathematical axioms are mere "generalizations from observation" ("Logic," vol. i. p. 258), and yet that a man can know them to hold good externally to the reach of *possible* observation. Mr. Mill then considers it impossible to know, or even to guess, whether "in the more distant parts of the stellar regions" there may not be quadrangular trilaterals, and pairs of straight lines each pair inclosing a space.

Yet, in the extract before us, he alleges confidently that two divergent straight lines will *never* meet. Let us concede that experience can tell that they will not meet within *the reach of human observation*. But what possible reason can he consistently allege for even *guessing* that they may not meet,

after they have passed beyond human ken and entered those inaccessible "distant parts of the stellar regions"?

We believe that a careful observer would detect many more parallogisms in the extract on which we have been commenting; but our readers will have had enough of this particular passage.

The only other argument which we can call to mind, as having been adduced by Mr. Mill against the self-evident necessity of mathematical axioms, occurs in an earlier part of his volume on Sir W. Hamilton; p. 87, note. He has avowedly adopted this argument from another contemporary writer, who has pressed into his service Reid's "Geometry of Visibles"; and the argument itself may be thus stated: "If mankind had possessed only the sense of sight and not that of touch, they would have accounted it a self-evidently necessary truth, that every straight line being produced will at last return into itself, and that any two straight lines being produced will meet in two points." Consequently, such is Mr. Mill's implied inference, men's knowledge of geometrical axioms depends, not on the immediate and peremptory declaration of their cognitive faculties, but on their possessing the sense of touch.

We must here say one preliminary word, on Mr. Mill's strange attempt to enlist Reid's authority on his side. He speaks of "*Reid's* conclusion that, to beings possessing only the sense of sight, the paradoxes here quoted and several others would be truths of intuition, self-evident truths." But it is quite impossible that Reid can have intended what is here implied, because notoriously he maintained that men cognize with certitude the self-evident truth of mathematical axioms. In p. 451. of the volume from which Mr. Mill quotes, he says (sub finem) that "mathematical axioms" possess "intuitive evidence"; and in p. 452 he proceeds to enumerate them among the "first principles of necessary truths." We are confident that Dr. Reid, in the passage on which Mr. Mill relies, intended the very truth, which it will be our own business to set forth in opposition to our present antagonist.

In order to the apprehension of Mr. Mill's argument, it is necessary to premise, that both he and Dr. Reid account differences of *distance* as made known to man, not really by sight at all, but exclusively by touch. They hold therefore, that, if any man possessing sight were without the sense of touch, he would account all the objects seen by him to be *equidistant*. We are perfectly willing to admit this doctrine for argument's sake; though (as we said in our last number, p. 52, note) we have no conviction of its truth.

This being laid down, Mr. Mill in effect thus argues : Let a planet be supposed, the inhabitants of which possess the sense of sight but not that of touch ; while their mental constitution is identical with that of the human race. The objects, which the planetarian sees at any given moment, are all accounted by him as equally distant from himself ; and accordingly as ranged on the inner surface of a hollow sphere, his eye being centre of that sphere. Let a straight line be placed before his vision : it will appear to him as the arc of a great circle of that sphere. He is told however on trustworthy authority that it is a straight line ; and he will therefore enounce, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that every straight line being produced will at last return into itself, and that any two straight lines being produced will meet in two points. Those geometrical axioms therefore—such is Mr. Mill's implied conclusion—which contradict these two propositions, are not known to man by his mental constitution (for the planetarian has the very *same* mental constitution) but by his possessing and exercising the sense of touch.

When once this argument is stated, there can hardly be any need of exposing its fallacy. The truth, which this planetarian regards as self-evidently necessary, *is* self-evidently necessary in the judgment of all objectivists : only he has learned to clothe it in non-human language. That form, which he has learned to designate by the name "straight line," is precisely that which *human beings* designate an "arc of a great circle of a sphere."

Whether such a planetarian *could* conceive the idea which men call a "straight line," is a question which we shall not here discuss ; but if he do conceive that idea—possessing as he does the same mental constitution with men—he will cognize as self-evidently necessary, that no straight line however produced can possibly return into itself, and that no two straight lines can intersect in more than one point. In what language he will have learnt to *express* this idea "straight line," we cannot of course guess.

We are not aware of any other reasoning of the least importance anywhere employed by Mr. Mill, in opposition to the objectivist doctrine on mathematical axioms. It seems to us, that in every instance the only effect he has legitimately produced, is to open out some fresh line of argument, which tells with irresistible force against his own conclusion.

We ought not however perhaps—considering the ultimate purpose of these articles—entirely to pass over a philosophical theory, which arrives at a goal substantially the same with Mr. Mill's, by a route precisely opposite. Our readers will

remember that, towards the beginning of our article, we drew a distinction between "tautological" and "significant" propositions. A proposition of the former class declares no more, than has already been expressed in its subject. Suppose e.g. some one were gravely to enounce, that "every square is quadrilateral": "*of course*," I should reply; "for 'quadrilateral' is part of what is expressed by the very word 'square.'" Such nugatory propositions are of the form " A is A "; and Mr. Mill would himself admit that they are known independently of experience; though reasonably enough he might refuse to dignify them with the name of "*a priori*" or "necessary." Now such a philosopher as we speak of, while admitting that mathematical axioms are cognized independently of experience, maintains that they are "tautological"; and consequently that no inference can reasonably be made from *them* to the case of "significant" propositions. He denies accordingly, that there are any "necessary" propositions of the latter class.

As this view is fundamentally opposed to Mr. Mill's, it is no part of our present business to reason against it at any length. We will but draw attention to the whimsical character of a theory, which alleges that a vast body of new truths can be syllogistically deduced from tautologies; and we will add one single argument by way of refutation. So far is it from being true that "triangular" is part of what is expressed by the word "trilateral,"—that on the contrary I have comprehended the *whole* of what is meant by "trilateral," before I have so much as asked myself the question, whether a trilateral figure has three angles or any angle at all. So far is it from being true that $3+8$ is part of what is expressed by the words $2+9$,—that on the contrary I have comprehended the whole of what is meant by the latter, before I have so much as *thought* of the former, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly.

Mr. Mill has some excellent observations on this theory, so far as regards arithmetical axioms, in his "Logic," vol. i. pp. 284—289.

We now, however, return to our general argument. From what has been hitherto said three inferences may be deduced, of much importance in their respective ways.

I. Mathematical axioms are not ordinarily intued at first in an universal but in an individual shape. Dr. M'Cosh has done very great service, by dwelling on this truth in the case of *all* intuitions; but our present concern is with mathematical axioms. I hold 7 pebbles in one hand and 4 in the other, and then transfer one from the larger to the smaller group.

I intue, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that the new $5 + 6 =$ the old $4 + 7$: that not even Omnipotence could make the case otherwise. On reflection, I perceive that the same truth holds, not of *these* pebbles only but of *all* pebbles; not of *pebbles* only but of all numerable things. Still further, reflection enables me to intue the more general axiom, $a + b = (a + 1) + (b - 1)$; and the more general axiom still, $a + b = (a + m) + (b - m)$; where a , b , and m may be any whole numbers whatever, so only that m be not greater than b . *Capability* of being universalized is indubitably a characteristic of self-evidently necessary truths; but we shall be quite mistaken, if we fancy that they are ordinarily *intued* as universal. The immense majority of mankind, while again and again accepting them in their individual shape, seldom if ever universalize an axiom from the beginning of their life to the end.

II. There can be no need of employing words to prove the very obvious proposition, that if mathematical axioms are self-evidently necessary, the validity of syllogistic reasoning is no less so. But the whole body of mathematical truth is derived syllogistically from mathematical axioms; and it follows therefore, that the whole body of mathematical truth is strictly necessary.

III. Even were there no other necessary truths than those which (we trust) we have conclusively proved to be such in our present article,—let us observe what results from our argument. Entirely distinct from, entirely over and above, the experimental order, there is a body of what may be called “transcendental” truth; truth which transcends human experience.* We are not able yet to decide whether all transcendental truth is necessary: but anyhow all necessary truth is transcendental; for the knowledge of anything as *necessary*—Mr. Mill will be the first to admit—is wholly unattainable from mere *experience*. Further, among these transcendental truths are to be numbered the propositions of geometry,

* It will conduce to clearness, if we accurately distinguish between our use of the words “transcendental” and “intuitional.” We call those truths “intuitional,” which the individual accepts exclusively on the ground of mental intuition; and we call those truths “transcendental,” which are neither experienced facts nor *inferrible* from experienced facts. Thus the truths testified by *memory* are “intuitional,” but not “transcendental”: they are facts which have been experienced, and therefore are not “transcendental” truths; yet they are known to him who remembers them, exclusively on the ground of present intuition, and they are therefore “intuitional.” See our last number, pp. 45, 46, 51. On the other hand Euclid's theorems are “transcendental,” but not generally “intuitional”; because they are not accepted on the ground of intuition, but of *deduction* from intuitive truths.

arithmetic, algebra, the differential calculus, calculus of variations, &c. &c. Again, all the truths of mechanics and physical astronomy are necessary, if understood hypothetically. Take any proposition whatever of physical astronomy: it is a necessary truth that this proposition holds, *if* there be in existence a certain attractive force. But still further. Scientific men have not of course taken the trouble to work out a series of necessary hypothetical propositions, except in those comparatively few cases where the hypothesis corresponds with physical fact. But a million other hypotheses may be framed; as e.g. that the force of gravitation varies inversely as the distance, or as the cube of the distance, &c. &c. &c.: and for each one of these hypotheses, a new vast series of necessary hypothetical propositions can be evolved. It is plain then that, though there were no necessary truths except mathematical, even so their number is literally unimaginable and incalculable; immeasurably more than a thousand times the number of experimental truths. All trustworthy science, says Mr. Mill, is experimental: on the contrary, the enormous majority of true scientific propositions are transcendental.

This will be our best place, for explaining the exact end at which we are aiming in this series of articles. Our ultimate purpose is a philosophical establishment of Theism; i. e. of the dogma, that there exists a Personal God, Infinite in all perfections, the Creator and Moral Governor of the universe. Those who deny that this dogma is cognizable by man with certitude, may be called "antitheists"; i.e. opponents of Theism. Of these, comparatively few are dogmatic atheists; men who think that reason disproves the existence of a Personal Creator. A far larger number, of whom Professor Huxley may be taken as representative, are "nescients"; i. e. deny that man can know certainly, or even probably, anything whatever about the matter. Others again, far more numerous perhaps than is commonly supposed, regard it as probable that the universe had an intelligent Maker; but are driven by the existence of moral and physical evil, to deny that this Maker combines Infinite Power with Infinite Love. We are led by various indications to suspect that Mr. Mill himself belongs to this category. Lastly there are "pantheists." The pantheist holds with some emphasis the cognizableness of the "Absolute" and the "Unconditioned"; but denies the existence of a Personal God, to Whom men are responsible, Who knows their thoughts, and Who will requite them according to their works. Now we believe that pantheists—certainly Hegelian atheists—hold in philosophy the

objectivist doctrine : but they have no important representative in England ;* and at all events would require a totally distinct consideration. While therefore our arguments, we hope, shall be such as to hold their own against all comers, our *direct* contest shall be only with those antitheists, who profess the phenomenal philosophy.

The phenomenistic doctrine is such as this : that an ascertained truth, means a truth experienced or inferred from experience ; that he who lays stress on supposed *intuitions*, leaves a foundation of rock to build on the sand ; that such a thinker, instead of manfully and philosophically confronting facts, erects into a would-be oracle his own individual idiosyncrasy ; that "à priori philosophy" means simply the enthronement of prejudice and the rejection of experience. And we fully admit, or rather indeed contend, that this phenomenistic doctrine issues legitimately in pronounced antitheism.

Our first reply to it shall be founded on the faculty of *memory*. "Our belief in the veracity of memory," says Mr. Mill, (on Hamilton, p. 508, note,) "is evidently ultimate : no reason can be given for it, which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well founded." In other words, according to his frank confession, when I trust my memory—when I believe myself to have experienced what my memory distinctly testifies—I am resting exclusively on an intuition ; I am holding most firmly a truth, for which experience gives me no warrant at all.† Yet *unless* I hold firmly this intuitive truth, I am literally incapable of receiving any experience whatever ; I have no knowledge of any kind, except my present consciousness. The whole fabric of experience then has, for its exclusive foundation, a series of those intuitions which are called acts of memory. If intuitions as such are to be distrusted, experience is an impossibility and its very notion an absurdity.

Mr. Mill has laid himself open, we think, to just criticism, for his *mode* of making this most honourable admission. No one will doubt, either that the phenomenist school professes the general doctrine we have ascribed to it, or that Mr. Mill habitually identifies himself with that school. Yet here is a

* Dr. Stirling, the leading English Hegelian, professes belief even in Christianity. ("Secret of Hegel," preface, p. xxi.)

† This is undeniably Mr. Mill's admission : for he says that no reason whatever—whether grounded on experience or on any other basis—can be given for the veracity of memory, "which does not presuppose the very thesis for which it is adduced." A reason, which presupposes the very thesis for which it is adduced, is undeniably no reason at all.

most pointed *exception* to the school's general doctrine; and an exception which no phenomenist had made before. Surely he might reasonably have been expected, not merely to state it (however explicitly and unmistakably) in a *note*, but to give it a prominent position in his work. If ever there were a paradoxical position, his is one on the surface. It is most intelligible to say that there are no trustworthy intuitions; and it is most intelligible to say that there are many such: but on the surface it is the *ne plus ultra* of paradox, to say that there is *just one* such and no more. He seems to have been unconsciously almost ashamed of this paradox; and instead of placing it in the foreground, has shrouded it in the obscurity of a note.

Then further he was surely called on to state explicitly his *reasons*. He holds that there is just one intuition—one and only one—which carries with it its own evidence of truth. There was an imperative claim on him then, as he valued his philosophical character, to explain clearly and pointedly *where the distinction lies* between acts of memory and other alleged intuitions. He would have found the task very difficult, we confidently affirm; but that only gives us more reason for complaining that he did not make the attempt. To us it seems, that various classes of intuition are *more* favourably circumstanced for the establishment of their trustworthiness, than is that class which Mr. Mill accepts. Thus in the case of many a wicked action, it would really be *easier* for the criminal to believe that he had never committed it, than to doubt its necessary turpitude and detestableness. Then in the case of other intuitions, I know that the rest of mankind share them with myself; and I often know also that experience confirms them so far as it goes: but I must confidently trust my acts of clear and distinct *memory*, before I can even guess what is *held* by other men or what is *declared* by experience. We think it a blot on Mr. Mill's philosophy, that he has chosen, as his only trustworthy class of intuitions, a class for which there is less extrinsic evidence than for that of many others. But we think it a far greater blot on his philosophy, that instead of facing the difficulty he has ignored it.

This then is our first argument against the phenomenist doctrine. So far from experience being a more trustworthy guide than intuition, experience is not so much as possible unless we are throughout guided by intuition. Our second argument against the same doctrine is more closely connected with the earlier part of this article. Phenomenists allege, that experience affords a legitimate basis for certitude, and that intuition affords no such basis. On the contrary—without here

discussing the question of "greater" or "less" certitude, —at all events intuition affords a *higher kind* of certitude than does experience. Experience at best can but declare what happens within the reach of human observation: but intuition avouches truths eternal and immutable;* truths which necessarily hold good in every possible region of existence.

But thirdly we maintain against phenomenists, that the best grounded conclusions of experimental science are not certain *at all*, except in virtue of certain necessary truths known mediately or immediately by intuition. In other words we maintain, that the certainty of physical science rests in last analysis, not on the phenomenal but on the transcendental order. This is a consideration of extreme importance; and we shall devote to it the remainder of our article. Our argument is this.

All physical science depends for its existence on the fundamental truth, that the laws of nature are uniform.† By introducing transcendental considerations, Catholics are able to prove conclusively this fundamental truth. We cannot indeed enumerate and weigh these transcendental considerations, until we have reached a later stage of our argument; here we are only contending, that no basis, adduced by consistent *phenomenists*, can suffice for its support. This is virtually admitted by the phenomenist philosopher, who has closer philosophical connection with Mr. Mill than has any other living writer: we refer to Mr. Bain. His language is so remarkable, that we shall quote it entire, italicising one or two sentences.

Granting, however, that the belief in memory, as well as the belief in present consciousness, is a primary assumption, we next remark that it comes short of our needs. The most authentic recollection gives only what *has been*; something that has ceased, and can concern us no longer. A far more perilous leap remains; the *leap to the future*. All our interest is concentrated on what has yet to be; the present and the past are of value only as a clue to the events that are to come. Now, it is far easier to satisfy us of what has been, than of what is still to be.

The postulate that we are in quest of must carry us across the gulf, from the experienced known, either present or remembered, to the unexperienced and unknown—must perform the leap of real inference. "Water has quenched

* See our number for July, 1869, p. 154.

† In saying that "the laws of nature are uniform," we mean, of course, that no physical phenomenon takes place without a corresponding physical antecedent, and that the same physical antecedent is invariably followed by the same physical consequent. Of course we hold firmly against Mr. Mill that such physical antecedents are *efficient causes*; but this consideration is external to our present argument.

our thirst in the past"; by what assumption do we affirm that the same will happen in the future? *Experience does not teach us this*; experience is only what has actually been; and, after never so many repetitions of a thing, there still remains the peril of venturing upon the untrodden land of future possibility.

The fact, generally expressed as nature's uniformity, is the guarantee, the ultimate major premise, of all induction. "What has been, will be," justifies the inference that water will assuage thirst in after times. *We can give no reason, or evidence, for this uniformity*; and, therefore, the course seems to be to adopt this as the finishing postulate. And, undoubtedly, there is no other issue possible. We have a choice of modes of expressing the assumption, but whatever be the expression, the substance is what is conveyed by the fact of uniformity.

Let us word the postulate thus:—"What has uniformly been in the past will be in the future." Otherwise, "what has never been contradicted in any known instance (there being ample means and opportunities of search) will always be true."

This assumption is an ample justification of the inductive operation, as a process of real inference. Without it, we can do nothing; with it, we can do anything. *Our only error is in proposing to give any reason or justification of it*, to treat it otherwise than as *begged* at the very outset. If there be a reason, it is not theoretical, but practical. Without the assumption, we could not take the smallest steps in practical matters; we could not pursue any object or end in life. Unless the future is to reproduce the past, it is an enigma, a labyrinth.—"Deductive Logic," pp. 273, 274.

We give Mr. Bain every credit for his moral candour in making the admission—so repugnant to phenomenist principles—that, without this *à priori* presumption, science would be impossible; and yet that no "reason or justification" for the assumption can possibly be given. Still we must account the passage we have quoted discreditable to his intellectual character. In his work on "The Senses and the Intellect," Mr. Bain emphatically denies, that even mathematical axioms are intuitively known; and yet he maintains the intuitive cognizableness of such a proposition, as that "what has uniformly been in the past will be in the future." For this truly amazing assumption he gives no reason whatever,—and says that no reason *can* be given,—except that physical science could not go on without it. Yet what would he himself say to an objectivist, who should assume the intuitive cognizableness of morality, while giving no other reason for that assumption, except that Christianity could not get on without it? He would say, we suppose, "so much the worse for Christianity"; and we might similarly reply to him, if we chose to be so narrow-minded, "so much the worse for physical science." We really know not one of the "*à priori* fallacies" which

Mr. Mill in his "Logic" so ably denounces, more extravagantly wild than Mr. Bain's. "Nature abhors a vacuum"; "actio non datur in distans";* "the heavenly bodies must move in the most perfect of figures, i. e. a circle";—there is not one of these propositions, which may not quite as plausibly be considered self-evident. Moreover, the thinkers who have advocated such axioms as those above mentioned, have at all events openly avowed themselves *a priori* philosophers; whereas Mr. Bain, the originator of this astonishing tour de force, professes himself a severe and cautious disciple of experience.

There are two doctrines importantly different, on the uniformity of nature. There is the Catholic doctrine, that the laws of nature are ordinarily uniform, but very often miraculously suspended; and there is the infidel doctrine, that they are *unexceptionally* uniform. Mr. Bain's language throughout implies the latter. In other words, he assumes as intuitive a principle, which with one breath sweeps off the whole Christian religion, without condescending to give even one philosophical reason for his opinion.†

Mr. Mill is by no means so unfaithful to his phenomenism as Mr. Bain, in the proof which he gives for the uniformity of nature. He thus reasons :—

The considerations which, as I apprehend, give, at the present day, to the proof of the law of uniformity of succession as true of all phenomena without exception, this character of completeness and conclusiveness, are the following:—First, that we now know it directly to be true of far the greatest number of phenomena; that there are none of which we know it not to be true, the utmost that can be said being that of some we cannot positively from direct evidence affirm its truth; while phenomenon after phenomenon,

* Some philosophers, even some Catholic philosophers, really consider this axiomatic. F. Franzelin however ("de Deo Uno," p. 356) says that Scotus, Vasquez, Biel, Francis Lugo, Valentia, and many grave theologians either doubt or deny its truth. And this fact by the way disproves Mr. Mill's statement ("Logic," vol. ii. p. 317), that so recently as "rather more than a century ago" this "was a scientific maxim disputed by no one and which no one deemed to require any proof." For ourselves we can see no shadow of ground for the maxim.

† We ought not to conceal the fact, that the sentence immediately following our extract runs thus: "our natural prompting is to *assume* such identity [of the future with the past]; to believe it first and prove it afterwards": and the last words may be understood as meaning that we *can* "prove it afterwards." Certainly the sentence is expressed with discreditable obscurity: but Mr. Bain had already said expressly that "experience does *not* prove this"; and this sentence therefore must only mean, that when *the future becomes the present* we shall be able to prove that it resembles the past.

as they become better known to us, are constantly passing from the latter class into the former ; and in all cases in which that transition has not yet taken place, the absence of direct proof is accounted for by the rarity or the obscurity of the phenomena, our deficient means of observing them, or the logical difficulties arising from the complication of the circumstances in which they occur ; insomuch that, notwithstanding as rigid a dependence on given conditions as exists in the case of any other phenomenon, it was not likely that we should be better acquainted with those conditions than we are. Besides this first class of considerations, there is a second, which still further corroborates the conclusion. Although there are phenomena, the production and changes of which elude all our attempts to reduce them universally to any ascertained law ; yet in every such case, the phenomenon, or the objects concerned in it, are found in some instances to obey the known laws of nature. The wind, for example, is the type of uncertainty and caprice, yet we find it in some cases obeying with as much constancy as any phenomenon in nature the law of the tendency of fluids to distribute themselves so as to equalize the pressure on every side of each of their particles ; as in the case of the trade winds, and the monsoons. Lightning might once have been supposed to obey no laws ; but since it has been ascertained to be identical with electricity, we know that the very same phenomenon in some of its manifestations is implicitly obedient to the action of fixed causes. I do not believe that there is now one object or event in all our experience of nature, within the bounds of the solar system at least, which has not either been ascertained by direct observation to follow laws of its own, or been proved to be closely similar to objects and events which, in more familiar manifestations, or on a more limited scale, follow strict laws : our inability to trace the same laws on a larger scale and in the more recondite instances, being accounted for by the number and complication of the modifying causes, or by their inaccessibility to observation. ("Logic," vol. ii. pp. 106-7.)

Before we consider the value of this argument, a preliminary remark will be in place. We have already said that, by help of transcendental considerations, the uniformity of nature is conclusively established ; and we will here add, that these transcendental considerations are of such a kind, as to impress their force not on philosophers only but on all mankind. Since then, as we consider, the mass of men are at starting most reasonably and completely convinced of the thesis which Mr. Mill desires to prove, it is only to be expected that they should receive with ready acquiescence any reasoning, which is adduced for so undeniably true a conclusion. Let it be granted then, that the great majority of Mr. Mill's readers are satisfied with his argument. Still such a fact does not at all evince the argument's real sufficiency, because the fact may so easily be accounted for by the cause which we have stated.

Now Mr. Mill's reasoning amounts at best to this. If in any part of the world there existed a breach in the uniformity of nature, that breach must by this have been

discovered by one or other of the eminent men who have given themselves to physical experiment. But most certainly, adds Mr. Mill, none such has ever been discovered, or mankind would be sure to have heard of it: consequently, such is his conclusion, none such exists. Now in order to estimate the force of this argument, let us suppose for a moment that the fact were as Mr. Mill represents it; let us suppose for a moment that persons of scientific education were unanimous in holding, that there has been no well-authenticated case of a breach in the uniformity of nature. What *inference* could be drawn from this? Be it observed, that the number of natural agents constantly at work is incalculably large; and that the observed cases of uniformity in their action must be immeasurably fewer than one thousandth of the whole. Scientific men, we assume for the moment, have discovered that in a certain proportion of instances,—immeasurably fewer than one thousandth of the whole,—a certain fact has prevailed; the fact of uniformity: and they have not found a single instance in which that fact does *not* prevail. Are they justified, we ask, in inferring from these premisses that the fact is *universal*? Surely the question answers itself. Let us make a very grotesque supposition, in which however the conclusion would really be tried according to the arguments adduced. In some desert of Africa there is an enormous connected edifice, surrounding some vast space, in which dwell certain reasonable beings who are unable to leave the enclosure. In this edifice are more than a thousand chambers, which some years ago were entirely locked up, and the keys no one knew where. By constant diligence twenty-five keys have been found, out of the whole number; and the corresponding chambers, situated promiscuously throughout the edifice, have been opened. Each chamber, when examined, is found to be in the precise shape of a dodecahedron. Are the inhabitants justified on that account in holding with certitude, that the remaining 975 chambers are built on the same plan? We cannot fancy that Mr. Mill would answer in the affirmative: yet otherwise how will his reasoning stand?

But secondly it is as far as possible from being true, that men of scientific education are unanimous in holding that there has been no well-authenticated case of breach in the uniformity of nature. On the contrary, even to this day the majority of such persons believe in Christianity, and hold the miracles revealed in Scripture to be on the whole accurately reported. The majority of scientific men believe, that at one time persons, on whom the shadow of Peter passed, were thereby freed from their infirmities; and that at another time garments, brought

from the body of Paul, expelled sickness and demoniacal possession. (Acts v. 15; xix. 12.) Will Mr. Mill allege that S. Peter's shadow, or that garments from S. Paul's body, were the *physical cause* of a cure, as lotions and bandages might be? Of course not. Here then is a series of physical phenomena, resulting without physical cause; and Catholics to this day consider that breaches in the uniformity of nature are matters of everyday occurrence.* Even then if it were true—it seems to us (as we have already said) most untrue—that Mr. Mill's conclusion legitimately follows from his premisses,—still he cannot even approximate to *establishing* those premisses, until he have first disproved Catholicity and next disproved the whole truth of Christianity.

But the strongest objection against the sufficiency of Mr. Mill's argument still remains to be stated. "All our interest," says Mr. Bain most truly, "is concentrated on *what is yet to be*; the present and the past *are of value only as a clue to the events that are to come*." Let us even suppose then for argument's sake, that Mr. Mill had fully proved the past and present uniformity of nature: still the main difficulty would continue; viz., how he proposes to show that such uniformity will last one moment beyond the present. It is quite an elementary remark that, whenever a proposition is grounded on mere experience, nothing whatever can be known or even guessed concerning its truth,

* In the following passage F. Newman does but express what is held by all thoughtful Catholics, who are at all well acquainted with the facts of their religion. We italicize one or two sentences:—

"Putting out of the question the hypothesis of unknown laws of nature (which is an evasion from the force of any proof), I think it impossible to withstand the evidence which is brought for the liquefaction of the blood of S. Januarius at Naples, and for the motion of the eyes of the pictures of the Madonna in the Roman States. I see no reason to doubt the material of the Lombard crown at Monza; and I do not see why the Holy Coat at Trèves may not have been what it professes to be. I firmly believe that portions of the True Cross are at Rome and elsewhere, that the Crib of Bethlehem is at Rome, and the bodies of S. Peter and S. Paul also. I believe that at Rome too lies S. Stephen, that S. Matthew lies at Salerno, and S. Andrew at Amalfi. I firmly believe that *the relics of the saints are doing innumerable miracles and graces daily*, and that it needs only for a Catholic to show devotion to any saint in order to receive special benefits from his intercession. I firmly believe that saints in their lifetime have before now *raised the dead to life, crossed the sea without vessels, multiplied grain and bread, cured incurable diseases*, and stopped the operation of the laws of the universe in a multitude of ways." ("Lectures on Catholicism in England," p. 298.)

We argued on a former occasion (April, 1867, p. 292), that miracles affects the foundation of physical science.

except within the reach of possible observation. For this very reason, Mr. Mill professes himself unable to know, or even to assign any kind of probability to the supposition, that nature proceeds on uniform laws in distant stellar regions. But plainly there are conditions of *time*, as well as of *space*, which preclude the possibility of observation; and it is as simply impossible for men to know from mere experience what will take place on earth to-morrow, as to know from mere experience what takes place in the planet Jupiter to-day.

In considering the question "on what grounds we expect that the sun will rise to-morrow," Mr. Mill ("Logic," vol. ii. p. 80) falls into a mistake very unusual with him; for he totally misapprehends the difficulty which he has to encounter. He argues—we think quite successfully—that there is a probability amounting to practical certainty that the sun will rise to-morrow, *on the hypothesis that the uniformity of nature so long continues*. But the question he has to face is, what reason can he have for knowing, or even guessing, that the uniformity of nature *will* so long continue? And to this, the true question at issue, he does not so much as attempt a reply.

Notwithstanding the disclaimer with which we started, our recent course of argument may have led unwary readers to fancy, that we have been in some way disparaging the trustworthiness and certainty of physical science. So far is this from being so, that on the contrary such trustworthiness and certainty constitute the major premiss of our syllogism. That syllogism runs as follows. The declarations of physical science are absolutely trustworthy and certain: but if there were no human knowledge independent of human experience, they would *not* be trustworthy and certain; consequently it is untrue that there is no human knowledge independent of human experience. In other words, that doctrine of phenomenism, which in some sense idolizes physical science, is in real truth fatal to the object of its idolatry.

Here we conclude for the present. Our article has consisted of two distinct portions: in the former of these we have purported to prove against Mr. Mill, on grounds of reason, the existence of certain necessary truths; while in the latter portion we have set forth some general considerations, which tell importantly, as we think, against the doctrine of phenomenism. These considerations may sufficiently be summed up as follows.

Phenom	,	full ex	nt, teaches primarily, that
experien			, foundation for certitude;
and teach		ii	ence from this, that there is
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no necessary truth humanly cognizable as such. We have replied firstly, as to intuitionist truths in general, that (by Mr. Mill's own admission) no experience is so much as possible, unless a large number of truths be assumed, which are *not* known by experience; viz. truths testified by *memory*. And we have replied secondly, as to necessary truths in particular, that unless necessary truths were cognizable, experimental science could not so much as exist.

Our ultimate purpose however in these articles, as we have said, is to draw out, as completely as we can, the philosophical argument for Theism. But it does not follow, because Mr. Mill's phenomenism is false, that therefore Theism is true; on the contrary, for the full establishment of that fundamental dogma, it will be necessary to accumulate a large number of philosophical premisses. This we hope to perform in future numbers. In January next we are to state and defend, against Mr. Mill, what we regard as the true foundation of morality.

ART. III.—PIUS VII. AT SAVONA AND FONTAINEBLEAU.

L'Église Romaine et le Premier Empire, 1800–1814. Tom. IV. et V. Par M. le COMTE D'HAUSSONVILLE. Paris : Michel Lévy.

IN two former articles on the history of Pius VII. and Napoleon I. we have traced the very able narrative of M. d'Haussonville from the Conclave in which the Pope was elected, in the year 1800, down to the beginning of 1811. Nothing could be more critical than the whole state of things at that moment. Indeed, those who regarded the Catholic Church as a mere human institution, not unnaturally regarded it as hopeless. And yet the oppressor had already begun to feel some of the inconvenience which was the effect of his own violence. The Pope was a prisoner at Savona. Being deprived of freedom, and resolved not to be a tool in the hands of Napoleon, he refused to do anything. The affairs of the Church in France were suddenly brought to a stand-still. No bishop could be instituted; the usual course of business was suspended; and Napoleon found it a matter of simple necessity to do something which should put a stop to this paralysis of ecclesiastical affairs. For some time he was in absolute per-

plexity what could be done, and how he should set about it. We have already shown how he tried to get the Pope to act, by causing the highest ecclesiastic in France to write to him, and by trying to work on him by unaccredited agents; but all was in vain. Then he resolved to cut him off in the most absolute manner from all communication with the external world, and when in this state of solitude to overwhelm him with declarations from the Catholic clergy that they considered the obstinacy of the Pontiff the only obstacle to the peaceful and healthy action of the Church. Care was taken that he should neither see nor hear anything except what was published in the *Moniteur*, and this official organ was daily loaded with addresses to the Emperor in this sense. For many months,

To the great astonishment of Parisian readers these ecclesiastical documents usurped the place usually devoted to the bulletins of the "grand army." In truth, however, it was not for them that they were intended. The Emperor cared much less what effect they might produce at Paris than at Savona. Pius VII. was deprived of the society of his most confidential servants, and just now also of all his books, and of pen, ink, and paper; no doubt also, of the magnificent inlaid escritoire, which in the first days of his captivity the Count Salmatoris had so zealously caused to be placed in his *cabinet*. The only recreations allowed him were a walk in the very small garden of the Episcopal residence, and the study of the *Moniteur*. This last M. de Chabrol took especial care that he should never be without, but when the official paper contained any news likely to work on the mind of his prisoner, he managed that his attention should be specially called to it. If he attended at all to the addresses inserted in the *Moniteur* of January, February, and March, 1811, Pius VII. must have observed that, with the exception of only five chapters, which preserved a significant silence, all the canons of the See not yet suppressed in Italy were eager in conforming to the *mot d'ordre* given from Paris. (iv. p. 23.)

The fact is that care was taken to get up such addresses everywhere by means of the Prefect. Some persons might be disposed to wonder, that a man so keen-sighted as Napoleon did not see that they would have carried more weight if they had been less exactly like each other. But we imagine that his contempt of anything like liberty, and his resolution to govern men's consciences by absolute terror, made him indifferent to this consideration. All the chapters in Italy expressed themselves in words nearly identical. The inference no doubt would be that their addresses were dictated to them from above. And he was perfectly content that people should see that. *Oderint dum metuant*, was his almost avowed principle in dealing with the clergy. Our author remarks that it

must have been doubly bitter to the Pope's feelings to see in the *Moniteur* the addresses of the chapter of Imola, once his own diocese, and of Savona, his actual residence. This last, we suspect, must have been drawn up by M. de Chabrol himself, because it is full of peculiar phrases and expressions, which figure in his daily despatches, and which he took care to borrow from Napoleon's own letters. The Emperor no doubt calculated that the impression made on the mind of the Pope was likely to be all the stronger, if he saw that the whole clergy of Italy, as well as of France, were driven by sheer terror into adopting not merely the general wishes of Napoleon, but his very expressions. At the same time, while intimidation was chiefly relied on, bribery was not neglected. Five days after the appearance of the Savona address, our author finds an order, under Napoleon's hand, for the payment of £240 sterling to the Bishop of Savona, "who," he adds, "is very poor." But it is well to observe that the subserviency of the majority of the clergy, while it filled him with contempt, so far from inducing him to treat them with favour, only made him resolved to multiply his demands.

From this moment he proclaimed at every opportunity, and more loudly than ever, the maxim of State, that bishops, canons, and *curés*, all owed to him an obedience as entire as that of the other functionaries of his Empire. And what wonder? The authority of a church is purely moral, and when great characters gradually disappear out of it,—when it shows no *esprit de corps*,—when each of its members is so little occupied with the care of its dignity, that the most considerable among them, instead of feeling its loss as an irreparable disgrace, feel it no merit to stand up for it, the man who has exacted from them these disastrous sacrifices seldom retains any gratitude for them. By a just retribution, it is usually from the hand of the master to whom they have had the weakness to submit, that these unworthy priests receive their punishment. They have exalted his pride until, for his misery and from their own, they have turned him into a mad despot, whose ever-increasing demands they are sooner or later unable to satisfy.

In the commencement of 1811, the man who had made the *Concordat*, had fallen into so strange a state of mind, that at one time he really thought of nothing less than a legislative settlement of the question of the institution of bishops, to be enacted merely by his Senate and his Deputies (iv. p. 26).

From this plan he was dissuaded by the advice of those whom he was wont to call "the *philosophes* of his Council of State," among whom Cambacérès was the first. "Strange inversion of parts — while prelates, sincere believers, deserted from weakness the cause of their Church, its defence was taken in hand, upon principles merely of good sense and moderation, by men who had once been revolutionists, and

most of them avowed enemies of the Catholic Faith, or at least utterly indifferent to it." Our author, who views the matter as a Protestant, is amazed; to a Catholic it is nothing surprising that He in whose hands are all hearts should, when He so pleases, make use even of His enemies to effect His own purposes,—

"He moulds the Egyptian's heart of stone
To do Him honour, and e'en Nero's throne
Claims as His ordinance; before Him still
Pride bows unconscious, and the rebel will
Most does His bidding, following most his own."

But those who would judge truly of the conduct of the French clergy at this crisis must remember that the number of priests and bishops who, because they refused to submit to the demands of the tyrant, were actually lying in pestilential dungeons or banished to distant isles, can be actually proved to have amounted to many hundreds. Napoleon, indeed, to whom deliberate falsehood never cost even the most passing feeling of shame, dictated to his faithful and deluded followers at St. Helena a statement that the number "detained" in consequence of his difference with the Church never exceeded fifty-two. By giving an odd number so exactly he evidently wished it to be observed that he was not speaking loosely from memory, but stating the exact number as ascertained by actual calculation. But this was only an instance of what Sir Walter Scott calls "a lie with circumstance." Our author prints a number of letters, under his own hand, ordering the imprisonment and transportation of a number many times greater. With the keen polish of French satire, he remarks that these orders must have escaped his memory. "Such things are so easily forgotten." In this world it will never be known how great may have been the number of confessors who were seized, in obedience, not to letters from himself referring only to their own particular case, but to his general directions, which were unsparingly severe, for the arrest of all who in any degree opposed his policy. These were the men "of whom the world was not worthy." But his system of imposing absolute silence, and concealing even the punishment of his victims from the eyes and ears of all men, while he paraded the submission of those whom he succeeded in intimidating, had the effect of deluding not only his contemporaries, but his historians (many of them willing enough to believe anything base of the priests) into the delusion, that the clergy of France and Italy, like every other class of men, suffered themselves to become his unresisting tools.

The truth was, that although he found among them only too much of baseness and servility, he encountered a real resistance which he met nowhere else, and which filled him with a rage which shows itself in a very undignified manner in the letters suppressed in the official edition of his correspondence, and published by M. d'Haussonville.

And thus we venture to say that, even when every other institution and individual was crushed beneath the iron heel of Napoleon I., the Church still retained her liberty. For that liberty varies according to the varying condition of the States among which her sons are sojourners. In a non-Catholic State, in which the private and political rights of every subject are defended by just laws equally administered, the freedom of the Church consists in the freedom of each one of her children to do all that is just and right, without suffering for so doing. Such liberty, thanks be to God, we, to a great extent at least, enjoy in these islands. But when, in the inscrutable Providence of God, nations are afflicted with a tyranny like that which oppressed France and Italy sixty years ago, or that which now afflicts unhappy Poland, the Church is still free, even while her children are enslaved, so long as they continue to do what is just and good and to suffer for it. This liberty she possessed under the persecuting heathen Emperors, and she possessed it still under the man who more perhaps than any other that ever lived combined the highest gifts of genius with the vilest baseness of heart and character, the Corsican tyrant under whose yoke Europe groaned in the earlier years of the present century.

It is necessary to keep this steadily before our minds on reading M. d'Haussonville's narrative, which sets vividly before us the unworthy subservience of so many bishops and members of the Sacred College. The Church was still free even when Napoleon felt himself most secure of her submission, and when all external resistance to his will seemed to have been for ever crushed. She was free precisely because Pius was in captivity, because Cardinal Pacca and several others were in the dreary prison of Fenestrella, among the wildest rocks of the Alps, and several more in the dungeons of Vincennes; because thirteen more were deprived of all their revenues, forbidden to wear the *insignia* of their spiritual rank, and placed under the *surveillance* of the police, in different sequestered towns; because several of the most eminent French and great numbers of the Italian bishops lay in state prisons; and because hundreds of priests (how many hundreds is known to God only) were suffering in one or another of these ways, and only suffering more severely because their less

elevated rank gave them less claim to the consideration of their gaolers. There was not one of these noble confessors but might well echo the words of the great Apostle; they were in bonds, but because they were bound the Truth was free (2 Tim. ii. 9),—"Laboro usque ad vincula, quasi mala operans—sed Verbum Dei non est alligatum."

It is evident that all this was keenly felt by Napoleon himself, even when he most affected to despise it; and hence, as our author points out, his language about the act by which the Holy Father annulled the assumed authority of Cardinal Maury in the diocese of Paris, was totally different, according to the audience which he was addressing. Of this, as (at an earlier period) of the Bull of excommunication, he spoke privately to the few whom he most trusted as of "a most dangerous act, plotted on the part of the Holy Father with the most black perfidy." Terms failed him to express the fury with which it filled him, because that fury was the result of secret fear. Before the clergy he confined himself to vague allusions to it, as to a foolish and impotent manifestation of ill feeling, to which he attached not the slightest importance. In his public acts and official speeches he systematically avoided even the most distant allusion to it.* What he really wished was, that no man should know anything about it; he seems almost to have flattered himself that he had succeeded, at a moment when he could hardly help knowing that the acts of violence by which he had wreaked his vengeance on M. de Portalis, the Abbé d'Astros, the cardinals, and the Pope himself, must be talked of in secret by every functionary of the Empire and by every humble curé in the most remote village. All he really effected was, that every man who whispered his feelings about the matter felt that he was acting against the Emperor, and thus became more and more decidedly enlisted as his secret enemy. Still the great monarch kept up his futile attempt at absolute concealment.

The "*Philosophes* of his Council of State" soon convinced Napoleon that his first project, that of regulating the institution of bishops after the example of Henry VIII., would not hold water. It was a matter which required ecclesiastical authority, and it followed that nothing less than a council could deal with it. In preparation for this Napoleon had referred questions (which our reader will find, with the answers given to them, in our author's 45th chapter) to two Commissions, appointed, one in 1809, the other in 1811. The questions proposed to the latter of these Commissions began by

* Vol. iv. p. 31.

assuming it as already a settled point that in future the Pope was to have nothing to do with the institution of bishops in France, and the bishops on the Commission were to report on the steps to be taken to supply his place. Cardinal Fesch was a leading member of these Commissions, and with him the saintly Abbé Emery had great influence. He now wrote to the Cardinal that the time was come for "resistance to blood." The Cardinal went to the Emperor and warned him that he "had now come to a point at which he would be compelled to make martyrs"; but the report of the Commission, though not quite all that Napoleon wished, was elastic enough to comprehend anything. He could not fail to see that if he acted upon it he might wholly dispense with the Pope. What it recommended was the calling of a National Council, and it said plainly enough that, if the Pope still refused to submit, this might take his place. In preparation for the Council the Emperor called together at the Tuileries a great gathering, consisting of the members of his ecclesiastical Commission, and the chief dignitaries of the Imperial Court, Talleyrand, Cambacérès, &c. M. Emery, though a member of the Commission, was unwilling to attend; when specially sent for he retired into his oratory, and, falling on his knees, prayed to be directed how he ought to act, and after a few minutes came calmly out to the bishops who had been sent to bring him. The Emperor opened the meeting with an invective against Pius VII., asking what means the canon law afforded "for the punishment of a Pope who preaches rebellion and civil war," and accusing him of doing his best to stir up assassins against the life of the Emperor.

After this discourse (says Cardinal Consalvi) which was nothing but a tissue of erroneous principles, falsehoods, atrocious calumnies, and anti-Catholic maxims, not one cardinal or bishop had the courage to confront force and power in defence of the truth. They all forgot their duties, and maintained a scandalous silence. Even the civil magnates present looked at each other with evident alarm, but in absolute silence. At last the Emperor turned to M. Emery and demanded his opinion on the matter. The simple priest thus questioned looked to the bishops of the Commission, as if asking their permission to express his opinion in their presence; then turning to the Emperor he said, "Sire, I can have no other opinion than that expressed in the Catechism which is taught by your orders in all the churches of the Empire. There I read—'The Pope is the visible head of the Church.' Now a body cannot dispense with its head, with him to whom it owes obedience by Divine right." The simplicity of this answer and the quotation from his own Catechism seemed to take the Emperor by surprise, and as he made a pause, as if waiting for M. Emery to say something more, he added, "In France we are compelled to maintain the four articles of the Declaration

of 1682. But we must receive what they teach as a whole. The preamble to that Declaration states that the Primacy of S. Peter and of the Roman Pontiffs was instituted by Jesus Christ, and that to it all Christians owe obedience. Moreover it is added that the four articles have been decreed in order to prevent any attack upon that Primacy from being made under pretext of the liberties of the Gallican Church." M. Emery then went into some developments of the subject, to show "that the four articles, although they limit the powers of the Pope upon certain points, preserve to him an authority so great and eminent, that without his participation no affair of importance either in doctrine or discipline could be regulated." From all which he drew the conclusion, that if a council were assembled, as was talked of, such council would have no validity if held without the sanction of the Pope (iv. p. 86).

Nothing so very strong after all, it may be said; he only said what all Catholics know. But it was a strong thing to be laid down by a humble priest, a man invested with no dignity and secured by no diplomatic character, before the face of Napoleon himself, and in the presence of his arch-Chancellor and his grand vice-elect, and of all the highest dignitaries of his Empire specially convened to sanction the purpose he had formed of obtaining the authority of a council to enable him to dispense with the interference of the Holy Father in the institution of bishops; and that, after he had already extorted from his ecclesiastical commission, consisting of cardinals and high prelates (some of them long ago distinguished for having bravely maintained the rights of the Church in the Convention), the concession that "in case of necessity" (of which necessity he, of course, was to be the judge) such a proceeding would be valid. Every one present expected a violent outbreak of rage. If as much had been said by Cardinal Fesch, all his dignity as the Emperor's uncle and as Primate of all the Gauls and Cardinal would not have protected him from it. But the Abbé Emery had established over the mind of the tyrant the influence of sanctity, and to the surprise of all present he controlled himself. Again addressing M. Emery, he said:—

"Well I do not dispute the spiritual power of the Pope, since he received it from Jesus Christ. But Jesus Christ did not give him the temporal power. That was given by Charlemagne, and I, as successor of Charlemagne, think fit to take it from him, because he does not know how to use it, and because it interferes with the exercise of his spiritual functions. What have you to say to that, M. Emery?" "Sire," replied M. Emery, "I can only say what Bossuet says, and whose great authority your Majesty justly reverences, and whom you are so often pleased to quote. Now that great prelate, in his 'Defence of the Declaration of the French Clergy,' expressly maintains that the independence and complete liberty of the

Sovereign Pontiff are necessary for the free exercise of his spiritual authority throughout the world, in so great a multiplicity of empires and kingdoms." And then, without a moment's hesitation, he went on to quote the exact words of Bossuet, for he had them quite ready by heart, having often quoted them in the Commission itself. And he laid special emphasis upon these words of the Bishop of Meaux, "We rejoice at the temporal power, not only for the sake of the Apostolic See, but still more for that of the Church Universal, and we most ardently hope from the bottom of our hearts, that this sacred Sovereignty may ever remain safe and entire under all circumstances." "Well," replied Napoleon (who had listened patiently, as he generally did when he met a man who knew how to pronounce a weighty opinion upon a subject which he perfectly understood), "Well, I do not reject the authority of Bossuet. All that was true in his times, when Europe acknowledged a number of masters. It would then have been unsuitable that the Pope should have been the subject of any one sovereign. But what inconvenience is there in the Pope's being subject to me,—to me, I say, now that Europe knows no master except myself alone?" M. Emery was considerably embarrassed by confronting this unlimited pride of the Emperor: he wished to convince and not to wound it. "Your Majesty," he replied, "is better acquainted than I with the history of revolutions. What exists now may not always exist, and in that case all the inconveniences foreseen by Bossuet might once more make their appearance. Therefore the order of things so wisely established ought not to be changed." The Emperor made no reply, but passing to the clause which the bishops had proposed as an addition to the Concordat, that His Holiness should give institution within a fixed period, in default of which the right of institution should devolve upon the Provincial Council, he again questioned M. Emery, asking him whether he thought the Pope would make this concession. M. Emery replied without hesitation that he thought the Pope would not make it, because it would reduce to nothing his right of institution. The Emperor started, and turning towards the bishops who were on the Commission, said to them, "Ah, ah, Messieurs, you want to lead me into a *pas de clerc* [an expression for a blunder, in terms contemptuous towards the clergy] by leading me to demand of the Pope a thing which he has no right (*ne doit pas*) to grant to me." The bishops were much mortified by the apostrophe which M. Emery's reply had drawn upon them. When the Emperor rose to retire, he bowed his head with a gracious salutation to the ex-superior of S. Sulpice, without seeming to take much notice of the other members of the Commission. As he was leaving the room he asked one of the bishops whether the account M. Emery had given of the teaching of the Catechism about the authority of the Pope was correct. The bishops could not help remembering it. For a moment there was a general conversation, and M. Emery's colleagues, who feared that his openness must have offended the Emperor, gathered round him begging forgiveness for the abbé, in consideration of his advanced age. "Gentlemen," said the Emperor, "you are mistaken. I am not in any degree offended with M. Emery. He has spoken like a man who knows his subject, and that is the way I wish people to speak. It is true he does not think with me, but in this place each one ought to have his opinion free" (iv. p. 91).

No other man ever ventured to speak the truth to Napoleon as boldly as did the Abbé Emery. The great men who had been silent witnesses of the scene were struck with amazement. Talleyrand said publicly, "I was well aware that the Abbé Emery was an able man, but I never believed him to be so much so. He has skill enough to tell the Emperor the truth without offending him." Napoleon himself showed his feelings by exclaiming to Cardinal Fesch, who tried to speak to him on ecclesiastical affairs a few days later, "Hold your tongue. You are a dunce (*un ignorant*). Where did you ever learn theology? I must discuss it with M. Emery, who does know it." But he had refused to be led by this wise councillor, and he was no longer to possess him. M. Emery had before this been severely punished for his integrity. Napoleon found means of hitting even those who had least to lose. He had already dissolved the different missionary congregations, and had positively forbidden the preaching of missions; because he feared that the missionary priests might let out the truth with regard to his relations with the Holy See. The Sulpicians had been the last; but a year before this he had broken up their congregation, and had specially ordered M. Emery himself to leave S. Sulpice; because, being consulted by Cardinal Somaglia as to whether he could attend the Emperor's marriage with Maria Theresa, he had replied, "that he himself should have no scruple, but that, if the Cardinal had any, it might be better not to attend, as conscience binds." It availed nothing to M. Emery that he was unembarrassed by natural ties; that he had refused to be elevated to high dignities in the Church; that he cared nothing either for wealth or worldly honours. To him S. Sulpice was instead of wife and children and houses and lands; within its walls he had spent a long and holy life, had "feared God in youth and loved Him in age," and out of it he had sent generation after generation of priests trained in the holiest rules and practices; there was not so much as one of its stones which was not endeared to him by some holy recollection. But because he had, most cautiously and with the greatest moderation given advice to a friend who sought it, he was turned out laden with the burden of eighty years to seek a new home in which to die, separated from the brethren among whom he had lived, and expressly forbidden to have any communication with them. Years before he had sent one dear friend across the Atlantic to found a Sulpician community at Baltimore, in the United States, and now he began sorrowfully to anticipate that the time was come when his congregation could exist only in a Protestant land under the shelter of political free-

dom, expelled as it threatened to be from Catholic Europe by the over-mastering power of Despotism.

Pius VII., when discussing with the French minister in 1800 the demands of the First Consul with regard to the *concordat*, extolled the peaceable and regular working of religious affairs in free countries, even although they were heretical. Pius VII. was destined once again to do the same thing at Savona, during the terrible storms of the council of 1811. In the same spirit the Abbé Emery at this time turned his mournful eyes towards the United States. He wrote to his most intimate friend, the head of the Sulpician Seminary at Baltimore :—"Alas ! after the overthrow which has already taken place, and that which is now threatened, it must be admitted to be probable that before long it will be impossible that Sulpician communities should exist in France, and that both the thing and the name will be confined to America. For myself, I cannot think of moving thither. My age does not permit it ; but I forewarn you, that if things turn out as I fear they will, many of our members will go where you are, and I shall take measures to secure their being followed by all our property and all the most precious things we possess " (vol. iii. p. 300).

So well pleased, however, did Napoleon profess himself to be with the Abbé Emery at this moment, that Cardinal Fesch even conceived a hope that he might be permitted to return to die among his brothers and children at S. Sulpice, and ventured to intercede with the Emperor for this favour. But that was too much to hope from the magnanimity of the great Napoleon. The favour was refused, and it was the last which the tyrant was able either to concede or to refuse to the aged priest. The day of weary, disappointing toil was over ; the evening had come ; the sun had set ; in the natural world all was shut in by a sky which had never been so dark and lowering ; but faith assured him that above the clouds and darkness the Sun of Righteousness was shining in undiminished glory, and that when the right time should come He would dispel every mist that man could raise, and once more shine out upon the world which He had created and redeemed. To Him he was willing to leave the care of the future, and for himself he had nothing to desire except the summons by which he was to be called, without longer waiting, to soar beyond those earth-bred clouds, and plunge into the full effulgence of the True Light. And now that summons was come. The last earthly news which reached him was that the Emperor had convened a national council, to be his tool in getting rid of the Pope. He knew too much both of the character and objects of the tyrant, and of the degradation of the great majority of those with whom he had to deal, not to know that this, according to all human calculations,

could hardly fail to issue in a great schism and a relentless persecution. It was his last fear, his last grief, if indeed he could be said to fear or to grieve, knowing, as he did with a sober, calm, infallible assurance, that whatever might come first, "sooner or later his must be the winning side, and that the victory would be complete, universal, eternal." He had done his part, and now joyfully left to his Lord the working out of the results. He wrote to an intimate friend, "It is a good moment to die;" and passed to his rest, April 28, 1811.

But his plain-speaking had not been without its result. Napoleon had learned that his Commission (fearing to tell him the truth) had deceived him into believing that by calling together a council he might get the right of institution transferred from the Pope to a provincial synod. He now found that he had no alternative, but must, one way or another, come to terms with the Pope. He pushed on the convocation of the council without consulting him, hoping to intimidate him by the expectation that its object was to pronounce against him a sentence of deposition; and with the same object the letters which summoned it were filled with invectives against the Pope, although, curiously enough, mention of his name was avoided, the complaints being made against "one of the parties to the *Concordat*."

And now the Emperor judged that the time was come to bring to bear upon the Pope the arts for which he had been preparing by long imprisonment and entire shutting out of all intelligence as to the events of the outer world. He determined to send some prelates to treat with him. He selected them with his usual penetration. Our author remarks that when he had to deal with churchmen his object was not by any means to select men of bad character. On restoring the public recognition of the Church in France at the time of the *Concordat* he had been at pains to select "before everything else worthy and memorable pastors, but taking care to find men who had the good qualities of private rather than of public life." His instinct seldom deceived him, and on this occasion it did for him all he wished.

M. de Barral, whom he made Archbishop of Tours, and M. Duvoisin, Bishop of Nantes, had both belonged to the clergy of the *ancien régime*, and before 1789 had even gained a distinguished position in it by their exceptionable merit. Both had emigrated during the Reign of Terror, and had returned to France almost at the same moment, shortly after the signing of the *Concordat* and before its publication. The First Consul immediately saw in them the dispositions which at that moment were shared by all the ecclesiastics to whom he had just opened once more the long-closed gates of their country—a sincere gratitude for the interest which he exhibited in the

welfare of religion and a warm admiration for his own person. Their tried piety, their exemplary character, the character of their opinions, and (if I must speak out) the partiality and complaisance which they professed towards the authority which had just established itself upon the ruins of our liberties, naturally marked out M. de Barral and M. Duvoisin for the favour of Napoleon.

M. Maury, Bishop of Trèves, was another man of the same class. These three prelates he selected as his emissaries; and in a long personal interview gave them their final instructions. "They were authorized to sign two conventions,—one on the special affairs of the Church of France and the institution of bishops; the other on the affairs of Christendom at large and the person of the Pope." With regard to the first, the Pope was to engage to institute all bishops named by the Emperor, and that if this was delayed three months, then institution was to be given by the metropolitan, or if his was the vacant see, then by the senior of his suffragans. As to the other, the Pope might return to Rome if he would take the oath to the Emperor in the form laid down for bishops in the *Concordat*; if he refused this, he should not return to Rome, but might fix himself at Avignon, whence he might direct the spiritual affairs of Christendom, and where the ministers of Christian States accredited to him should enjoy the immunities of diplomatic agents, and he should be treated with the honours due to a sovereign, and have free communication with foreign Churches. Eighty thousand pounds sterling per annum should be set apart for his revenue. This sum,—

Whether paid by us, or by all Christian princes, shall be raised in whatever manner the Pope prefers out of the benefices of Christendom. As for the spiritual power of the Pope in the interior of our empire, if he goes to Rome and takes the oath, we demand nothing more; if he does not think fit to take the oath, and goes to Avignon, we shall require him to engage not to do anything in our empire which is inconsistent with the four propositions of the Gallican Church. If these first articles were arranged, the bishops were to assure the Holy Father how much the Emperor desired "to come to an understanding with him upon all subsequent questions, and to arrange all the different matters relative to the glory and prosperity of the Christian religion." In their intercourse with Pius VII. they were never to forget that they were sent in order to impress upon him the afflicted condition of Christendom, and the evils which the ignorance and obstinacy of his counsellors (Pius VII. had no counsellor left within his reach) had produced, and were calculated to produce. My intention is (the Emperor expressly added) that you should make no use of your powers, unless you find the Pope in a reasonable state of mind, and unless, enlightened by what you tell him, he abandons the madness by which he has for so many years been guided (iv. p. 109).

At the last moment he seems to have had some misgivings

as to his taking the first step towards a reconciliation, and his minister wrote to renew his instructions that "they were not to acknowledge that they were invested with any powers, until they saw the Pope disposed to treat"; also, before signing anything, they were to send it for the Emperor's approval. The bishops were ostensibly sent, not by him, but by their brethren the prelates at the moment present in Paris, from whom they bore letters to him, which had been dictated by Napoleon himself. The whole was carefully managed to impress on him that the French Church was prepared to separate itself from him, if he did not immediately accept the Emperor's terms.

The three prelates reached Savona on May 9, 1811. The Prefect of Montenotte, an adroit man selected by Napoleon as his gaoler, informed him that they had arrived, deputed to him by the clergy of France. He reported to the minister, "I found the Pope as if he had something on his mind, although calm. He said that the bishops could come in whenever they would, alluding apparently to his want of liberty. I then expressed the strong desire and hope of all enlightened men for a conclusion to the ills of the Church. He answered that he wished it, only on condition that nothing should be demanded of him which could wound his conscience." At the first interview the bishops assured him that they were not sent to judge him or to announce the intention of the bishops of France to do so, and he told them that he could not take any step until he had "his natural advisers," his theologians, and the means of obtaining information as to the qualifications of the persons proposed to him, and that he was now separated even from his confessor, who had been refused admission to him, deprived of books, pen, and paper; but, adds M. de Barral, among these complaints he did not insist on the necessity of his return to Rome. He appointed a second interview two days later, as he must have time to read the letters they had brought from different cardinals and bishops, of which there were seventeen or eighteen.

We have two very full and independent accounts of all that went on round the person of the Holy Father at this time,—one from the letters which the Archbishop of Tours daily despatched to the minister at Paris, and which gives the particulars of what may be called the official negotiation with the Holy Father. These letters were afterwards published by him, and have therefore long been public. The other is contained in the letters of M. de Chabrol, the Prefect of Montenotte, and, in fact, the Pope's gaoler. These were as regular and far more full than the others, and contain what may be

called the secret history of the affair—far more important, we need hardly say, than the other ; and this has never been made public until the appearance of M. d’Haussonville’s work. It is on these reports that any true narrative of the proceedings at Savona must be founded. As soon as the first interview had taken place he wrote :—

The Archbishop of Tours gives your Excellency a detailed account of the first interview with the Pope. We have all agreed that it is specially important to work upon the Pope’s feelings, and produce an effect upon his heart, in the situation in which he is placed. He seems prepared to stand firm against all argument and discussion, but to be accessible to an impression on his feelings. He reserved yesterday for thinking over the letters which had been sent to him. The day was spent by us in establishing our relations in the interior of the palace, so as to be acquainted with everything the Pope lets drop in familiar conversation, and to have it in our power to bring before him by a channel direct, though not official, whatever it is expedient for the success of the negotiations that he should know.

And what were these secret means of *surveillance* and of operation, the establishment of which was so important, and from which the Prefect of Montenotte hoped so much ? Must it be confessed ? The Pope’s medical attendant had been secretly gained over to the interest of the man who kept his master a prisoner.* It is possible that such disgraceful proceedings may not be so rare in history as one would have hoped. But what we think really extraordinary is, to see a sovereign lower himself by taking a direct part in them. However, the affair was important, and the Emperor was not a man to be checked by such scruples. We have already mentioned that Napoleon had written with his own hand to M. Bigot de Préameneu, the *Ministre des Cultes*, to tell him that the Pope was to suffer in his own person from his resentment at his conduct. In consequence, things had been so arranged, that the expenses of the Pope’s household had been reduced to two shillings and a halfpenny a day for each individual, the Pope included. But the good offices of the Pope’s medical attendant deserved to be rewarded on a different scale, and Napoleon valued them too highly to subject himself to be blamed for having forgotten them. He wrote to the minister, “Tell Dr. Porta that you have laid his letter before the Emperor ; tell him that his Majesty has written in the margin of his letter from Amsterdam that whatever disputes there may be between the Pope and His Majesty, and although they may be more or less warm, His Majesty will always regard personal services

* It is to be remembered that Pius VII. was suffering from a painful and dangerous disease, which made surgical assistance indispensable, and had, therefore, a medical man always about him. M. Porta had been about his person in the days of his prosperity at Rome, and every one must have observed the remarkable influence which an educated man acquires under these circumstances over a person whom he has often relieved from severe pain. It was this influence which Napoleon characteristically turned to his own account.

rendered to the Pope as if they had been rendered to himself. Dr. Porta has only to express his wishes, and his salary shall be paid as it was when the Pope was at Rome ; therefore a salary of 12,000 francs (£480 sterling) is awarded to him from the time at which he quitted Rome, and this salary shall be continued as long as he stays with the Pope. Add that you are to send him an order for the payment, and that he is to let you know the period at which he ceased to be paid."

M. de Chabrol's letters say "M. Porta, the Pope's doctor, is of wonderful use to us." "The official communications are thus seconded by insinuations which suit our purpose." He is able to report every doubt which crossed the mind of his prisoner. A complete cordon of conspirators was drawn round the oppressed Pontiff—prelates whose character invited confidence, and who professed (and no doubt believed themselves sincere in professing) nothing but an earnest desire to serve the interests of the Church in a crisis of extreme danger, and those whom he regarded as his private friends, drawing out of him his secret feelings and doubts for the purpose of betraying them day by day and hour by hour to his oppressor. The tyrant, one of whose greatest qualifications was a happy instinct in judging of the characters of those with whom he had to do, had laid his snare with the greatest skill. Cardinal Pacca says :—

The talents of Pius VII. were of no ordinary kind. His character was neither weak nor pusillanimous. On the contrary, he was remarkable for resolution and quickness of wit. Adequately versed in the sacred sciences, he was also endued with that rare practical talent which enables a man to look at matters in their true light, and to see through their difficulties. But to all these fine qualities he united a natural disposition, which some regarded as a virtue, others as a defect. His first impression of a subject, his first view of it, showed admirable discernment and exquisite good sense ; but if one of his ministers, or any other person of weight, opposed his opinion in private conversation, and urged him with importunities, this excellent Pontiff would give up his own opinion, and adopt that of the other, which was very often not the better. His enemies attributed this yielding disposition to a great intellectual weakness, an excessive love of repose. Those who were more just regarded it as the effect of a singular modesty, and a want of confidence in his own powers.

Such a man was just the person to be gradually worked upon by assurances day by day repeated, and it seemed to him, by persons quite independent of each other, that the whole of the clergy and bishops of France, and indeed of the whole world, were unanimous in condemning the obstinacy with which he refused the proposals of Napoleon as the sole cause of all the troubles of the Church. It was this which induced Cardinal

Pacca to pronounce that in his concessions to Napoleon he "deserved rather sympathy than blame"; "and yet," says our author, "even Cardinal Pacca never knew the dramatic scenes of Savona, for Pius VII. himself could not describe them to him, because he did not know them himself as they stand out for the first time in all their touching misery in the letters of the Prefect of Montenotte" (vol. iv. p. 156).

For the details of the intrigues which followed we must refer to the pages of our author, the first in which they have ever been made public. In the second interview the Pope, referring to what Cardinal Fesch had laid down in his letter as the only possible basis of negotiation, said that he could not in conscience decide such questions without the assistance of suitable advisers. The bishops (who, it will be remembered, were known to him, not as agents of Napoleon, but only as delegates sent by the bishops of France), with what they call some "round-about expressions of modesty," proposed themselves as being "qualified both as bishops and by their sincere attachment to the Holy See and to the person of the Pope" to act in that capacity. He then told them that as to the declaration of 1682 he never had done anything contrary to it, and did not intend to do so, but that it was impossible for him to engage not to do so, it having been condemned and nullified by Alexander VIII. "The Holy Father's tone," says the bishop's report, "was touching, and without the least bitterness." When the details of the Emperor's demands were discussed, and the bishops enlarged on the number of persons most attached to the Pope, who were suffering by the existing state of things, "he seemed touched and, lifting his eyes to heaven, said to himself, *Pazienza*." Still his conscience would not allow him to give way. "I am without advisers," he said, "the Head of the Church is in prison. If he were free, and had his natural councillors, it is possible that he might find means of reconciling everything. *Plus vident oculi quam oculus*." The bishops began to despair, and yet they continue to report; "his kindness, his gentleness, his resignation, and even his friendliness towards us have never varied for a moment. Since our arrival he sleeps little, and frequently complains of his health." "They were much more affected," says our author, "than Napoleon would have liked by what went on before their eyes." M. de Chabrol became alarmed. On May 13 he writes: "I went to the palace this morning to make out the secret motives of so ill-timed a resistance. I had a very long talk with Dr. Porta, and made him well understand the situation in which his master was placing both himself and all those attached to his cause. He is thoroughly

imbued with these principles, and seemed disposed to do us indirectly all the service in his power." Next day M. de Chabrol reports a long interview with the Pope himself, to whom he spoke in "terms which the bishops would have found it difficult to use," answering to his complaint that he could not act while deprived of his advisers, that "no counsellors could be so authoritative as the general agreement of the Churches both of France and Italy"; that "the Council was about to pronounce against him, and deprive him of the power he still had of making terms"; that the Emperor was making concessions out of pure generosity, as the Council was ready to give him his full demands; that all the Pope's adherents felt that he ought to give way, and that his successor would blame his memory as having uselessly compromised the power of the Holy See. The Pope

Replied, with gentleness, that no doubt the opinion of men was something, and that it was possible he might be blamed, but that his opinions had their foundation in his conscience, that upon this he took his stand, and easily forgot the judgment of men to think only of the judgment of God (vol. iv. p. 144).

M. de Chabrol then says that he tried to move him by his feelings, speaking of the sufferings, not of himself alone, but of so many persons on his account.

He was affected, but I had gained no real victory against his inconceivable obstinacy. For himself, he said, he was prepared for everything, and cared little what happened to him. As for the others God would provide, but that he would never purchase the peace of which I spoke, or seek to avoid the reproaches with which I threatened him, by the sacrifices which were proposed to him. He left me, seeming, I repeat, much affected, but resolved (vol. iv. p. 145).

M. de Chabrol continues his reports. He learns from Dr. Porta that the Pope's health is giving way, that his anxiety prevents his sleeping, and that he seems crushed by the fatigue of these discussions, and by his sense of the responsibility resting on him. M. de Chabrol's inference is, that the bishops should see him again, and try what repeated conferences would do, and that "all other possible means are to be used to work on his feelings." Then he writes: "Dr. Porta has served us well. He went out yesterday, and took an opportunity this morning to assure the Pope, on his own knowledge, that the whole population, both of Savona and Genoa, are looking for his giving way.

The reports continue in the same strain, but, says our

author, "the letters of the bishops suddenly become as short and enigmatic as those of the Prefect are clear and detailed." May 18th, they say that he told them that "his head was worn out, and that he should be in a better condition in the evening. The fact was, that the ten days during which he had been subject to this incessant persecution had been too much for his bodily and mental strength."

Twenty-four hours later, without entering into any further details, the bishops report that, having found the Pope tolerably well disposed, they had taken advantage of it to obtain his agreement to several articles relating to the canonical institution, and the additional clause to the Concordat (i.e., the clause authorizing the metropolitan to give institution, if not given by the Pope within three months]. The Pope having by degrees become familiarized with this idea, they had even taken the pen and sketched a draught of what they hoped he would agree to. "This morning we drew out the whole clearly and in French. We presented it to the Pope. He wished for some changes of expression, some additional phrases, some trifling suppressions, and the result is on the whole tolerably good—much better than we flattered ourselves a few days ago that we could obtain." The note thus hastily corrected by its authors in the Pope's cabinet, and of which we shall later republish the text entire, was with his consent left by the bishops upon the Holy Father's chimney-piece. Next morning, at a very early hour, they all set off together for Paris (vol. iv. p. 153). This memorandum made the Pope promise,—1. That he would grant institution to the persons nominated by the Emperor. 2. That he would extend the same provision to the Churches of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia by a new Concordat. 3. That he would consent to the insertion in the Concordat of a clause providing that he would expedite the Bulls for the Emperor's nominees within a time to be fixed, which he thought could not be less than six months, and if they were delayed beyond six months (for any reason except the personal unworthiness of the persons named), authorizing the metropolitan of the vacant Church, or in default of him the senior bishop of the ecclesiastical province, to give the Bulls in his name. Finally, the Pope makes these concessions in the hope of obtaining for the Holy See the "liberty, independence, and dignity which become it" (vol. iv. p. 430).

The fact was, and Dr. Porta's reports fully bear it out, that both the body and the mind of the Holy Father had given way under the stress of perpetual anxiety, agitation of feelings, and loss of sleep, continued without sparing during so many days. For several days past he had "felt that he was no longer master of himself, and that (in his own words) he had been in a state of intoxication."

On the night preceding the departure of the bishops the assistant-chamberlain, who slept in the room opening into the Pope's bedroom, heard him for the first time uttering deep sighs, and accusing himself out loud in terms

of the strongest self-condemnation. At seven in the morning he caused M. La Gorse, commandant of the Palace, to be called, and asked with extreme anxiety whether the bishops were gone, and sent to request the immediate attendance of the Prefect of Montenotte. Before M. de Chabrol had arrived Pius VII. sent again to him by M. La Gorse, and immediately explained to him with great agitation that he had not adverted the evening before to the last lines of the note that had been left with him, that the bishops must immediately be informed by courier. Then begging the commandant of the Palace to sit down while he corrected a postscript written in the margin of the note which he held in his hand, he began to make so many corrections and interlineations, that when M. de Chabrol arrived half an hour later the note had become very difficult to understand (vol. iv. p. 158).

M. de Chabrol saw that the Pope was in a state of mind in which it was useless to oppose or reason with him, he took the note, and, leaving the room, tried to decipher it with Dr. Porta. But he was soon recalled. This time it was, not the last words, but the first clause in which the Holy Father saw the greatest difficulty. He admitted having read it; but he had made an error, and another article must be substituted for it. After trying in vain to calm him, M. de Chabrol left him, promising to return in an hour. When he came back he found Pius VII. in extreme agitation.

He said that he had done wrong (*prévariqué*); that in the last phrase, which treated of the government of the Church, there was a stain of heresy; that he would a hundred times rather die; that he had not adverted to this last article, and that it was necessary that I should send off a courier to the bishops to get it suppressed. For the rest, he would abide by it, but the suppression of this was absolutely necessary. He would rather make a public outburst (*éclat*) in order to make his sentiments known." Little by little M. de Chabrol succeeded in quieting him, especially by giving him an assurance that he would write to the bishops. "Next day the Pope was in as great a state of nervous agitation as ever. He assured M. de Chabrol that he had not slept at all in the night, and that his head was quite worn out, and he was in the state of a man half-intoxicated." Dr. Porta thought his state serious. "He was led to fear some hypochondriacal affection (*hypochondriaque*). He still hoped, however, that it would not come on. Unhappily the doctor's hopes have not been realized. Some days later he was obliged to certify that the Pope's pulse was irregular and his appetite diminished. He observed that the Pope at times broke off what he was saying, remaining wholly absorbed in one thought; and then suddenly woke up from this absorption as if from a dream. In short, he observed every symptom of an hypochondriacal affection, the tendency of which was to destroy the faculties both of the body and of the intellect."

M. de Chabrol writes that he observes the same symptoms. A few days later he says, "The Pope is still in the same state;

he expresses no opinion on any subject, but preserves a profound silence towards every one." When the Prefect attempted to introduce a conversation about the Council, which was already to have met, he made no answer; absorbed in absolute silence, he shut his eyes like a man buried in profound thought, and only came out of it to say, "Happily I have signed nothing." The Prefect tried to continue the conversation, but he fell again into the same state.

All the despatches of the Prefect of Montenotte which we have hitherto quoted were official. In a private letter, addressed to M. Bigot de Préameneu at a moment when he thought, prematurely, that the illness of Pius VII. had come to an end, M. de Chabrol expresses himself more clearly as to the real state of the Pope's health, and uses a word which would never have been formed by our pen, if it had not been read first in the private but authentic correspondence of the Imperial Prefect. "As this letter is confidential, I think it necessary to make known to your Excellency that it is impossible to treat with the Pope unless he is surrounded by a Council equally cautious and firm, so that he may be kept steady in one resolution. You must have seen by my late letters that the irresolution of the Pope, when wholly shut up in himself, goes so far as to affect his health and his reason. At this moment the mental alienation has gone by, and the physical disorder is less severe, but everything shows that some support is necessary to a weakened intellect and a delicate conscience."

In these words M. de Chabrol seems to have supposed that he was insulting Pius VII., yet, after all, he can say nothing against him except that he had a delicate conscience, a body subject to human infirmities, and an intellect which in him, as in all other sons of Adam, was liable to be affected by bodily infirmity. But the person upon whom in truth his report puts a brand of never-dying infamy was the heartless tyrant who, for his own selfish purposes, deliberately subjected to a lingering mental torture,—more subtle, but no less cruel, than the racks on which the bodies of martyrs have so often been extended,—a man whom the very heathen would have regarded with reverence, both for his age and his secular dignity, while to Christians these titles to reverence were as nothing compared with that due to his apostolic office and dignity, as Vicar of Jesus Christ upon earth. It does not appear that Napoleon, one of whose great qualities was, that he insisted on reading for himself all the reports (whether of his generals or his civil ministers), was moved either to tenderness or remorse when he learned from those of M. de Chabrol that both the body and mind of Pius VII. had, for the moment, given way under his unrelenting cruelty. It is some satisfaction to know that the result brought upon him

considerable difficulty, perplexity, and embarrassment. The "National Council" had been convoked for the 9th of June, and he had confidently reckoned on being able to report to it, that the Pope had accepted his proposals, and on obtaining from it a unanimous vote of adhesion to them. He had obtained something like an acceptance of his terms, but he did not dare to make use of it, for the Holy Father had not only retracted it, but declared that, if any use were made of it, he would declare loudly and publicly what his judgment really was. The Council was postponed to the 17th, in hopes of some favourable change at Savona. It met at last, but was far from answering his wishes; and our author says, "the lamentable occurrences at Savona which have now, for the first time, been made public, were in fact the principal cause of the failure of the Council of 1811."

We have detailed the proceedings at Savona both because they so strictly relate to Pius VII. himself and because Napoleon's policy of entire concealment has hitherto been so absolutely successful with regard to them that, as our author shows, M. Jauffret, a man who had special means of obtaining official information, and who published, as late as 1823, a work in several volumes full of very accurate details on the internal affairs of the French Church; and the Abbé Pradt, who was nominated by Napoleon Archbishop of Malines, and who has left numerous works on contemporary history, were wholly ignorant of the real nature of the events at Savona, and in consequence unable to conjecture the real motives of Napoleon's conduct with regard to the Council of 1811. But the real history of these proceedings cannot be too widely known in justice to the memory of Pius VII. Care has been taken by the tyrant and his adherents and admirers to let all the world know he made concessions which he afterwards retracted; but the circumstances under which they were made, the means taken to deceive him into the belief that he was only doing what was judged by all the best and most religious men—cardinals, prelates, priests, and laymen—to be necessary in the interests of the Church, and finally that he did not, even for a moment, give way even to this pressure until his sufferings of mind and body had been so long continued as for the moment to overthrow the balance of his mind and prevent his knowing what he was doing,—all this has hitherto been carefully concealed and is most clearly proved by the official correspondence of M. de Chabrol. It throws light, moreover, upon the character of Napoleon as well as upon that of Pius. In his whole history we doubt whether there is anything—even the murder of D'Enghien or the divorce of

Josephine—which makes one so deeply feel the utter heartlessness of his selfishness, as does the consideration, that day by day for weeks together he received and read without compassion the report of the mental tortures inflicted in cold blood by his authority and orders upon a man venerable were it only for his age, his secular dignity, and his misfortunes; who had a special claim upon himself were it only that he had always shown towards him a personal regard and affection more nearly bordering on weakness than anything else in his character; and who added to all this the infinitely higher dignity of being the Vicar of Christ, which there is good reason to believe Napoleon, however irreligious in practice, really recognized with an interior faith.

The next scene described at length by our author is that of the Council of 1811, officially termed "National," although, as he shows, it had no claim to that title. Had our object been to select the most interesting parts of the volumes before us, not to confine ourselves to those which bear most directly on Pius VII., we might perhaps have gone into the details given upon this subject in the forty-eighth, forty-ninth, and fiftieth chapters of M. d'Haussonville's book, even in preference to those which we have already given. Here again he has been fortunate in obtaining several original narratives of all that happened which have not been available by those who wrote before him, and his narrative is most graphic and interesting. What is specially to be observed is that Napoleon, while of course wishing that the proceedings of what he called a National Council should appear free, took especial pains to keep undiminished the terror which he had already imposed on its members by the persecution of the Abbé d'Astros, of the "Cardinals in black," and of so many others. Immediately before the assembling of the Council he had broken out with strange and most undignified violence against M. de Bois-Chollet, Bishop of Séez, a man who had done great services in the pacification of La Vendée, and against whom there seems to have been literally no charge even of opposition to the Emperor's policy, but who was complained of by the Mayor, to whom he had given some slight offence. Napoleon, who visited his diocese with Marie Louise, called him before him, and after railing at him in coarse language, ordered all his papers and those of his vicars-general to be seized, and commanded him immediately to resign his see. Then he sent for the chaplains.

These gentlemen found Napoleon kneeling in a chair, the back of which he held in his hands. This was with him an habitual attitude. They began very humbly to intercede on behalf of their bishop, when the Emperor began

one of those scenes of premeditated violence in which he seemed to delight more than ever. The victim selected was M. de Gallois, a simple parish priest, made an honorary grand-vicar by M. de Bois-Chollet. He was a priest of great virtue, celebrated for his knowledge of the canons, and who was considered the model ecclesiastic of the diocese. Napoleon, still leaning on his chair, without giving them the least salutation, abruptly addressed the canons the moment they had entered the room, and asked very shortly "Which of you guides your bishop, who is nothing better than a fool?" One of them pointed to M. de Gallois. "Ah! is it you? Why did not you advise him to attend at the marriage of the Rosières?"* M. de Gallois, a little disconcerted but much more astonished, first looked at the Emperor, whose eyes seemed to give him a sign to answer without delay. "Sire, I was not here when those Rosières were married." "Why did you make your bishop issue that circular about the suppressed feasts?" "Sire, I was still absent and, to speak the whole truth, as soon as I knew of it I returned to Séz to advise a circular of a very different nature, which did actually appear." F——, † where were you then?" "With my family." "And with such a bishop, who is nothing better than a F—— fool, why are you so often absent? and who governs the diocese then? and why did you become grand-vicar to such a bishop?" "Sire, I obey my superiors. Every ecclesiastic owes obedience to his superiors." "Are you a good Gallican?" "Yes, Sire, perhaps one of the most decided in your empire" (iv. p. 179).

The result was that M. de Gallois was sent to a dungeon at Vincennes, and was never restored to liberty till the fall of the Empire. The ministers interceded for him, but Napoleon said he was "too clever." This case was just before the meeting of the Council.‡

The proceedings in his own Council provoked the Emperor beyond endurance. He was enraged at the sermon preached to the bishops at their first sitting. He had taken the precaution of requiring that his uncle should see it in manuscript, and certain passages which declared adherence to the See of Rome had been objected to. The preacher, the Bishop of Troyes, promised to omit them, but whether his feelings ran

* The complaint of the mayor was that some young ladies who bore this title, as having obtained a prize, had been married, and the bishop had not been present at the wedding.

† A coarse execration, which our author does not choose to print.

‡ Our author, in apologising for quoting the strong "military" language of Napoleon, relates a most characteristic scene described to him by an official who was present when it took place. Napoleon on some occasion rated M. de Talleyrand in the coarsest language at the Tuileries for half an hour together. Talleyrand listened without answer and without showing the least alteration of countenance. At last, when the Emperor turned away from him but while he was still within hearing, he remarked to the bystanders—"What a pity, gentlemen, that so great a man should have had so bad an education."

done, the Council was again called together and obliged to vote; and that those who had been compelled to promise might be kept to their engagement, the vote was taken, not as before by ballot, but by a public vote. What the Emperor demanded was then carried, but thirteen, or as it seems fourteen, bishops still ventured to vote against it. At this last sitting, on August 5, 1811, a report of what had gone on at Savona, drawn up by the Archbishop of Tours and altered by Napoleon himself, was read. This was the first intimation the Council had had on the subject. The President then put to the vote two questions, after saying that as the majority had already expressed their approval of them discussion was needless. The first was that "The National Council is in case of necessity competent to decree as to the institution of bishops." The Archbishop of Bordeaux publicly protested that he did not admit the competence of the assembly, and the Bishop of Chambéry proposed as an amendment "in case of extreme necessity"; but the original resolution was carried. The next, carried without the formality of a vote, was "Should the Pope refuse to confirm the decrees which the Council shall make as to the institution of bishops, that will be a case of necessity." Then the decree itself was voted and signed by the President and secretaries.

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And now he had at least obtained a vote from his so-called Council in favour of all that he wished. Six bishops were to lay it before the Holy Father, and ask his confirmation. The accounts of his bodily and mental health sent by M. de Cha-

brol had at last become so much improved that it was no longer impossible to negotiate with him. But the same unscrupulous agent had already reported that it was useless to try the old plan of keeping him absolutely without communication with any advisers, and then working upon his feelings until he at last gave way. The result of this he saw would only be (as it had already been) to wear out his strength both of body and mind, and wholly to incapacitate him from making any definite arrangement. What the Holy Father had declared from the beginning was, that he could do nothing without the presence and assistance of his natural counsellors, and M. de Chabrol had now reported the same thing. Napoleon therefore resolved to allow some of the Cardinals to resume their natural post in attendance on the Pope. But who were they to be? As for those who were called the "Cardinals in Black," whom for their fidelity to their conscience he had already deprived of their revenues, forbidden to wear the dress of their office, and sent to live in different out-of-the-way towns of France under the surveillance of the police, he felt sure that he could not trust them; still less the Pope's former ministers, who had been lying in dungeons at Fenestrella or elsewhere for their fidelity to him. And yet to send none but Frenchmen born would hardly do. Accordingly he selected four, of whom three were Italians—Cardinals Dugnami, Roverella, Ruffo, and De Bayane. They were to go ostensibly free to counsel the Holy Father on the questions in dispute between him and the Emperor. It is humiliating to find that they submitted to pledge themselves in writing, before they went, to advise whatever Napoleon wished. Cardinal Pacca, in recording this, says:—

I blush and grieve in making up my mind to expose an action of my colleagues which must inflict a real stain on their memory. But the whole world ought to know the base intrigues employed by the French Government to draw from the Pope concessions injurious to the Holy See, in order that in time to come the like may not be successful against Popes. When the Cardinals set out, it was rumoured in Paris that they had left with the Emperor, at his desire, a promise in writing, and signed by each of them, that they would use their influence with the Pope to induce him to give way to the Emperor's desires. The truth of this rumour was at first doubted by good Catholics; they could not believe that cardinals of revered character could forget their solemn oaths and commit an act, I will not say of treachery, but of unpardonable weakness. They went [says our author] as if voluntarily to offer to the suffering Pontiff, a prisoner at Savona, their treacherous assistance and advice, professedly disinterested, but they had concerted every particular of it beforehand with his all-powerful gaoler. It must be added, that this unworthy comedy was to last a long time. Is it credible, those who

away with him or for some other reason, he spoke them as they had been written. Then, when each of the bishops was asked, according to custom, whether he consented that the session should be opened, the Archbishop of Bordeaux (who was reputed to be a saint) said, bowing his head, "Yes, I consent, saving always the obedience due to the Sovereign Pontiff, which I engage and swear to observe." When the proceedings opened, his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, the president, himself knelt down first of all and took the oath, ending, "I promise and swear true obedience to the Roman Pontiff, successor of S. Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, and Vicar of Jesus Christ upon earth." He then called on all the others to take the same oath, one by one, and was observed to be specially scrupulous in requiring the formula should be distinctly pronounced, when it came to the turn of any who had formerly been constitutionalists, or whose fidelity to the Holy See was for any reason suspected.

Napoleon was so little pleased with these proceedings that he gave the most positive orders that the *Moniteur* should give no account whatever of the opening of the Council, and rated Cardinal Fesch. Extreme precautions were taken to prevent the publication of any account of what had taken place.

We must refer to chapters xlviii., xlix., and l. of our author's work and to the valuable documents given in the appendix to vol. iv. for the details as to the debates and proceedings of the Council. They are most interesting.

The Council was divided into two groups most unequal in number. On one side was the small cabal of bishops who acted as managers on behalf of the Emperor. In addition to the four who had been sent to Savona (that is, MM. de Barral, Duvoisin, de Manny, and the Patriarch of Venice) there were Cardinal Maury and the Abbé de Pradt. With them the Sovereign was free to discuss without mystery or concealment all the resolutions which he wished to be proposed to the Council; for there was perfect confidence on both sides. With them he was perfectly at his ease in concerting without reserve whatever means he thought most proper in order to triumph over the opposition of their colleagues. Along side of these complacent prelates, whose number as we have seen was so very small, or rather in opposition to them, was almost the whole mass of the bishops collected from the provinces of France and from beyond the Alps. These bishops, utterly strangers to politics and party spirit, were all animated by an immense desire of conciliation; and had made up their minds to make every sacrifice, not absolutely against their consciences, to procure the peace of the Church. Their admiration for the great man who governed France was so great, their assurance of the wisdom of his plans still so entire, and their faith in the power of his genius so unshaken, that they arrived in Paris with the deepest conviction

that everything must have been almost entirely settled beforehand at Savona, and that no concession would be demanded either of the Holy Father or of themselves which would be contrary either to their religion or to their dignity. Such was the *mirage* of happiness which the Minister *des Cultes*, speaking in the name of his master, dispelled at a single blow [on the second day of sitting]. Hardly could the unhappy bishops believe their ears. Not more scared would be a band of pilgrims who heard for the first time the roar of the lion in the desert. What was now to be wished, to be done, or managed? To the guileless security of the first days there succeeded a want of confidence reaching the extreme of terror. What they professed to themselves was that they would be firm in the good cause and accomplish their duty to the end, but they secretly asked themselves whether they had the strength to do it. Midway between the Court prelates prepared to do anything, and the majority of the Council so little satisfied but so much terrified, fluctuated the president of the Council, himself drawn in opposite directions by his ultramontane convictions and his dynastic inclinations, without credit with his nephew, without influence over his colleagues, full of good intentions, agitation, and contradictory views, and with all his impetuosity managing only to embroil matters more by his want of good sense, discretion, and tact. (iv. p. 232.)

No state of things, as our author observes, could have been more favourable than this to the wishes of Napoleon, and yet so exorbitant were his demands, that in the end he had to break up this assembly and have recourse to more violence against its members. It was with extreme difficulty that his uncle could prevent the assembled bishops from going in a body to ask for the liberty of the Holy Father; and, what still more enraged him, the committee appointed by the Council to report on the matter voted, that the Council was not competent to settle the question of the institution of bishops. He dissolved the Council, and ordered four of the leading bishops (the Archbishop of Bordeaux, the Bishops of Ghent, Troyes, and Tournai) to be sent to dungeons at Vincennes. The first of the four, who fully expected this sentence, and was prepared for it, was not actually seized, because the Minister of Police, the unscrupulous Savary, remonstrated, saying that he was regarded by all men as a saint, and that the universal feeling would be against such a step. The others remained in imprisonment, more or less severe, until the fall of the Empire.

Napoleon having thus not only dissolved his Council but taken measures which, even if it had still been sitting, would have deprived it of all plausible pretence of freedom, caused his ministers to deal with each of the bishops severally, and by threats and persuasion to obtain his promise to vote for the resolutions demanded by the Emperor. When this had been

done, the Council was again called together and obliged to vote; and that those who had been compelled to promise might be kept to their engagement, the vote was taken, not as before by ballot, but by a public vote. What the Emperor demanded was then carried, but thirteen, or as it seems fourteen, bishops still ventured to vote against it. At this last sitting, on August 5, 1811, a report of what had gone on at Savona, drawn up by the Archbishop of Tours and altered by Napoleon himself, was read. This was the first intimation the Council had had on the subject. The President then put to the vote two questions, after saying that as the majority had already expressed their approval of them discussion was needless. The first was that "The National Council is in case of necessity competent to decree as to the institution of bishops." The Archbishop of Bordeaux publicly protested that he did not admit the competence of the assembly, and the Bishop of Chambéry proposed as an amendment "in case of extreme necessity"; but the original resolution was carried. The next, carried without the formality of a vote, was "Should the Pope refuse to confirm the decrees which the Council shall make as to the institution of bishops, that will be a case of necessity." Then the decree itself was voted and signed by the President and secretaries.

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had undertaken these characters mustered courage to represent them without fear for whole months ? (vol. v. p. 1.)

But the Emperor heard of another person who might, he thought, be useful in the same way—M. Bertalozzi, Archbishop of Edessa *in partibus*. He was in Italy, and had not even been called to the Council. But it came to Napoleon's ears that he had the entire confidence of the Holy Father. He received orders to come immediately to Paris; but had no sooner crossed the frontier than he was arrested and committed to prison. Whether this was done to intimidate him, or whether it was a "regrettable mistake" of the imperial police, the author doubts. However this may be, "no one could from that moment be more strongly convinced than he that the great thing for the head of the Catholic Church to do was to put an end to the differences which led to mistakes so unpleasant."

While Napoleon was thus providing a council of advisers for the Pope, he did not allow the bishops of what he called the National Council at Paris to choose those of their own number who were to go in their name to present what had been voted by them for his acceptance. He chose the Archbishop of Tours, the Archbishop-nominate of Malines (De Pradt), the Patriarch of Venice, and the Bishops of Feltre and Placentia; he afterwards added to their number the Bishops of Trèves, Evreux, and Pavia. They received their instructions not from the Council, but from himself. It was his character, that success always made him raise his terms and make more exorbitant demands, and this was the case now that the bishops of the Empire had ended so ingloriously the Council in which they had at first shown unusual courage. He insisted that the Pope should receive, absolutely and without modification, all the propositions as to the institution of bishops which he had forced on the assembly at Paris. They were to be applied to all the Sees in his Empire. At first he contended that they should be applied to the See of Rome, as well as all others. This was too much. Even his own creatures among the bishops complained that the faithful would not hear of it, and his minister supported their objection. Napoleon, therefore, found out that Rome was not included in the decree; but he still required that the Pope should receive it "pure and simple," and that it should include all places which he either had added or might add to his Empire. It is a remarkable proof of the utterly unlimited extent of his voracity for annexation, that he expressly says, the decree includes "whatever he may hereafter annex on the

side of Spain"; showing that his brother Joseph, the puppet King of Spain, whom he had set up, was already destined to be removed in due time, and his kingdom annexed to the Empire, as that of Louis Bonaparte in Holland had already been. When all instructions had been given, the Cardinals, the Pope's faithful advisers, and the prelates, who came to treat with him nominally on behalf of the Council, set off almost at the same moment; but by different routes, lest Pius VII. should see that their plans had been arranged together.

The Holy Father had been again in absolute solitude since the bishops had left Savona on May 20. "One hopes," says our author (though nothing shows it) "that his common books of devotion, paper, pens and ink, and the 'Office of the B. Virgin,' which had been seized, had been restored to him. But certainly none of his old servants had been allowed to return to him." All access to him was watched as closely as ever. All the Italians who had left Rome with him were scattered, some in the State prison of Fenestrella, some in other imperial fortresses. Dr. Porta alone was left to him, not without good cause, as his daily visits were more serviceable to the clever Prefect of Montenotte than to the Pontiff himself. M. de Chabrol, exactly informed of the state of health and disposition of his prisoner, was the only person who came from time to time to interrupt the melancholy monotony of his existence by bringing him such news from Paris as he thought it expedient he should hear. His chief subject was to enlarge on anything which had fallen from the Emperor.

M. de Chabrol could hardly think the Pope in his right mind, because when he exhorted him to secure the triumph of the Church by uniting himself to Napoleon, the Pope suggested that possibly "constraint and persecution might be advantageous to the Church. There might be fewer Christians, perhaps, but better and more zealous." "I left the Pope," he said, "amazed to see the class of facts and ideas in which he seeks examples for his conduct and support for his views. I assure you, however, it is the exact truth." Meanwhile his reports, especially of what he learns through Dr. Porta, are sent in continually. On the 29th of August arrived the Cardinal de Bayane and M. Bertalozzi; a few days later the other cardinals. The absolute prohibition of all news except what M. de Chabrol had found it convenient to communicate (the quantity of which was less remarkable than its falsehood) made him wholly dependent on them for all knowledge of what had really taken place in the Council at Paris. They had offered themselves as his advisers. Certainly their first duty as honest men, not to say as members of the Sacred College solemnly sworn as the Pope's councillors, was to undeceive him as to the false accounts given by Napo-

leon and his agents with regard to the opinions entertained by the Catholic bishops, clergy, and laity. But unhappily they had made engagements to Napoleon inconsistent with the honest discharge of their duties to the Holy Father. They left him under the impression that the Council had been wholly favourable to Napoleon's demands; communicating only the votes ultimately passed, but wholly concealing the opposition made to the Emperor's demands—the demand for the liberty of the Holy Father—the vote carried that the Council was not competent to settle the question of episcopal institution—the arrest of the three bishops who were actually in the dungeons of Vincennes—and, lastly, the means by which the votes which they communicated had been obtained. This great breach of honour and fidelity was but a sample of all their proceedings. There were at Savona two sets of ecclesiastics—the bishops sent ostensibly by the Council, really by Napoleon, and the cardinals, with his old confessor, the Archbishop of Edessa, who had come to be his advisers. These two bodies really concerted together all that was to be said or done, while the Pope was made to believe that there was no communication between them. Nay, care was taken that his Council should talk over affairs with him one by one, in order that the impression might be produced on his mind, that the opinion and advice which each of them expressed to him was not concerted even by themselves in common, but was the spontaneous judgment of each one of them, arrived at separately as his judgment upon the questions which the Holy Father put to him. M. de Chabrol wrote to the minister, after the two first had arrived, "The opinion of two men worthy of confidence could not be insignificant, given, as it was, at once, and when they were still isolated, so that their advice could not be attributed to any preconcerted deliberation, but must have its full moral weight." No man, surely, who reads these proceedings can restrain his indignation, when he remembers that every word spoken by the Pope's advisers had been settled beforehand with his oppressor. The Archbishop of Tours writes in the same way to the minister, how important it is that they should each have private conversations with the Holy Father, instead of going to him together. With the same object, the Cardinals were most careful to have no communication with the bishops sent by Napoleon; they privately communicated the state of his mind and purposes to his gaoler, by whom all they said was repeated to the bishops.

Before long it appeared that the Pope had not been merely alleging a fallacious excuse, when he said that he could not meet the Emperor's wishes unless he had the presence and

advice of his natural counsellors, and that if they were restored to him a settlement might perhaps be made. We have seen that M. de Chabrol expected important effects from the presence of the cardinals, and the result confirmed his expectations. It seems as if Pius VII. had before been really uncertain in his own mind, whether or not he could, without betraying his trust, concede what Napoleon demanded with regard to the institution of bishops; and felt that if he could it was evidently important to do so, in order to obtain peace for the Church. But the change was so momentous that, when he thought of conceding it by his own unaided judgment and in entire ignorance how the matter would be viewed by other men of learning, sanctity, and high office in the Church, his conscience refused to take on it such a burden, and he could not make up his mind to the responsibility. This responsibility he no longer felt when he was acting, not merely on the advice of the cardinals and of his old confessor, the Archbishop of Edessa, but on what they assured him was the deliberate judgment, not only of all the bishops of France and Italy assembled at Paris, but of all good and sober-minded Catholics, both clerical and lay, throughout the civilized world. The fraud, concerted by Napoleon and carried out by these cardinals, produced its full effect. The result was, that before the cardinals had been a month at Savona, he drew up a Brief addressed to the archbishops and bishops assembled at Paris, in which he recited and confirmed the resolutions which had been passed on the 7th of August; thus conceding the whole of Napoleon's demands about the institution of bishops. The French bishops asked for some changes, chiefly verbal, in the drawing up of the Brief, and to most of these the Pope consented. M. de Chabrol then begged him to write to the Emperor. To this he willingly assented, and wrote, with his own hand, a letter of most fatherly kindness. Nothing could exceed the satisfaction and joy both of the cardinals and the bishops. M. de Chabrol felt quite as much. That Napoleon, a man who well knew his own mind, and who had obtained all that he had demanded, should be otherwise than satisfied, never occurred to any of them. The bishops asked Cardinal Fesch to obtain for them, as the reward of their own services, the restoration of the Pope to liberty; nor did they doubt that they should obtain it. The Pope himself considered the change complete, and although he felt it to be momentous, nevertheless, for the best. In fact, if the Brief had been so, as no one doubted it would, and as no one doubted it would, it is difficult to imagine that by it would ever have

been abolished except by the express command of Pius VII. or one of his successors: for even when the time of Napoleon's fall arrived, those who came in his place would hardly have ventured, whatever might have been their individual wishes, to deprive the civil government of the immense accession of powers he had obtained for it.

But the good Providence of God, once more taking as its instrument the evil passions of the oppressor himself, averted from the Church this danger. Napoleon had, somewhat suddenly, become unwilling to make up his quarrel with the Church, even upon the terms which he had himself dictated. He was on the eve of the Russian war. That he must be victorious in it was a matter of course; and when the time came that he should return to Paris, after conceding peace on his own terms at Moscow or St. Petersburg, what was there to hinder him from making himself far more absolutely master of the Church than he would be, if he now carried out on his side the terms which he had proposed, and which Pius VII. had accepted?

He was no longer content that the Pope should reside, as he had himself proposed; either at Rome or at Avignon, in a sort of quasi-independence. He had made up his mind that for the future the Head of the Catholic Church should reside in Paris, and be as completely a tool in his hands as the Russian prelates already were in those of the Czar. He delighted to feel, that he should thus make himself really master of the consciences as well as the bodies and properties of all Catholics, not merely on the European Continent (which he regarded as already his own), but of the millions in Great Britain and Ireland, in America, in Asia, and throughout the world. The first fruits he would reap, by employing the whole authority of the Church against the English and Spanish opponents of his brother Joseph, and against the English in Sicily and Naples. But what might be the future uses for which he might employ such a vassal, who could say? And against hopes like these what was there to set on the other side?—merely the welfare of the Church, the glory God, the souls of men, and his own honour and good faith. Such things were of course less than dust in the balance. Accordingly he resolved, on some pretext or other, to pick a new quarrel with the Pope, to retain him in captivity, and leave matters unsettled until his triumphant return from Russia, when he would take the settlement of them into his own hands. His first ground of quarrel was, that the Bulls for the institution of those whom he called "his bishops" had not arrived, although the Pope in the terms of his Brief had engaged to

send them. In fact there was a little delay; but M. de Chabrol explained how it arose, by pointing out that all the secretaries and other officials accustomed to draw up such documents had been separated from the Pope, and that the Bulls were being prepared as speedily as was possible under the circumstances. But the wolf had no difficulty in finding a new ground of quarrel with the lamb. The next was about the application of the terms of the Brief to the Episcopal Sees immediately about Rome. They had always been in the immediate nomination of the Holy Father. The Emperor, having seized the temporal dominions of the Holy See, had taken this nomination to himself. Now it had been well understood, and expressly agreed to by Napoleon himself, that Pius VII. should not be required in any way to sanction the annexation of the States of the Church to the Empire. The Pope had declared that to himself personally nothing could be more grateful, but that he felt precluded from giving any sanction to it, by the oath which he had taken on his election to the Holy See. The matter therefore had been arranged, by adopting in the Brief such general terms as provided for the nomination by the Emperor to the Episcopal Sees in all districts annexed to the Empire, without mention of the States of the Church in particular. Thus Napoleon practically secured his object, as he was in actual possession; but Pius did no act recognizing his possession. The Emperor therefore now demanded that it should be expressly stated that the settlement applied to all the Sees of the Empire, "of which the Roman States form a part." This was selected as a ground of quarrel, because it was well understood that it was the one thing to which Pius could not in conscience agree; and Napoleon's present object was to demand something, which he would be, however reluctantly, obliged to refuse. A little later he objected to the terms of the Brief, because it provided that a metropolitan, if he gave institution to a bishopric, should do it "by the Pope's authority," and because it spoke of the Roman Church as the "Mother of all Churches." In a word, if the Holy Father was willing at once to enter voluntarily into the condition of entire vassalage which he designed for him, things might be so arranged at once, and he might be left during the Emperor's absence as the most dignified of his slaves; if not (and Napoleon neither expected nor altogether wished it) then the matter must stand over, until he could finally arrange it himself after his great Russian triumph. Any how it must be done by himself, and himself alone; for he had, not without good grounds, the most absolute confidence in the ascendancy which he always gained over every

man with whom he came into personal contact, and he felt the matter to be both too difficult and too important to be trusted to any subordinate agent.

With these views the Emperor, as much to the disappointment and astonishment of the able Prefect of Montenotte as of the cardinals and bishops, professed to be wholly dissatisfied with the Brief. The Pope's private and conciliatory letter he refused to answer. When he received it he was at Flushing, on a journey through the northern provinces of his empire, undertaken to prepare matters for the Russian campaign. He wrote instructions to his Minister *des Cultes* at Paris to keep the Brief absolutely secret, not allowing any one to know that it had been sent; immediately to break up the Council, and send every one of the bishops out of Paris, not allowing any exception to this except in the case of those who were members of his "Commission." As for the Pope, the bishops and cardinals already at Savona were to announce to him the demands of the Emperor. Grievously as they were disappointed at the manner in which their past services had been received, they obeyed. They had an audience on December 13th, but found the Pope inflexible. He was specially displeased with the cardinals. They had come to him professing to act as his sworn advisers; they had suggested the concessions which he could possibly make, and he had followed their advice; and now in a moment, because it so pleased the tyrant, they came to demand from him further concessions, which they had not only not asked before, but had (either explicitly or implicitly) declared he could not make. They were therefore self-convicted of playing false with him. M. de Chabrol he hardly blamed; he was avowedly the agent of Napoleon. That agent wrote that further concession was, at present, not to be hoped for. "The Pope has refused it in terms which showed that his resolution was fixed; indeed it was founded upon what the Holy Father termed 'an inspiration in his prayers.'" He had found that he had been betrayed by his councillors, and had resolved to act on his own judgment. The most indecent threats, both from the bishops and even more from the Prefect, produced no effect on him. He was calm as ever, but quite unmoved. He resolved, however, to write again to Napoleon himself, and M. D'Haussonville gives his letter. It was in his usual spirit of gentleness; it ended—

"We have most seriously reflected, and God knows how much meditation and anxiety this matter has cost us. We are in the greatest distress of mind, and cannot refrain from once more representing to your Majesty that it is essential to us to have a greater number of counsellors and especially free communication with the faithful. When once we are in a situation we

assure your Majesty that, with aid from Heaven, we will do, in order to satisfy you, everything that can possibly be made compatible with our Apostolic Ministry. We live in the confidence that by His help who is the supreme disposer of good things in this world, we shall then be able to arrange everything to our mutual satisfaction. Whatever tends to the spiritual advantage of the Church will at the same time restore tranquillity to our own mind; a tranquillity the more necessary to us because our advanced age brings every day more forcibly before our mind the strict account which we are on the point of giving to God of our own awful duties. With overflowing heart we pray the Lord to pour out upon your Majesty the abundance of His benedictions."

What answer could Napoleon give to this touching supplication of the Holy Father? He dictated it himself to his Minister *des Cultes*. Reproaches, recriminations, threats—this was all that the Emperor returned to Pius VII. for his advances and his benedictions (vol. v. p. 127).

This insulting answer fills more than four pages of the volume before us. It is hardly possible to give any idea of it by extracts. What Pius VII. seems to have felt most when it was read to him by M. de Chabrol (for the cardinals and bishops to whom it was addressed in the name of the minister, though dictated by Napoleon himself, had left Savona before it arrived) was—first, that it accused him of "hoping to excite public troubles"; then that it called on him to resign his office, if he was so ignorant as not to know what every seminarist knows. On hearing the first of these propositions, he protested, "Never." When the latter was read, "He listened with profound emotion. I saw him so much overset and agitated that his hand trembled greatly." When M. de Chabrol pressed the advice, he said that, "Come what might, he would never resign." What seemed most queer to M. de Chabrol he shall tell in his own words:—"He is always fortifying himself with the idea that God will interfere in the decision of his affairs." M. de Chabrol was by no means the first, and we fear he will not be the last, who thinks that he cannot more strongly describe the infatuation of his victim, than by saying, "He trusted in God that He would deliver him. Let Him now deliver him if He will have him."

The mere rudeness and impertinence of Napoleon's language does not seem to have affected the Holy Father; as for instance, "His Majesty pities the ignorance of the Pope, and feels compassion when he sees a Pontiff who might have discharged so grand and glorious a part become the calamity of the Church"; "His Majesty is better acquainted with these [ecclesiastical] matters than the Pope, and too well ever to be turned aside from the course he has marked out for himself;" and much more of the same kind.

Negotiation was now at an end. Napoleon gave express orders that the imprisonment of the Holy Father should be made as severe as ever; i. e., that no person should on any ground have access to him; that he should be deprived of all books, pen, ink, paper, &c. And M. de Chabrol announces that the order was fulfilled. He gave positive orders that the very existence of the Pope's Brief, and also the fact that he had sent the Bulls for the institution of Napoleon's bishops, should be kept an inviolable secret. And thus it happened that those bishops never were canonically instituted into their Sees, although there was no longer any reason why they might not have been so. Thus Cardinal Maury never really was Archbishop of Paris, or Mgr. de Pradt Archbishop of Mechlin; and the result was that at the fall of the Empire they lost their possession of those Sees.

All this part of the history has been till now entirely unpublished. The only authorities for it are to be found in the secret correspondence and reports of Napoleon, his ministers, and his agents, and these have hitherto been strictly concealed. Not one of the important letters given by M. d'Haussonville has been admitted into the official publication of the "Correspondence of Napoleon I.," and, he adds, nothing can be more curious than the absolute contradiction which is to be seen throughout, in the manifestoes, letters, &c., of Napoleon intended for the public, and those which he designed only for his ministers. He is perhaps the only man in history who was invariably, universally, and deliberately false in all his statements and dealings with others, and who yet retained such clear perspicuity of mind as never in any instance to allow himself to be the dupe even of one of his own most favourite lies. At this very time, for instance, his boast both to the Pope and to the world at large was that the clergy of his Empire were to a man with him and against the Holy Father. His private correspondence proves that he never for one moment allowed himself to be deluded upon this subject; he well understood and ever remembered that, whenever he had to do with a Catholic, he had to do with one who regarded him only as the early Christians regarded Nero and Domitian. He could never take precautions enough against them. This was his reason for chasing every bishop from Paris. At this time he writes to his minister to remove the Sulpicians from every seminary in France; to allow the immunity from military service, which had been given to the Seminarists, to be extended only to the dioceses of those bishops who had given him complete satisfaction. He at once excepted the dioceses of Saint Brieux, Ghent, Tournai, Troyes, and the

Maritime Alps (the last was held by Mgr. Miollis, the original of the bishop whose portrait is drawn in "*Les Misérables*"), and adds, "report to me which dioceses it will be well to strike with this interdiction. But this manner of acting must be kept most secret." Then he wrote to break up all houses of Sisters of Charity, who adhered to their rule by continuing to obey their superiors whom he had displaced. He was by no means insensible to their services to his sick and wounded soldiers; but he felt that the better Catholic any one was, the more sure it was that the influence of that person would be thrown into the scale against his plans.

Napoleon set out for Russia. He stopped some days at Dresden, where he was surrounded by the princes of Germany. Some years before he had declared that he was compelled by his "conscience" to interfere with the Pope because he was suzerain of Germany. He was now really exhibiting himself in that capacity. He was attended by the Emperor and Empress of Austria, by the Kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, and by almost countless princes and nobles; the unfortunate and oppressed King of Prussia following him more like a captive than an ally. There, on the same day, he wrote two letters on ecclesiastical subjects; the one ordered new severities against the Sisters of Charity, the other ordered the removal of the Pope from Savona to Fontainebleau. No person was too humble, none too high, for his ever-wakeful wrath.

He laid down every detail of the Pope's journey. He was to be dressed as a simple priest, to pass through Turin, Chambéry, and Lyons by night. His companions were to be Dr. Porta and the Archbishop of Edessa, sent for on purpose. The real reason for this last measure seems to have been that he would have his prisoner within his own reach on his triumphant return home, as he had resolved to take the matter into his own hands. Characteristically he invented a false one in writing to his brother-in law, Prince Borghese, to whom he gave his orders. The Pope nearly died on his journey; and a surgeon was sent for while he lay at the Hospital of Mont Cenis, and told, "You will see a sick man, for whose relief you are to do all you can. I do not say who he is. You will no doubt recognize him; but if you make it known, farewell to your liberty, perhaps to your life." Such was the liberty of private subjects under the first Empire.

At Fontainebleau the Pope was intended to have lived in state, and the Emperor's plans for him were in some degree allowed to appear; for the Archbishop's palace at Paris was gorgeously furnished for his use and received a new name—"The Papal Palace, formerly archiepiscopal." He, however,

declined everything of the kind. The carriages and horses provided for him he would not use, nor celebrate Mass Pontifically, or even walk in the public gardens. He said he was still a prisoner. He had, however, the use of books, and the company of some ecclesiastics. Months passed rapidly away; and Napoleon returned, not in triumph, but as a fugitive. Not a year ago he had refused to answer the most touching letters from the Holy Father, and had sent in return only one loaded with insults, written nominally by his minister. On January 1st, 1813, he volunteered a letter, for which, as monarchs seldom write such productions, it is difficult to find a royal name. It was what schoolboys would call "sneaking"; assuring the Holy Father of his distress last summer when he had heard that he was unwell, and that in spite of all that had happened, his own affection to the person of the Holy Father had never varied, and that he "prayed God that he might have the glory of settling the government of the Church, and might long enjoy and profit by his work."

This was followed by negotiations. But Napoleon treated the Pope as he did the allied powers; his demands were as large as they had been even in the hour of his proudest success. The Bishop of Nantes and all the actors on the scene at Savona were now collected in the palace of Fontainebleau, and the Bishop had his instructions from Napoleon.

The Pope and his successors shall swear before their coronation not to do or order anything contrary to the four propositions of the Gallican clergy. The Pope and his successors shall in future have the right to nominate only one-third of the sacred college, the other two-thirds shall be nominated by the Catholic sovereigns. The Pope shall disapprove and condemn by a solemn Brief the conduct of those cardinals who were not present at the ceremony of the religious marriage of the Emperor; who, however, will restore to them his good graces, on condition of their consenting to sign the said Brief. Cardinals Pietro and Pacca are excepted from this amnesty, and they are never to be allowed to return to the Holy Father (vol. v. p. 216).

Then the Pope was to reside at Paris, and to receive £80,000 sterling annually out of his alienated dominions. The institution of bishops, including those of the Roman States, was to be according to the decree of the Council. These terms were pressed upon him, as more moderate terms had been pressed at Savona. The result was the same. He said he could not act without counsellors, and the stress upon his mind already seriously affected his health. The Bishop of Nantes reported this to the minister. Two days later, January 18th, 1813, the night had set in, the Pope had taken his *siesta* and was sitting in conversation with the cardinals and bishops who resided in

the palace, when the door suddenly opened, and the Emperor came in. The party hastened to leave the room; but "Napoleon," says Cardinal Pacca, "ran towards the Pope, seized him in his arms, kissed him, and loaded him with demonstrations of affection." No discussion took place till the next day. Several succeeding days were spent by the two *tête-à-tête*. What passed in these secret conferences has never been known. The accounts published under the Restoration were quite without foundation. The stories of personal violence to the Pope, our author declares, are "false."

Pius VII., whom his most intimate servants hesitated to question, and who was always loth to explain the particulars of this interview at Fontainebleau, always denied that any violence had taken place, but gave it to be understood that the "Emperor had spoken to him, says Cardinal Pacca, with hauteur and contempt, and had even treated him as ignorant of ecclesiastical matters." On the other hand, Napoleon in the notes dictated at St. Helena, says absolutely nothing on the subject of the interviews at Fontainebleau. He contents himself with saying that he exercised more patience on this occasion than suited his situation or his character. For our part we have found nothing in any of the numerous documents we have examined to contradict the testimony, unfortunately contradictory, either of Pius VII. or of Napoleon. But if we know nothing of the details of the conferences of Fontainebleau, their result at least is certain. At first sight of the text of the new Concordat it appears that the Emperor did not hesitate to withdraw much of his original pretensions. All the clauses which, according to the Bishop of Nantes, had at first sight so greatly shocked the Holy Father, were totally left out. It contains nothing about the four propositions of the Gallican Church, nor of the interference of the Catholic powers in the composition of the Sacred College. Residence at Paris is not distinctly imposed upon the Holy Father, it is only implied in vague terms that he will fix himself in France or in the kingdom of Italy (Avignon seems to have been the city preferred by Pius VII.) The Emperor no longer demanded that the "Cardinals in black" should be censured, nor does he impose upon the Sovereign Pontiff the obligation of banishing from his presence for ever Cardinals de Pietro and Pacca. Moreover, if he maintains the fatal limit of six months for the canonical institution of bishops, he makes in return certain concessions, upon which the Pope set great value, and which he had ruthlessly refused at Savona. The six bishoprics suburban to Rome were re-established and restored to the nomination of the Holy Father. Moreover he was to have the right of nominating to ten bishoprics to be hereafter named, either in France or in Italy. With regard to the bishops of the Roman States absent, owing to circumstances, from their dioceses, the Pope might name them to Sees in *partibus* until they were replaced in vacant Sees either in the Empire or the kingdom of Italy. Finally, his Majesty engaged to restore to his favour the cardinals, bishops, priests, and laymen who had incurred his displeasure during the last few years. These clauses, some more favourable to the Church than those which had been presented to him at Savona, others specially favourable

to the persons who had most warmly embraced his cause, no doubt influenced Pius VII. in his assent. It is known that he insisted on its being stated in the preamble to the Concordat that the articles composing it "were to serve as the basis of a definitive settlement." He insisted no less stoutly on laying down in the last article, that he "had been led to this arrangement in consideration of the actual state of the Church and in the confidence with which his Majesty had inspired him, that he would give his powerful protection to many things so necessary to religion" (vol. v. p. 227).

The same evening Napoleon dictated to the Bishop of Nantes a letter, addressed to the Pope, declaring that he did not consider the articles of the Concordat as implying any surrender on the Pope's part of the States of the Church. We cannot doubt, although our author does not so view it, that this letter had been demanded by the Pope, and was virtually part of the Concordat.

Our readers cannot fail to observe that at this point of the history the novelty of M. d'Haussonville's narrative fails us. The reason is plain. As to all that went on at Savona, his history is founded on the original documents, the written orders given by the master to his agents, and their reports to him of their proceedings. From the moment at which Napoleon begins to act himself, these documents of course fail; for of the two who discussed the Concordat of Fontainebleau, neither owned any master on earth whose orders he could receive, or to whom he could report his fulfilment of them; and hence it is that the details of those interviews can never be known until that day, when the Master in Heaven shall reveal the secrets of all hearts. We have thought it necessary to enlarge on the facts which were first made known by our author; but the narrative which follows, deeply interesting as it is, we are induced by want of space to cut short, especially as it is chiefly founded on the well-known memoirs of Cardinal Pacca. It must be remarked, that before Napoleon came personally on the scene, the Bishop of Nantes had already reported to the minister that the Pope was in a state of bodily health in which "he could not bear any discussion." When in that state he had been kept five long days in perpetual discussion with the terrible monarch of the European world. The result naturally was, that before the Concordat was signed, his whole strength, both of body and mind, had totally broken down. He was again in the state of total prostration to which he had before been reduced at Savona. When the paper was ready for signature, the cardinals resident in the palace and the Empress Maria Louisa were admitted. The Pope, utterly broken down, hesitated at the last moment; and looked to the cardinals. It is believed that a look from one of them would

have decided him to refuse, but he saw none; and the cardinal nearest to him "inclined his head as if in assent." Then Pius VII. put his signature to the paper.

Napoleon (no doubt anxious to prevent his retracting) gave orders that the Concordat should immediately be carried out; and then laid it before the Senate, contrary to agreement, as what had been drawn up was not a concordat, but only preliminary articles. He also at once ordered the singing of a *Te Deum* throughout France for the restoration of peace between the Church and the Empire. The imprisoned and banished cardinals returned from their several dungeons or places of exile, and found the Holy Father in a state which made them fear for his life. The moment Cardinal Pacca congratulated him upon the courage with which he had borne so long a captivity, he answered, "Alas, at the end of it we have fallen into the mud."

Deeply interesting as is the narrative of the discussions which led to the solemn retraction of the Concordat and the precautions which were necessarily taken to keep what was going on from the knowledge of Napoleon's spies, we must refer our readers for all this to M. D'Haussonville. These difficulties long delayed the sending of the touching and beautiful letter to the Emperor, in which the Pope declared, with expressions of hearty sorrow and humility, that he had done wrong, and that his conscience would not allow him to abide by some of the articles of the paper signed on January 25th as a basis of a definitive agreement; expressing also his sorrow and surprise, that it had been published contrary to agreement. It was characteristic of Napoleon, that after an outbreak of rage he sent this letter to his Minister *des Cultes* with orders to keep it strictly private, "in order that he might be free hereafter to declare that he had, or that he had not received it, as might be most expedient."

Our space will not allow us to follow the changes of Napoleon's conduct towards the Holy Father, as the changing fortunes of the campaign of 1813 made him less or more reasonable. M. D'Haussonville throws much light upon it, from the letters addressed by him to his Minister *des Cultes*. At one time, while renewing his orders that the protest of the Pope against the Concordat should be kept a profound secret, he directs the minister to order the archbishops and bishops before returning to their dioceses, to visit the Pope and deliver to him, as from themselves, an address which the Emperor was so good as to write for them, and which speaks of the Concordat of Fontainebleau as "an inspiration of the Holy Spirit," and expresses regret that he delays to put it in execution. There could hardly be a greater sign that men felt his power

was departing, than the fact that this letter seems never to have been obeyed. Then he orders that the Pope should not be allowed to see any one but the cardinals, and that Cardinal di Pietro should be again arrested and banished to some remote town. Then he fills up by his own authority the vacant sees, and orders measures of persecution against the Seminarists and others who refuse to recognize his new bishops. His minister writes a letter to the bishops to ask prayers for France, now invaded, but Napoleon suppresses it, feeling that the French clergy could not but feel the triumph of the invaders as their deliverance. His too faithful tool, the Bishop of Nantes, dies suddenly, and has only time to write to entreat him to restore the Pope to liberty. The allies come on, and Murat, his puppet king of Naples, turns against him and tries to seize the States of the Church for himself. Then Napoleon proposes a peace with the Pope, and the restoration of all his dominions. At last Fontainebleau became no longer safe, and the august prisoner was once more sent away for security, under the custody of M. Lagorse, who had long been his gaoler (under M. de Chabrol) at Savona, by a circuitous route, once more to that place. His journey was, as before, a triumphant progress wherever he passed. Italy was now in the hands of Napoleon's enemies, and both parties agreed to the restoration of the Pope. Napoleon wrote, on March 10th, 1814, to order that he should be escorted by Asti, Placentia, and Parma, and given up to the advanced posts of the allies under the command of General Count Nugent. Pius VII., before leaving Savona, gratified the long disappointed desire of the people by celebrating Mass in their cathedral church, on the feast of Notre Dame de Délivrance, March 19th. He stayed a few days on his way at his native town, Cezena, and was restored to Rome amid the rapturous thanksgivings of his people, March 24th, 1814.

Our author concludes by contrasting the false and malignant mention made of Pius VII., in the notes dictated by Napoleon at St. Helena, with the noble and generous disposition with which Pius interceded for him with the British Government when it was reported that his exile was affecting his health.

We had hoped to make some remarks on the lessons of this remarkable history, and their bearing especially on our own day, but our space does not admit it, nor is it necessary. One consideration, which will surely force itself upon every reader, is that the spiritual interests of the Church were always in extreme danger, from the very day on which the exercise of temporal sovereignty was wrested from Pius VII.

ART. IV.—REPLY BY F. BOTTALLA TO MR. RENOUF.

[F. Bottalla has honoured us by making the DUBLIN REVIEW his channel for publishing a few papers in reply to Mr. Renouf. He has been prevented by stress of occupation from writing earlier on the subject.]

THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF MONOTHELISM AND ITS LEADERS.

THAT the orthodoxy of Pope Honorius may be fully justified from all suspicion in our minds, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the nature and purport of the Monothelite heresy. This is the reason why, in the earlier portion of his pamphlet on Pope Honorius, the author gives a brief sketch of the origin and nature of Monothelism, confronting its principles with the principles of Catholic teaching in respect of the double will and operation in Christ.* Mr. Renouf in his rejoinder has endeavoured to refute the statements made in the opening pages of the pamphlet already mentioned, concerning the drift of the Monothelite heresy; but he has not adduced any proof in support of the view which he has so confidently adopted and put forward. He has contented himself with assertion, and with referring his readers to a note at the end of his pamphlet, which professes to explain the meaning of the word *ἐνέργεια*; a term which plays no inconsiderable part in the present controversy. Mr. Renouf qualifies as *great trash* the assertion that “the word *ἐνέργεια* was more commonly used by the Greeks to express the operating principle, *δύναμις*; substantial, essential, to the nature itself, although it was used likewise in its more proper sense:” and we are further told, on the authority of one passage from Origen, and of one or more from Aristotle, that *ἐνέργεια* “does not mean a principle of operation.”† Now all this is sheer shooting beside the mark, for the question really at issue is not whether in the glossary of Aristotelic terms the word *ἐνέργεια* was used principally to mean an act, but whether it was in general use

* “Pope Honorius before the Tribunal of Reason and History,” n. 1, p. 1, seq.

† “The Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered.” By P. Le Page Renouf. London. 1869. Note, p. 98.

among the Greek Fathers, particularly at the time of the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies, in the sense of a principle of operation, substantial and essential to one nature. A reference to some of these Fathers will justify our view, that such was in reality the meaning which they attached to the term under discussion. In fact, as far back as the second century, S. Justin had given it the meaning with which Mr. Renouf finds so much fault. S. Justin says expressly: *ἐνέργεια φυσική ἐστι δύναμις οὐσιώδης*,* that is to say, it is a *δύναμις*, or a power substantial and essential to nature. And he adds that the *ἐνέργεια* of each substance is a quality naturally belonging to it, and which makes clear and defines the nature.† S. Gregory of Nyssa speaks of this *ἐνέργεια* as of a substantial and essential *δύναμις*.‡ St. Basil is no less explicit. Not only does he employ the word in question in the meaning of *δύναμις*,§ but he also represents *ἐνέργεια* as being substantial and essential to nature, and as the principle by which it is specified and defined.|| Before S. Basil, S. Alexander, patriarch of Alexandria, had taught explicitly in his epistle against the Arians, that *ἐνέργεια* is the *δύναμις*, inborn, substantial and distinctive of each substance.¶

Following in the footsteps of these and other Doctors of the Church, the Fathers of the sixth century attribute the same meaning to the word *ἐνέργεια*. Among them we reckon principally S. Anastasius Sinaita. He assigns the meaning of this word in his *Ὁδηγός*,** for, after having produced the words of St. Gregory of Nyssa, to which we referred above, he confirms the notion exhibited by that holy Doctor, and repeatedly

* "De Providentia et Fide." Fragm. apud S. Maximum, *Opuscula theolog. et polem.*, Op., t. ii. p. 280, Migne.

† "De Providentia et Fide," Fragm. apud S. Maximum, *Opuscula theolog. et polem.* l. c. p. 280. *Ἐνέργεια φυσική ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσιώδης καὶ συστατικὴ πάσης οὐσίας ποιότης.*

‡ *Ἐνέργειαν ἡμεῖς εἶναι φάμεν, τὴν φυσικὴν ἐκάστης οὐσίας δυνάμιν τε καὶ κίνησιν, ἥς χωρὶς οὔτε ἐστὶν, οὔτε γινώσκειται φύσις.*—Frag. ap. S. Maximum, l. c. p. 281.

§ "Adversus Eunomium," l. i. n. 8 (Op., t. i. p. 528, ed. Migne). St. Basil employs the word *ἐνέργεια* to mean the divine attributes, as Providence, Creation, &c.

|| Fragm. apud S. Maximum, l. c. p. 281: *πάσης οὐσίας ὅρος, ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια καθίστηκε.*

¶ *Ἐνέργεια φυσική ἐστὶν ἡ πάσης οὐσίας ἐμφυτος κίνησις. Ἐνέργειά ἐστι φυσικὴ, ὃ πάσης φύσεως οὐσιώδης καὶ γνωστικὸς λόγος. Ἐνέργειά ἐστι φυσικὴ, ἡ δηλωτικὴ πάσης οὐσίας δύναμις.*—In Epist. ad Eglonem Cynopolitanum Episc. adv. Arianos. In Fragm. cit. S. Maxim., l. c. p. 280.

** *Ἐνέργειά ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς φύσεως δύναμις.*—Ὁδηγός, c. ii. (PP. LL. t. lxxviii. p. 69, ed. Migne).

asserts that *ἐνέργεια* is the *δύναμις* of nature; * that it is so essential to nature that no nature can exist without it, *ἐνέργεια* being in fact its distinguishing principle. † St. Maximus, the strenuous opponent of Monothelism and great theologian of the seventh century, qualifies *ἐνέργεια* as substantial (*οὐσιώδης*), as constituting the substance itself, and expressly declares that there may be a nature without actions, but that no nature can exist or be known without natural operation (*ἐνέργεια*), ‡ a truth which he deduces from the fact, that the definition of each nature is implied in the quality of its substantial *ἐνέργεια*. § And no wonder, because, as the learned Doctor goes on to say, “*ἐνέργεια*, being natural, must constitute nature itself, and form its character.” || In other words, *ἐνέργεια*, in the opinion of S. Maximus, is a substantial and essential *δύναμις* of the soul and of nature, from which it cannot possibly be separated. ¶

Another great theologian and opponent of Monothelism in the eighth century, S. John Damascene, gives us the same notion of *ἐνέργεια*. Admitting the definition already laid down by men expert in the craft (*ὡς οἱ περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὶ διειλήφασιν*)—that is to say, that *ἐνέργεια* is a substantial principle of nature,—he draws the conclusion that no nature can ever exist without *ἐνέργεια*. ** Furthermore, the holy Doctor points out that the first sense in which the term *ἐνέργεια* is used is that of *δύναμις*; †† and he himself qualifies it as such; ‡‡ as such he reckons *ἐνέργεια* with the vital principle, the sensitive faculty, the power of generation, the mental and sensitive power, &c. §§ He consequently does not, any more than S. Maximus, con-

* *Ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς φύσεως δύναμις*.—*Ὁδηγός*, c. ii. p. 69 (Migne, PP. GG. t. lxxxix.).

† *Ibid.*, p. 65.

‡ *Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐ τῶν ἐκτὸς τυγχάνει ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργεια, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀνευ μὲν τῶν ἔργων δύνασθαι τὴν φύσιν εἶναι· ἀνευ δὲ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείας, οὔτε εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, οὔτε γινώσκεισθαι δυνατόν*.—“*Disputatio cum Pyrrho*” (Op., t. ii. p. 341, ed. Migne).

§ Πάσης φύσεως ὅρος, ὃ τῆς οὐσιώδους αὐτῆς ἐνεργείας καθίσταται λόγος.—“*Disput. cum Pyrrho*,” l. c. p. 345.

|| *Ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια φυσικὴ οὐσα, φύσεως ὑπάρχει συστατικὸς καὶ ἐμφυτος χαρακτήρ*.—*Ibid.*, l. c. p. 348.

¶ “*De Duabus Christi Voluntatibus*.”—Op., t. ii. p. 200, Migne.

** *Εἰ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια, φύσεώς τινος οὐσιώδης ὀρίζεται κίνησις, ὡς οἱ περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὶ διειλήφασιν· ποῦ φύσιν τις οἶδεν ἀκίνητον, ἢ παντελῶς ἀενεργητόν, ἢ ἐνέργειαν εὐρηκεν, οὐ φυσικῆς δυνάμειος ὑπάρχουσαν κίνησιν*;—“*De Fide Orthodoxa*,” l. iii. c. xv. (Op., t. i. p. 1057, ed. Migne).

†† *Ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἡ δραστικὴ καὶ οὐσιώδης τῆς φύσεως κίνησις* (l. c. p. 1048).

‡‡ Op., cit. l. iii. c. xiv. (l. c. p. 1036). *Λέγου δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν θελητικὴν καὶ ἐνεργητικὴν δύναμιν*, &c.

§§ “*In* elementaris ad Dogmata,” c. viii. (Op., t. ii. p. 109, Migne).

found a transitory motion of the soul or body with the substantial and essential activity of the soul. Finally, not to weary out the patience of the reader with needless citations, Euthymius, a Greek writer who died in the beginning of the twelfth century, states in the clearest manner that *ἐνέργεια*, in the sense in which the word is employed by the Fathers, is a *δύναμις*, and therefore he ranks the will and its operation (*τὴν θελητικὴν, καὶ ἐνεργητικὴν δύναμιν*) * in the same category.

Upon all this we would make the following remarks. First of all, Mr. Renouf ridicules the assertion that the term *ἐνέργεια* was commonly used by the Greeks in the sense of *δύναμις*. And yet we have seen the Greek Fathers, from St. Justin to S. John Damascene, not only using the word in that sense, but also defining it as a *δύναμις*. If the Fathers asserted *ἐνέργεια* to be a *δύναμις*, we must conclude that this was the sense of the word commonly received by them, especially after the rise of Monophysitism, and much more during the Monothelite controversy. We have seen that this was in fact the case. Moreover Mr. Renouf is surprised that any one should employ the term under dispute in the sense of that which is substantial in every nature, though this is to assert no more than what the Fathers have already all along asserted. They most commonly designate *ἐνέργεια* as *οὐσιώδης*; and in defining it to be a *δύναμις*, they manifestly teach that it is substantial to every nature; and as expressly deny that it has the character of an accident.

In confirmation of this view it should be added, that the Fathers were always unanimous in declaring that the admission of but one operation is tantamount to the recognition of only one nature. This was the doctrine of S. Justin ("De Providentia et Fide," in Op. S. Maximi, l. c. p. 280), S. Gregory of Nyssa (Fragm., in Op. S. Maximi, l. c. p. 281), S. Basil, † S. Cyril (Fragm. in Op. S. Maximi, l. c. p. 283), Anastasius Sinaita (Ὁδηγός, c. ii. p. 65, ed. Migne, cit.), Theodorus Abucara (Opuscula, iv. p. 1512, ed. Migne, t. 97, p. 88), S. Maximus, ‡ S. John Damascene ("De Fide Orthodoxa," l. iii. c. xx. — Op., t. i. p. 1052, ed. Migne), and many others. Moreover,

* "In Panoplia Lat.," p. 676, ed. Lyon. See the Greek quotation in Petavius "de Incarnatione," l. viii. c. iv. n. v. p. 379 (Op., t. v. ed. Antwerpiae).

† Epist. 189, nn. 6, 7 (Op., t. iv. p. 691, seq., ed. Migne) et Fragm. apud S. Maximum, l. c. p. 281.

‡ "Opus theol.," pp. 200-201, ed. Migne, cit., et in I *in Pyrrho*, p. 344, seq. l. c. Migne.

in the Synod of Lateran held under Martin I., and in the Sixth Council of Constantinople, this principle was powerfully urged against Monothelism. It was advanced by Pope Martin himself, who appealed to the authority of S. Basil (Conc. Lat. Secr. I.—Labbe, t. vii. p. 87), and it was proclaimed by Stephen of Dora (*ibid.*, in Conc. Later. Secr. II. p. 111, l. c.), and by others; lastly, in the Sixth Council all the Fathers there assembled bore witness to it in their prosphonic address to the Emperor Constantine (Con. Const. IV. Act. XVIII.—Labbe, l. c. p. 1087). So that the confidence of those who venture, in the face of such evidence as this, to declare that “it argues an extraordinary ignorance to repeat the assertion of Theophanes, that when one operation is admitted, there must one nature be acknowledged,” is altogether inexplicable,* for Theophanes asserts no more than that which the Fathers in the first centuries of the Church had already proclaimed, and which two general Councils, summoned expressly for the extirpation of Monothelism, had confirmed. But inexplicable as is the confident statement that “it argues an extraordinary ignorance to repeat the assertion of Theophanes, that when one operation is admitted, there one nature must be acknowledged,” the proof alleged in its support is singularly infelicitous. Mr. Renouf points triumphantly to the notorious fact, “that from their earliest existence down to the present day, the Nestorians have never ceased to hold ‘one will and one operation in Christ.’”† The very allegation of such a proof argues in him who adduces it “extraordinary ignorance” both of theology and of history. For all the world knows that Nestorius, as well as Theodorus of Mopsuestia, whilst confessing in word “one operation and one will in Christ,” the better to conceal their heresy in admitting the double personality, really denied the single operation and will, since the Nestorian starts from a principle diametrically opposed to that on which the Monothelite heresy builds its system. The Monothelite argues thus:—in Christ there is but one person, and therefore also but one operation and one will. But the Nestorian, who acknowledges in the God-man two persons, as well as two natures, cannot possibly teach one physical operation and will in Christ, although inasmuch as he regards the union of the two persons in Christ as a moral union, he can and does teach and maintain a moral unity of operation and will in Christ. Again, whereas in the Nestorian system the unity of operation and will was only apparent, and the

* ““ Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered,” n. 1, p. 13.

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formula of one will and operation was resorted to in order to conceal the error of the division of Christ, the unity of operation and will in Christ was, in the teaching of Monothelism, real and physical. It does not, therefore, follow that because the Nestorian acknowledged two distinct natures in Christ, whilst he denied His double operation and will, therefore the Monothelite error does not contain an implicit denial of two distinct natures in Christ, unless we maintain that the Monothelite formula refers only to a moral unity of operations and wills.

And here we are met by two questions which require explanation. The first is, whether the Monothelites denied the human activity and will in Christ, or only the act of these faculties: if the former, we may inquire further whether they also denied His human nature? On the first question, Mr. Renouf, arguing against Petavius, who holds the scholastic view on the Monothelite system, says, "the clearest proof that it is wrong is that he is unable to produce a single passage from a Monothelite source in favour of it. His proofs are taken exclusively from orthodox authorities."* But not an argument or a document does Mr. Renouf himself bring forward to balance or outweigh the proofs taken from "orthodox authorities." And where, it might well be asked, could more competent authorities be found to represent the true state of the question than the orthodox authorities produced by Petavius? They are eminent Doctors of the Church, who lived at the time of the controversy, who bore the brunt of the battle, fought the enemy at every turn, and allowed him no single breathing-space, until they had dislodged him from his very last position. It would be strange indeed if Greek theologians of such acknowledged learning and genius had been all the while beating the air in ignorance of the stand-point of their adversaries, and passing strange that these same subtle adversaries should never have raised their voices to complain of this ignorance of the true purport of the controversy, or to protest against the doctrines attributed to them. In the Sixth Synod, when their error was definitively condemned, the Monothelite heretics never asserted that they had been misunderstood by their opponents; that the consequences of their doctrine were greatly exaggerated; that errors had been imputed to them which their system did not imply. And yet they ought to have made this protest, especially as in this very Council the maxim was often repeated, that wherever

* "The Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered," p. 12, in the note (*).

one operation is admitted, one nature also must be acknowledged. Really this principle implies the existence of something substantial and essential to nature, not merely the act of a faculty. Thus, the proofs taken exclusively from orthodox authorities cannot be made light of; in fact they constitute one of the strongest arguments in support of our assertions. But is it true that not a single passage can be produced from a Monothelite source to confirm our view? We do not think so, and side with Petavius rather than with Mr. Renouf. Not a few citations in proof of this our view have been already made in the pamphlet entitled "Honorius before the Tribunal of History and Reason,"* and certainly the extracts taken from Theodorus of Pharan, and brought forward both in the Sixth Synod and in the Lateran Council, might, even alone, suffice for that purpose. Theodorus of Pharan was regarded in his age as one of the foremost leaders of the Monothelite faction, and he was the confidant and the adviser of the patriarch Sergius. Now he plainly maintained that the human nature in Christ was only an instrument and an organ of His divinity;† so that in the development of this principle he declared that any act whatever, whether of the soul or of the body, belonged to the Word from Whom it proceeds, yet so as through the soul and the body.‡ Thus, the vital power from which the intellectual and sensitive operations originate and proceed is the Logos; and the humanity is only a vehicle by which they are transmitted. On this account the same author, after having asserted that Christ submitted to the feeling of weariness, sleep, hunger, and thirst, the liability to which was owing to a divine and most wise economy, continued:—"Maxime vero etiam motum horum et quietem ad illam omnipotentiam et sanctissimam Verbi operationem applicamus, et ex hoc unam unius ejusdemque Christi operationem appellamus."§ So that the *ἐνέργεια* of the Divine Logos is the source to which Theodorus attributes all those acts; and therefore he concludes that the *ἐνέργεια* in Christ is one; that is to say, that the principle or *δύναμις*, from which all these acts proceed, is a single, and moreover divine principle.

* "Honorius before the Tribunal of History and Reason," p. 12, seq.

† *μίαν γινώσκειν ἐνέργειαν; ταύτης δὲ τεχνίτην καὶ δημιουργὸν τὸν Θεόν, ὄργανον δὲ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα.*—Fragm. in Conc. Lat. Secr. III. (Labbe, t. vii. p. 172); in Conc. VI. Act. XIII. (l. c. p. 993).

‡ Fragm. in Conc. Lat. Secret. III. (l. c. p. 169); in Conc. VI.—XIII. (l. c. p. 992).

§ *ἡ μάλιστα δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις κίνησιν καὶ ἡρεμίαν τῇ πανσθενεὶ καὶ πανσόφῳ τοῦ λόγου ἐνεργείᾳ προσάπτομεν.*—In Conc. Cri. VI. Act. XIII. (l. c. p. 992).

He evidently denied the principle of operation to the human nature of Christ, and ascribed it to the power of the Divine Word, Who was personally united with the humanity.

Apollinaris had already regarded the humanity of Christ as a mere instrument moved by the Logos. Hence he argued that the instrument and that which moves it produce one only operation (in Act. XII. Conc. Const. IV., l. c. p. 937). Apparently, according to Apollinaris, the principle of activity dwelt with the Logos alone, since His humanity as an instrument (*ὄργανον*) was moved by Him alone. Therefore he concluded that the Word and the instrument had become one only substance in Christ. Now all the leaders of the Monothelite sect imbibed this error from Apollinaris, and therefore they attributed to Christ one only operation, and that a divine one. In fact, it is common among them to compare the humanity of our Lord with a senseless body without a soul. Sergius expressed this idea in his famous letter to Pope Honorius (in Act. VIII. Conc. ejusdem, l. c. p. 776); and Macarius put it forth again in his profession of the Monothelite faith, which he read in the Sixth Synod (in Labbe, t. vii. p. 940), in which he copied to the letter the words of Patriarch Sergius. Here it is pitiful to see how Mr. Renouf distorts and misconstrues a passage of Macarius for the purpose of drawing from it a proof in favour of his thesis. "Macarius of Antioch," he says, "in a passage quoted at the end of the Eleventh Session of the Sixth Council, holds as strongly as any one *ἐνεργεῖν ἐκτέραν μορφήν*. ("The Case of Honorius Reconsidered," note, p. 99.) Now who would believe that the words referred by Mr. Renouf to Macarius really belong to St. Leo? We will give the entire passage:—"Cernis," says Macarius, "quomodo dicens Leo Papa operari utramque naturam propter communionem cum altera, unam ejus operationem promulgavit." (In Labbe, t. vii. p. 940.) The Catholics were in the habit of quoting St. Leo's words against the Monothelites, because the Pope's expression clearly establishes the doctrine of the two operations in Christ. In fact, in the Second Session of the same Council, when the dogmatic epistle of S. Leo was read to S. Flavian of Constantinople, at the words "Agit utraque forma alterius communione, &c.," the Catholics exclaimed that by those words S. Leo had evidently proclaimed the doctrine of the two operations in Christ, and they challenged Macarius and his party to rebut that passage if they could. But Macarius replied that these words of S. Leo do not import a double operation in Christ. (In Labbe, t. vii. p. 640.) And, in the passage quoted above, Macarius says nothing " it by the

words "the two natures act," Pope Leo did not mean that there were in Christ two natural operations, nor do his words imply it. Mr. Renouf quoted St. Leo's words referred to by Macarius as expressing his profession of faith concerning the distinct operation of the two natures in Christ. Consequently his quotation has no weight whatever; he has made a blunder, and there the matter ends. But even if some Monothelite passage were found which would seem to involve the doctrine of the two natures in Christ acting distinctly, we should easily get at its real meaning by confronting it with the principles which the Monothelite Sect unquestionably advocated. Now it is beyond doubt that they maintained the unity of operation in Christ; it is also certain that they asserted the Logos to be the principle to which all kinds of actions in Christ were to be referred and ascribed; lastly, they manifestly taught that the humanity in Christ is, in relation to His divinity, as a motionless body compared to the soul, or as a mere instrument incapable of anything without the hand which moves it. Such being the principles held by the Monothelite Sect, what else could they mean when they hint at something like an action in the humanity of Christ, but that which has been already indicated in the pamphlet on Pope Honorius? "Although the Monothelites acknowledged that the human nature of Christ possessed soul and body, with the faculties of each, still they plainly asserted that these were unable to perform any operation whatever by themselves, since all the operations, both of the human and of the divine nature, were to be ascribed to the power of the Divine Word, Who was personally united with the humanity." ("Pope Honorius," &c., p. 12.) That is to say, the Monothelites admitted, in the humanity of Christ, some kind of aptitude to perform the different operations which are proper to our nature, but they denied that it could act without the virtue of the Logos, Who stands to it in much the same relation as the vital principle to the human body. A human body is fitted for the actions of life, but it cannot perform them without the soul, which communicates activity and strength to its organs. This is the reason why the Monothelites compared the humanity of Christ with a motionless body, and with a mere instrument or an organ. In the body, as well as in an instrument and in an organ, there is fitness to act, but no principle of action. In the same manner, in the humanity of Christ there is no principle of action whatever, its place being taken by the power of the Divine Logos.

And in order to show that our view of the Monothelite system is not a singular one, we will quote a few words from the work of a man whose testimony on the present contro-

versy is above suspicion, inasmuch as he has won golden opinions from Mr. Renouf. We refer to the work of Dorner on the person of Christ. Speaking of the Monothelite error, he says: "In the first stadium the question of one or two wills was not at all agitated: the principal and only question was, Are the two natures to be conceived as active and efficient, or not? The one party, at a later period designated Monothelites, were disposed to represent the deity of Christ alone as active, and not the humanity. . . . Dyophysitism was thus reduced to a dead, impotent proposition, and by assigning to the humanity of Christ, at the utmost, a passive position, they took a most decided turn towards Monophysitism."* And further on, after having exposed the principles of Theodorus of Pharan, he concludes as follows:—"Body and soul in Christ were simply the ready organ of the alone dominant Logos, the medium for the evolution of His *ἐνέργεια*, which he designates *μὴ Θεοῦ ἐνέργεια*. The motions which pertained to the human nature did not penetrate to the upper sphere: the Logos with His nature is represented as having occupied the place of the personality, and the humanity is thus reduced to the rank of a mere garment, or means of revelation, which stands in a completely passive relation to the divine nature, the divine nature being, at the same time, also the personal element. When Theodorus speaks of the *ἐνέργεια* in the sense of effect, he does not fear to describe it as both divine and human (as it were composite); but when he understands by it the activity, the principle itself as active, he can only attribute it to the Logos."†

From all this we may safely conclude that the unity of operation was not inferred, as Mr. Renouf believes, from the received doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. ("The Case of Honorius," l. c.) The truth is that the Monothelites did not understand how there could be unity of person in Christ with the double operation of His two natures. They believed that unity of person would essentially require unity of operation. Therefore they came to the conclusion that the human nature in Christ, being without activity, was only a motionless instrument of the Divinity. This is the reason why the Fathers of the Fourth Synod, as well as their predecessors, did not think that they could urge a more telling argument against Monothelism than that contained in the words of Pope Leo, in which that holy Pontiff inculcates that "*agit utraque*

* "History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ," by J. A. Dorner.—D. ii. vol. i. p. ii. e. 1, p. 166.—Edinburgh, 1861.

† *Ibid.*, p. 170. See also further on, in the same part.

forma quod proprium habuit." By these words the double principle of activity is asserted in the two natures of Christ; and consequently the double operation. The doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* is admitted by all Catholics; and it was taught by the same Pope Leo when he said that each nature in Christ acts "*cum alterius communione*": but this has nothing to do with the Monothelite error.

"During the first period of the controversy," says Mr. Renouf, "the negation of 'two wills' was a corollary of the doctrine of one operation." ("The Case of Honorius," p. 14.) Quite true. But if the negation of two wills is a consequence of the dogma of one operation, the Monothelites, by denying a human operation in Christ, must have denied the principle of activity in His manhood. Because as long as the humanity of Christ is destitute of activity, it is a corollary that in Christ there is no human will: for will is the essentially active power of the soul. But it would be no longer a corollary, if the humanity of Christ were endued with its full activity. If the Manhood is not destitute of its proper mode of action, why should it not have its own will? Then, again, in order to be consistent, Mr. Renouf should maintain that by *will* the Monothelites meant the act of the will. But in this case why were they always so anxious to distinguish the *operation* from the *will*? When the doctrine of one will became more prominent among them, they expressly denied in Christ the two natural operations as well as the two natural wills. This was the plain confession of Macarius of Antioch in the Council of Constantinople. (Act. VIII.—Labbe, t. vii. p. 780.) And Sergius, in his letter to Honorius, pointedly remarked that if two operations are admitted in Christ, it is necessary to admit two wills. (In Act. XII. Synodi VI.—Labbe, l. c. p. 957.) Moreover, if the Monothelites did not deny the human will in Christ, but only its act, the whole reasoning of the Catholic Doctors, and nominally of S. Maximus and Anastasius his disciple, against their error, would come to nothing.

S. Maximus maintained stoutly that Christ was not simply a God acting in the shape and appearance of a man. Anastasius, no less than other Fathers in later times, pushed his argument with still greater vigour. He argued that if Christ was destitute of will, His humanity must have been involuntarily subjected to the Word of God: moreover that it must have been incapable of any virtue whatever, which cannot exist without free will, and for the same reason that it must have been on the same level with the nature of irrational creatures. Finally he, as well as S. Maximus, charged the Monothelites with all the errors and the consequences of Docetism

and Monophysitism.* The arguments advanced by these Doctors evidently prove that the will denied by the Monothelites is not an act, but the power of the soul and the source of human activity. Now, what was the answer of the Monothelites? Did they reproach their adversaries with having misconstrued and misinterpreted their doctrine? Nothing of the kind. On the contrary they so fully appreciated the correctness and the strength of the arguments of their opponents, that at a later period they withdrew a little from the position they had hitherto held. They acknowledged that every nature which exists must possess its activity; therefore their error took the new shape of the doctrine of a composite will.† And here is fresh evidence that when the Monothelites denied the human will in Christ, they denied its power and its essential activity. Finally the Doctors and the Synods of that age understood the error of the Monothelites in this sense, nor did they ply them with other arguments than such as were calculated to establish the existence of the power and the activity of the human will in Christ.

It only remains to answer the last question proposed above; viz. whether the Monothelites denied Christ's human nature. Doubtless no one can assert that they ever denied it openly and on principle; they rather affected to profess the dogma of Chalcedon, and to denounce those who had been anathematized in that Synod. All this has been already clearly stated in the pamphlet on Pope Honorius, and established by the citation of documents proving such to have been the case. The only question at issue is, first, whether the Monothelite doctrine was in itself Monophysite, and moreover whether the Monothelite leaders were consciously Monophysites in disguise. As to the first part of the question, we believe that Mr. Renouf is not far from agreeing with us, since he says that "there can be no doubt that the first Monothelites took a fatal direction altogether"; and he confesses that "their dogma has indeed been judged by the Catholic Church to be subversive of the Creed of Chalcedon."‡ At all events it is clear, especially to those who do not think as Mr. Renouf, that the Monothelites denied only the act and not the power in Christ. The Fathers, who understood Monothelism far better than Mr. Renouf, regarded it as a branch of Monophysitism of the school of Severus.

* "*Anastasius adversus Monophysitas et Monothelitas*," l. iii. (Mai, *Script. Vet.*, Nova Collectio, t. viii. p. 195, seq.).

† See Dorner, second period, first epoch, vol. i. div. ii. p. 193, seq.

‡ "*The Case of Pope Honorius*," etc., pp. 12, 13.

Therefore in the Council of Lateran, as well as in the Sixth General Synod, it was truly said that the Monothelites had renewed by their errors the dogmas of Apollinaris and Severus.* Dorner himself does not hesitate to say that "Dyophysitism was thus reduced (by the Monothelite error) to a dead, impotent proposition; and by assigning to the humanity of Christ, at the utmost, a passive position, they took a most decided turn towards Monophysitism." †

With regard to the other part of the question, Mr. Renouf boldly asserts that "there is not even a shadow of evidence as to any conscious treason on their part against the faith of Chalcedon"; that "those who speak of them as 'Bishops who had long before imbibed the poison of the Monophysite heresy,' as 'professing externally but only hypocritically, to admit the faith of Chalcedon,' &c., and 'those who accuse Patriarch Sergius in particular of hypocritical craft, cunning, and fraud,' usurp the privilege claimed by writers of fiction, and invent feelings, motives, and designs about which history itself is profoundly silent." ‡ Whoever hears this dogmatic language of Mr. Renouf may be tempted to believe either that the thing is really as it is stated by him, or that at least he was not aware of the facts which he qualifies as fictions. But the truth is far otherwise. What we asserted, with the most learned theological writers, is solidly grounded on history; and moreover the facts were clearly referred to in five or six full pages of the pamphlet on Honorius, and are contained in historical documents which Mr. Renouf professes to know perfectly. Nevertheless that gentleman thought fit to ignore those facts, in order to get out of a difficulty. Unquestionably it is a fact universally known in antiquity, that the early heretics, who had held the doctrine of one operation and one will in Christ, had either implicitly or explicitly denied the two natures. It is a fact that the Monophysites, especially the partisans of Severus, deprived Christ of a double natural will and operation, in order that they might deprive Him of His human nature. It is a fact that the whole Church, when combating that sect, solemnly declared that unity of will and operation argued unity of nature. Consequently, as Theophanes well remarks, the Monothelites must have known this principle well: especially as Theodore of Pharan, one of the

* "Libellus Stephani Dorensis in Conc. Lat. S. II." (Labbe, t. vii. p. 105); S. IV. (l. c. p. 270); "Epist. Agathonis Papæ in Act. IV. Conc. VI." (Labbe, l. c. p. 692).

† Op. cit., l. c. p. 166.

‡ "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 13.

first leaders of Monothelism, had been a Monophysite, and Sergius himself was born of Jacobite parents, and must therefore, if for no other reason than this, have imbibed the poison of Monophysitism in his infancy. Moreover it is a fact that the Theodosians and the Jacobites whom Sergius and Cyrus of Phasis intended to reconcile by the Monothelite formula, boasted, after their act of union, that the Council of Chalcedon had entered their communion, and not they that of Chalcedon; and that the unity of operation being once admitted in Christ, they would be able to hold and to teach the oneness of His nature. This fact is testified to by Theophanes,* and contradicted by no one. Now they well understood that the Monothelite formula was only a disguise of the Monophysitic dogma, and that the two doctrines were intimately connected as a principle and a necessary consequence. No wonder that the new sect professed externally the faith of Chalcedon and acknowledged two natures in Christ. To acknowledge two natures in Christ was a formula which had already become a part of the mind of the Church, and its denial would have argued consummate insolence, and would have met with well-merited contempt. On the contrary, the new Monothelite formula would imply in a more plausible manner the dogma of Severus concerning the oneness of Christ's nature. We have already answered this difficulty in our pamphlet on Pope Honorius (p. 10).

Moreover who can doubt that the leaders of the Monothelites were hypocrites, acting out of malice? This was the judgment which has been handed down to us by witnesses upon whom we can rely. We will mention only two of them; Stephen of Dora, who bears testimony to the persuasion of the Eastern Church from the very beginning of the Monothelite Sect; and Pope Martin himself, the great Martyr, who lost his life in opposing that heresy: he is the unerring and authoritative witness of what the Southern Church thought of the Monothelite leaders. Stephen of Dora not only taxes the leaders of Monothelism with having restored to life the heresies of Apollinaris and Severus, but also states that their error was calculated to deceive the simple; † moreover that they intended to reject the doctrine of the Holy Fathers and of the Council of Chalcedon: and that this was the reason why they disseminated their erroneous and pernicious doctrines. ‡ Pope Martin expressed the same views in the Council

* *Chronographia*, ad A.D. 621, p. 507—Bonnæ.

† In *Conc. Lat. Secr. II.* (Labbe, t. vii. p. 106).

‡ *Ibid.*, l. c.

of Lateran. He qualifies the character of the heretics as deeply malicious and deceitful.* Speaking of Sergius and of the other leaders of Monothelism by name, he says that they made every effort to lead the bishops into error, and employed every means of fraud and deceit, as well as of terror and violence, to bring them into subjection. Nay more, he further declares that in doing so, they paid no attention to the sentence of condemnation pronounced by the Synod of Chalcedon against those who had attempted to adulterate the purity of the faith with the novelty of erroneous doctrines.† Thus the Roman Pontiff with all the Lateran Council adjudged the Monothelite leaders to be guilty of trickery, of craft, of violence, and of treachery against the Synod of Chalcedon. Pope Martin, then, did not represent the first Monothelites in a different light from that in which they are painted in the pamphlet on Honorius, after the example of the great theologians and historians who wrote on the origin, progress, and development of Monothelism.‡ Petavius, the most learned of them, openly and repeatedly asserts that the leaders of that sect were nothing else but a branch of the Monophysites, and he represents them as conscious of their error.§

To all this we should also add that the malice and hypocrisy of the Monothelite leaders are again made manifest by the patristic documents which they alleged in their justification. In the Sixth Council we have some instances of this. Whilst the testimonies quoted by Pope Agatho in his dogmatic letter were found to agree perfectly with the authentic Codices of the Fathers, those which had been collected by Macarius and his partisans were proved to be interpolated, misconstrued, and curtailed in their principal parts.|| Was this an evidence of honesty on the side of the Monothelites? In addition to this comes the forgery of the Libellus of the Patriarch Mennas, the whole of which was concocted for the defence of the heresy. When that document was read in the Third Session of the Sixth Synod, the Papal Legates, who had brought the authentic Act of the Fifth Council from Rome, protested against the forgery, and its insertion into the original Acts of that Synod. Upon inquiry it was clearly proved that the

* In Conc. Lat. Secr. I. (Labbe, l. c. p. 86).

† *Ibid.* Secr. I. (Labbe, p. 90).

‡ *Ibid.* (Labbe, p. 91).

§ "De Incarnatione," l. viii. c. iii. n. 5, etc.

|| See Conc. VI. Act. VI.—IX. (Labbe, t. vii. p. 746, seq.). After the full examination of the passages, the dishonesty of the Monothelites was so manifest, that they did not venture any longer to hold the patristic position which they had taken up.

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pages containing that Libellus had been annexed to the volume of the Acts, and that their marginal numbers did not answer the progressive numeration of the whole. (Conc. VI. Act III.—Labbe, l. c. p. 646.) It was again confronted with another authentic Codex which was found in the Archives of the Patriarch, and the conclusion they came to was, that the Libellus of the Patriarch Mennas was a Monothelite forgery, and as such it was condemned by the Council. (Conc. VI. Act. XIV.—Labbe, l. c. p. 1011, seq. p. 1019.) Now the Patriarch Sergius was the first to allege the authority of Mennas's Libellus in support of the new error, of which he is esteemed to have been the principal author. (Ep. Sergii ad Cyrum; Epist. ejusdem ad Honorium Papam. In Act. XII. Conc. VI.—Labbe l. c. p. 947, 954.) Therefore that forgery is to be referred to his age, and not to a period before which the new dogma had been conceived and shaped. Consequently, either he must have been the author of the forgery or some one of his partisans, in all probability with his knowledge and consent. At all events, it seems impossible to presume so much simplicity in the Patriarch as to let himself be imposed upon by such a piece of imposture. In a matter of so great importance he should have looked into the adulterated Codex, which had been interpolated and corrupted whilst in his own archives; and he would have been able easily to discover the forgery. Even if his defenders and admirers think him simple enough to have accepted documentary evidence of such a nature, they will not succeed in clearing him from a very grave suspicion. But whether the Patriarch was or was not the author, or only an accomplice of the forgery, it is certain that his first partisans had recourse to such dishonest means in order to establish and propagate the new error by deceiving the multitude. When the Fathers of the Sixth Synod anathematized the forgery and the forgers, they evinced their persuasion of the hypocritical dishonesty of the new heretics.

The same can be argued from the forgery of the two letters of Pope Vigilius, which was condemned, no less than its authors by the same Sixth Council. (In Act. XIV. Conc. VI.—Labbe, l. c. p. 1014.) Mr. Renouf maintains the authenticity of those letters; he denies that they have even been interpolated by the Monothelites ("The Case of Honorius," &c., p. 90, n. x), as Hefele maintains they have been ("Hist. des Conc.," l. XIV. ch. ii. § 267, t. iii. p. 471, French ed.), and before him Balutius (Præf. in Acta Conc. V. n. iv. seq.—Labbe, t. vi. p. 7, seq.), and Cardinal Baronius ("Annal. Eccl.," an. 680, n. 47). Mr. Renouf thinks that "the critical

reasons which prevailed in the Sixth Council have little weight at the present day." It is not here our task to examine the weight which the critical reasons of the Sixth Council may have at the present day. But whether or not the criticism of that Synod was well grounded, there can be no doubt that the assembled Fathers had a strong conviction that the Monothelite Sect had with full malice resorted to the most unlawful and sacrilegious means in order to sap the foundations of Catholic dogma.* Therefore the Council solemnly declared in the sentence of condemnation of the Monothelite leaders, that their doctrine was impious, and that they had been the inventors of heretical novelty; and hence it condemned them as heretics.† The language held by the Council shows manifestly whether the Assembly thought the Monothelite chiefs to be in good faith and in the full innocence of their minds and their hearts. In the nineteenth century such an opinion would argue nothing but the great simplicity of a modern writer.

* In Act. XIV. (Labbe, l. c. p. 1014). Whatever the opinion may be of Balutius, Hefele, and others with regard to the two letters of Pope Vigilius, it is certain that they were not found in the authentic copies of the Fifth Council, whether Greek or Latin, which came to hand at the time of the Sixth Synod, nor even in the copy which was brought by the Papal Legates. Moreover, the only Codices which contained them were manifestly interpolated. Finally it was evidenced in the same Council (Act. XIV.—Labbe, p. 1015, seq.), that the letters of Vigilius and the Libellus of Mennas had been disseminated throughout the Church by the Monothelites, and inserted in a large number of Greek and Latin Codices, as if the latter had been imperfect and defective. No wonder, then, that Pope Vigilius's letters were found later in Latin manuscripts. If Facundus Hermianensis relates that Pope Vigilius had secretly written to the Emperor before publishing his *Judicatum*, this does not prove that the two letters, as they appear in the Seventh Action of the Fifth Council, are not a forgery. All this proves only that the judgment formed by Mr. Renouf with regard to the sentence of the Sixth Synod on the two supposed letters of Pope Vigilius is, as usual, at fault.

† In Act. XIII. Conc. VI. (Labbe, p. 978); in Act. XVIII. (Labbe, l. c. p. 1090).

ART. V.—OPPRESSION OF CATHOLICS IN SWITZERLAND.

Denkschrift der schweizerischen Bischöfe an die hohe Bundesversammlung bei Anlass der Revision der schweizerischen Bundesverfassung. St. Gallen, Druck und Verlag von J. J. SONDEREGGER. 1871.

IF there are any men with minds open to conviction who still believe in the professions of European liberalism, Switzerland at the present day offers them an instructive lesson. We would especially commend to their notice the memorial addressed by the Swiss Bishops to the Federal Assembly last April. Ably drawn up, moderate in tone, appealing throughout to facts, it is just such a document as would carry weight with honourable and fair men of all parties in England. It is an appeal to the supreme authority in Switzerland, on occasion of the projected revision of the Constitution which has just commenced, against the persecution to which the religion of the Swiss Catholics is subjected.

Many of our readers may be startled at the use of the word persecution in connection with Switzerland, the land of freedom *par excellence*. It is, however, no exaggeration.

The memorial of the bishops opens with a description of the relations between the Church and Protestantism in Switzerland before the French Revolution. As soon as the first storms of the Reformation had subsided, the Catholic and Protestant cantons mutually guaranteed to each other the peaceful enjoyment of their religious rights. But more than this, in the mixed cantons also similar guarantees were provided. The property of the Church, her monasteries, her schools, and her freedom were secured from all interference. Even insults in speech or writing were legally prohibited on both sides. To obviate every danger of oppression or intrusive legislation, in all religious questions the decision was taken out of the power of a majority, and referred to the members of the religious body concerned. Nay, by the latest provision on the subject,—a treaty of 1712,—it was enacted that where the religious character of a question was disputed, the declaration of even *one* side that it was of such a character should entitle the members of the one communion to deal with it apart.

The Revolution, however, swept away all this system of real liberty and mutual consideration, and even when downright persecution of religion ceased, and something like the old state of

things was restored, as, for instance, friendly relations with the Holy See, the revolutionary principle of the omnipotence of the State, and the revolutionary practice of legislating by absolute majorities on ecclesiastical and religious questions in the mixed cantons, remained behind. The liberty or oppression of religion was thus entirely dependent on the character of the men who formed the majorities in the federal and cantonal assemblies. One encroachment on Catholic freedom succeeded another, until at last the suppression of monasteries in Aargau and the general attack upon the Jesuits and their flourishing colleges throughout the confederation, led to the Sonderbund war. The defeat of the Catholic cantons left them at the mercy of conquerors who were not disposed to use their victory with much moderation. Some fifty establishments which had survived the Reformation and the Revolution were suppressed, and a new constitution was drawn up, in which the liberal formula of freedom of worship was inserted, but which carefully ignored the ancient guarantees for the inviolability of the monasteries and other Catholic establishments.

Three-and-twenty years have passed since that time, and every year has heard the cry of anguish from the Catholic people and clergy, as the hand of Protestant and infidel majorities has been laid more and more heavily upon one object after another of the Church's solicitude. Take the case of canton Ticino. Its constitution declares that "the Catholic and apostolic religion is the religion of the state," but it could not have fared much worse if it had been under a Russian government. Flourishing religious houses, with their schools, have been swept away at Ascona, Lugano, Mendrisio, and Bellinzona; the Diocesan Seminary was forcibly suppressed at Pollegio. Parish priests have been driven from their cures, and others, under the censures of the Church, intruded in their place by military force. The bishop and those sent by him are forbidden the use of their jurisdiction, and parishes punished for receiving him solemnly. Prohibitions have been issued against missions, spiritual exercises, the publication of the jubilee, and even the devotions of the Month of Mary, and in "Free Switzerland" heavy fines are inflicted on men and women for the sole offence of practising the devotion or singing hymns to our Blessed Lady in their own houses!

Our readers must not imagine that we are presenting them with an *ex-parte* view of doubtful or disputed facts. The bishops refer to the written law framed in 1855, by which, among other provisions, the legislators of this happy canton assign to the "Staatsrath," or cantonal assembly, "the absolute power of changing the destination of religious foundations,

fixing and regulating the election, installation in benefices and official functions of beneficiaries, erecting new parishes and abolishing existing ones. Power is conferred on the Communes at any time to remove their pastors from their cures and proceed to a new election. The 'Placet' of the State is made requisite not only for elections to benefices, but for all ecclesiastical decrees issued by the bishops and by the Pope, under penalty of fines varying from five to five thousand francs. On the other hand, the parish priests are required, under penalties, to publish from the pulpit, without any commentary, all decrees and proclamations of the civil authorities, whatever may be their purport."

The repeated and imploring appeals of clergy and people to the Federal Assembly against these laws were utterly in vain; and in 1859 they were followed by further decrees for the suppression of episcopal jurisdiction within the canton, whether exercised by the bishop in whose diocese it is situated, or by a vicar apostolic. The Swiss bishops naturally recall the days of the Catacombs, and declare that the sad scenes of the early Church are renewed among the priests and the faithful of the canton Ticino. "All intercourse with their lawful pastors is prohibited under pains and penalties, and has to be carried on in secret whenever episcopal institution to benefices, faculties in cases of conscience, instructions in questions concerning divine worship or the care of souls, &c., have to be sought for." And Switzerland is a free country, and Ticino a Catholic canton!

But bad as is the state of the unfortunate Catholics of this canton, those of the diocese of Basle are worse off still. This diocese, the memorial of the Swiss bishops informs us, is the largest in Switzerland, containing 400,000 Catholics and extending over the cantons of Bern, Soleure, Lucerne, Zug, Aargau, Basle, and Thurgau. It was erected in 1838, and the bishops declared that "its two first prelates sank under the weight of their afflictions and cares, whilst the present occupier of the see is in a far higher degree a veritable 'man of sorrows' under the pressure of vexations of every kind."

It is impossible to present the reader with all the details of the vexatious and insolent persecutions against which the bishops raise their voice. We can only give a few specimens. In 1859 the Government of Aargau forbade the use of the Catechism approved by the bishop, and in 1867 subjected to its censure a newly-compiled one. The well-known Bible History of Schuster, used throughout a large part of Europe in various languages, fared no better. These insolent meddling legislators, probably most of them unbelievers, forbade its use, and had

another drawn up. We pass over a host of smaller vexations, ridiculous orders issued to the clergy, as to the length of their sermons, the sanctification of feasts, prohibition to take part in any religious ceremony in the neighbouring diocese of Fribourg, &c.

A far more serious injury to religion is their interference with the training and education of the clergy. No candidate is allowed to devote himself to the ecclesiastical state without two several examinations by the civil authority, according to the results of which the cantonal assembly of Aargau is pleased to decide whether he may embrace that vocation or shall be finally and for ever excluded from it. None are admitted to these examinations who have been pupils of any Jesuit establishment. In 1860 the bishop succeeded in erecting his diocesan seminary, but he was only able to do so under the most oppressive conditions, which deprived him of the free choice of professors and superiors. Even this very partial success was of short duration. The well-known Compendium of Moral Theology by Gury was an offence to the would-be theologians of the cantonal assembly, and the bishop was required to give it up. He yielded, and adopted that of Archbishop Kenrick, of Baltimore. Far from being conciliated by so extreme a concession to their oppressive interference, the authorities took still greater offence, and on the 2nd of April, 1870, suppressed the seminary. The bishop, as a last resource, collected his students in a private house, where he proposed to give them their ecclesiastical training and instruction at his own expense; but this too was interdicted, and the bishop is now deprived of all means of supplying the ranks of his clergy.

After this we are prepared to hear that these same members of a civil assembly, Protestants, infidels, and what not, thought themselves equally competent to discuss the dogmatic decrees of the Vatican Council, of which they requested the Federal Assembly to forbid the publication throughout the Confederation.

We give a few more of the decrees affecting religion in this land of religious freedom. All elections to benefices are subject to the "placet" of the civil authorities. No priest is permitted to perform any functions of his office, even temporarily, without permission of the government. The Capuchins are forbidden to assist in the cure of souls, and generally, to quote the very words of the Aargau law, "the ecclesiastics of the canton are in all respects, with regard to their relations towards their parish, under the superintendence and corrective authority of the civil officials designated for this purpose." A new sort of bishops! The permanency of appointments to benefices is also abolished, periodical elections ordered, and the duration of the office limited to six years. It is easy to say that in all these

ART. VI.—THE ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER ON
THE EVILS OF THE DAY.

The Four Great Evils of the Day. BY HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. 8vo. pp. 142. London: Burns & Oates. 1871.

THIS recent volume of the Archbishop of Westminster contains four Lectures lately delivered by his Grace in S. Mary's, Moorfields. It is prefaced by a few lines to the effect that the lectures are published in compliance with the request of many who desired their publication. "They are printed," it is added, "as they were taken down, with only such corrections as were necessary for the sake of clearness."

We perceive, on the list of the Archbishop's works appended to the volume, an announcement of another volume in the press, which will probably be the complement of this. "The Fourfold Sovereignty of God" is a forthcoming work that may be expected to present the positive side of a subject of which "The Four Great Evils of the Day" give the negative. Whether the Divine Sovereignty over men and society, the acknowledgment of which becomes feebler and more dubious on all sides of us every day, will be there treated as a lofty and a beautiful ideal, or how far that ideal will be applied to the evils of which we are conscious in actual life, is more than we can anticipate.*

The subjects of the four lectures now before us are: The Revolt of the Intellect against God; The Revolt of the Will against God; The Revolt of Society from God; and, The Spirit of Antichrist. No one, we think, who has reflected on the signs of these our times, will fail to see that the Arch-

* Almost as we are going to press we receive this volume, of which we hope to give some account in our next number. A few words of preface justify the anticipation we had partly formed. "These pages," says the Most Rev. author, "are intended to complete, in outline, the subject of the Lectures on the Four Great Evils of the Day. In speaking of those evils, I was often aware that the positive truths ought to have been stated first, and that the sovereignty of God must be understood before the revolt of man can be measured." The subjects of the six lectures composing this new volume are: The Sovereignty of God over the Intellect of Man; over the Will of Man; over Society; the Sovereignty of the Divine Head of the Church; that of the Church derived from its Divine Head; and, lastly, the Sovereignty of God over the Course of the World.

bishop has here mapped out the prominent evils of the day. No one who so much as looks through the volume will deny that the ground is here traced, at least in outline. The limits within which such lectures are of necessity confined preclude a treatment more in detail. It is an outline, but a most suggestive one. We will endeavour to place before our readers the course of the argument pursued in the first two lectures.

The first lecture, on the Revolt of the Intellect against God, we cannot summarize so well as the Archbishop has done in the recapitulation which he prefixes to the second lecture. We italicise two clauses.

I have spoken of the revolt of the intellect from God as one of the chief evils of these latter times ; and I instanced in proof of it the rise of atheism—a negation of the existence of God—which I then said, and say again, is characteristic of these latter days ; because the earlier ages of the world were so profusely penetrated with the traditionary belief in a Divine Being, that, though they fell into polytheism, pantheism, and idolatry, yet into atheism, as we know it now, they never fell. The other intellectual evils of these times are deism, or the rejection of revelation ; heresy, or the rejection of the Divine voice of the Church ; *the jealous and ungenerous limitation of the doctrinal authority of the Church, even in those who believe in the revelation of the Faith* ; and lastly, the practical unbelief of lukewarm and heartless Catholics. *These two last being what may be called the premonitory symptoms of rationalistic doubt and of final unbelief.* (p. 38.)

The subject opens with the question of our Divine Lord to His disciples, whether He should find faith on the earth at His second coming ? By which is not meant, that the Faith will then no longer exist ; for His Church is indefectible, and the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance ; they are not retracted, or lost again, from that one perpetual, ever-teaching ever-infallible body. But our Lord will find many who have fallen from it ; “giving heed to spirits of error, and doctrines of devils.” “He will find then the light shining in vain in the midst of many who will be willingly blind ; the teacher in the midst of multitudes, of whom many will be willingly deaf : they will have eyes, and see not ; and ears, and hear not ; and hearts that will not understand. As it was at His first coming, so shall it be at His second.”

The Archbishop then devotes a couple of pages to expose “a superstition which, strange to say, pervades those who are willing to believe but little else.” We will not tamper with the words in which he defines it :

One credulous superstition of these days is this : That faith and reason are at variance ; that the human reason, by submitting itself to faith, becomes

dwarfed ; that faith interferes with the rights of reason ; that it is a violation of its prerogatives, and a diminution of its perfection. Now I call this a pure superstition ; and those who pride themselves upon being men of illumination and of high intellect, or, as we have heard lately, in the language of modern Gnosticism, "men of culture," are, after all, both credulous and superstitious. (p. 3.)

The falsity of this superstition is shown by simply stating that "the revelation of faith is nothing but the illumination of the Divine reason poured out upon the reason of man"; the light shown in the mirror, the face reflected on its surface. It is a participation, by the soul, of the light of the Divine intelligence shining out upon it. In proportion, therefore, to the nobleness of the subject-matter of revelation must be the ennobling process effected in the soul that receives it. In measure as the revelation is of the highest truth, so must the soul apprehending it be thereby elevated and strengthened above its own unaided powers. But no truth, and thence no revelation of truth, can be so high, or so momentous, as the nature and attributes of God, the relations into which He has entered with His creature, that creature's eternal destiny and perfection, or the means by which he is to attain it. Nothing, therefore, is worthier of the highest exertion of the human reason, nor can anything more strictly claim the title of a science, than the reception by faith of Divine revelation in its fulness, and the elaboration by an intellect animated by faith, of its corollaries and conclusions.

We are glad to have such a proposition stated at the outset of these subjects. For a vague impression to the contrary exists among well-meaning people, who have not gone so far as distinctly to assert it. We can understand men of docile minds even acquiescing, as in a supposed necessity, in the alternative of remaining with powers of analysis and habits of experimental research undeveloped rather than endanger the unreserved submission they owe to revelation. Were this, indeed, the alternative, their choice would be abundantly justified. If science, as distinct from "the oppositions of knowledge falsely so called," were of its own nature inconsistent with revelation, then "God is true, and every man a liar." It simply needs, however, that science and revelation, faith and reason, should be defined as terms, and their operations precisely stated, to show the fallacy of this groundless apprehension of some, this arrogant superstition of others. It is merely a "modern Gnosticism," as the Archbishop well calls it, which would assert that implicit and explicit assent to Christianity, on the only ground on which it can be adequately proposed to us,

enfeebles the intellect, and surrenders the legitimate processes of reason. As well might it be said that the presence and functions of a prime minister, whose office brings him most confidentially to the presence of his sovereign, extinguishes or derogates from the usefulness and legitimate spheres of those who in their subordinate departments are serving round the throne.

The way is thus cleared, by showing that when the human intellect revolts against God, it is not the intellect healthily performing its functions, analyzing and inferring by any appropriate procedure of its own; but intellect morbid, arrogant, intrusive, and erroneous. The understanding becomes less true and less sound in proportion as it becomes falsely ambitious; less intellectual—and less, in a word—because less docile and patient. This is Gnosticism; this is revolt. And it is peculiarly the Gnosticism and the revolt of our present time.

There have been three periods of the human reason in the history of mankind. The first period was when the reason of man wandered alone, without revelation, as we see in the heathen world, and most especially in the two most cultivated races of the heathen world; I mean the Greek and the Roman. The second period was that in which the human reason, receiving the light of revelation, walked under the guidance of faith; that is to say, by the revelation of God of old to His prophets, and by His revelation through the incarnation of His Son in Christianity. Lastly, there is a period setting in—not for the whole world, not for the Church of God, but for individuals, races, and nations—of a departure from faith, in which the human reason will have to wander once more alone without guide or certainty; not indeed as it did before, but, as I shall be compelled hereafter to show, in a worse state,—in a state which is in truth a dwarfing and a degradation of the human intelligence. (pp. 4, 5.)

That is, the first period was one of degradation and progressive decline, because without revelation; a phase of the human intelligence with all the unmitigated consequences of the Fall; darkening, enfeebling, degrading. The second period was that of inspiration and revelation; in a word, of faith. This is a period when moral and intellectual elevation were spread abroad in men's lives and conscience. The inspired utterances of the Old Testament are derived from direct supernatural approach to God, the source of light, and "in the most elaborate literature of Greece and Rome, there is nothing which, for intellectual elevation, refinement, and power, is comparable with them." Still more, of the Gospel Revelation, "the history of the progress and perfection of the human intellect is the history of Christianity itself. Christianity has elevated, culti-

vated, developed, invigorated, and perfected the human intellect." The third period is that of the present revolt, and therefore present decline, of the intellect of man.

This word, indeed, "revolt," is used by S. Paul expressly to denote the spirit of the latter days of the world. "Now," as the Archbishop paraphrases it, "a revolt means a rebellion, a rising, a casting-off of obedience, and the erection of a self-constituted authority in its place." And the symptoms of this spirit of revolt against God the Author of truth revealed, and against the Supreme Authority commanding obedience both to truth and law, may be stated as follows:—

(1.) There are some few among us, and have been for the last two hundred years, who profess atheism:—that is, who make profession of "not only a blasphemous but a stupid impiety." Why is it stupid? Lord Bacon answers, in an immortal sentence, reproduced in these Lectures. Quoting the Book of Psalms, Bacon says: "'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.'" It is not said, "'The fool hath *thought* in his heart': that is, the fool did say so in his heart, because he hoped there might be no God. He did not say it in his head, because he knew better." And so S. Paul accounts for the depth of heathen degradation by saying: "They liked not to have God in their knowledge." Yet, even these were not atheists: on the contrary, their departure from the true God led them into polytheism, and their more thinking men even into pantheism. All the ancient heathens, then, were theistic in a high degree: and from them, so far, the theories of some among us, who make up for fewness of number by confidence of assertion, is not an advance, but a retrogression.

Under this head comes prominently the Positivist school, led by Comte; to whose self-asserted maturity of thought, as in contrast to the previous childishness of belief, the Archbishop devotes two or three pages.

(2.) Next in order comes that degree of intellectual revolt against God, of which they are guilty who hold the "absolute rationalism" condemned by the Syllabus. "Men," says the Archbishop, "who, though they do not reject the existence of God, do nevertheless reject the knowledge of God . . . believe in a God of nature, but reject the revelation which He has given them of Himself." The cause of this is not far to seek; and though, so far as it affects our country, it is touched in this Lecture with tenderness and regret, it is dealt with faithfully.

The first cause of rationalism, that is, the rejection of Christianity, in the present day was the rejection of the Divine authority of the Church of Jesus

Christ three hundred years ago : and that by a law of production so legitimate, by an intellectual law so certain, that, I think, any one who would give himself sufficient time and apply sufficient industry to follow the history of unbelief in the last three hundred years would see it to demonstration. (p. 14.)

This is drawn out sufficiently to furnish matter of thought on a topic which cannot be too much urged upon earnest minds. Still exterior to the truth, they have to be convinced of what they are naturally, and not always blameably, slow to believe. It must be shown, as it may be so easily, that the movement of the sixteenth century, from which their religious system sprang, was one of unbelief against faith in the full revelation of God, and against the unfailing instrument to propound and to preserve it. In other words, that while infidelity is a graduated thing as regards its special object-matter, it is one and indivisible in its intellectual principle. The whole moral nature of such persons revolts, and has ever done so, against certain degrees of rejection which they have been wont to define as infidelity. But they fail to perceive that Protestantism is, of its very nature, an infidelity less developed indeed, less extensive in range, less fearless in assertion, less consistent in theory, but as real and essential, as the more recognized forms of unbelief. And he who shall couch them of this mental film, so that the operation be performed with tenderness and prudence, will thereby be doing a work of spiritual mercy.

(3.) The "moderate rationalism" aimed at in the Syllabus consists in—

The retaining a belief of Christianity, or the professing to believe it; but the believing of it only so much as, upon private criticism and its own judgment, the individual mind is disposed to retain. But is it not obvious, at once, that the human reason can only stand related to the revelation of God, either as a critic, or as a disciple in the presence of a Divine Teacher? The moment the human reason begins to criticise, to test, to examine, to retain, or to reject, it has ceased to be a disciple, it has become the critic; it has ceased to be the learner, it has become the judge; and yet find me, if you can, any middle point where the reason of man can stand between the two extremes of submitting to the Divine authority of faith as a disciple, and of criticising the whole revelation of God as a judge. There is nothing between the two. Now this kind of intellectual revolt (I must call it by a hard name, but it is an old one, and used by the Apostles) is heresy. What is the meaning of heresy? It means the choosing for ourselves, as contra-distinguished from the receiving with docility from the lips of a teacher—the choosing for ourselves what we will believe and how much we will believe. (pp. 20, 21.)

These three forms, then, of intellectual revolt; viz. atheism,

and rationalism, whether absolute or moderate, make up the great staple of non-Catholic religious thought at this day. England, in common with all other nations or sections of them, that have cast off the teaching authority of the one definite Teacher of truth, is handed over to a system of negation, diminution, limitation, evaporation, under which truths, once possessed, vanish away. *Diminutæ sunt veritates a filiis hominum*, is a sentence which applies to human theories in religion with all the more intensity as time goes on. Doubt is the legitimate result of theory, where to theorize is to act the critic and judge in God's revelation. A denial which at first seemed partial, attaching to some doctrines only, works itself out, till it is seen to be of principle, not of detail. It becomes confluent and universal, under the inevitable processes of human thought.

(4.) But is there a possibility of these evils, rife among such as are without, in any degree affecting such as are within? There is a direct danger here for Catholics also. Consider our social contact with those who, unhappily for themselves, and (unless we stand on our guard) for us, are tainted by the infection. We live in a country which for three hundred years has been pervaded by a spirit of opposition to the Catholic Church. Everything round about us is full of antagonism to the Faith.

More especially, the tone of our publications: popular or philosophical, direct or indirect:—

The whole literature of this country is written by those who, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes consciously, assume an attitude of hostility to it. I say, sometimes unconsciously, because, being born in that state, they often do so without being aware that they have received an heirloom of false principles and of false histories respecting the holy Catholic Church. Without knowing it, they are perpetually incorporating them with what they write; so that the greater part of the literature of this country, which is in the hands of us all, contains a systematic contradiction of that which we believe. The newspapers, which fill the whole country, day by day, are animated by a spirit which is against us; and they are filled by details, and narratives, and correspondence, and they must forgive me if I say fables, fictions, and fabrications—anything that can pander to the morbid appetite, to the craving for scandals against Catholic institutions, Catholic priests, Catholic nuns. Only the other day we read attacks against certain nuns in Paris which, for studied but transparent falsehood, were worthy of the Commission of Henry VIII. How is it possible that Catholics can read these things day by day, and their eyes, and imaginations, and hearts receive insensibly no stain from them? They who walk in the sun cannot help being tanned. You go to and fro in the midst of all this literature and all these daily calum-

nies, you breathe this atmosphere charged with untruths—how is it possible that you should be unaffected by them ? (pp. 24, 25.)

The effect of this contact is, naturally, to make “the charity of many grow cold.” And their first approach to the spirit of those who surround them is, in the same proportion to recede from the generosity and fulness of Catholic belief.

There was growing up in the minds of some men a disposition, which, I am happy to say, is nearly cast out again, to diminish and to explain away, to understate and reduce to a minimum that which Catholics ought to believe and to practise. (p. 26.)

We reluctantly omit the masterly exposition which follows, of the extent of the truths which are of faith, but have never been the object of a definition. Space will only permit the conclusion.

I should have thought that a generous heart, filled with the love of God, would have desired to know more and more of Divine truth, and would have said, “Let me know everything which God has revealed, let me have the fullest and the amplest knowledge,” rather than be jealous and niggardly in limiting the growth of that knowledge. (p. 28.)

(5.) There is a danger among Catholics of what may be called practical unbelief; “even in many who would lay down their lives for the dogmas of the Faith.” If we are to state it in a word, they believe more than they love; and while, therefore, their faith is unshaken, it remains uninfluential over their lives.

They become, for instance, unconscious of the Communion of Saints, of the presence of God, of the operation of the unseen world, of the working of the Holy Spirit of God in the Church, and of the personal agency and subtlety of the enemy of truth. I have given these last two examples, because they are the two stealthy and secret approaches whereby the enemy of truth first assails those who sincerely believe. When opening his trenches against the faith of those who never doubted, he begins with the least noise, and under cover. (p. 29.)

The revolt, then, of the intellect against God

Is against His existence, or against His revelation, or against His divine authority. And there are the two stealthy and incipient forms of intellectual revolt to which Catholics are tempted; the one of diminishing what they believe to a minimum, the other in reducing to the least that which they are bound to submit to in point of authority, or to practise in point of devotion. (pp. 29, 30.)

Application is then made of these propositions to the events

preceding and following the General Council, in a passage for which we would gladly find space, but that it would be impossible to abridge it.

The Second Lecture is concerned with the revolt of the Will against God. And here we come at once to the truth which underlies every system of sound ethics, inspired or uninspired—the connection and interdependence of the intellect and the will of man. This it is which made Aristotle insist on the moral preparation of the “hearer,” or disciple, as a condition to his rightly apprehending the ethical teacher. This made him point out that a self-controlled, virtuous habit of mind and life,* was the preservative of an intellectual sense of all things concerned with the right conduct of human affairs. And on this our Divine Lord founds what is at once a law and a promise: “If any man will do His Will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.”† The will, then, that is, the moral state of the thinker, reasoner, or disciple, influences his intellectual perceptions. What a habit of self-control and personal conformity to law, and obedience to right reason in conduct, would have enabled him to perceive,—of that his moral obliquity and obscurity keeps him in intellectual, not irresponsible, ignorance. And this, of course, leads to the whole subject of the obligation of belief, and the guilt of unbelief.

Having cited the text, Rom. viii. 7, in which S. Paul declares that the wisdom of the flesh is not subject to the law of God, the Archbishop says:—

Now, such was not the state of man when God made him in the beginning. Man was created perfect, both in body and soul. The passions and affections were in perfect subjection to his will, and his will to the Will of God. From the first moment of his creation he was constituted in a state of grace, and the Spirit of God dwelt in him, illuminating him with the knowledge of God, ordering his affections and passions according to the law of God, and subjecting his will to the Will of God; so that there was a supernatural unity and harmony in his soul, and his soul was, as it were, the Kingdom of God within him. Such was the state of man in the beginning; and the wisdom of the flesh then had no existence—the wisdom of the Spirit reigned in him, which is both life and peace. When sin entered, and death by sin, then the wisdom of the flesh developed itself; that is, human nature in its fallen state, deprived by its own sin of the Spirit of God, became darkened, troubled, disordered, unholy. The unity and harmony which existed before, the dominion of the soul over itself, was shattered and destroyed. The

* *Σωφροσύνη ἀπὸ τοῦ σώζειν τὴν [πρακτικὴν] φρόνησιν.*—Arist. Eth. Nico.

† S. John vii. 17.

rebellion of the passions and affections against the soul at once arose. As soon as the will of man revolted against the Will of God, the passions and affections in him, which till then had been subject to him, revolted. He was punished for his revolt against God by an internal revolt against himself. (pp. 41, 42.)

The divinely-appointed remedy for this otherwise hopeless rebellion is the redemption of man, whereby his will is once more brought into conformity with the Will of God, and the wisdom of the Spirit lives and works in him. But the redemption is of humanity entire; and its object is, indeed, the sanctification and salvation of the individual man, but also the founding, ruling, and perfecting of the kingdom of God among men.

Every regenerate soul restored to friendship and union with God, by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, is compacted in the Body of Christ: "unto whom coming," as S. Peter says, "be you also as living stones built up, a spiritual house." And as every stone is shaped and squared and fashioned and fitted to the place that it is to occupy, so every Christian soul, built up into the unity of the Church of Jesus Christ, grows into a temple in which God dwells by His Spirit. In this kingdom the Will of God is supreme, and the Holy Spirit perpetually dwells, pervading the Church with sanctity. The Church incorporates the Will of God, and makes it visible among men. The sins of individuals notwithstanding, the Church is conformed by its interior subjection to the Will of God, because it is a spiritual society made up of individuals, called from all races and languages, compacted and built together in indissoluble unity, as they subject themselves, one by one, to the wisdom of the Spirit, Who dwells in the Church for ever. But the Church has a twofold mission. The first part of its work—the highest and the noblest—is the salvation of individual souls, as I have described. But it has another: the second part of the mission of the Church to the world is the sanctification of the civil society of the world, that is, of the households and families of men; then of peoples, nations, states, legislatures, kingdoms, empires, and the whole civil order of mankind. (pp. 43, 44.)

Regarding in this light the mission of the Church, its long life of eighteen centuries may be considered under three successive phases, represented by three very unequal periods of time. The first was from the Day of Pentecost to the conversion of the Empire, three hundred years; during which the Church was painfully gathering individuals into its fold, under almost constant stress of persecution. The second was when "the civil power of the world first paid homage to the Church of God"; and this extends from the fourth century to the sixteenth. Not that the world had the note of sanctity, nor that great evils and scandals ceased to abound. But the

world recognized the supreme authority of faith, and of its laws. "The public order of society was Christian, and the wisdom of the flesh was, at least so far as public laws could reach, in subjection to the wisdom of the Spirit." The third period is that of the last three hundred years:—

A revolt of the will of man from the Will of God, as expressed and embodied in the whole work of the Church for the previous fourteen hundred years. When, three hundred years ago, individuals one by one revolted from the authority of the Church, they laid the first seeds of the revolutions which, in these later ages, have separated whole nations from the unity of the Faith. Individuals began the work in the sphere of private judgment, or of their private conscience before God. But that which begins in the private conscience of men, one by one, becomes little by little the collective and public opinion of a people, and is at last forced upon governments and legislatures, and changes the public laws in conformity to itself. Now, for the last three hundred years, there has been a continual expunging of the law of Christianity, of the faith and the doctrines of Christianity, from the laws of Christian peoples; so that I may say that at this moment there does not remain one single people that has not separated itself formally from its old relations of unity with the Christian Church. Many, as in the North and West of Europe, have formally separated themselves altogether from the unity of the Catholic Church. Other nations, that remain at least united in faith and in outward worship, nevertheless have broken all bonds and relations with it, except in the bare retaining of dogma and of spiritual discipline. (pp. 47, 48.)

This third period, in which we now live, is marked by the special character of *lawlessness*, which the Apostle predicts as belonging to the latter days. This spirit is—

The rejection of law, the rebellion of the human will, the human will making a law to itself, that is, each individual becoming his own legislator, and each legislator making laws at variance with the wills of others, causing perpetual change, universal discord, isolation of man from man, and because isolation, therefore conflict endless and suicidal. (p. 50.)

The ways in which human lawlessness manifests itself are chiefly as follows:—

(1.) In individuals. At this day, men are no longer bound by the restraints which their fathers imposed on themselves, in avowing infidelity or personal disobedience to the laws of God. "Fifty years ago," says the Archbishop, "if a man did not believe in Christianity he held his peace, not only out of respect for others, but out of respect for himself. Now, men have no shame to profess infidelity."

(2.) In the social relations, especially as regards the solubility of Christian marriage. "The law of Christendom was the law of England down to fifteen years ago, and the bond of marriage was indissoluble. But the indissoluble bond of marriage is the foundation of the domestic life of Christendom. In these days a blow has been struck at this first principle of Christian homes, which are the foundation of political society."

(3.) The "Principles of '89," as they have been called, which are the lawlessness of all civil and political relations. They advocate the "rights of man"; but say nothing on two other topics, the rights of God and the duties of men. And yet, "when men rise for their rights, forgetting to say a word about their duties, they are already in rebellion." Moreover, we may trace another manifestation of this political and social lawlessness, in the stir that is abroad regarding what are called "the rights of women."

(4.) In the degree to which luxury and softness, in dress and the pleasures of society, have invaded our domestic life and personal habits. This has come partly from the unparalleled wealth for so long a time poured into our country; and, though to some extent resisted by the manliness and simplicity of the national character, it constitutes one result of an over-civilization and self-worship which has carried our nation into many habits of revolt against the law of the Cross. "The taint of mortality is upon a refined and luxurious life, though on the outside, like the whited sepulchre, it seems unspotted."

(5.) The profuse worldliness which marks our present day has about it the same lawless character. "What is the world but the aggregate of that wisdom of the flesh, which is declared to be an enemy of God? The world always was and always will be at variance with the sanctity, the purity, the justice of God; and therefore S. John says: 'Love not the world, nor the things which are in the world.'" It comes to us under its several forms of ambition, covetousness, and the fear and worship of the world. "The flattery, the adulation, the sycophancy, with which people will wait upon the world to catch its favour, to be admitted into society, to sit at the tables of rich men, to be known as the acquaintance of those who bear titled names, the mean fawning obsequiousness of those who wait upon the world"—who, that knows the constitution of society will say that a warning against all this spirit is thrown away? "The worship of the world, and the bondage of the world, the fear of losing its favour, or the fear of incurring its ridicule, degrades millions of men who were created to the image of God, and as men, if not as Christians, ought

to be ashamed of such meanness." And this, because the law of God is neither their supreme nor proximate law.

(6.) Even in the Catholic worship of the present day may be latent a subtler and less suspected form of worldliness. We are in danger of becoming self-pleasing and self-indulgent in things that ought to be referred more simply to God. A disclaimer was hardly needed from the Archbishop, whose zeal for church construction and adornment may be left to speak without commentary, that in touching on this point he is not discouraging the dedication of our best gifts to the service of the sanctuary. After making it, however, his Grace proceeds :—

You will not misunderstand me, then, when I say that the spirit of the world will often enter into the splendour of the sanctuary, and that the sounds which fill the ear, and the beauty which fills the eye, may take away the heart and the mind. Unless there be the spirit of prayer and union with our Divine Lord in the heart, men may come and go without worshipping God in spirit and in truth. This is one of our most subtle dangers. Satan knows well how to pass off the intellectual simulation of religious opinion for Divine Faith ; how to pass off imaginative dreamings about the perfections of saints for practical obedience ; how to fill men's imaginations with ideas of asceticism while their lives are self-indulgent ; and to make even the splendours, sweetness, beauty, and majesty of Catholic worship a fascination of the sense and a distraction of the soul. The tempter is always busy, and nowhere changes himself into an angel of light so easily as in church. Now, I ask, have you been enough on your guard against this ? The Catholic Church, lavish as it is in all splendours, because all things are due to Him who is the Giver of all, has sure and deep correctives to recall its children from the mere fascinations of sense by the eye, or the ear, or the imagination, to the presence of God. Where Jesus is present in the Blessed Sacrament, no splendour can easily withdraw the mind from Him ; or if any become lukewarm, there is a prompt and strong remedy in the confessional. They who live in spirit and in truth will adore in spirit and in truth, as well in the majesty of a basilica as in the austerity of a catacomb. The interior spirit vivifies all exterior forms. Ceremonies are a mere mask to the unbelieving and the undevout. They are the folds of the Divine Presence, the countenance of the unseen Majesty, to those that believe and love. (pp. 63-65.)

(7.) One more, and that a very patent exhibition of the lawlessness of our day, is the spirit of compromise. And this, as the Archbishop most truly says, is one that threatens us all.

The days in which we live are not days of firmness. People who still retain a belief in revelation nevertheless hear so much against dogma, that they are often tempted to use the same language, and to disclaim dogmatism. They hear so much said against ascetici that they try to show

their freedom from it by a liberty which is dangerous. But religion without dogma is not Christianity, and religion without asceticism is not the religion by which we can be saved. The religion of Jesus Christ began in the preaching of John : "Do penance ; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." There can be no repentance without the mortification of the senses. The times in which we live are, perhaps, of all times since the beginning of the Church, the least ascetic. . . . There is little mortification of the intellect : the intellect ranges without check and without limit ; men read every book that comes to hand, every newspaper they find on the table. They do not ask whether it is for the Faith, or against the Faith ; is it heretical, or is it sound ; is it pure, or is it impure. They begin without discrimination ; they read on without fear ; they find the book to be heretical, erroneous, scandalous, licentious, and yet they do not burn it ; they do not even put it down. The Catholic Church strictly and wisely prohibits the reading of any books that are written by those who have fallen from the Faith, or teach a false doctrine, or impugn the Faith, or defend errors. And that for this plain and sound reason : the Church knows very well that it is not one in a thousand who is able to unravel the subtlety of infidel objections. (pp. 65, 66.)

Here we must stay our hand, with the consciousness of having done scant justice indeed to the author, in this short abstract of one-half of his important volume. In the two remaining Lectures, that on "the Revolt of Society from God" carries forward the description of our present evils, from its first detail of the revolt of man's individual intellect and will. "The Spirit of Antichrist" draws out the antagonism, perpetual and irreconcilable, of the spirit of the world against the spirit and interests of our Lord, and of those who belong to Him. This animosity is instanced especially in relation to (1) the influence exercised by religion in the sphere of politics and principles of government ; (2) the influence of the Church as a visible and tangible embodiment of religion ; (3) the supernatural life of those who are living under religious vows ; (4) the priesthood ; and (5) the Holy Father, as the Vicar of our Lord.

There is one passage, however, in which an important topic of the day is so powerfully handled, that we cannot withhold it from our readers :—

It is commonly said, that what is called "dogma" is a limitation of the liberty of the human reason ; that it is degrading to a rational being to allow his intellect to be limited by dogmatic Christianity ; that liberty of thought, liberty of discovery, the progress of advancing truth, apply equally to Christianity, if it be true, as to all other kinds of truth ; and therefore a man, when he allows his intellect to be subjected by dogma, has allowed himself to be brought into an intellectual bondage. Well, now, let me test the accuracy and the value of this supposed axiom. The science of astronomy has been a tradi-

tional science for I know not how many generations of men. It has been perpetually advancing, expanding, testing, completing its discoveries, and demonstrating the truth of its theories and its inductions. Now, every single astronomical truth imposes a limit upon the intellect of man. When once the truth has been demonstrated there is no further question about it. The intellect of man is thenceforward limited in respect of that truth. He cannot any longer contradict it without losing his dignity as a man of science—I might say, as a rational creature. It appears, therefore, that the certainty of every scientific truth imposes a certain limitation upon the intellect; and yet scientific men tell us that, in proportion as science is expanded by new discoveries and new demonstrations, the field of knowledge is increased. Well, then, I ask, in the name of common justice and of common sense, why may I not apply this to revelation? If the possession of a scientific truth, with its complete scientific accuracy, be not a limitation, and is therefore no degradation of the human intellect, but an elevation and an expansion of its range, why should the defined and precise doctrines of revelation be a bondage against which the intellect of man ought to rebel? On the contrary, I affirm that every revealed doctrine is a limitation imposed upon the field of error. The regions in which men may err become narrower, because the boundaries of truth are pushed farther, and the field of truth is enlarged. The liberty of the human intellect is therefore greater, because it is in possession of a greater inheritance of certainty. And yet, if there be one superstition which at the present day is undermining more than any other the faith of men, it is the notion that belief in the positive dogma of Christianity is a slavish limitation of the intellectual freedom of man. (pp. 111–13.)

One remark is obvious, on the subjects here selected and treated: their strict accordance with the course of the Syllabus of 1864. And this does but enhance our perception how grave is the occasion which has called forth the Syllabus itself, and this its commentary. Through previous centuries the utterances of the Church and its head have concerned false propositions on particular doctrines, where all men believed the chief staple and foundation of truth. From Nicæa to Trent, they were in most instances the disproportioned statements, aberrations, subtleties, exaggerations, or partial denials of men otherwise believing, that fell under condemnation. The prominent exception to this, of course, is the nest of so-called Reformers aimed at by the Council of Trent. But even Luther, Calvin, and the rest believed, *e.g.* on the whole,* the

* Upon the whole; for we have not forgotten the blasphemy by which Luther denounced the Epistle of S. James as an *epistola straminea*, that ought to be thrown into the Elbe; inasmuch as he was unable to distort it to his doctrine of Justification. Moreover, these men, whose controversial position must have forced them to think out, at least from time to time, the grounds of belief, could hardly have escaped some perception that the proof

Inspiration of Scripture; however much their theory deprived them of all adequate proof of it. They drew their arguments against the Church from the sacred volume which the Church had given them. It has been reserved, then, for these latter times to deny that Inspiration itself; and, beyond that, the whole system and ground of supernatural belief. Accordingly, from the chair of Peter there has now, as ever, issued a declaration proportioned to the needs of the day. And the measure of those needs may be taken by the fact, surely solemn in the extreme, that the utterances from Rome are now concerned with the very foundation of all revealed religion, nay, of Theism itself.

There is very much in this to arrest the attention of an earnest non-Catholic thinker. Human opinions have run round their course. During a cycle of three centuries the Protestant theory has had everything—except truth—in its favour. The material advantages of universities, colleges, endowments of learning; state patronage; court sunshine; the aid, not feebly exerted, of the secular arm; a social prestige that struck its roots deep through the several classes and departments of national life; the unquestioned tradition of literature and public opinion; wealth, “unto an hundred bates of oil, and salt without measure,”* to prosecute its enterprise. These things it has possessed, to the full and overflowing. And the end of the long problem is, after all its pretensions and self-assertion, its fringes and phylacteries, its comminations, treatises, canons, anathemas,—that it needs a voice from Rome, its ancient hereditary foe, to teach it the catechism it has let slip and lost. “It has need to be taught again what are the first elements of the words of God.”

It must condescend to learn that there is a personal God, distinct, independent of the forces and laws of nature; a Creator, not a mere *δημιουργος*; a moral Ruler of His creatures, who commands them to believe Him as well as obey; who exacts the homage of implicit belief in all that He reveals and His Church proposes—beginning with a truth so primary as the essential distinction between right and wrong. If Protestantism cannot teach these things “as having authority, and not as the scribes,” if it has been unable to retain them,

of Inspiration rests on the tradition and therefore on the authority of the Church. They must occasionally have felt as uncomfortable as the man in the well-known engraving, who, having seated himself on the beam which he is sawing asunder, becomes aware of his position, while the mob are pulling at it from below.

* 1 Esdras vii. 22.

and has no remedy or help when its children rise up to dispute and cast them aside, let it learn in its old age from the voice which is commissioned to teach mankind. Truth still resides and is propounded on earth :—*Roma locuta est.*

None, we think, will rise from these Lectures without grave anticipations of the future. What are we coming to, when man, as represented by our leading men, and society, moulded and pledged, as ever, by its vigorous thinkers and even its confident rhetoricians, thus revolts openly from God? We disclaim, with the Archbishop (p. 106), all intention of entering into the exposition of unfulfilled prophecies. He speaks "of patent facts under our eyes."

They are sufficient, because they give us principles and warnings to govern our conduct. Nevertheless, I must say, in passing, that if there be anything evident in the plain words of Holy Scripture, if there be anything explicitly declared by the Christian Fathers, and anything distinctly taught by the theologians of the Church, it is this : that Antichrist, though taken to express a diffused spirit which pervades systems, and incorporates itself in various forms in all ages, nevertheless will be, towards the latter days, impersonated in one who shall be the head and the chief of that Antichristian spirit and system, and shall use all his power against the Name and the Church of Jesus Christ. This I now set aside, as being beyond my purpose. I am speaking of the Antichristian spirit which manifests itself either in individuals or in whole systems, sometimes in whole nations. Just as the electricity which is suspended in the air is breathed unconsciously, so the Antichristian spirit exists in what is called the Christian world in its present fragmentary and divided state. (pp. 106, 107.)

Yet, grave as is the prospect of such an imminent division of men into Christian and Antichristian, it has also (strange as the words may sound) an ingredient of hope and consolation. This fragmentary state of Christendom may tend to healing and reunion, from the very force of the pressure from without. "The reunion of Christendom" is indeed a phrase so deeply branded by the misuse of it in late years, that we are almost led to employ some other, though less precise. But one may be secure, in these pages, from being thought capable of giving adhesion to a theory, of which it might be hard to say whether it lacks most of common sense or of sound theological principle. We mean something very different from a heterogeneous binding together of discordant elements; something more worthy of attention. We mean the drawing together and moulding, under the power of truth, the hearts and minds of men, who are already "not far from the Kingdom of God." They may be led to seek admi
Kingdom all the more, because the proved facts of

condition all around its pale stand out with such distinctness, and—we must add—with so much hideousness, as at the present time. *Ou Catholique, ou déiste*, said Fénelon, two centuries ago. The man who should answer, *Ou déiste, ou Catholique*, would be a sort of devotee among the philosophers of to-day. But others will accept the alternative, and in a better sense. Every man in whom remain, un-effaced by systems of materialism or sensuous degradation of thought, the primary ideas of God, and of his own soul in relation to Him, will thenceforth know how to choose his part. When one *savant* gravely tells him he is descended from an ape, and another dissects a frog before his eyes to convince him that he and the frog have an equal amount of soul, and therefore an equal chance of immortality; when voices from Natal or Printing-house Square ring the changes on unbelief, when Essays and Reviews (including the *Saturday*) relegate now inspiration, now other supernatural beliefs, to the limbus of childish things and immature ages, the problem is in process of working itself clear. Religion cannot but greatly benefit by such blasts of impiety; if only for this reason, that amid the sifting and winnowing, religion more easily finds its own. "Wisdom is justified by her children."

There have been times in the history of the Church and the world, when the good was apparently not so very good, nor the bad so very bad. The Church, here or there, might not have been illustrated by any galaxy of Saints; while its human counterfeit contained some more than respectable lives. The Gallican prelates and ecclesiastical courtiers, for example, who surrounded the throne of Louis XIV., numbered at least one (if all records are true) who could sneer at the exiled James II., in the saloons of the *Grande Monarque*, as "a man who has given three kingdoms for a mass." On the other hand, the non-jurors then possessed among them a good deal of vigorous life, and assertion of some Catholic principles; which, if animated by the energy of opposition, was not wanting in devotion or fortitude. The seven imprisoned bishops had caused England to ring with their fearless confessorship for their system; and Ken, especially, has come down to our days, embalmed in the affectionate and reverential feelings of admirers who regard him from their own point of view. At such a period, courtliness, secularity, and the shadow of a throne, stunted somewhat the evidence of Catholic life, and a concurrence of influences added a factitious stature to Anglicanism. It might have confused some minds more apt to look at first-sight results than at objective principles.

Such things are not the present. The symptoms of our day

surely may be stated thus : decay, and that daily, of definite religion, and of the whole supernatural principle, outside the Church ; and a clearness of intelligent belief, with corresponding vital energy, within. One is tempted to imagine, that if an intelligent observer shall resist this twofold demonstration of the home where Truth resides, neither would he believe, if one rose from the dead. And here, we repeat, is our encouragement ; not indeed for such as continue in their unbelief, but for the man of good will, to whom the demonstration preaches with the voice of a trumpet, and will be heard. The two Standards, as in the meditation of S. Ignatius, are unfurled with great distinctness, one over against the other. A neutral position is impossible. To believe, or not to believe, that is the question. " Fragmentary Christianity," as the Archbishop more than once phrases it, has crumbled under the feet of those who have endeavoured to make their stand upon its basis. And, if the retribution has been slow in overtaking the work of those who upheld and abetted a national crime three centuries back, it has come at last. By degrees the proof has been demonstrated ; and the high pretensions which ushered in that rebellion against Truth have been drowned in the clamour of a chorus of infidelity :

Raro antecedentem scelestem
Deseruit pede Poena claudo.

ART. VII.—THE BASILICA OF SAN CLEMENTE.

S. Clement Pope and Martyr, and his Basilica in Rome. By Rev. JOSEPH MULLOOLY, O.P. Rome, 1869.

I Monumenti scoperti sotto la Basilica di S. Clemente, &c., estratto dal Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana del Commendatore GIO. BARR. DE ROSSI. 2a Serie, Anno I. fasc. 40. 1870. Roma.

Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana. Serie 1a., 1863—1869. Roma. London : C. J. Stewart.

THE treasures hidden beneath the soil of Rome seem inexhaustible ; and, just at the time when the spirit of Revolution is making desperate efforts to uproot the Catholic traditions of Rome from the hearts even of the Romans them-

selves, the very earth itself opens out fresh proofs of the general historical accuracy of those traditions which modern scepticism would have us reject as less worthy of credit than the fables of Paganism. All our readers are aware of the important discoveries made by De Rossi in the Catacombs, and the labours of F. Mullooly at San Clemente have attracted the attention of almost every English-speaking tourist to Rome. Now that he has published an account of his discoveries in the handsome and richly-illustrated volume which stands at the head of this article, we may expect still greater attention will be given to this most interesting church; and we therefore propose to give our readers as full an account of San Clemente as our space will admit, supplementing the information we gather from the good Prior's volume by the more scientific archæological notices which De Rossi has given of the same subject in various numbers of his "Bullettino." We shall preface our account by a short narrative of the discovery of the ancient Basilica.

It was so far back as 1848 that Father Mullooly first suspected that the beautiful Church of San Clemente was not the ancient Basilica so frequently mentioned in early history. His study of the topography of this part of Rome, and his minute examination of the marbles in the choir, had led him to the conclusion that the ancient *dominicum* of S. Clement must be sought for either beneath or else in the neighbourhood of the present church. The Revolution of 1848 obliged him to defer his intended investigations, and even when happier times came various circumstances combined to prevent their being carried out. The good Prior, however, persevered in his determination to sift the matter to the bottom, and, to use his own words,—

In process of time, what had been but conjectures ripened into convictions, and, in 1857, the researches were commenced by opening a passage through a chamber containing some remains of ancient walls, and thence through another, quadrangular and vaulted. Here, having made an aperture in the wall, and removed a quantity of rubbish, to the depth of fourteen feet, we discovered three columns standing erect, *in situ*, and some fragments of frescoes representing the martyrdom of S. Catherine of Alexandria, and a group of nineteen heads with an equally poised balance; and the inscription, written vertically, "*Stateram auget modium justum.*" These discoveries removed all doubt as to the site and existence of the primitive Basilica. (F. Mullooly, p. 128.)

The discovery of this ancient Basilica could not have been made by one better qualified to appreciate it than Father Mullooly. At once a Religious, an archæologist, and a man of business, his antiquarian ardour never urges him to treat with disrespect the monuments of a later age, nor does his devotion to the

traditions of the place make him shut his eyes to any discovery, however inconsistent with those traditions; so that we are equally sure of having every vestige of antiquity faithfully and jealously preserved to us, and of feeling that the mediæval and even more modern beauties of his church will never be sacrificed to an inconsiderate enthusiasm for ancient remains. While we call attention to the archæological importance of the discoveries, which, as De Rossi says, "we owe to the fifteen years' indefatigable labour of the meritorious Irish Dominican" (Bull., p. 130), we must not forget our tribute of praise to the prudence with which these excavations were accomplished. The present church stood on a foundation of compacted rubbish, with which the abandoned Basilica had been purposely filled up; and all this had to be removed before the ancient Basilica could be made accessible to the public. More than 130,000 cart-loads of rubbish had to be carried out in baskets, and brick vaults and arches had to be constructed in order to support the upper church. F. Mullooly engaged the services of Cav. Fontana, a Roman architect, and the whole of this difficult and delicate undertaking was accomplished without a single accident. Pope Pius IX., in 1866, was conducted by the enterprising Prior through the subterranean church, which had been buried and forgotten for so many centuries; the new high altar was consecrated by Cardinal Guidi on January 30th, 1868, and the relics of S. Clement and S. Ignatius of Antioch, having been carried in solemn procession round the Flavian amphitheatre, were deposited in the new shrine prepared for them beneath the Altar of S. Clement. The progress of the excavations has attracted great attention from visitors to Rome; and it has been mainly through the substantial tokens of their interest in the work, left by Catholics and Protestants alike, that F. Mullooly has been enabled to bring his labours to so successful an issue.

Having thus briefly described the excavation of the ancient Basilica, we shall endeavour to make as clear to our readers as is possible without the aid of plans and illustrations, the result of these excavations, and then proceed to trace the history of this Basilica by a comparison of its monuments, now open to public view, with ancient documents and historical records.

In the December number of the *Bullettino* for 1870 (which has been published also as a separate pamphlet), De Rossi gives a vertical section of the upper and lower church, a glance at which would at once make plain all that we are about to describe. It is supposed to be cut through the row of pillars which divide the south aisle from the nave. Beginning at the top of the section, we cast our eyes down from the roof and

clerestory windows to the arches supported by the above-mentioned pillars. The episcopal throne is in the apse at the west extremity of the church. In front of it, and somewhat outside of the chord of the apse, is the high altar, in celebrating at which the priest faces east. At a lower level is the choir or chancel, extending east to about the middle of the church, and separated from the nave on the north, east, and south sides by a marble panelling of great beauty. On either side are the *ambones* for the Epistle and Gospel, and east of the Gospel *ambo* rises the spiral column for the Paschal candle. This choir is raised two steps above the pavement, which is composed of beautiful ancient marbles. This pavement is now supported by the brick vaultings constructed by F. Mullooly, and the row of pillars, through which the section is supposed to be cut, is supported by a similar row imbedded in a wall constructed at the time when the present church was built. These pillars, one of which is of the finest *verd' antique*, are evidently *in situ*, and correspond to the colonnade above, although their positions are not, except in three instances, identical with those of the columns in the upper church. Two of the pillars have been strengthened with masonry, which is plastered and adorned with paintings. The apse of the subterranean church was of a larger span than that of the present Basilica, and the altar stood within instead of without the chord of the apse. The pillars dividing the north aisle from the nave are, in consequence of the greater width of the subterranean Basilica, considerably to the north of the corresponding colonnade in the upper church; and the outer wall of the north aisle was likewise some distance outside the limit of the present north wall. The apse of the subterranean church is brickwork of the age of Constantine. The frescoes on the walls will be more conveniently described when we come to consider the history of the Basilica.

We shall narrate further on the circumstances under which the relics of S. Clement were in 867 first deposited in this Basilica by Cyril and Methodius, the apostles of Moravia and the Slaves; and how the body of Cyril was shortly afterwards laid in the same church. As the thousandth anniversary of the conversion of their race approached, the apostolic nuncio at Vienna, the present Cardinal de Luca, in 1858, made known the earnest desire of the Slaves to have the tomb of their apostle recovered. Accordingly De Rossi made excavations in the part of the Basilica indicated by Baronius as the place of S. Cyril's sepulture. These excavations, unsuccessful in their primary object, were very fruitful in unexpected results, and brought to light remains still more ancient than the subterranean church which F. Mullooly was even then excavating.

The whole of the north wall of the subterranean church rests upon a titanic construction of great masses of tufa. This gigantic wall makes a right angle just before reaching the north-west corner of the Basilica, and is continued across the church, exactly beneath the place where the ancient altar must have stood, thus leaving a narrow space between itself and the foundations of the west wall. An immense cornice of travertine binds these masses of tufa together, as in the Cloaca Maxima, and the whole construction bears the stamp of the age of the kings. It has been traced 90 feet from north to south, and 210 feet from west to east, without finding an end in either direction. De Rossi, still pursuing his search for the tomb of S. Cyril, broke through the brick wall which runs parallel to the vast construction, and penetrated below the apse of the subterranean church. He here discovered two small rectangular chambers; of which, the first had its vaulted ceiling covered with white stucco, ornamented with rosettes and sunken squares, with figures representing pagan subjects, in the best style of classical art, and evidently the work of the first or second century. De Rossi was unable to pursue his investigations further for fear of damaging the church; but, since the time of these discoveries, F. Mullooly has followed up the work with such success, that he has found an ancient staircase leading down from the Basilica to this stuccoed chamber, which is entered at the further end from that part where De Rossi broke into it. In fact, the *ambulacrum*, to which this staircase leads, is outside the ancient apse. This *ambulacrum* was discovered within the last twelve months, and since the publication of F. Mullooly's book. On the side of the *ambulacrum*, opposite to the stuccoed chamber, F. Mullooly found another larger chamber of later construction, with a vaulted roof made artificially to resemble a cave, with four large and several small *luminaria*, and with two benches, like an Oriental divan, running the whole length of the sides; while at the extreme end were the remains of an altar. This singular chamber was recognized at once by De Rossi, and other archæologists, as a Mithraic *speleum*, of which examples have been found at Ostia and elsewhere.

Thus, within the precincts of San Clemente, we have the modern church, carrying us back to the eleventh or twelfth century; the subterranean basilica, with walls of the age of Constantine; the Mithraic cave, of the third century; the stuccoed chamber, of the first century of our era; and lastly, the massive tufa construction which carries us back to Tarquin the Proud, or even to the days of Servius Tullius. Each of these periods calls for special notice.

To begin with the earliest remains, the gigantic wall of tufa and travertine: it is impossible as yet to arrive at any precise conclusion as to the work of which these walls formed a part. Attempts have been made to prove that we have here part of the wall with which Servius Tullius surrounded Rome; but De Rossi does not consider the arguments for this hypothesis sufficiently cogent to upset the generally-received opinion, that this portion of the valley between the Cœlian and the Esquiline was included within the circuit of those walls. These remains must, therefore, have formed a portion of some important building *within* the city; and the reasons given for supposing it to have been the palace of Tarquin, and those which, De Rossi is inclined to think, tend to identify it with the Government Mint in the early days of the Republic, are discussed in the *Bullettino* for 1863, pp. 29, 30. The foundations of these massive walls are still unexplored, and we must wait until the water has been drawn off before we can form any certain opinion about these most ancient remains.

The chamber with stucco decorations comes next in antiquity: and the style of these decorations forbids our assigning to them a date later than the age of the Antonines. The walls are brickwork of imperial times. The chamber is exactly under the apse of the ancient Basilica; in fact, it occupies the same position in that Basilica which in the Vatican Basilica is occupied by the *Confessio* of S. Peter, and in so many other ancient churches by the shrines of the saints to whose memory they were erected. When, therefore, we read S. Jerome's notice of S. Clement, written at the end of the fourth century, and which concludes thus: *Nominis ejus memoriam usque hodie Romæ exstructa ecclesia custodit*, we cannot resist the conviction that the *memoria* here mentioned is none other than this little chamber, preserved beneath the church, built some time before the days of S. Jerome. The question then arises, How is it a *memoria* of a martyred Pope, whose relics remained until the ninth century in the Crimea? Before replying directly to this question, we will call the attention of our readers to an inscription on a bronze plate such as was attached to the collar worn by slaves. One side of this plate bears the words,—

TENE ME QVIA FVG · ET REBOCA ME VICTORI · ACOLITO
A DOMINICV CLEMENTIS. ✠

That is, "Hold me fast, for I am a runaway: and return me to Victor the acolyte of the *dominicum* of Clement." *

* Fabretti, *Inscr.*, p. 522, n. 365.

The badges of slavery are sought for in vain in the inscriptions of the catacombs; but, in this case, there is nothing inconsistent with the elevating influence of Christianity; for these bronze plates were substituted, in accordance with an early law of Constantine's, for the degrading practice of branding slaves on the forehead. The point, however, to which we invite attention is, that Victor, the owner of the slave, does not style himself *acolytus basilicæ* or *tituli S. Clementis*, but *acolytus a dominico Clementis*. Of all the inscriptions found in Rome of priests, deacons, and other ministers of the sanctuary, this is the only one which calls a church by the name *dominicum*. This appellation, as S. Cyprian testifies,* was used in the days of persecution to denote the place where Christians assembled for divine worship; but, after the middle of the fourth century, it never appears on Roman inscriptions. Thus, we are again confronted with a church of S. Clement in the time of Constantine, known by the appellation given to Christian places of worship in the ages of persecution. Such places of worship as had been in private houses retained, after the peace of the Church, the names of the families in whose houses they had been: such as S. Pudentiana, or S. Cecilia; and it was not the custom, in the fourth century, to call a church or an oratory after the name of a saint unless it was built in the saint's own house or over his sepulchre. S. Clement's sepulchre being in the Crimea, we are thus led to the conclusion that the *dominicum Clementis*, formed or contained part of the house once occupied by S. Clement himself; and thus the *memoria* of S. Clement, with its stucco ornaments of the first or second century, so carefully preserved beneath the apse of the Basilica, is none other than an apartment of the house inhabited by him "whose name is in the book of life."† This quarter of Rome was filled with patrician palaces; and, in the days of the Flavian emperors, was the most fashionable part of the city. The consul Flavius Clemens, who suffered martyrdom under Domitian, was cousin of the Emperor; and the Clementine "Recognitions," "Homilies," and other works wrongly attributed to S. Clement the Pope, bear testimony that he was believed in the second and third centuries to have been connected with some of the noblest families in Rome.

We have lingered thus long over the most ancient part of these remains which can be assigned to Christianity; and our conclusions are confirmed by an examination of the Mithraic *spelæum*, which is only separated by a narrow passage from the

* *De Op. et Elem.*, n. 19. "In *dominicum* sine sacrificio venis."

† Philipp. iv. 3.

memoria of S. Clement. The doorway from this passage into the *memoria* is evidently of a later date than the stucco ornaments on its ceiling; the capitals of the pillars on either side mark the decadence of art, and contrast strongly with the pure classical type of those ornaments; and thus prove the doorway to have been made at a later period, in order to connect that *memoria* with the chamber on the opposite side of the passage, to which it thus became a kind of vestibule. This chamber itself appears to have been adapted for the Mithraic worship rather than originally intended for that purpose. Archæologists are not quite agreed as to the nature of the respective rites celebrated in the open temples, and in the secret grottos used in the worship of Mithras. At the end of the last century, an artificial cave, similar to this, was discovered at Ostia, with inscriptions which proved it to have been granted to a Mithraic priest by the Emperor Commodus in the year 190. That cave was in the lower apartments of a palace—*cryptam palati*. This is also found in what, we have reason to believe, was the ancient palace of the first patrician Pope. Two side doors of the chamber have been blocked up; and a third is completely hidden by the altar at the further end, behind which once stood the very curious figure of Mithras, found in various fragments by F. Mullooly. We have a photograph of this figure, and also of the altar, before us as we write. A youthful figure, with a Phrygian cap on his head, rises out of a rough mass of rock. This was Mithras, supposed to have sprung from a stone, *petra genetrix*. The altar has in the front a bas relief of Mithras sacrificing a bull, and at the back a large serpent, on either side genii bearing torches. *Cautus* was one of the appellations of Mithras, and a cippus was found in this chamber with the words upon it, *CAVTE SACR*. Similar symbols have been found in other Mithraic caves.

There is, thus, no doubt about this having been a *spelæum* of Mithras; but the question that now presents itself is, how did this Oriental superstition find a home in such close proximity to a church of the age of Constantine, and actually communicating with the most sacred spot in that church, the *memoria* of S. Clement? The Mithraic worship held its ground in Rome, and especially in private houses, until 394. And had this been a private house belonging to persons of that sect, they would certainly have never been disturbed in their idolatrous practices, nor have forfeited the possession of their house until the end of the fourth century. The only satisfactory solution of the question is the supposition of De Rossi, that this *spelæum*, or rather the stuccoed chamber connected with it, was one of the *loca religiosa* restored to the Christians by Constantine, as

having been originally their property, and used by them for Christian worship.

Supposing, therefore, that this stuccoed chamber was used by S. Clement as a place of assembly for "the Church in his house," and after his exile and martyrdom regarded with still greater veneration by Roman Christians as his *memoria*, it would be just one of those places likely to be marked out for confiscation; and it was actually, about the third century, defiled by the Mithraic *spelæum*, to which it was made to serve as a vestibule. The Christians would still remember the spot as the *dominicum Clementis*, and it would be one of the first sacred places that S. Melchiades would claim as of right belonging to the Christians, when Maxentius decreed the restoration of the *loca ecclesiastica*.* This supposition is so reasonable, and so entirely confirmed by the existing remains and by historical facts, that we feel no hesitation in accepting it as a recovered page of the lost history of San Clemente, and a confirmation of the notice in the *Liber Pontificalis* that S. Clement was born in Rome in the Cœlian Region.

We come now to the ancient Basilica itself, the brickwork of the apse of which belongs to the time of Constantine, and the existence of which we have seen alluded to in unmistakable terms by S. Jerome. The episcopal chair, which now stands in the apse of the upper church, bears an inscription stating it to have been put up there by Cardinal Anastasius in the twelfth century. But the marble slabs of which it is composed are far more ancient than that; and are, in fact, adorned near the edge with a line of letters in the well-known Damasine character. A careful comparison of these letters, and of similar ones on other pieces of marble in both the upper and lower Churches, has enabled De Rossi to reconstruct the following inscription. His archæological genius has supplied the gaps in italics:—

Salvo SIRicio epISCopo ECCLESiæ s. GA†
 PRAESBYTER s. MARTYRi Clementi hOC
 VOLVIT dedicatum (?)

This long inscription in a single line shows that the marbles must have originally stood side by side, and probably formed a kind of screen, similar to that which surrounds the choir in the upper church. And thus, we have a record of the decoration of this Basilica in the pontificate of Siricius, *i.e.* between 384

* S. Aug., *Brev. Coll. cum Donat.*, iii. 34.

† Gaudentius, or Gallus, or Gabinius.

and 398,—about the time when S. Jerome wrote. Other fragments contain portions of inscriptions by S. Damasus himself.

The next historical notice of San Clemente is in the Epistle of Pope Zosimus, in 417, to the Africans concerning the Pelagian Celestius, where he mentions the Council before which that cunning heretic had made his defence. "We sat," he writes, "in the Basilica of S. Clement, for he, imbued with the teaching of Blessed Peter the Apostle, had corrected ancient errors with such authority, and had made such great progress [in perfection], that the faith which he had learned and taught he also consecrated by his martyrdom."* A memorial of this Council is thought to be preserved in the fragment of a fresco still to be seen about the middle of the wall of the north aisle; but nothing certain can be laid down on this point. In 449 S. Leo the Great sent Renatus, Cardinal Priest of San Clemente—*Presbyterum Tituli S. Clementis*,†—as one of his legates to that which is commonly known as the "*Latrocinium*" of Ephesus.

The beautiful marble screen which encloses the *schola cantorum*, together with the ambones and Paschal candlestick now in the upper church, have been pronounced by all archæologists to be far more ancient than the earliest date at which that church could have been constructed; but F. Mullooly has been able to fix the date of their erection by the discovery, upon one of the marble beams under the panels to the west of the Gospel *ambo*, of an inscription, which runs thus:—

ALTARE TIBI D̄S SALVO HORMISDPAPA · MERCVRIVS P̄B
CVM SOCIIS OFFERT—

"In the Pontificate of Pope Hormisdas, Mercurius the Priest, with his companions, offers an altar to Thee, O God." The Pontificate of Hormisdas lasted from 514 to 523, and this piece of marble evidently formed part of the epistyle of the altar. One of the pillars which now adorns the monument of Cardinal Venerio, in the same church, bears on its capital the inscription:—

+ MERCVRIVS P̄B SCE *ECclesiæ Romanæ servus* D̄NI

It is a natural conclusion to infer that this pillar once supported the *ciborium* or baldachino of the altar which Mercurius had erected; and that both altar and *ciborium* originally stood in the lower church. This Mercurius, Cardinal Priest of S. Cle-

* Ep. 3.

† S. Leo M., *ad Flavian*.

ment, afterwards, i.e. in 532, became Pope John II., as we are informed by a celebrated inscription in S. Peter's *Ad Vincula*: "*Joannes cognomento Mercurius ex sanctæ ecclesiæ Romanæ presbyteris ordinatus ex titulo sancti Clementis ad gloriam Pontificalem promotus.*" De Rossi fully endorses the opinion of F. Mullooly, that in Mercurius, Pope John II., we have the person whose monogram is so frequently repeated on the marble panels of the screen, and who has been thought to be John VIII., by reason of a similarity between the monogram and that on coins of the latter Pontiff. The classical style of the panels agrees far better with the sixth than with the close of the ninth century; and the fact of John II. having put up a beautiful altar while he was titular of San Clemente, makes it probable that he would still, as Pope, take a special interest in this Basilica, and complete the work of restoration which he commenced before his elevation. Some fragments of the screen which once surrounded the sanctuary of the ancient Basilica have been discovered *in situ*.

An interesting episode in the history of San Clemente is the life and death of the beggar, S. Servulus. S. Gregory the Great came himself to the Basilica, to preach his panegyric, which is still preserved:—

In the porch of the Church of S. Clement (he says) Servulus, whom many of you knew as well as I, passed his days. He was poor in this world's wealth, but rich in heavenly treasures. He was paralyzed from his infancy. His mother and brother attended him, and the alms he received he caused them to distribute among the poor. He was utterly ignorant of letters, but he bought the books of the Sacred Scriptures, and had them continually read to him by the pilgrims and other pious persons to whom he gave hospitality, so that he committed them all to memory. In his sufferings he never ceased, either day or night, to give thanks to God and sing His praises. But when the time arrived for him to receive the reward of his sufferings, the pain attacked the vital parts, and knowing that he was near death, he asked the pilgrims, and those persons whom he had lodging with him, to arise and sing with him the Psalms for his death. And while they were singing, he suddenly interrupted them, saying with a loud voice: "Hush! do you not hear the melodies of the heavenly choir?" And, while listening to the angelic chant, he expired.*

F. Mullooly argues from this episode of S. Servulus that the Basilica was in good repair in the time of S. Gregory the Great, that is, at the beginning of the seventh century; and we do not read of any further restorations or building there until the

* S. Greg. M., *Moral.* i. Hom. 15, n. 4.

time of Pope Adrian I., who died in 795. Of him the *Liber Pontificalis* records: "He restored and made new the roof of the title of blessed Clement, in the IIIrd Region, which was even on the point of falling, and was quite in ruins." His successor, Leo III., presented this Basilica with "a vestment of cross-work having its border studded with gold"—*vestem de stauracin unam habentem periclysin de chrysoclavo*; and also with a silver *corona* of fifteen pounds weight.

We now approach a period of the history of our Basilica during which it is more easy to compare historical accounts with existing remains. In the south-west corner of the nave of the subterranean church are a series of subjects painted in fresco, all apparently of the same date. One of them represents the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin,* but on either side of the group of astonished Apostles is a figure of much larger proportions. One, who has a circular *nimbus*, and holds a small cross in his hand, has the name SCS VITVS at his head. The other, who is invested with the pallinus, has a square *nimbus*, showing that he was living when the picture was painted and the inscription—SANCTISSIMVS DOM LEO —RT PP ROMANVS. The missing letter of the numeral is evidently Q,† so that this painting must have been executed between 847 and 855, the period of Leo IV.'s pontificate. Beneath the whole picture runs an inscription: "*Quod hæc præ cunctis splendet pictura decore, componere hanc studuit presbyter ecce Leo.*" Leo IV. had been priest of the church of the *Quattro Coronati*, just opposite San Clemente; and it is probable he designed, if he did not himself paint this fresco, while a simple priest, and that after his elevation to the Pontificate the title and the pallium were added. He appears to have had a particular devotion to the mystery of the Assumption, for he ordered the octave day of that feast to be observed with great solemnity, whereas the *Liber Pontificalis* says that it had not been so kept before his time in Rome. The Pope was so pleased with the

* We are surprised to find Mr. Hare ("Walks in Rome," vol. i. p. 318) indulging in such uncalled for remarks upon this fresco as the following: "The Ascension, sometimes called by Romanists (*in preparation for their dogma* of 1870) 'the Assumption of the Virgin,' because the figure of the Virgin is elevated above the other Apostles, though she is evidently intent on watching the *retreating* figure of her Divine Son." Our Lord is *seated* in glory. Even so eager a Protestant controversialist as Mr. Wharton Marriot says: "The subject is the 'Assumption,' as we have already observed." (*Testimony*, n. p. 50.)

† When first discovered, De Rossi distinctly saw part of the curve of the Q. Mr. J. H. Parker, who really attributes the picture to Leo IX., had probably not read De Rossi's remarks upon it.

zeal with which the people entered into this devotion, that he made a liberal distribution of alms on the occasion. It is interesting to remember this in connection with the fresco. In the long list of magnificent offerings which S. Leo IV. made to the different Basilicas, in thanksgiving for the preservation of Rome from the Saracens, we find that he gave to "the Basilica of S. Clement, Pope and Martyr, six salvers (*gabathas*) of the purest silver—three with the sign of Christ in filigree work, two figures of palms, and one polished, weighing four pounds." On another occasion he gave to this church "a silver ewer, having engraved upon it the figure of a man's head, with a vine and other devices, weighing three pounds." After Leo's death, an antipope Anastasius succeeded in obtaining possession of the Vatican Basilica, and the *Liber Pontificalis* records how he destroyed pictures which S. Leo had caused to be painted there.

It is impossible to determine with any exactness the dates of the various frescoes with which the subterranean church was adorned. The Crucifixion, with Our Lady and S. John at the foot of the Cross; The Maries at the Sepulchre; Our Lord in Limbo raising up Adam and welcomed with outstretched hands by Eve, and a fragment of the first miracle in Cana of Galilee, are all depicted on the wall, at right angles to the east wall on which is the painting of the Assumption. The style is similar, and perhaps we shall not be wrong in assigning to them the same date. One circumstance connected with the last-named subject remains to be noticed. It is, that the wall upon which it is painted had not formed part of the original building. At first the nave had been separated from the narthex by four pillars, still with one exception *in situ*. These, however, do not appear to have been sufficiently strong to bear the weight of the portico, and four of the spaces between them were (possibly by Adrian I.) blocked up with masonry, leaving only the space between the two centre ones open as an entrance to the church. These walls were plastered and afterwards adorned with frescoes. The space between the two pillars on the opposite side of the narthex has been blocked up in the same way, and upon the wall is painted a fresco of our Lord giving His blessing after the Greek manner, with S. Andrew and S. Clement on either side of Him, and SS. Cyril and Methodius kneeling before Him, guarded by the archangels Michael and Gabriel. Two of the pillars in the colonnade, which divides the south aisle from the nave, have been, at some period previous to the abandonment of the Basilica, strengthened by a wall of masonry, in which they are embedded, and this wall is likewise covered with frescoes of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

Within four years of the death of S. Leo IV., Nicolas I.

began his eventful pontificate. His name appears on one of the frescoes in the narthex of our ancient Basilica. The painting represents the translation of the relics of S. Cyril, or perhaps of S. Clement, from the Vatican to his own basilica, Pope Nicolas walking in the procession with a tiara on his head and wearing the pallium, accompanied by his cross-bearer and bishops and clergy. Other Popes, as S. Clement and S. Boniface I., are in the frescoes contemporaneous with this also represented with the tiara. In their case it is an anachronism, but of S. Nicolas the *Liber Pontificalis* expressly relates that he was crowned (*coronatur*), which is never said of any previous Pontiff. The translation of S. Clement's relics, however, did not really take place during the reign of Nicolas, but in the time of Adrian II., who succeeded him in 867; so that the inscription is incorrect:

HVC . A . VATICANO . FERTVR . PP . NICOLAO . IMNIS . DIVINIS .
QD . AROMATIBVS . SEPILIVIT .

But, although this slight anachronism proves the picture to have been painted some time after the event which it represents, there was a very close connexion between Pope Nicolas I. and the translation of the relics of S. Clement. A short account of the finding of those relics will make this abundantly evident.

In 848, Cyril of Thessalonica, a Roman by family, but a Greek by education at Constantinople, was sent to the Chazari, a tribe of Huns, who had settled on the Danube, and had asked the emperor Michael III. for Christian teachers. His mission was successful; and, after his return to Constantinople, he was sent with his brother Methodius on another mission to the Bulgarians. Methodius's artistic powers greatly aided the effect of his brother's preaching, and a painting of the Last Judgment, which he executed in the palace, produced such an impression on the king Boigoris that he not only earnestly desired Baptism, but, after some years, actually renounced the world and his crown and became a monk. Soon after his conversion, he sent to the Pope for an answer to certain questions, and for further instruction in the Christian religion. S. Nicolas complied with his request and solved his difficulties. From Bulgaria the missionary brothers went on to Moravia and Bohemia, and are regarded as the Apostles of all the countries where the Slavonian tongue was spoken. S. Nicolas invited both the brothers to Rome. Cyril died there, and was buried in the Church of S. Clement.

Before Cyril set out on his mission to the Chazari he went to the Crimea to learn Turcic. While there he inquired diligently for any information about the relics of S. Clement. S. Gregory

of Tours tells us how the angels had built a shrine beneath the sea, in which the body of the martyred Pope was preserved; and how, on the anniversary of his martyrdom, the sea was wont to recede so as to permit the faithful to visit this shrine. But the people told Cyril that for five centuries this wonder had never taken place. He therefore persuaded the Bishop of the diocese to accompany him in his search for the sacred spot. Gaudericus of Velletri, who is believed to have had it from the mouth of Cyril himself, tells us:—

Taking ship on a calm day, under the guidance of Christ, they went their way . . . and sailing with great devotion and confidence, with hymns and prayers, they reached the island in which they supposed the holy martyr's body to be. They then went round about it, and searched with a great blaze of lights and increasing earnestness in their holy prayers, and then began very anxiously and unremittingly to dig in that mound where so great a treasure was suspected to rest. After working there for some time, and with much holy desire, on a sudden, as if God gave some brilliant star, one of the precious martyr's ribs shone forth. At this spectacle all were filled with immense exultation, and, not without some excitement, they now vied with each other in digging out the earth more and more, and then in due time his sacred head also appeared. And after a little while again, behold the whole was found, by degrees and at intervals, as it were out of a number of parcels of holy relics. And, last of all, there appeared the anchor with which he had been cast into the deep. After the celebration of the Holy Mysteries, by the bishop, on the spot, the holy man lifted the chest of the sacred relics upon his own head, and bore them to the ship, and then transported the treasure (*gloriam*) to the metropolis. On the following morning the entire population of the city assembled, and taking up the chest of sacred relics, went round the town with much thanksgiving, and coming to the greater Basilica honourably deposited them there.*

After Cyril had accomplished his mission to the Chazari, he returned to Constantinople through Pontus, and obtained from the bishop the relics of S. Clement, which he always carried about with him in his missionary journeys, until, with his brother Methodius, he arrived in Rome. S. Nicolas I., who had invited them, died before the two brothers reached the eternal city; but his successor, Adrian II., went out with the Roman clergy and people, and thus after the lapse of eight centuries S. Clement's body once more entered the city, and was buried "in the Church which long before had been erected in his name."† Cyril died shortly after his arrival; and though

* Gaudericus, quoted by Rondinini, lib. i. s. 3; F. Mullooly, pp. 95-97.

† Ibid.; F. Mullooly, p. 103.

Methodius wished to take back his relics to their mother, according to a promise they had made before their departure on their apostolic mission, the Pope, at the strong remonstrance of the Roman people, refused to allow the sacred remains to be taken out of Rome. Methodius then requested that they might be deposited in the Church of S. Clement, and the Pope assented. Accordingly, with much joy and reverence they laid Cyril "in a marble monument, prepared for the purpose in the Basilica of S. Clement, on the right side of the altar." Baronius says that Methodius, after apostolic labours in Moravia, where his Slavonic Liturgy is still used, returned to Rome, and died at an advanced age, and was buried with his brother in San Clemente. In the south-western corner of the southern aisle are some remains of masonry which are considered by De Rossi to have once formed part of this monument to the apostles of Moravia. A few steps further west is a rude fresco, representing S. Cyril, whose name is painted vertically, before a crowned monarch, probably the Emperor Michael III.; and further on is a fragment of a picture of an archbishop baptizing a young man, possibly the King of the Chazari.

The translation of the relics of S. Clement to his own basilica is the last historical event which can with certainty be assigned to the subterranean church. In 896, an earthquake shook the pillars of the Basilica of S. John Lateran; and, if we suppose it to have extended to San Clemente, we may assign that date to the injury sustained by the columns, which, as we have mentioned, were afterwards imbedded in brick piers. The paintings on these brick piers are of a different character to all the rest in the Basilica, and De Rossi considers them to belong to the eleventh century. His reasons for this conclusion are so closely connected with the determination of the date of the destruction of the ancient Basilica, and the filling up of its lower portion to form a foundation for the more modern church, that we must ask our readers' attention to a few dates by which that event may be fixed with tolerable accuracy.

We have already had occasion to mention the marble episcopal throne in the apse which was placed there by Cardinal Anastasius, with an inscription stating that he *hoc opus cepit perfecit*. Cardinal Anastasius died in 1125, and Panvinus writes of him that "his tomb still remains in the Basilica of S. Clement, which he rebuilt from the foundations."* A conclave was held in San Clemente in 1099 for the election of Pope Paschal II. It is hardly probable that a church, capable of being used for such a purpose, should, in the course of twenty-

five years, require rebuilding from the foundations; so that the conclave was, in all probability, held in the modern church. F. Mullooly found, in the pavement of the narthex of the subterranean basilica, an inscription with the names of Gregory VI. and Nicolas II., whose pontificates ended respectively in 1046 and 1060. The demolition of the ancient Basilica and the building of the present church must, therefore, have taken place between 1060 and 1099. Now, we know that, in 1084, this part of Rome was pillaged by the Normans under Robert Guiscard, who marched to the relief of S. Gregory VII., then besieged in S. Angelo by the Emperor Henry IV. It is impossible, therefore, to resist the conclusion, that this was the date of the destruction of the ancient Basilica; and that, in the course of the next fifteen years, Cardinal Anastasius, finding the soil of this part of Rome so much raised in level by the accumulation of rubbish from the devastations of the Normans, determined to abandon the lower part of the Basilica and use its walls and columns as foundations for the new church. If the ancient Basilica had been constructed with a *triforium*, like that of S. Agnese fuori-le-mura, the colonnade of this *triforium* would supply the pillars of the present church, and thus we may account for the beautiful columns (some of them composed of the most precious marbles) being left *in situ* in the ancient Basilica.*

The only historical point that now remains to be determined is the date of the four sets of paintings executed at the expense of Beno de Rapiza and Maria Macellaria his wife. These are all painted on blocks of masonry, constructed to support shattered or failing columns. They are all by one and the same artist; and, since one of them represents, as we have seen, the translation of the relics of S. Cyril from the Vatican, they must have been executed after the year 867. We have, therefore, to fix upon some portion of the interval between that date and 1084, when the church was destroyed. F. Mullooly appears inclined to assign to them a date soon after that of the event which one of them represents; but De Rossi observes with truth that a mistake, such as the substitution of Pope Nicolas for Pope Adrian II., is not likely to have been until some time after the death of both, while the same mistake is actually found in writers of the eleventh century. Muratori, the great authority on mediæval Italy, lays down the following rule as

* This idea was drawn out in a clever paper in the *Month* for 1868 (vol. ix. p. 610). The writer of it anticipated a discovery of a flight of steps leading from the porch to the lower church. We have not heard of any such staircase having been actually found.

to the use of the cognomen: "Very rarely in the tenth century, more frequently in the eleventh, and in abundant instances in the twelfth century, was the use of the surname diffused and established"; and he goes on to show that the Venetians first used it, and that in Rome, even in the eleventh century, it was extremely rare. We cannot, therefore, place these paintings, on which the surname *De Rapiza* occurs, earlier than that century; and the researches of Corvisieri on the ancient families of Rome have led that author to assign the rise of the family of the De Rapiza to the same eleventh century. The brilliancy of the colouring at the time when these frescoes were first brought to light is an additional confirmation of De Rossi's opinion that they were executed shortly before the destruction of the ancient Basilica.

The determination of the date of these frescoes is interesting, not merely from an archæological point of view, but still more so because these paintings are by no means contemptible as works of art. F. Mullooly says:—

They are a link in religious art, especially as being votive pictures, by which we can trace the ideas which prevailed when the Catacombs had fallen into desuetude. Without a single symbol of the Catacombs, or a single figure imitated from them,* they contain a distinct, formed, and characteristic school of painting. The ideas eliminated from them do not contradict the Catacombs. And on the side of art, as compositions, they are superior to any we possess in the Catacombs. With all the defects of drawing and perspective, the colouring is pleasing, they tell their story well, and they exhibit a grouping and movement for which we seek in vain through the Catacombs, or indeed in most of the Pagan frescoes which have come down to us. And if some have fixed the age of Charlemagne as the commencement of modern history, the wall pictures of that age may be taken as forerunners of Cimabue, Giotto, and the beginning of the modern school of painting. (F. Mullooly, *Introd.*, p. xliii.)

Kugler, in his Handbook of Painting, has assigned 1204, the date of the Latin conquest of Constantinople, as the period of the rise of Italian art. We are not sufficiently acquainted with early Italian paintings to speak positively on the subject; but there appears to us to be less difference in style between these paintings and those of Cimabue, than between the works of that father of Italian painting and those of the Byzantine artists. Mr. Okeley has brought forward weighty reasons for tracing Gothic architecture to a Roman origin, and it will be interesting if these frescoes should help to prove the existence

* This is t (lions' den, as

of the

of a native school of painting, which did not learn its principles from Byzantine, but from Roman masters. One thing is certain: these spirited compositions were executed at least 150 years before the date given by Kugler for the rise of Italian painting.

The subjects of the central compartments of these frescoes are mostly from traditions connected with S. Clement. The Pagan Sisinnius miraculously struck with blindness while intruding into the chapel where S. Clement is saying Mass. Above this is a representation of the enthronization of S. Clement by S. Peter, Linus and Cletus standing on either side of the episcopal chair. The other fresco in the nave represents the history of S. Alexius, his life, death, and recognition; while above is a figure of our Lord on a jewelled throne, with S. Clement and S. Nicolas on either side, while between each is an archangel, Michael and Gabriel, with thuribles. The two other frescoes in this series are the narthex. One, which we have already mentioned, depicts the translation of S. Clement, or more probably S. Cyril, from the Vatican to San Clemente. The other represents the miraculous preservation of a child left behind in the submarine shrine of S. Clement in the Crimea. Below is a large medallion bust of S. Clement, to whom Beno de Rapiza, his wife the Lady Maria, their little son Clement, and their daughter Attilia, with her governess, offer votive candles.

We should have been glad, had our space allowed of it, to enter into a more full account of the scenes represented in these frescoes; but, in the absence of illustrations, such descriptions fail to convey a very definite idea to the reader; and we must content ourselves with referring those who wish for more information to the beautiful photographs in F. Mullooly's book. We have not attempted any account of the more modern church, which has been so long identified in the minds, even of the learned, with the ancient Basilica whose history we have traced. Even in so recent a work as Mr. A. J. C. Hare's "Walks in Rome" we find the words of Lord Lindsay quoted as though F. Mullooly's discoveries had never taken place:—

In S. Clemente, built on the site of his paternal mansion, and restored at the beginning of the twelfth century, an example is still to be seen, in perfect preservation, of the primitive church; everything remains *in statu quo*—the court, the portico, the cancellum, the ambones, paschal candlestick, crypt, ciborium—virgin and intact. (Op. cit., vol. i. p. 315.)

Truth is stranger than fiction; and the knowledge, which we have gained through the recent discoveries is even more valuable and interesting than the pleasing imagination which many centuries attracted travellers to the Basilica of San

ART. VIII.—THE ROMAN QUESTION.

La Questione Romana nel Congresso. Per BARONE DI LETINO CARBONELLI.
Geneva. 1870.

IT is in some degree a new symptom of the times that the Italian Catholics are using the press in defence of the rights of the Church. There have been instances of it for several years, and the spirit seems to be extending. It is impossible not to see that it must cause real perplexity to the Government of Victor Emmanuel. That Government must either altogether throw away the pretence of the liberty of the press or allow the discussion of facts which, when truly stated, clearly prove that it was not originally called into existence by the people of the States of the Church, and does not now represent them; that it is maintained by force, in opposition alike to right and to the will of the governed; and moreover that it contains in its very constitution the seeds of weakness and death.

Our readers, we think, will be interested to see how these questions are being discussed in Italy, and we propose, in the present article, to give some examples taken from two recent numbers of the *Civiltà Cattolica* (those for July, 1871) and from a pamphlet published with his name, by the Baron Carbonelli.

We were at once struck by a distinction between these publications. The *Civiltà Cattolica* is published at Florence, immediately under the eye and subject to the authority of the Government of Victor Emmanuel. Baron Carbonelli publishes at Geneva. There is something satisfactory in the very fact. Geneva is now the point nearest to Rome at which those who remain faithful to the Holy Father are allowed to speak out what they mean and feel. Geneva, the city where John Calvin so long exercised an undisputed autocracy, the city of which S. Frances of Sales was Bishop, and in which he was not only refused permission to reside, but could only pass through it at the risk of his life—the city where Voltaire erected his battery to overthrow the Christian Faith, whence Rousseau poured forth principles even more dangerous for the subversion of all Christian principles both social and moral—it is in this same Geneva that Catholics have now established their fortress, to assail the principles of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Calvin, now enthroned in once favoured Italy. It is exactly the case of a

besieged garrison making a successful sortie and turning against the invaders the cannon of their own lines. "Geneva," writes Archbishop Spalding, "has been called the Protestant Rome, on account of its having been for so long a period the headquarters of the opposition to the Catholic religion. But it is Protestant Rome no longer, simply because it has ceased to be Protestant in any proper sense of the term. Nearly one-half of the city, and considerably more than one-half of the canton, is now Catholic; while nine-tenths of the remaining portion has gone off into the ranks of Unitarianism and Rationalism, the latter verging on downright infidelity. The name of John Calvin is now seldom heard, and his last resting-place is utterly unknown; and the same may be said of his predecessors and co-workers of iniquity under the mask of religion,—Viret, Favel, and others. Their memory is wholly gone, and their very names have well-nigh perished. The principal and real non-Catholic saints of Geneva are Jean Jacques Rousseau, a native of the city, who has a statue erected to him on an island of the Rhone, in a position prominent and central; and Voltaire, a foreigner, the philosopher of Ferney, in the immediate vicinity; while the secondary patrons may be said to be two other infidel foreigners, Gibbon and Byron." Have we not here a figure of the state of the question between the Catholic religion and Protestantism, not in Geneva alone, but throughout Christendom. The fate of the Protestant Reformers has been that of the swarms of locusts, which is nowhere more graphically described than in F. Newman's "Callista." They came on at first as a resistless host, but very soon became dangerous and mischievous only by the pestilence which was bred out of their decay and putrefaction. So it is that what the Church has now to contend against is not Protestantism in the sense of a false religion, but the infidelity which has been produced by the utter decay of all religion in every country in which Protestantism has supplanted the Church. For many reasons the process has been slower in England than elsewhere, but in England, at this hour, it is going on before our eyes.

Still, so far as we may judge by comparing the pamphlet of Baron Carbonelli with the articles in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, the mere profession of liberty, however false in fact may be the Government by which that liberty is professed, enables those who publish in Italy itself to speak out with a very considerable degree of plainness. The distinction between the two seems pretty much to be, that while at Geneva a Catholic may state his conclusions as well as give the premisses from which they are drawn, at Florence he is at liberty to state and enforce his premisses so that he leaves it to his readers to draw the prac-

tical conclusion from them. In fact he is compelled to adopt what the great Protestant philosopher Butler thought the most effective way of enforcing practical truths. After pointing out as the peculiar misery of his own times (he died in 1752) what is certainly tenfold more characteristic of ours, that, "not to mention the multitudes who read merely for the sake of talking and to qualify themselves for the world, or for some such kind of reasons, there are, even of the few who read for their own entertainment and have a real curiosity to see what is said, several, which is prodigious, who have no sort of curiosity to see what is true. For the sake of this whole class of readers, for they are of different capacities, different kinds, and get into this way from different occasions, I have often wished that it had been the custom to lay before people nothing in matters of argument, but the premisses, and leave them to draw conclusions themselves." Butler, it seems, calculated that men are more impressed by a conclusion which they have drawn for themselves than by one supplied to them ready drawn out, and if so, the *Civiltà Cattolica* may suffer no loss by being published at Florence, for it concludes one of its articles, "You ask what is to be done? What are we to reply? If we did not fear the claws of the public prosecutor, we would say openly what we think. But being unable to do that, we invite our readers to read over again [a certain] article," which will no doubt sufficiently suggest it.

Baron Carbonelli begins by quoting the declaration of the Government of Victor Emmanuel made almost immediately after "the sacrilegious occupation of Rome, when it was bombarded on one side by Bixio and breached by Cadorna on the other close to the Porta Pia," a declaration which, while founded on the inability of that Government to resist the surging tide of revolution, "declared Rome and the Roman provinces an integral part of the kingdom of Italy," professedly on the basis of a *plébiscite* assumed to be spontaneous; and yet at the very same moment felt itself compelled to add to the first article those which follow:—"The Sovereign Pontiff retains the dignity, the inviolability, and all the personal prerogatives of a Sovereign." "There shall be sanctioned by an appropriate law the conditions necessary to guarantee, together with territorial franchise, the independence of the Supreme Pontiff and the free exercise of the spiritual authority of the Holy See."

Whether these clauses (he says) were dictated by the fear of pressure from foreign countries, or by the necessity of soothing the apprehensions of Catholics and the conscience of the Italian people itself, or by some other deep conviction in the minds of the ministry themselves, I know not. Perhaps it is to be attri-

buted to one of these causes, perhaps to all of them together. . . . Be this as it may, the revolutionary Government, in spite of itself, has plainly avowed four things.

First. That the Pope, as head of the Catholic Church, must be invested with a special character of authority, which is wholly political, and must preserve the dignity, the inviolability, and every other prerogative of a sovereign.

Secondly, that the Pope must exercise freedom in his spiritual authority ; and that in order to enjoy liberty of action in the exercise of that spiritual authority, he must be independent ; and that as a necessary means of his being independent, he must have a territory free from all interference, ruled and governed by himself.

Thirdly, that the Holy See, or internal hierarchy of the Church, its officers and nominees, and the whole body dependent on it, must enjoy the same privilege of emancipation from the lay state, both as to person and things, without which the free exercise of its ministry is impossible.

Fourthly, that the Government admits its obligation to guarantee to the Pope, by the means above mentioned, his regal authority and the independence and security of a territory beneath his government.

Now if all this does not amount to a declaration that, in order to exercise his spiritual authority, the Roman Pontiff must also possess temporal and political power, I challenge the most acute logician to show how it is to be declared.

And it inevitably follows either that the guarantee proclaimed on behalf of the Pope, of his authority, his liberty, and his territory, settles what is called the "Roman question" by no means in the sense in which the Italian revolution has proclaimed that it must be settled, and in which it set itself to settle it by iron and fire on the ill-omened day of the 20th of September—or else that the act of the 9th of October is only the completion of the system of falsehood and shame which has been carried on for ten years in homage to the obscene madness of that revolution.

In his second section the Baron shows that it is impossible the Holy Father should really possess and govern part of Rome (what is called the Leonine City) without interfering with and even wholly overthrowing the sovereignty of the king in the remainder of the city. Then he goes on :—

But in truth, the proclamation of "territorial franchise," and every other substantive and adjective of this decree, are nothing more than a farce and falsehood ; the proclamation containing a decree which cannot become law until it has been submitted for approbation to the Legislative Assembly. As yet, therefore, it is nothing more than a proposal which, to treat it in the manner most favourable to the ministers, can be understood only as expressing the desire or will of the existing Government. But this desire or will may not be approved by the wisdom of parliament, and it is easy to see that it will be received with cries of indignation and tumult. (p. 8.)

And then he asks whether the Assembly, the **majority of**

which had already listened without protest, and even with applause, to speeches demanding "the radical overthrow of the Papacy," and that "the Pontiff of Christ should be turned out by the Pontiff of the people," is likely not only to leave undiminished liberty to the Pope in his episcopal character, but also to acknowledge him as an independent sovereign. This, he says, would be to believe that rivers will flow back to their source, especially because the revolutionary party is strengthened since that both by the election of many of its members, and by finding Rome already in its hands. And even if the parliament at Florence should vote all that is promised, what security would that be for its permanence, for it is the essence of parliamentary government that one minister and one parliament succeed another, and thus the Head of the Church would always hold his power subject to notice to quit; and even supposing, what is hardly conceivable, that the proposal should really and honestly be carried out, what a state of things would it produce!—two governments carried on on diametrically opposite principles in the same city, the one, for instance, suppressing convents, the other doing its utmost to encourage them; one seizing the property of the Church, the other denouncing the seizure of Church property as robbery; and between both, with the population excited by one to acts which the other treats as criminal, and in one quarter of the city worn down by wars and taxation, while in the other assisted by all the charity and love which the Gospel prescribes, can any one believe that such a state of things would really be lasting? Can it have been intended to last by those who set it up? The author goes on to show that from the state of the case conciliation between the two parties is impossible. "The Pope, as the minister of charity, can pardon and absolve the usurper, but only on condition of penitence and restitution; while the temper of the government may be inferred from two sayings laid down by members of parliament: one, 'That the revolution must be carried on in the name of all other religions against the Catholic religion,' the other, that 'To overthrow the principles of the Church of the Pope is more important than the material occupation of Rome.'"

But, says our author, the hypocritical profession of the revolution that it secures the Faith while spoiling the Pope of his temporal authority, turns upon an historical argument, viz., that for the first eight centuries of Christianity the Popes possessed no such temporal power, and yet that during that time the Christian religion was planted and spread throughout the world. This leads him to discuss the position of the Supreme Pontiffs in early times, during the middle ages, and in

modern times; and to show that the peculiar position of things in the primitive Church, when persecution was directed not against the spiritual power of the Popes, but against the profession of Christianity itself, made a marked difference between the two, and that at present the real freedom and independence of the Supreme Pontiff is absolutely essential.

Next the author answers what he pronounces to be the greatest of all absurdities,—the notion that Rome is the ancient and natural capital of Italy, and that the Italian cities are fitted to make a single body, and have at any time had one government. In answer to this, he goes through the whole course of history, and shows that there never has been any period at which Italy has been one nation or Rome its capital. Even during the Roman Empire the different Italian peoples, although under one head, possessed separate governments; and never since have they at any time been united under Rome.

Next he shows from history that the Rome of the Popes has always been independent, and has been the “protector and saviour of Italy.” Then, in the tenth section, he shows that the political power of the Popes grew up not only without the least conspiracy on their part, but against their own will, and that when the people rebelled against the imperial authority, the Popes obliged them to submit to it.

Next he shows the advantages derived from the combination of spiritual and temporal power in the Supreme Pontiff, both in Europe and beyond its limits, and to Italy in particular—advantages which no historian, however hostile to Christianity, has been able to refuse to acknowledge—and these he traces in the abolition of slavery, the restoration of women to their proper place in society, and several other particulars; and shows that from the very nature of the authority which Christian Rome has exercised over the whole world, it was impossible that the Supreme Pontiff, who was by Divine authority chief and ruler of all ecclesiastical orders, should not be within that district chief also of the temporal.

Next he discusses the rights which Catholics all over the world have in Rome, quoting from M. Thiers, whom he calls a Protestant (a name which Thiers, as a disciple of Voltaire, is, we believe, far from claiming for himself), and from Bossuet, both of whom maintain the necessity of the Pope’s absolute independence. Each nation should have its ecclesiastical colleges in Rome; the religious orders of each should have their mother-house there. But the Government of Florence has already seized by force the Quirinal, the residence of the Popes and the palace in which conclaves are held, and the other offices from which the administration of the Church in all

countries is carried on. It has seized the noble college which was founded at the cost of private persons, many of them in other countries, for the education of young religious. It has swept away the religious direction and education of the Roman University; it has interrupted the communication of the Holy Father with the faithful, by seizing and prosecuting the papers which published the Pastoral *Respicientes*; it has seized and broken up, one after another, all the chief religious houses. All this is a setting aside of the rights not of Catholics in Rome alone, but throughout the world; and he says it cannot be doubted that Catholics will not permit their Church to be trodden down and their head enslaved, but that they will claim their rights in Rome, the city restored and maintained by them, and will contend to the utmost to restore it free and entire to the Supreme Pontiff. And this is the interest of all governments, for even those which are not themselves Catholic have Catholic subjects.

Next, our author discusses the argument upon which, as he says, the "new theory of right" depends—that of the "will of the people," and he undertakes to show, both synthetically and analytically, that it is not only the duty, but the desire of the Roman people, to follow the counsel of Seneca, "*ab innovationibus teipsum cohibe longissime.*" The Romans (beside the ecclesiastical order, which is naturally very numerous) consist of the nobility, the official men, the merchants of the Campagna, who, with the officials form the middle class, the professional men, the artists, the tradesmen and artisans, among whom several thousands are Jews. He goes through them in order, showing that each is by interest as well as inclination on the side of the Holy Father, and asks "what class remains to the Government of Florence to favour those aspirations of which we are told? None but the Jews, most ungrateful to the Pontiff, their benefactor. But did not they also prefer Barabbas to Christ?"

The real sympathies of the Roman people, he adds, were shown by the demand to be allowed to fight as soon as attack was threatened. It was not the Government but the people, which required that resistance should be made; and when, a few days before the final outrage, the Holy Father appointed a Triduo at the shrine of the Apostles, for the purpose of beseeching God on behalf of the assailed Church, the concourse of people throughout those three days to the Vatican was so great, that the vast temple may be said to have been too small, and every countenance in the thronged streets was marked with profound grief. On another day, when the Pontiff attended at the opening of the new aqueduct, restoring that formerly

called the Macian, and which those who undertook it desired to call, in honour of him, the *condotta Pia*, the crowd was overpowering, and all united to hail him, proclaiming him their sovereign and benefactor, waving handkerchiefs, and throwing up their hats. Again, on the very eve of the 20th of September, when he went to throw himself before the Virgin of the ancient church of *Ara cœli*, he could hardly make his way through the crowd, which received him with an intoxication of joy the whole way. Was not this spontaneous and unarranged movement of the Roman people the most expressive *plébiscite* that Rome has yet uttered? Again, the falsehood published by the Republicans was that the Roman people, pressed down by a hand of iron, was unable to show its real desires. But it was refuted by the fact that, when on the 20th of September, the troops were brought up to the walls, and nothing was spared to excite the Roman people to a rising, or, at the very least, to a demonstration in the Piazza, which might have been made a pretext for intervention, all that was done was labour lost. It availed nothing that repeated messages were sent under military escort to encourage the disaffected, and on entering Rome the disillusion and disgrace were greater and greater. Along the whole extent of the Corso not a shop was open, not a balcony hung with draperies, as is the custom on festal occasions. On the contrary, most, both of the palaces and more humble dwellings, had put up the coats of arms and the flags of foreign powers, as if to protect them from an armed banditti. And then poured in before the regular troops a mob of strangers of all sorts, mixed with criminals and other fugitives, the scum of the population of Rome itself. As for the *plébiscite*, he says, that has been abundantly described by others—the open farce, the different regions represented by ordered bodies, among which was hardly heard the musical language of the country. But, he adds, the absurdity of *plébiscites* is now so notorious that no man of sense pays any attention to them. The strongest possible confirmation of all the former signs of hostility was that the *employés*, in all offices under Government, voluntarily chose to see their families deprived of bread, and themselves reduced to beggary, rather than dishonour themselves and break their faith to their proper Sovereign and Pontiff by taking any oath to the foreign Government. And, then, what of the organs of public opinion, so much extolled nowadays—the public journals? There is not in Rome so much as one revolutionary journal which was established by Romans, and hardly so much as one emigrant Roman who has taken a part in such loathsome illusion; while, in spite of all the violence of ruffians and the lions of the men in power, the number is ever increasing

of spirited Catholic journals, all of purely native origin, and eagerly inquired for and read. Of the *Unità Cattolica* alone more than 800 copies are daily taken in Rome.

Next, our author shows in detail the failure of the new institutions; the municipality could not be made to work, and, as far as it did, was against the new Government. Neither did the Lieutenant-Governor of Rome or the Government of Florence get on much better, the one setting himself to put a stop to all cries in the streets, the other to issue a marvellously confused, undigested, and unconstitutional set of decrees, laws, and arrangements. These acts of the Government, says our author, forcibly suggested the idea that the pretended unification of Italy was being set aside, and treated as something dangerous. Unity consists emphatically in the uniformity of government and laws. But meanwhile the Government of this one country, called Italy, preserved Tuscan laws in Tuscany, Lombard laws in Venetia, Papal in Rome, and thus showed that the habits and customs of the people of these different cities are not fit to be melted into one, but that their differences must be respected. And if the southern kingdom has made least difficulty about receiving the code of the Kingdom of Italy, that is because its laws under the old Government were wiser and better than elsewhere, and therefore, instead of new laws being introduced there, they were in fact made the basis of those which were imposed on the rest of the peninsula. Rome itself found itself transported from a state of honourable liberty to one of despotic license, and from a most mild taxation to the insupportable system which had already reduced to misery the rest of Italy, and has been reduced to a condition of passive resistance, varied by partial and fruitless risings, always pouring down imprecations on the new system, and calling out for that which is gone by. But the foreign revolutionists have the upper hand both of the Government and of the citizens. He then describes the relations of the new Government to religion—the sacred images are insulted, Christ is made the object of blasphemies, the carrying of the sacred *viaticum* is threatened, and one day the parish priest of San Lorenzo in Lucina, when carrying It, was subjected to repeated outrages and blows.

As to morals, books and pictures of the foulest obscenity are publicly exposed, a show is made of naked women, habitually in a theatre erected for the purpose in the Piazza di San Silvestro, and sometimes even in the public piazza, and the city is flooded with the most shameless prostitutes, who openly carry on their trade in the *cafés* and the most crowded streets.

As to the security of person and property, assassinations are

committed in broad daylight, thefts and robberies go on daily, those who are suspected of being "clericals" are insulted and treated with violence. And then he shows how the revolutionists are allowed to make what demonstrations they please, as when they went in procession to the cemetery, where executed criminals are buried, to take up and treat with signal honours the heads of two ruffians, the vilest of assassins, who mined and blew up a part of the Serristori barracks, leaving dead under the ruins no less than seven-and-twenty Italian youths, part of the band of a battalion of Zouaves, and who did this not from any mistaken feeling of patriotism, but for a bribe of ten scudi each. And all these things were not done under any excusable outbreak of sudden enthusiasm, but were a deliberate expression of a perverted system encouraged by the authorities, as things even worse are now being practised with impunity in Naples.

In the midst of all these outrages, the President of the Council of Ministers at Florence laid upon the table of the Legislative Assembly, together with other laws about Rome, one "to guarantee the independence of the Supreme Pontiff, and the free exercise of the authority of the Holy See." "It is not easy to see," says our author, "amid all the trouble which the minister said he had taken about the Catholic movement, and about the security which it was incumbent upon Italy to give to Europe on the subject of the safety of the Pope, how he could have done anything more inopportune, more inefficacious, and more impertinent than such a proposal." Only two days before, on the feast of the Immaculate Conception, a mob, led by a man who sold poultry, and who had been raised to the office of lieutenant in the National Guard, with some other ruffians of the same class, attacked with axes and revolvers the numerous congregation, which, on that day memorable to Catholics, was returning across the Piazza of the Vatican from their worship in S. Peter's. The next day, and the day after, another mob of ruffians rushed to assault the Palace of the Vatican itself, in which the Supreme Pontiff was residing, crying out that they meant to disarm the handful of men—only about a hundred—who are intrusted with the defence of his august and sacred person. It might have been expected that the Government would have been aware beforehand of this attempt, which was not made by the lowest of the people, who are faithful to the Holy Father; certainly that they would have put it down immediately, and given over its leaders to the judicial authorities as men who with armed force had committed both sacrilege and a breach of the public peace. But, instead of this, the Government did not scruple to take advantage of these

events to prove, in its own way, the inconvenience caused in the present state of the popular mind, by the mere guard of honour by which, in case of extremities, the Pope might be defended, and to urge its disarmament, so that he might henceforth be wholly in the hands of the forces of the State. Thus at one and the same moment the Government of Florence was setting itself to put Europe to sleep at the cost of elaborate written promises, and was busy at Rome in acts by which the Pope was to be reduced to the condition of a simple bishop, shut up under forms of respect in his residence, lately royal, as an absolute prisoner of the revolution.

Neither was it possible to imagine that the proposal was serious, knowing, as the ministers did, that the majority of the Chamber of five hundred had already made a formal declaration for the abolition of the Catholic Church. And accordingly all its most important articles were either struck out or made useless by the committee to which, according to the custom of Parliamentary bodies in France and Italy, it was sent.

From the twentieth to the twenty-fourth sections our author's work is devoted to the consideration of the Italian Revolution. This part is specially interesting, and deserves to be studied by all who think, as no doubt many English Protestants do sincerely think, that the Italian Revolution and the violent aggressions of the Piedmontese Government, were justified, or at least in great measure excused, by the abuses of the Italian Governments under the old *régime*; for our author is so far from defending those abuses, that he points out what they really were and whence they arose, not contenting himself, as most Englishmen are almost obliged to do, with a vague notion of bad government at all times and in all parts of Italy, but distinguishing between different parts and divers times. And it is just this part of his work, we have no question, which made it indispensable that he should find a publisher beyond the limits of Italy. For he shows that there was no time--

When Tuscany or Romania, or even more certainly when the Two Sicilies, had any wish to become the handmaids to the petty state which ran round the feet of the Alps, the physical position of which buried it in snow, while its social development, in keeping with this, was always torpid, prepared for military rule, and with decaying institutions; while other parts, and especially the Two Sicilies, had wise laws, wise administrations, and statesmen of singular wisdom, who devoted themselves to promote the greatness of their own country and the liberty of its people. And again, Lombardy and Venetia, if they had not been annexed to Piedmont by foreign force, would have laboured to give themselves a free constitution independent of all foreign masters.

And least of all, in regard to liberty, would the Italian nation ever have

thought of *Piedmontizing*. It was freshly remembered how strong had been the reaction in Piedmont against the very first dawn of the French Revolution, against which it had not only taken up arms, but had made itself the gathering-place of all legitimatist conspirators. Neither could the Italians at large forget the days of blood which followed Novara, and the obstinate resistance, to the very last moment, against the Liberal movement commenced at Rome, which was from the first supported by the Neapolitan monarchy, and to the last resisted by the Government of Turin. But in the same proportion that that Government was retrograde, in the same was it ambitious to extend its dominions (p. 74).

The author then shows how much had been done in other parts of Italy for the improvement of government, even before the French Revolution, in the kingdom of Naples and the grand duchy of Tuscany, and especially in Rome itself. Then came the wars of the Revolution—the States and republics, set up and thrown down by the revolutionary invaders,—and “when, after so many misfortunes, the decisive day of Waterloo gave hopes of an era of peace, there immediately followed the last and supreme calamity of Italy—the Congress of Vienna.” That Congress put Istria and Dalmatia, Lombardy and Venice under the dominion of Austria, and brought a foreign yoke into the midst of Italy. In times past the Italians had striven, at the cost of sanguinary wars, to shake off this evil, but it was now more calamitous than ever, inasmuch as it was that of a state neighbouring and powerful, and regarded as essentially reactionary; and because it soon appeared that Austria was imposing these reactionary principles, not on her own dominions alone, but on the other Italian States. Hence arose the intense feeling which in every popular movement inspired the cry, “Down with the foreigners!” “War to the foreigners!” and, says our author, “This demand might have been satisfied, and reconciled with the dignity of the German Empire, if Austria had formed her Italian dominions into a kingdom, and had given it to the Prince Maximilian, who was living in retirement, and was so unhappily sent beyond the ocean, but who was personally beloved and revered by the Italians, whom he had for some time governed in a friendly spirit. But not such were the destinies either of Austria or of Italy.”

Meanwhile political reforms became, says our author, more and more necessary in Italy. Steam navigation, railways, and electric telegraphs made her believe that the world was becoming one family.

The aspirations of the Italian people, as described in the narrative of Sivo, whom no one will suspect of Liberalism, were for well-ordered liberty. And in proof of this he states that the minister Intonti, who was head of the Police

department in Naples, proposed only the change of a ministry which had incurred odium by retrogradism, the institution of a Council of State in the form of a Senate, and some modifications of the administration. But on the very night which followed this proposal, Intonti was arrested and carried to the frontier, whence he received orders to go direct to Vienna, on pretext of bearing dispatches.

But truth obliges us to declare, that all this war against the persons and the ideas connected with improvement proceeded, not from the Sovereign, but exclusively from the agents of authority. No one denies that King Ferdinand II. of Naples, in everything which was his own spontaneous act, was favourable to intellectual improvement; that he himself, in opposition to the whole of his ministry except one, caused the seventh Congress of men of science in Italy to be collected in Naples; and, moreover, that he was reproached by numbers, as having a strong tendency towards the Liberal party. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold II., in his turn, threw open his states, and even his palace, to the Liberal party throughout the Peninsula. But the seats of the ministry were occupied by men, faithful and most honourable administrators, but in no sense statesmen, and the better part of the aristocracy were alienated by the arts of the disaffected, leaving the Court to be surrounded by courtiers, a very few of whom were not ignorant but timid, the greater part both ignorant and self-willed. Upon one point the courtiers and the ministers were of one mind, to press on despotism and to mislead the Sovereign as to the true state of affairs.

I have myself read political statements presented to the King in the moment of the greatest political excitement, in which were contained political reports given in by the authority which presided over public order, and which testified to the most perfect public tranquillity and to the indignation of the people against "*some eight or ten revolutionists and filibusters.*"

And I myself, when I was at the head of the ministry of Public Works, whence it ought to be supposed that I was not ignorant of the true condition of the State, was assured, in August, 1860, that the whole population was for the king, and ready to put down the revolution.

Unhappily the king was always betrayed and deceived. (p. 79.)

But the most fatal legacy left to Italy by the French Revolution was the system of centralization. It is impossible to speak more strongly than our author does upon this point. It will probably surprise most English readers to find that he considers it not an evil left to Italy by the old *régime*, but one introduced by the revolution and the wars which it occasioned. The revolution was aimed at the destruction of all privilege, and with privilege it confounded local authority, and thus subjected all that hitherto had been left of local freedom to a central rule. That this was especially the case in Italy was long ago pointed out by Niebuhr, who traced in the ancient cities of the States of the Church municipal authorities which survived not only the Roman Empire, but the confusion of the

barbarian invasions which attended its fall, and lasted through the peaceful period of the old *régime*, till they were destroyed by Napoleon, "that faithful lover of despotism." What is still more curious, Niebuhr believed these institutions to have existed before the different cities were conquered by the arms of the ancient Roman Republic, and thus to have represented the very earliest dawn of civilization in Europe. Our author says: "License sweeping away every principle of authority, produced arbitrary rule and was fatal to liberty. The military dictatorship made arbitrary power an institution, and smothered even the faintest cries of liberty, concentrating in one man the central power, the government, and the administration. Thus do extremes meet." And the military dictatorship itself received new force from the fact, that its very principle made necessary foreign wars, and combined all Europe against France. But it was a fundamental error to make a permanent political system of what had been imposed as a necessity by extraordinary circumstances. The author believes that this centralization is the main political reason why France, since the Revolution, has never enjoyed any stability; while, "on the other hand, the stability, both of government and of liberty in England, has sprung from the complete decentralization of power, the ministry occupying itself only in political matters and the great interests of the State, while the administration of the country is carried on by local authorities." "America also is equally and even more rigid in preserving the independence of all authorities and the free rule of each of its separate divisions; and hence it has so rapidly arrived at its present condition of civilization and power. In Italy, unhappily, the opposite system was retained; everything—finances, industry, commerce, public work, public health, being all managed by central authorities, and even religion itself was made a matter of politics by regulations which shackled the communication of the Church with its Supreme Pastor, and subordinated it to the authority of a minister of public worship. Nay, the administrative tribunals did not pronounce sentences, but mere recommendations (*avvisi*), without virtue or power unless they were approved by the royal authority; that is, the political government retained judicial powers, and became at the same time both judge and party in the cause."

Naples, says our author, should especially be kept in view by any one who would trace the thread of the disturbances of Italy, not only because the commotions in the other states were substantially the same, except in the area affected by them, but because Naples was the largest and most intelligent state in the peninsula, and the work of destruction there was most violently

carried out. In his twenty-third section, therefore, he traces the chief events in Naples since the revolutionary movements of 1820 were put down. The Neapolitan revolutionists, he said, were supposed by the Government to have been completely conquered; but this was not really the case. Then follow the effects produced in Naples by the events at Rome in 1848. The king was perfectly well-intentioned, but his designs were thwarted by his own ministers. In this state of things, while there was a party pressing on for a social revolution, Cavour took possession of the ministerial office at Turin in the very same spirit in which Romano, somewhat later, took possession of the same office at Naples. His object was the ruin of his own king, just as that of Romano was the ruin of the young and inexperienced King of Naples; and it is now known, by the publication of Persano's journals and papers, how Cavour employed the diplomatic agents of the King of Sardinia at the different courts of Italy to excite revolution in the states to which they were accredited.

In the twenty-fourth section he inquires what the provinces annexed to Piedmont have gained by the change effected by Cavour. The finances of Italy have been destroyed; "the debt has been increased to three milliards; there is an annual deficit, which no human wisdom will prevent from still farther increase; all credit and confidence has been destroyed, and the country is on the brink of bankruptcy. Thus new Italy has destroyed the two fundamental objects of society—the security of person and of property."

The twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sections are devoted to a comparison of the two ideas of Italian unity and of an Italian confederation, such as that recommended by "the able Abate Rosmini." The mere loss of the civilizing effect of the different capitals by which every part of the Peninsula had a centre of civilization and of art, and by which Italy was till lately the envy of all other states, will always indispose the Italians to the first of these. But certain as it is that Italy is not destined to submit to a single sovereignty, it is no less difficult to doubt that it is her right and her duty to be united. This plan was actually accepted in 1848 by every Italian state except Piedmont, which, after leaving the invitation addressed to it to join in such a confederation unanswered for six weeks, replied that "the proposal should be taken into consideration after the Austrian war was concluded." The author advocates this system as "combining four marvellous advantages: (1.) The progress of Italy would be directed by the purest source of justice and liberty, as it would be guided by the Gospel, which equally preserves the rights of the monarch and of the people.

(2.) It will preserve (without its abuses) that Guelph system which meant the independence of Italy, against that Ghibelline system, which meant the usurpation of the empire and subjection. (3.) It will add to the material power of Italy that moral power which belongs to the Pope alone, and which extends over more than two hundred millions of Catholics scattered through the world. (4.) It will secure to each of the States of Italy its real independence, because the supremacy of the Pope is wholly spiritual and moral, and never too powerful; as is so often the case in other political confederations, in which the head of the whole either is, or if he pleases may be, the lion of the fable, who divides in order to secure to himself all the four portions." Then, after answering the objections which had been made to this plan, he says it is much what existed in the States of the Church "before the invasion of the French Republicans; when Bologna was a government almost independent under its Senate of forty members, and sending its ambassador to Rome, and the other provinces were united rather than fused into one, and retained the names of Duchy, Marquisate, and County. Whenever the licentious war is at an end, which is now waged by irreligion and revolution against the temporal authority of the Pope, whom Bonet did not scruple to call 'the most legitimate sovereign of the world,' then the Rome of the Popes will stand proudly forward as mistress of the Church and of the nations."

In conclusion the author protests against the doctrine of the *fait accompli* as giving a title to wrong and robbery, contrasting with it the old notion of prescription, which gave sanctity to a title on account of long possession, and concludes that the lesson taught by the Italian revolution is this:—

Order springs from the harmony of the parts, and liberty from respect to order. Laws, therefore, ought to be conformable to the development of human nature. If they are an impediment to it, or if they run in advance of it, harmony is destroyed and society dislocated, in the first case by the effect of compression, in the last by the effect of license.

In his historical arguments our author quotes the ancient Latin authors and the events of Roman history as authorities, in a manner unusual on this side the Alps. The fact is, that he represents a civilization the continuity of which has never been entirely broken off. It is curious to observe that no Frenchman ever cites an authority older than the great Revolution, for with that event the existing world of France really began. Laws, rights, nay, manners and customs, existing before it are as little to the present generation as if they had

belonged to a different race. With Englishmen it is quite different. We retain the main principles of the customs and modes of thought which our ancestors brought with them when they first set foot in Britain, nay, many of our most fundamental laws derive from this tradition their only authority, and have never been enacted by any legislature. In some respects, however, a new system of laws was introduced by the Norman conquest, and accordingly it is chiefly laws made since that event that men quote as authority. But no law or custom that existed in Britain before it became England has in truth any authority with us, because the old British people were destroyed and have left us no heritage of institutions or laws. But an Italian refers to the laws and customs of the Roman Empire, and even to those of the Republic, as we do to the institutions of our earlier kings.

This very thing is an indication of a state of feeling which makes it all the less likely that the Italians should long submit to the government of Victor Emmanuel. They are not like a people without a history, and their whole history from the very earliest time presents no example of anything like that which now exists. Even the Roman Empire when at its strongest, was, as M. de Champagny says, not so much a single kingdom as a confederation of free commonwealths under one absolute head. To an Italian it is indeed a forcible argument which our author urges, when he says that Italy has never been one kingdom nor Rome its capital. Still more has it ever been the case since those ancient lands, over which the Northern barbarians swept like an inundation at once destructive and fertilizing, recovered their civilization, that every Italian people has prided itself on the beauty and fame of its local capital, all of which are now, for the moment, reduced to the condition of provincial towns.

But in truth it needs no such considerations to prove that the present system cannot last. It needs only to state what it is, in order to convince any sober-minded man that it is not really intended to last (if indeed it is intended to work even for a moment), but only to blind men who for different reasons would object to the real objects of the men now in power at Rome if they were openly avowed. And this is the conclusion to which the *Civiltà Cattolica* very plainly leads its readers; while, as we have shown, it prudently abstains from drawing it for them in direct words. Take, for instance, the article in the number for June 1, 1871, on "The Double Diplomatic Representation in Rome," i. e., on the system professedly established by the Government of Victor Emmanuel, that each of the Catholic powers is to have two embassies at Rome, one to the

Holy Father, the other to the King, from which the question of course arises whether or not the same man can discharge both these offices. The *Civiltà* begins by saying that the *Italian Gazette* announces that "instructions have been sent to the Nuntios and Internuntios of the Holy See, that they are to inform the respective Governments which have accredited representatives to the Pope that no such representative will be received at the Vatican if he is at the same time accredited to the Italian Government; so that foreign Courts must make up their minds to have a double representation at the Court of Rome or to break off diplomatic relations with it," and that the same notification has since been repeated in the principal organs of the Liberal press. The *Civiltà*, while professing not to receive these papers as any authority for facts, considers that "this matter of the diplomatic representation is one more inextricable entanglement, springing from the occupation of Rome. For its double character seems to be on the one hand unavoidable, on the other impossible to be allowed. This judgment of ours may seem strange, but the thing appears indisputable, and the reader will have the patience to hear the reasons which we have to allege for one and the other part of our conclusion. And first, the representation of one and the same person in Rome accredited to the Head of the Church and to the lay Prince is totally absurd—and that in relation to the Governments—in relation to the Pope, and in relation to the representatives themselves." Then the writer goes through each of these. It would be absurd in relation to the Government, because it would imply an implicit acceptance of the principle of the "*fait accompli*," which cannot but be repugnant to Governments even though Protestant. This principle, he says (already condemned by the Supreme Pontiff in the Syllabus), may be said to have fallen in Europe with Napoleon III., who proclaimed and supported it, together with "the unjust principle of non-intervention and the farce of the *plébiscite*. It is destructive of all principles of morality and right. Moreover the Holy Father has solemnly declared that he does not surrender any of his rights. Catholic princes will hardly choose to identify themselves with the attacks on them. As to the Protestant princes—that brings in the question of the peoples. The Catholic bishops and people in Prussia, England, Baden, and Holland have made addresses to their sovereigns protesting against the wrong done to the Pope, and begging the Government to interfere on his behalf. It can hardly be supposed that the Governments will wish to identify themselves with the spoilers."

This leads the writer to consider the assertion that there exists a league offensive and defensive between Italy and Prussia. To

say nothing of the immense inequality of the parties to such a league, as proved by the fresh memories of Custoza and Lissa, it is incredible, he says, that Prussia, unless she is mad, would so strongly disgust all her Catholic subjects, which form one half of the empire.

As to the Holy Father, there is no need of any proof. He refuses to resign any of his sovereign rights. The Italian Government would specially desire that the same person should perform both functions, as ambassador to it and also to the Pope, because as long as he receives representatives men will naturally continue to think of him as a sovereign at least *de jure*; and for this very reason the Pope cannot cease to do so.

An ambassador must be acceptable to the prince to whom he is accredited. But the same person cannot at the same time sympathize with the Pope and with those who have plundered him. No one can have the sympathy of two pretenders to the same throne. But the Pope maintains his pretensions and the King his. The ambassador must always be seeming to oppose one or the other, and hence there would be "continual suspicions, umbrage, distrust, quarrels; instead of confidence, security, and friendly intercourse."

So much for the persons. As to the business, it would be worse still. The same diplomatist would represent the political interests of his country with the lay Prince, and its spiritual interests with the Pontiff. But the spiritual interests represented by him are intimately connected with the liberty of the Pontiff himself. For on his liberty depends the liberty of the consciences of Catholics throughout the world. The authority of the Pontiff is the first principle which informs the Catholic Church and rules its actions. It would therefore be the business of the minister who represented the Catholic interests of another country to watch and criticise with vigilant eyes every measure of the executive which might possibly interfere with the liberty of the Holy Father's actions, while, on the other hand, the first duty of one who represents abroad the political interests of his country is to abstain from all interference with the internal acts of the Government. How could the two characters be combined, or how would it be possible to avoid collisions, disputes, and causes of suspicion and complaint? And hence arises another danger, for it is almost certain that the religious interests of the country represented would be subordinated to the politics either of that country or of Italy. Men of the world care more for temporal than for spiritual affairs, and diplomatic representatives are usually men of the world.

But if on these grounds a double representation is absolutely

necessary, it is plain that on the other hand it is attended with the gravest difficulties. How would it affect the Italian Government? If the accrediting of the same minister to both sovereigns would be to acknowledge the *fait accompli*, the opposite course, for that very reason, would imply a protest against it, and acknowledge the sovereignty of the Pope at least as a matter of right. More than this, it would always be preparing the way for the restoration of his temporal power. "Right tends of its very nature to realize itself in acts, and whoever acknowledges the right is of necessity committed to promote such a result. And this is more especially the case in the present day, when public opinion is so powerful."

Then the minister accredited to the Pope is to have the ordinary privileges of an ambassador,—exemption from the authority of the Government in whose country he resides, &c. These exemptions are often unpleasantly felt in ordinary cases, but are borne for the sake of the advantages of national relations. But in this case the ambassador is to have all the privileges and none of the relations to the Government, and he may, nay, more, he must, be unfriendly to it; because the liberty of the Pope must be continually exposed to interference from the acts of the lay Government. Already the presence of the Pope himself, not being subject to the lay Government, is felt by it as a most serious embarrassment. What will it be when he is surrounded by a diplomatic body, all of them equally exempt from its authority and representing powerful States? Then the King may be on unfriendly terms, may be at war with any one of them. What is he to do then?—to keep in his own house an enemy endued with entire immunity and with the liberty of corresponding with whom he will? or to banish him? In this latter case where will be the guaranteed liberty of the Holy Father in his communications with every country of the Catholic world?

Then the dignity of the ambassador to the Pope could hardly fail to be greater than that of the minister accredited to the King. There would be a subordination of one to the other. The secular prince would by degrees share in this subordination.

Next, says the writer, it is useless to conceal the fact that the great majority of the Roman people look with hostile eyes on the political change which has been effected in Rome. "From conscience, or from interest, or from a noble elevation of mind, they cannot reconcile themselves to it." And he goes on to specify the different motives of conscience and interest, with the calm manner of a bystander, which must be singularly aggravating, one would say, to the existing Government. The

nobility, too, have stood aloof from it. And this will put the diplomatic corps accredited to the King in a very undignified position. And then, having shown that as things are at present it is impossible that the same minister should be accredited to the Pope and the King, and equally impossible that there should be separate ministers, he ends, as we have already said, by asking what is the remedy, and saying that the fear of the public prosecutor makes it impossible for him to suggest it. It is evident enough that it is the restoration of the Holy Father to his temporal authority.

In the next number of the Magazine is an article on "The Two Peoples." It begins—

Another incalculable evil which Rome has incurred by the entry of the new arrivals through the breach by the Porta Pia is that her unity is gone, and that she is now divided into two peoples in discord and hostility to each other. The glory for which Rome has been envied was the admirable concord of her citizens. Here all breathed peace. Free to a degree unknown elsewhere on earth to dispose of their own affairs, and to censure even publicly the errors of their Government (and what human government does not sometimes fall into mistakes?), the Romans were all of one mind in thoughts and likings, in everything that regarded customs, social order, and obedience to their Sovereign and Father. It used to be charming to see walking, side by side, through the streets, the ecclesiastic with the layman, the soldier with the citizen, the noble with the plebeian, chatting pleasantly together in sweet converse, as members of one family." (p. 173.)

The writer goes on to remind those who have ever seen it of the festivity kept every 12th of April (the anniversary of the wonderful escape of the Holy Father at S. Agnese); how the whole city poured out, and all the Romans seemed like school-boys on a holiday celebrating the festival of a common father. And although there was doubtless "an imperceptible fraction of men of corrupted minds," they did not affect the real unanimity; they either voluntarily exiled themselves or avoided notice.

But alas, the concord so sweet and admirable has been shattered by the shells of Bixio and Cadorna. Dissension has been kindled and has possessed itself of men's minds. The Romans of to-day are divided into two camps. Of the one, the nucleus is formed of those who have returned from abroad, with their adherents, very few in number, who had remained hidden in Rome. To them have since joined themselves all who from love of gain, desire of getting on, wish for license, or degradation of heart, have come over, sooner or later, to the new masters. Then a considerable part of it has been made up of the vast number of foreigners who have thronged to Rome, like vultures to a carcass, to make their prey of its public offices, manufac-

tures, and trade. These classes make up one people. The other people is composed of all that remains of the real Romans, who are still faithful to the Pontiff. It is composed, first, of all the ecclesiastics, among whom it is said that, with the exception of P. Scarpaccia, no one has dishonoured his sacred character by a base defection. Next it is made up of all the nobility, for it is hardly worth while to mention some six or seven, most of them youngsters, and some of them bankrupts. Next comes the vast majority of the townsmen. That this is the case is apparent from the refusal of almost every one of the persons in public employment to take the oaths to the new Government. Next come the native soldiers, who (except a very few who might be counted on one's fingers) have universally preferred an honourable poverty to the wages of a hostile flag. Last come the artisans and labourers, and these too have proved by all means in their power their devotion to the Pope-King. A striking proof of this was the 21st of June, on which the vast crowd gathered at S. Peter's, to show by their earnest prayers their fidelity to their beloved Sovereign, was chiefly composed of these classes, although it was a working day.

This second people is supreme in numbers, the first is supreme in audacity. It could not be otherwise, considering the persons of whom it is composed and the assistance it derives from the force of the Government. But be the proportion of numbers what it may, what is certain is that the two stand against each other, front to front, and that the former unity of the Roman people is broken in pieces." (p. 175.)

It may of course be said that after a revolution this is inevitable. That is true, says the writer, and is a great evil to society, which is defined by S. Augustine *concors hominum multitudo*, and has now become *multitudo hominum discors*. But after most changes there are two things which gradually diminish the evil. "First the dispute is usually confined to the domain of politics; religion does not enter into it, at least directly. The friends of the new system boast themselves to be, as much as their opponents, zealous for the honour of God and devoted in obedience to the head of the Church." Whether these professions are sincere or not is a matter for their own consciences. The other alleviation of such a state of division is, that it probably, nay certainly, heals by time, as appeared in the case of the adherents of the Stuarts in England.

But neither of these alleviations of the evil can have effect in Rome. Here the discord of the two parties is directly on the very province of religion, which is immediately implicated. This is well worth attention, and there can be no mistake or illusion on the subject. The act of invasion has been solemnly declared by the Pope to be sacrilege, and all who accept or take the side of it, in whatever manner, are pronounced to be partakers in the sacrilege. It is impossible that there should be any invincible mistake on this point; that such is the decision of the infallible teacher of Christian morality.

Each man is competent to judge, when his judgment agrees with that which is the rule of private opinions. Besides, an *anathema* has been pronounced by the Pontiff against the act of invasion, and in this all are included who adhere or consent to it. They are separated from the Church, without the possibility of excuse or evasion, by the public decree of him with whom it rests to pronounce sentence. And thus the revolutionists and the conservatives are divided into two opposite camps precisely upon the question of religion. The former cannot possibly unite themselves upon it with the latter. By the very fact of being rebels against the Pope in matters political they are also rebels in matters religious. On the other hand, the conservatives, by the very fact of continuing in the Church, remain faithful to the Pope, and thus every act of religion is an implicit profession of political opinion. (p. 177.)

It is difficult, without consideration, to see how deep must be the dissension in a country in which every man, who either has or professes any religion at all, is of the same religion; when a state of things has arisen in which no man can perform any of the ordinary acts of religion; can hear Mass, for instance, or frequent the sacraments, without making a public declaration that he is opposed to the existing Government and desires its overthrow; and in which no adherent of the Government can ever pretend to respect or adhere to the national religion, as in England the adherents of the house of Hanover, a hundred and fifty years ago, used indignantly to deny the charge that they were not "good Churchmen." The result is, that the Liberals at Rome resent every public act of religion as a direct insult to themselves and their cause. The *Italian Gazette*, for instance, mourning over the daily defections which it says take place from the Liberal party, goes on to attribute them directly and immediately to the "Triduos and public prayers for ultimate triumph, in which God is implored to stretch out His arm against all the enemies of the Church, Turks, heretics, excommunicated persons, and Mussulmans—and this is what we are." It goes on to say how this affects men who do not like to be ranked among the sons of Mahommed or the Manichees." It complains of public notices, *avvisi sacri*, &c., and of the care taken to keep young people from the public schools and the University. In this, says our writer,—

The worthy writer in the *Gazette* alludes to the unanimous act of some five hundred young men, who left the Roman University as a protest against professors, who, by an act of adherence to Dollinger, had fallen into manifest heresy. This act, like the Triduos, &c., complained of, was evidently religious. It was in obedience to the precept of the Apostle, *Hæreticum hominem evita*. But it and they are none the less regarded as political, and thus it is proved, by the admission of the adversaries themselves, that they themselves regard the temporal sovereignty as inseparable from the religious authority of the Pope. (p. 178.)

And hence arises a state of things intolerable to the faithful in Rome, and in a less degree elsewhere, as has been seen at Florence, Turin, Genoa, Padua, and other places. They cannot practise their religion without being in danger of outrage and violence from revolutionists.

About 1,200 young men belonging to the families of the nobles and citizens had inscribed their names for a pilgrimage to the celebrated shrine of Grotta-ferrata, to take place on the 18th of June this year. Immediately a notice was circulated by the Liberal party, inviting the most audacious of its partisans, and especially those restored by the late armed invasion, to assemble in the street, and attack the procession of the pilgrims. This being known, most of the young men were forbidden by their parents to attend. Three or four hundred, however, of the boldest, persevered in their design, and gave notice to the Questura of the assault with which they were threatened. The Questura, which certainly ought to have known the thing without this notice, caused the street to be scoured beforehand by bands of lancers, and escorted the bold pilgrims by troops of infantry and cavalry. Thus the pilgrims remained unmolested. (p. 179.)

The Government is in a dilemma, says the writer. It is compelled to protect proceedings which it bitterly dislikes. But it dare not do otherwise, because it is necessary to show to the world, at least for the moment, that the Catholic religion is free in Rome. Its coldness proves what that liberty will be, if it ever feels itself secure in its possession.

Then as to the other cause which has alleviated other civil discords,—the mere effect of time, it can do nothing in Rome as long as the occupation lasts. Prescription, says the writer, is admitted as giving a title, for the sake of the peace of society, and to avoid endless contests. But there is always an exception to this, in the case of things sacred and of the public interests.

Now the dominion of the Pope over Rome is a thing sacred, and is the universal interest of the whole Christian world. This dominion has been given to Christ in the person of His Vicar, and is absolutely necessary to the independence and liberty of the Church. It follows that no Pope has power to resign it validly, for all surrender of things not one's own is unlawful. The Pope is not the owner, but only the trustee of the temporal sovereignty. He has received it not as a heritage for himself or his family, but as a right and property of the Pontifical office. As he cannot dispose of the office, so neither can he dispose of the jurisdiction appertaining to it. To do so would be to offend against Christ, in whose name he reigns, and to offend against the whole Church, for the benefit of which the Pontificate was instituted, and all that belongs to it has been passed from hand to hand. (p. 181.)

Hence, says the writer, appears the absurdity of those who have blamed the Pope for not resigning, for the sake of peace,

his temporal sovereignty. He had no power to do so. He was bound by the laws of the Church, and by the rule of justice, which is the law of God.

From all these things it follows that the antagonism between the two peoples in Rome can never cease, while the occupation of the Eternal city continues. The animosity of the Catholics against that occupation is indissolubly united with the right of the Pontiff to recover his states, and this right can never become less. It stands firm as long as the Pontificate itself stands.

The conviction of this has suggested to the more violent of the Liberal party the idea of attempting the destruction of the Papacy itself. Certainly if this diabolical plan could succeed, the victory would irrevocably be theirs. With the destruction of the Papacy the cause of the dispute and opposition would be cut up by the roots. But this is exactly the difficulty. To destroy the Papacy is, in other words, to destroy the Church, of which the Papacy is the foundation. And is it possible to destroy the Church? Christ has promised that it shall endure for ever; and the promise of Christ cannot fail. This faction therefore is mad. (p. 182.)

Others have proposed that the Pope should be bishop of some other city. But this is impossible by the Divine appointment, which has fixed in Rome the successor of S. Peter.

Others, more astute, hope to succeed by destroying the Faith of the Roman people. All they think will be easy, if they can make the Romans Protestants or infidels. This is the reason why congregations of all manner of sects have suddenly been opened in Rome.

And as the corruption of the understanding usually begins with that of the heart, no means have been spared to corrupt the public morals of the people and the private morals of families, and especially to infect with vice the pliant minds of young people. With this object the foulest materialism has been taught from the chairs of professors, the most obscene plays have been allowed in the theatres, numbers of prostitutes have been gathered from all parts of Italy, and the most shamelessly filthy prints have been publicly exhibited in the streets. (p. 183.)

We need not tell those who have seen anything of Italy of late years, that this plan has been publicly and avowedly put in practice, wherever the object has been to alienate the inhabitants from the Church and the Pope. Make a man licentious and he will not long be on the side of the Pontiff. That has been the deliberate avowed calculation. That it is utterly diabolical there is no need to say. What is truly marvellous, is, that numbers of really religious Protestants,—some, we fear, who consider themselves Catholics though Anglicans,—are ready

to support the men who adopt such instruments, only because those men are hostile to the Holy Father !

Still the writer is confident that even this will not succeed. As to the present state of things, he quotes again the *Italian Gazette*.

There is disaffection in the aristocracy, disaffection in the artists, who are suffering from the inundations, from the falling away of foreign visitors, from taxation, and from competition. There are murmurs from the men who let out carriages. The advocates, the notaries, the officers of the courts are without employment. The dangerous and idle classes are murmuring. Here is, in few words, the situation of Rome. (p. 184.)

It can, we think, hardly be doubted that the state of things here described cannot last long. Things may get worse, as indeed the writer seems to fear,—they can hardly remain as they are ; for the Government of Victor Emmanuel is evidently trying one of those middle courses which have never been found to succeed. It fears to destroy the adherents of the Pope and of religion in Rome, by a “reign of terror.” This might possibly succeed, at least for a time. It fears to forbid the practice of religion. It fears even to prevent all expression of opinion on the side opposed to it. To say nothing else, (and who can tell how far real religious fears keep some place even in the minds of the most wicked men ?) it fears to try too far the patience of all Catholic nations ; nay, of all Governments, whose interests and whose feelings are naturally on the side of order. And yet it is taking a course which without the extreme of violence has never succeeded. It is outraging the religious convictions and the worldly interests of a whole people.

ART. IX.—THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.

L'Internationale. Par OSCAR TESTUT. 7ème édition. Paris : E. Lachaud.

Les Mystères de l'Internationale. Paris : E. Dentus.

Histoire de l'Internationale. Par E. VILLETARD. Paris : Garnier Frères.

Guerre des Communeux de Paris, 18 Mars—28 Mai, 1871. Par un Officier Supérieur de l'Armée de Versailles. Paris : Firmin Didot Frères, Fils et Cie.

Une Mission Secrète à Paris pendant la Commune. Par Gesner Rafina. Paris : E. Dentu.

Par Ballon monté—Lettres envoyées de Paris. Par LOUIS MOLUND. Paris : Garnier Frères.

The Civil War in France. Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association. Third edition, revised. Printed and published for the Council by Edward Truelove, 256, High Holborn.

Earl Russell, the Commune, and Christianity. By HUMPHREY SANDWICH, C.B. (Reprinted from the *Fortnightly Review*.) London : Head, Hole, & Co.

The Fortnightly Review (September). London : Chapman and Hall.

IT seems but yesterday that Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston amid applauding Parliament declared that there had indeed been revolutions, and revolutions, such as the English of 1688 and the French of 1789 ; but that the idea of any such general moral essence, any such inspiring and dominant idea, any such secret and ubiquitous power, as the Revolution, in the same sense as that in which we speak of the Reformation, was a Papal craze, a Catholic and perhaps to some extent a Tory delusion. The great rule of foreign policy in that distant yesterday was that all nations should keep aloof from each other's affairs, and should cultivate and practise to the utmost extent the sublime principle of Non-intervention. A terrible answer has befallen all this balmy balderdash. The International Society has arisen, embodying the Revolution in one only of its aspects, but that an aspect more awful and odious, not merely to peers and members of Parliament, but to persons of property in general, than it is even to Pope and priest—for it represents the desire of the poor to deprive the rich of their power and their property, and, if necessary, of their lives. The Church has been already to a very considerable extent despoiled of its possessions, in general with the assistance and in a great degree to the profit of the classes who especially associate their existence with the possession of

property; and in any case the profession of poverty is one which a good Christian makes without shame, and to which the monk is bound. This it not, therefore, a movement against the Church, an institution which the great leaders of the International Society, being atheists, simply despise. It is, in the first place, a movement against the privileges of Mammon. The proletariat, as it has now become the fashion to call the people, who in old times were known as the poor, the lower classes, or the rabble, has got weary of being hounded on by the classes immediately above him,—lawyers, journalists, shopkeepers, speculators, and the rest, against priests, kings, and aristocrats. He denies the claim of the middle classes “to succeed to the nobles and to substitute *the supremacy of cash* for all the privileges of birth.”* He, for his part, is not satisfied with the state of society which is considered so satisfactory by his former leaders. They have inspired him with the love of liberty and equality. He finds, or pretends to believe, that he is the slave of capital, and that he is not the equal of his employer; and he proposes accordingly to evaporate capital and to reduce his employer to his own level. Far from supposing that the affairs of a country only concern its own inhabitants, he believes that the Revolution can only truly succeed by the conjoined action and close organization of the discontented of all nations against such as presume to be better off. It is a war, then, against the supremacy of cash, and the privilege of property—a war whose aim and end is to destroy not so much all that is sacred and noble as all that is safe and well-to-do; and whose scope is merely as wide as the world—not Catholic certainly, but at least International.

The Paris Commune has furnished the first sample of the new revolution in action and possession of power. That Government was the expression of the ambition and objects of the French workman, but was itself subject to the higher authority of the mysterious and ubiquitous Society, from whose centre in Holborn went forth, it is said, the order to burn Paris rather than surrender.† A candid and eloquent apologist “of those proletarian souls, suffering in the midst of our society and dreaming of a paradise of equality to be won by them at a blow at the close of some exploit of audacity and despair,” has lately addressed the cultivated circle of the *Fortnightly Review* to

* M. Auguste Desmoulins.

† C'est le prussien Jacoby et le russe Tovatchin de *l'Internationale* qui de Londres ont expédié l'ordre de brûler Paris le jour où la confrérie ouvrière reconnoîtait l'impossibilité de la défendre.”—*Guerre des Communeux de Paris*, p. 236.

explain that "legitimate thirst for justice," which animates them (the proletarian souls), and which he ventured to announce so long ago as 1869, would, if not satisfied, "expose the whole of human society to some disastrous commotion, by the side of which our political revolutions and our international wars would seem mere child's play."* M. Desmoulins evidently knows Paris and the Paris workman well; and he will not condescend to the ignorance or the prejudice of those writers who always speak as if the Empire had especially created that particular populace. The centralization, which is one cause of the moral malady of Paris, is, he holds, republican and bourgeois. "It may be painful," he observes, "to a republican and bourgeois, like M. Favre, to admit that the vice which he holds up is in its origin republican and bourgeois, but true statesmanship should have no such reserves." M. Desmoulins, for his part, has no such reserves, but declares that "the Parisian Red, far from being out of the pale of human nature, is only a spontaneous product of what is pompously styled modern civilization,—a civilization that, resting to this hour on war between nation and nation, town and town, farm and farm, man and man, is still in many respects sheer barbarism." We quite agree with the opinion that the Parisian Red is a spontaneous product of modern civilization, but must own to our surprise at seeing such a fact stated in such a place, and in such a tone. It has hitherto been the peculiar privilege of Catholic writers to say such things about modern civilization, and to be regarded as wickedly and invincibly ignorant of human nature for so doing. When the Pope condemned the proposition that "it was his duty to reconcile himself with modern civilization," there was a great chorus from all the organs, all the hurdy-gurdies, and even all the penny whistles of public opinion, of which the burden was that the Vicar of Christ had blasphemed against the age, against the laws of the universe, and against progress. But if modern civilization spontaneously produces Parisian Reds, it is a rather hard thing to blame the Pope for objecting to reconcile himself with it. Progress by plunder, progress by petroleum, is a creed that as yet little commends itself to the human race—is indeed a creed which in mere self-defence, and even if modern civilization should be temporarily suspended in the process, must be suppressed by the soldier and the hangman, as often as it passes from the region of faith to the region of practice. But this is only one instance of many in which the language of the world has gradually and quite unconsciously come round to the character of the language of the

* M. Auguste Desmoulins, in the *Revue Moderne*, 25 October, 1869, p. 694.

Church. It is hardly possible to open an English newspaper nowadays without meeting with affirmations of opinion and principle precisely similar to those of the Syllabus. Let us take, merely as the last example that meets our eyes, the following passage, which commences a late letter of the greatly gifted "Parisian Correspondent" of the *Times*, a writer who would be certainly annoyed and possibly scandalized if he were told that he was learning to write in the tone and almost in the terms of a Papal Encyclical. Nevertheless read this powerful passage in his letter of the 8th of October :—

It will be a long time before France will recover the moral strength which will enable her to re-establish liberty and to found a new future upon the basis of respect for law. From various causes, too many to enumerate, respect for laws, human or Divine, has been gradually growing weaker for the last eighty years, and moral sense has declined. I do not mean to say that there have been no pauses in this decline, but the revolutionary virus has always in the end resumed its progress, and it has now entered so deeply into the blood that there seem no longer any means of extracting it. It is all very well to raise new loans, to cover them seventeen times, and so prove that wealth abounds, notwithstanding the violent bleedings which the public riches have undergone. But in the mean time everything which the lowest morality forbids in private life seems to be permitted here when politics are in question. Calumny, falsehood, fraud, even violence, are looked upon as excusable faults. This confusion between right and wrong should be put an end to ; but what hope can there be of its ceasing when the men who are called to govern have themselves set the example of contempt of right and violation of the laws to arrive at power, and, when they have seized this power, make use of it often against justice and to violate the laws more at their ease ?

It is the style of a newspaper writer, not the style of official Rome, but the sense of the deadly progress of the revolution, of the destruction of all distinction between right and wrong in modern civil society, of the extent to which calumny, falsehood, fraud, and violence are used as legitimate political means, and of the utter unscrupulousness of contemporary statesmanship—in all these points the writer's sense is in curious accord with the teaching of such documents as the Encyclical *Quantà Curâ* and the Allocution *Multis gravibusque*. The difference is that the Pope warns men in time whither they are tending, whereupon Public Opinion at once sets itself up to ridicule the Pope. Time, however, brings its revenge and renders Public Opinion ridiculous, when it is compelled *ex post facto* to adopt the affirmations and assume the sorrowful and indignant strain of the very Encyclicals on which it has spent its silly scorn. These unconscious testimonies to the far-seeing wisdom of the

Holy See are nevertheless among the most interesting developments of modern thought.

M. Auguste Desmoulins is one of those fanatical believers in the infallibility of the unknown, to whom the past is all superstition, the present all corruption, and the future the one reality of life. He is inaccessible to conviction either in the way of holy water or the way of petroleum; and with him, as with all those of his school, the mind has become so far softened that the terminology which has hitherto served not merely among Christians and Jews, but among such heathens as the Greeks and Romans, the Turks, the Indians, the Red Indians, to distinguish between right and wrong, has ceased to convey a meaning. The world is not a mere Babel of tongues nowadays: it is, outside the Church, a far worse Babel of thought. In the following passage, which really sums up the argument of his paper in a sufficiently trenchant and complete form, M. Desmoulins does not hesitate to convey his opinion that the coveting of one's neighbour's goods is suggested by, or at least connected with, a sentiment of justice; that the daily bread earned by labour is much more keenly enjoyed by a man who does not believe in God, or Heaven, or Hell; and that as neither the French workman nor his master believes in a future state, it is only natural and quite right that the workman should heal the difference between them here by robbery:—

The Parisian workman is often obliged to visit the handsome quarters of the town, while new buildings are ever thrusting him further away beyond the old barriers into vile habitations. In this condition, which is made for him, anything helps to irritate him. How can he find content in a home that is narrow, ill-lighted, foul, nearly without air, when he compares this wretched hole, for which he pays so dear, with the sumptuous chambers that he has either built or decorated in the rich quarters? It is easy to denounce in eloquent homilies the spirit of envy that devours the lower classes. We should recognize that a true notion of justice mixes with the feeling.

The desire to enjoy the fruits of his labour is especially likely to spring up in the mind of the French workman, who does not believe, any more than his master, in the reparations of a future life; who does not perceive for the right of the master any other sanction than the material fact of possession; and whom, besides, universal suffrage invests with a share of sovereignty equal to that of the capitalist. Whatever may be said by those who have been justly called Mammonite writers, we can easily understand that the proletariat who has just given his vote, finds it hard to resign himself to social serfage at the very moment when he feels himself politically sovereign. This striking contrast between his rights as citizen, and his condition of pariah in society, accompanies him everywhere, reproduces itself in every act of his life, and adds a perpetual gloom to exhausting labour and never-abating privations.

This passage contains the essence of M. Desmoulin's apology for the Commune ; and it supplies, we submit, matter for reflection in its every line. The statesmen and the classes in society, who delight in seeing the influence of religion weakened or destroyed, never seem to realize until it is too late that they are sure to be the especial victims of their own success. The great truths of life hang together and sustain each other :

All is contain'd in each :

Dodona's forest in an acorn's cup.

The man who scorns to love God, how shall he continue to love his neighbour? The man who has said, "There is no God," is he not on the point of also saying, "Lust is lawful," "Property is robbery"? Paris is, and has always been, full of poverty. To preach the lesson of bearing poverty with resignation,—to teach the poor to sanctify their state by enduring it with patience, with charity, even with cheerfulness,—has always been one of the favourite tasks of the Catholic Church. To this end, she has founded many orders vowed to poverty, wearing a habit so mean, and living a life so spare, that the poorest of the poor may have no sense of inequality in their aspect or in associating with them. She founded in France of late a great society, that of S. Vincent de Paul, in which laymen of all classes and all ages were combined to visit the poor and to help them, not so much by alms, as by counsel, comfort, influence, careful to guard their self-respect, and to prove to them the true liberty, equality, and fraternity of Catholic charity. Against the religious orders, and especially against the poorer religious orders, those who sway the State, those who manufactured or manipulated opinion, the lettered, official, fashionable, wealthy, the cultivated and comfortable classes of French society, have been in a state of constant wrath and acrimony for a long, long time. They have had some success. They have deprived the working men of Paris and some other cities to a considerable extent of their religion—altogether of loyalty and respect for authority. What is the result? The Church suffers, of course. The Church always suffers. It is her privilege, her glory, the original and continual source of her power. An archbishop is shot, a few Jesuits, a dozen of Dominicans, some secular priests, and lay brothers. They die, as Catholic priests, always remembering their Master's example, know how to die,—serene, submissive, thanking God that He deigns to take them in the same way that He took His Son, blessing those who slay them with their last breath. And when even bad men see this sublime spirit, beside which the courage of the bravest soldier is a mere animal intoxication, they at least relent in their animosity. The

blood of its martyrs becomes the insurance of the liberty of the Church. The Church continues—whether order or revolution reigns, she at least never suspends for an hour—her august mission ; prays, absolves, baptizes, marries, buries, offers the great sacrifice, preaches the Gospel to the poor. But on whom does the wrath fall, when there is a Republic of Roughs at the top? An hour of scuffle suffices to overthrow the dynasty of a hundred battles. In a single night, the city is illuminated by its palaces and ministries in flames. In the course of a week, the power of statesmen, the fortunes of capitalists, the emoluments of office, rank, dignity, degree, respectability, the whole system of things that seemed so prosperous and powerful, is in fragments like those of some too richly-laden wreck. A month suffices to make the most popular tribune more detested than the sovereign whom he superseded. The guidance of public opinion passes from the hands of the cynical sceptics, who wished to keep society in a *juste milieu* between good and evil, into the hands of the much more earnest and outrageous ragamuffins, whose ideal is a hell upon earth. Burglary, murder, and arson become civic virtues ; and every man is regarded with truculent suspicion who wears broadcloth, uses silver spoons, or has been known to keep an account at a bank. The comfortable and the cultivated did not intend that things should come to such a pass. They only meant to make “God Almighty a tolerated alien in His own creation”—to curb the saving authority of His Church, to keep His priests in due subjection, to guarantee within decent limits the liberty of the Seven Deadly Sins. But when they have made the mob their master, they learn that it is not against the Seven Sacraments, but against the “supremacy of cash,” that the Commune has risen in revolt. Also, if not invincibly blinded, they may see that now as nineteen centuries ago, there is only one way of rendering the poor content with their lot. When our Lord told the disciples of John to return to his prison, and say what miracles they had seen, He concluded as with the most choice and significant of His works,—“The poor have the gospel preached to them.” To defraud the poor of the Gospel is in almost every country in the world at present an object of policy on the part of powerful parties of men. It is one of the principal wounds of the Church in these sad days ; but it is also obviously and imminently fraught with danger to rank and riches, to property and order, to modern civilization and civil society.

The origin of the International Society, though so recent, is veiled in mystery. Its design has been attributed to Mazzini, but the statement is repelled on authority deserving of atten-

tion. During one of the prosecutions of the Society in France, a well-known leader, Chalain, protested against the imputation. "You try," he said, "we do not know with what design, to make out that Mazzini was the founder of the International. We have often enough proclaimed that we do not want any more saviours, that we do not wish any more to serve as instruments, and that we have the pretension to understand the situation, and to know our own interests as well as any one can." Mazzini appears to be regarded as belonging to the revolutionary bourgeoisie, which is not less hateful to the leaders of the International than is the conservative bourgeoisie.* But besides the disposition to respect property, which is therefore supposed to attach to his character, he is also reputed to believe, after a fashion of his own, but still to believe, in the existence of God. At the congress held in London last month, Karl Marx, at present the most prominent personage of the Society, declared:—

"Leagues à la Mazzini fancied they were pursuing a worthy object when striving for the overthrow of a Government and its replacement by some other similar concern. But it was no use to substitute one bureaucracy for another. To adopt such a course was to invest Government with a sort of mystic power, and to deaden the feeling of independence in the people. As to Mazzini, more particularly, he had the additional weakness of believing in God, and if he had the power, would be sure to proclaim himself Pope."

How fast the Revolution is ready to devour its children, another passage in the same speech signifies. Herr Marx, blaming the inattention of the French Socialists to general politics, said that, in consequence, when the revolution of September came, "the previous abstention of the Socialists led to the formation of a government chiefly consisting of Bonapartists and spies. It was the backwardness of the working classes which had enabled MM. Favre, Gambetta, and Co., to set themselves up as rulers of France."† Mazzini, Favre, Gambetta already ostracized! How soon, it may fairly be asked, will the turn of Herr Marx come?

The true prophet and founder of the International Society was not, however, Herr Marx. The author of "*Les Mystères de l'Internationale*" declares that its original organizer was an Irishman; and that at the conception of the design the great political and the great musical genius of modern Germany assisted. No romance can well seem more absurd than the

* Villetard, pp. 72-74.

† Correspondence of the *Cologne Gazette*, quoted in the *Times* of October 18

sketch of the foundation of the International which is given by this grave writer; but then the reality in certain departments of politics is always much more absurd than romance; and "Lothair" may not be the only romance concerning secret societies which is meant to tell more than half the truth. In any case, this sketch of the foundation of the International is curious enough to merit reproduction:—*

The idea of the International is German. It originated in politico-philosophical regions, far distant from the industrial circles in which the workman agitates. Before resorting to other proofs, it suffices to record that in 1847 we find the pseudo-economist Diebneck in Berlin, transporting the legacy of Babeuf into Germany, and opening up new horizons to Communalism. Thus the German workmen of Paris were no strangers to the socialist movement of 1848. A little later, in 1850, Dr. Jacobi published a work on "The Solidarity of the Labourers," and Diebneck had his famous book on "The Organization of Working Men"—which had been condemned by the German tribunals—printed. At length, in 1862, we find Karl Marx, commencing an active propaganda in favour of the International on the free soil of England, in which the doctrines sown by the Socialists beyond the Rhine were to take root and flourish;—Karl Marx, the German student trained in the school of the master, the creature of Bismarck, between whom and Bismarck there existed a connecting link in the person of one Patrick Howell. Who was Patrick Howell? In 1836 there lived at Madgeburg a woman whose house was the rendezvous of a little galaxy of reformers, of diplomatists *in partibus*, and ardent patriots, who passed a good part of their time in the discussion of the great problems of the future, and in trying to solve them, at least in theory. Madame B——, the author of several works much read in Germany, the high priestess of this temple of the intellect, made pretensions to the revival in Germany, and in the nineteenth century, of something like the fashions of the antique and solemn hôtel de Rambouillet. By nature high-minded, enthusiastic, full of noble aspirations, giving free course to her ardent fancy, Madame de B—— had been familiar with the ideas under the influence of which the young Bismarck had been brought up in his early days. When the young scholar of Gottingen and Grieswald attained his twentieth year, the Egeria reserved for him by fate was in all the splendour of a second youth, which the numerous adorers of this modern Ninon de l'Enclos declared, twenty years later, to be only the perpetuation of an eternal spring.

Gifted with every grace and mind and person, this woman exercised a real fascination on all her circle. Her most recent conquest was indeed a proof of her power. For some months past a poor and obscure musician had been living at Magdebourg. Thanks to her recommendation he was given the place of chapel-master in the city. His name was Richard Wagner. He mixed up politics with music, and thus found himself frequently out of harmony

* "Les Mystères de l'Internationale," p. 29 et seq.

with his protectress. Madame de B—— loved France. Wagner hated France. Madame de B—— professed the faith of the Empire. Wagner held every sovereign in alliance with the Empire in horror ; and resented to the lady the unbounded admiration in which she held the man to whom he believed all the ills of his country were due. And nevertheless, little by little, Wagner was converted. In 1838 the gathering in Magdebourg was dispersed. She who was the soul of it was obliged, by family motives, to remove to Nienbourg. The chances of a troubled life took Wagner to Dresden, where he resided for four years. But the ties which existed between the two were not broken by absence. From Dresden Wagner wrote to Madame de B—— introducing to her Patrick Howell, whom a common friend had presented to him. Howell, who was of Irish origin, was a man of thirty years old, energetic, resolute, and keenly intelligent, but not above being deceived into certain illusions, which is not inexcusable, considering how difficult it would have been for a man of his class to resist the influence of such a syren. He was the son of poor peasants in the County Cork, and had hardly begun to learn anything when the poverty of his parents drove him to work. At sixteen he went to England, where, after a few months' apprenticeship, he became a workman, and then a foreman in some pottery works in the vicinity of Sheffield. His occupation inspired him with the idea of studying chemistry : thanks to his natural ability, he made rapid progress. A casual occurrence made him acquainted with a rich German, a manufacturer of chemical products, established in the United States. He accepted the offers made to him by this person, and went to North America. During five years he shared in the great movement of the German immigration, and when he returned at the end of that time, he brought numerous letters of credit and of introduction to Germany.

With a glance Madame de B—— and the young Bismarck comprehended the new comer. He was imbued with the principles of Fenianism, thanks to his birth ; he had followed the working men's movement in England, and he brought back with him from America many learned documents upon the federal system. Howell, the Irishman, became a precious instrument, all the more so because the *mot d'ordre* for him had no point of departure but her who gave it to him. Madame de B—— had no trouble in extracting a promise from him that he would keep their relations secret. She was a woman, and her desire to remain unknown needed no other justification. Howell was therefore, to all appearance, the head of the conspiracy. This place at the head of the movement for *the emancipation of the labouring classes* fulfilled all his secret aspirations. Thanks to the influences now set to work, circles were speedily formed in Hanover, Saxony, Bavaria, and Prussia. Secret excursions to Great Britain showed the new apostle what use, in the interests of the propaganda, might be made of that country. For fifteen years Howell laboured at his great task. He visited, in their turn, Switzerland, France, Spain, and Italy, sowing those doctrines on his route which were destined to produce such fruits as Newmayer, Kinch, Caporusso, Lucraft, Greulich, and Karl Marx. It was this latter whom he chose—having known him long and intimately—and having employed him in the publication of a *doctrinaire* newspaper—to continue the great work, so well

begun in England, when they from whom Howell received his inspirations said to him, "The hour has come."

In 1862, on the eve of the Great Exhibition, Karl Marx arrived in London with the programme of the *International* in his pocket.

In what proportion this strange story is myth we do not pretend to discuss. The name of Howell appears in the list of the Council General for 1868,* but has since disappeared from the proceedings of the Society. Possibly he has been entombed in the Hôtel de Ville. Possibly he may be the organizer of the Chinese and Indian branches of the Society, which already cause his countryman, Lord Mayo, no little trouble. In England he appears to have merely cast the seed, and left its culture to Karl Marx and George Odger. It was thus at the Great Exhibition of 1862 that the Society first took not merely its English, but its European and International form. The French Government had eagerly aided the French workmen's societies to send representatives to England on that occasion, trusting probably that the spectacle of so great a collection of industrial art in the midst of the prosperous and orderly society of England might help to cure some of them at least of the passion for a Red Republic. The effect was quite otherwise. The occasion for a great demonstration of international fraternization was seized upon by the authors of the new association, and it was held in the Freemasons' Tavern on the 5th of August, 1862.

The address which emanated from this meeting contained nothing to alarm. It spoke of the growing difficulty of maintaining an adequate rate of wages, owing to the constant encroachment of machinery on labour; appealed to statesmen and thinkers, masters and workmen, alike to give due attention to the immense problem; and advised the holding of annual congresses for the purpose of collecting facts, comparing opinions, and, if possible, devising a solution of the true relations between artisan and employer. The society spread and progressed, enrolling myriads of members; and as it grew stronger in numbers, it became bolder in its tone. In 1864 it declared that "the subjection of the labourer to the employer is the source of all slavery, political, moral, and material."† In that year the Central Council was founded, under the presidency of Mr. Odger, in London. It was determined to hold a general Congress in 1866. It was resolved that, as far as possible, all the local societies of workmen throughout the world should be induced to merge themselves in the one great society, but

* Testut, p. 37.

† Villetard, p. 73.

should be advised to create a special organ of the International in each country. These organs gradually diffused the false and impious opinions of the hidden leaders of the Society; and in a very few years the principles so avowed in its name embraced the atheism of Paine, Proudhon's axioms touching property, Rousseau's moral scheme, General Garibaldi's estimate of the priestly character, some of the peculiar views of the Albigenses, and the grand dogma of Jack Cade. The method of its government and organization was, it is stated by the author of the "*Mystères*," carefully based on the Jesuit system—no doubt, on the Jesuit system as unfolded by that erudite and candid investigator M. Eugène Sue, in which some unknown Rodin moves ubiquitous influence. Organized at first simply to vindicate the rights of labour, and so furnishing a natural attraction and connection for the workmen of all countries, it spread for years, little noticed and certainly little dreaded. At last it displays itself through a score of organs, hostile alike to God and to man; threatens to overwhelm and subvert the whole framework of civil society with its organized millions, to level the hierarchy of class, the long growth of ages of civil and social development, and to place the government of the world in the hands of a few ignorant and profligate fanatics.

Already at the close of the Congress held at Brussels in 1868, its President, Eugène Dupont, replied in the name of the society to the advanced Republicans who reproached the International with its want of political sympathy.

If the workmen despise politics, as we are told by those who reproach us, it is because, having witnessed two revolutions which have not ameliorated their condition, they have inquired into the cause, and they have discovered that 1830 and 1848 were only *revolutions of form, but not of foundation*, that the foundations of society must be changed, and that the true theatre of revolution is *the social question*. De Paepe, of Brussels, told us yesterday that kings and emperors are accidents: he said the truth. All actual Governments are in a state of transition. What we desire to overthrow, is not only the tyrant,—it is tyranny. The clericals say, "Look at this congress; it declares that it will have no Government, no army, no religion." They also say the truth. We will have no more taxes, no more armies, *for armies massacre us*; we will have no more religions, *for religions strangle intelligence*. Seeing that their influence is destroyed in the cities, they fall back on the peasants, and say to us: "You are in the minority. We have numbers on our side." It is not numbers which constitute their strength, it is ignorance; they hope to sow dissension between us and our brethren; but we, here, solemnly declare, that the enfranchisement of the workmen of the towns is inseparable from that of the workmen in the country; for, what we all desire is the right to life for all,—that is to say, justice in humanity.

The Congress of Bâle in 1869 adopted as part of the pro-

gramme of the Society the declarations :—1. That society has the right to abolish individual property of the soil and to resume its use in common. 2. That it is necessary to change the property in land into collective property. At this moment, when Mr. Disraeli is about to resume the task of educating his party in popular principles, and so reconciling the monarchy and the multitude through the link of Conservative Communism, the immortal principles propounded at Bâle will no doubt receive the sympathetic consideration of the Peers and Squires of England.

The destiny of the middle classes in the new era is a matter of no secondary interest in the present constitution of society. Hitherto the middle classes have led the working classes against the aristocracy and the clergy in the long course of conflicts which it is the fashion to consider as the growth of modern liberty. Their turn has come now ; and their future cannot fail to prove a subject of interesting contemplation to their friends. It need not be said that the grand object of the social revolution is to *exploiter la Bourgeoisie*. Its resolutions and its acts all travel to this end. But the following passage from an official organ, the *Egalité* of Geneva, is perhaps the most succinct and luminous exposition of the views of the Society as to the future of the middle classes yet uttered :—

When the social revolution shall have dispossessed the *bourgeoisie*, in the interests of public utility, as the *bourgeoisie* dispossessed the nobles and the clergy, what will become of them ?

We cannot answer with positive certainty, but it is probable that the new order of things will give them, to borrow an expression from one of our friends, an infinitely more precious wealth,—that of labour, well paid, at their discretion ; so that they may be no longer obliged to live by the labour of others, as they have hitherto lived. In case some of them should be incapable of labour, which will happen to a good many, seeing that *hitherto they have never learned the use of their ten fingers, what then ?* Well, then they will be given tickets for soup.

“ But that is too little,” the *bourgeois* will howl.

“ Too little,” the workman will reply—“ too little to have work, at your discretion, well paid, and soup for the invalids. The deuce ! You are hard to please. We would have been well satisfied with such terms formerly.”

In 1869, the Society was joined by a man who was no mere speculator or organizer, but a man of action, and, after his fashion, a soldier. This was Cluseret, a cashiered French officer, who had for a time held a military command in the Fenian Society, and who had, in 1866, devised, as part of the scheme of an Irish insurrection, the diversion of burning Downing Street and the principal public buildings of London.

The Government of the time were fortunately forewarned. Sand was provided in large quantities. Special constables were sworn in. Some of the Irish members of the Executive Committee were opposed to a scheme so wanton and so useless, and the project was dropped. But the idea had acquired a horrible fascination for Cluseret's mind, and a year before the outbreak of the Commune in Paris he already contemplated its application to that city in the case of a new revolution. A revolution was already calculated on apparently as imminent, by the French leaders of the International, from the date of the shooting of Victor Noir by Prince Pierre Bonaparte. In February, 1870, Cluseret wrote the following letter from New York, a letter eminently characteristic of his malign genius, and the last sentences of which show that the destruction of Paris was already ripe for discussion as part of the International programme :—

New York, 17th February.

MY DEAR VARLIN,—I have just received your welcome letter of the 2nd. It explains the delay in replying to my application. Need I say that I accept, and will set to work at once, in endeavouring to be useful to my brethren in poverty and toil. The newspaper which I told you of is not yet established. I think it better not to renew my attempts in that direction, considering the late events in France, and the numerous letters I have received from my friends, who are unanimous in recalling me to Europe.

In all probability I shall be there next summer, but, in the interval, I shall have arranged international relations between the different French and American groups, and selected one person, or several persons (at the discretion of the French committee) of proved zeal and capability, to replace me. As you say, we shall surely, infallibly triumph, if we persist in demanding success from our organization. But we must remember that the aim of our association is to associate (*solidariser*) the greatest number, for action. Let us, then, be liberal; let us round off our angles; let us be really brethren, not in words but in deeds; let not such mere terms as doctrine and individuality separate those whom common suffering, which means a common interest, has united: we are all and all, we must acknowledge that; if we are beaten, it is our own fault. I have not been able to picture our people to myself, during the late troubles. What has been the attitude of the workmen's societies, and what are their present dispositions? Certainly, we must not sacrifice our ideas to politics, but we must not detach ourselves from them, even momentarily. In my mind, the meaning of all that is going on is simply this, that the Orleans are slipping little by little close to power, and paring his nails for L. N., so that one fine morning they will merely have to substitute themselves for him.

Now, we ought to be ready, physically and morally, for that day. *On that day, we, or nothing.* Until then I shall probably remain quiet, *but on that day, I affirm*,—and you know my "Nay" never means "Yea,"—*Paris shall*

be ours or Paris shall exist no longer. This will be the decisive moment for the accession of the people.—Yours ever,
CLUSERET.

You are mistaken in believing, for a moment, that I am neglecting the Socialist in favour of the political movement. No: it is only from a purely socialistic point of view I am pursuing the revolutionary work; but you must thoroughly know we can do nothing in the direction of social reform if the old political system be not annihilated. Let us not forget that at this moment the Empire exists merely in name, and that government consists in party abuse. If, under these grave circumstances, the socialist party permits itself to be lulled to sleep by the abstract theory of sociological science, *we may wake up one fine morning to find ourselves under new masters, more dangerous for us than those we have at present, because they would be younger, and consequently more vigorous and more powerful.*

When Cluseret wrote these words, they may have appeared to himself only a daring dream. A year later they were accomplished with atrocious determination. English apologists of the Commune do not hesitate to say of the burning of Paris, "It is evident the incendiarism was simply an act of warfare,"* and that the object was to interpose "a rampart of burnt houses" in front of the retreating army of the Commune. But it is evident from the letter we have quoted that the act was long premeditated by the principal military official of the Commune, who, although for a time deposed from the Delegate Ministry of War, resumed his authority during the last days of the struggle. Nor did the incendiarism occur at a time or in a way to aid in the defence of any of the lines of barricades erected in the city. It was ordered when further resistance was hopeless. MacMahon's army entered Paris on the 21st of May, by the gates of St. Cloud, Auteuil, and Passy. On the evening of the 22nd his troops occupied the Champs Elysées, good part of the Faubourg St. Honoré, and the New Opera House. Already the defences of the quarter of the Tuileries were turned and rendered useless. On the 23rd, Montmartre, the Aventine Mount of the Revolution was carried by Clinchant and Ladmirault, and the Northern and Western Railway stations occupied. Cissey had, meantime, obtained possession of Saint Sulpice, and flung his left forward to the Corps Législatif. Next day the insurrection would have been completely surrounded and compressed in that part of Paris where the great historic edifices stood. It was at this moment, during the night of the 23rd, that the conflagration, long premeditated, was perpetrated. It was determined to destroy, not lines of houses through which the soldiers might advance on

* Sandwith, p. 6.

the morrow, but public buildings, from their very nature detached and incapable of being used in the prosecution of the assault—palaces, ministries, museums, churches, theatres; lastly, the houses of the *suspects*. The Government which had already directed the hotel of M. Thiers to be rased before Paris was even attacked, had indicated its policy of destructiveness. On the 20th of May, the day before the city was entered, that Government took its final decision. The combustibles were already placed, the incendiaries were already organized and disciplined, and on the evening of the 23rd, the following order was issued :—

Citizen Millière, at the head of 150 fusee-bearers (*fuséen*), will set fire to all suspected houses, and the public monuments on the left bank of the river.

Citizen Dereare, with 100 fusee-bearers, is charged with the 1st and 2nd *arrondissements*.

Citizen Billioray, with 100 men, is charged with the 9th, 10th, and 20th *arrondissements*.

Citizen Vesinier, with 50 men, is especially charged with the boulevards, from the Madeleine to the Bastille.

These citizens are to come to an understanding with the chiefs of barricades in order to ensure the execution of these orders.

DELESCLUZE, RÉGÈRE, RANVIER,

JOHANNARD VESÉNIER, BRUNET, DOMBROWSKI.

Was this act also directed by the International? It is so asserted, as we have already seen; and certain it is that it is adopted and justified by the Society. In the address issued by the General Council on "The Civil War in France," this passage occurs :—

The working-men's Paris, in the act of its heroic self-holocaust, involved in its flames buildings and monuments. While tearing to pieces the living body of the proletariat, its rulers must no longer expect to return triumphantly into the intact architecture of their abodes. The Government of Versailles cries "Incendiarism," and whispers this cue to all its agents, down to the remotest hamlet, to hunt up its enemies everywhere as suspect of professional incendiarism. The bourgeoisie of the whole world, which looks complacently upon the wholesale massacre after the battle, is convulsed by horror at the desecration of brick and mortar.*

Nor is the Council content with justifying the past; it does not hesitate to predict in the near future a war to the death between the workmen of the great cities and the rest of the

* Address of the General Council, p. 31.

world. Apparently these are about the true dimensions of the struggle. It declares from its watch-tower in High Holborn:—

After Whit Sunday, 1871, there can be neither peace nor truce possible between the working men of France and the appropriators of their produce. The iron hand of a mercenary soldiery may keep for a time both classes tied down in common oppression. But the battle must break out again and again in ever-growing dimensions, and there can be no doubt as to who will be the victor in the end,—the appropriating few or the immense working majority. And the French working class is only the advanced guard of the modern proletariat.

This address is signed by men of all nations; it bears English, Scotch, Irish, French, German, Flemish, Polish, Hungarian, Swiss, Danish, Italian, American names; and it closes with this emphatic declaration:—

Working-men's Paris, with its Commune, will be for ever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society. Its martyrs are comprised in the great heart of the working class. Its exterminators history has already nailed to that eternal pillory from which all the prayers of their priests will not avail to redeem them.

We are so brought face to face with the Revolution—atheist, murderous, incendiary, predatory, aiming at the destruction of the entire existing moral and social order, not in one country only, but throughout the world, preferring to achieve its ends by violence even where it enjoys the amplest political franchises, animated by no higher enthusiasm than that of hatred, the declared enemy of Church and State, of religion, of law, of civil society, of civilization, of property, but especially of capital. It counts its adherents by millions. There is not a country in Europe, excepting Turkey, Greece, and Ireland apparently, where the Society is not in active organization, and possessed of its propagandist committees, agents, journals. It has spread among the American democracy. Its last boast is that it has produced a new caste in the far East, destined to absorb all others. It has aggregated or allied to itself all the existing secret societies of Europe, even the oldest and most inveterate of all, Freemasonry, which throughout the reign of the Commune in Paris did not hesitate to reveal its sympathies, previously only suspected. It proposes the ruin of the world as it exists, in order to create a new world,—godless, lawless, savage; in which no superiority shall exist save that of brute force and moral infamy,—such a world as would welcome the coming of Anti-Christ, and crown him ere it perished in the element already distinguished by its predilection.

Is this, then, to be the end of the race of man?—this the

path of human liberty? Is the strange American oil, which the earth has begun of late years to exude, to feed the symbolic beacon of progress as it consumes the monuments of Christendom? After burning Paris, are we destined to witness London exploded? Why not London as well as Paris? This is no conspiracy against a particular Sovereign or State; it is a conspiracy against a class,—a class stronger in England than anywhere else,—the class that has made modern England what it is, and that governs England and England's empire, the great transacting, labour-organizing, capital-accumulating middle class. Nothing is impossible in an age which revolts against God, imprisons and mocks His vicar, in which anarchy is pretty generally preferred to order, and in which petroleum and picrate of potass are recognized instruments of political warfare. We have seen buildings, whose construction was the task of centuries, destroyed in a day; we have seen a great empire hustled out of existence by a street mob in the course of a few hours. It is easy to the multitude to destroy, and this is professedly a Revolution of destructiveness and of dissolution. How far further it shall be suffered to terrify and chastise the world rests with Him, who has said to the tide, "Thus far shalt thou go." As yet, we confess, we can see but slight sign of that spirit of penance among men which of old often availed to arrest His avenging hand.

ON THE FOLLY OF THE WAR WAGED BY POLITICIANS
AGAINST THE DOGMA OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY.

(Translated from the CIVILTA CATTOLICA.)

[One special reason for which we place before our readers a translation of this article is, that there has been some little discussion in the English Catholic newspapers as to the precise drift of the Holy Father's remarks on the *deposing power*.]

THE stubborn enmity to the dogma of Papal Infallibility lately defined by the Sacred Council of the Vatican, which actuates several Governments, is a most discouraging portent for the future destinies of civil society. It is, when examined with impartial candour, a manifest proof that many of those men to whom the destinies of peoples are in these days committed, are devoid of understanding, reject like madmen the hands which are stretched out to save them, and direct all their efforts cruelly to increase the sufferings of a moribund society.

To any mind endowed with good sense, the dogma of Infallibility presents itself as a powerful remedy for the evils by which modern society is ravaged, a remedy prescribed by those ordained and established by God to be the salt of the earth, and the light of the world.

However we may admire, and even exaggerate to ourselves, the progress we have made in all which relates to the material world, we cannot deny that we are suffering from an immense retrogression, and indeed a total decadence in all which relates to the moral order. Cities are becoming more and more beautiful, and the means whereby life is rendered joyous and luxurious are rapidly accumulating—wide streets, delightful gardens, exquisite parks, commodious and frequently sumptuous dwellings, magnificent theatres, the night outshining the day in the splendour of light, and the movement of crowds. Science and art multiplying the forces of nature, and perfecting the work of men's hands, are enabling them to produce, in ever-increasing numbers and variety, a multitude of objects hitherto unknown, and now largely dispersed even among the lowest classes of the people. Railways, steamers, and the electric telegraph have almost annihilated distance, and have drawn all countries, people, and things together. Our space does not permit us to offer the reader an exact and minute description of the achievements of progress in these directions. All this is strictly true, but it is also no less true that public and private habits are declining farther from rectitude every day. The ties of domestic life are relaxed, youth is emancipated from all restraint, the people are becoming insubordinate, the press is becoming blasphemous, the universities themselves are teachers of irreligion and materialism. What other age of the world has counted so many theories,

so many suicides, so many assassins, so many prostitutes, so many persons convicted of every kind of crime as ours ?

Science cries aloud, and vaunts herself,—and with reason ! But what has she achieved in the end ? She has multiplied the means of destroying men. Needle-guns, cannon of calibre to exterminate masses of troops wholesale, *mitrailleuses*, torpedos, a perfect system of mining, and many other inventions to destroy life in enormous numbers. The institutions of civil liberty cry aloud, and vaunt themselves ! In what have they resulted ? In forcing every man, without distinction, to be a soldier for nearly forty years of his life, that is to say for more than the best half of it. So that in a short time, the great cities will be merely huge barracks, under the gentle yoke of a military despotism, and with the peaceful and becoming manners of the camp.

But, to avoid tedium, let us place before our readers, in one short statement, the miserable condition into which the moral order of society has fallen. Let us take the Satanical sect called the *International*, the latest product of modern times. This association, through the evil diligence of the wicked, and the lamentable negligence of the good, has now overrun almost all the countries of the old and the new world. What is its scope ? What does it propose ? Nothing less than the annulment of all religion, anarchy, the dissolution even of family relations and obligations. In other words, the disruption of society, the return of man to the condition of the brute. A sect inspired by such ferocious intentions, and which finds everywhere numerous followers, and but feeble resistance, shows plainly that ruin is at the heart of modern institutions, and that, unless Almighty God interpose miraculously, society is rushing to a catastrophe still more tremendous than that to which the ancient Empire of Rome was dragged by the hands of the barbarians. We cannot even flatter ourselves that the danger is remote, when we see that the infamous faction have obtained a tremendous, though temporary, triumph in the first capital of Europe. The Commune of Paris, which for nearly two months was sufficiently powerful to tyrannize over nearly two millions of citizens, who partly connived, but were partly debased by terror, and which, at its pleasure despoiled the possessors of property, murdered innocent men, and burned down the fairest portion of that celebrated metropolis, is an event which we must admit furnishes the proof of facts to our belief that the moral conscience of the peoples is profoundly corrupted, and that society is on the brink of a precipice.

If we look for the root of this social corruption, we shall easily discover that it is the perversion of intellect. In former times also there were private and social sins, but they were the result of impetuous passions, and of undisciplined will, and the general mind remained sane. Now men sin through the depravation of their intellect. The thought of man is corrupted, and works in the darkness of error. Ideas are thoroughly vitiated in all that relates to morality, right, justice, the relations between man and man, between peoples and peoples. All this ruin has proceeded from the iniquitous abandonment of the laws of God, and of him who is their promulgator to mankind. *Non est veritas . . . non est scientia Dei in terra. . . . Propter hoc lugebit terra, infirmabitur omnis qui habitat in ea.*

Armies of every kind will inundate the earth like a loosened deluge, and exterminating, aimless wars become the law of the nations. *Maledictum et mendacium et homicidium et furtum inundaverunt, et sanguis sanguinem tetigit.* To so base an end, as indeed is fitting, tends the insolence of human reason, which has risen in rebellion against God.

The Vatican Council, assembled in order to repair all these evils, under the direction of the Holy Spirit, had touched with unerring finger the gaping wound of our days, and prescribed the true means of healing it.

After having by its first Constitution *De Fide*, led human reason once more on the right path, restricted it within its just limits, and made anew its submission to God, the Council passed on in its second Constitution *De Romano Pontifice*, to establish by the definition of Papal Infallibility, the unerring organ, always in action, by which God rules and guides that reason. Thus the Council defined the true remedy, the healing of the human intellect, lifting up before the eyes of all men that lamp which has been lighted by God Himself, that it may give light to all who are in the house. *Ut luceat omnibus qui in domo sunt.* The Roman Pontiff is the faithful echo of the Divine word. He is the mouth by which God speaks audibly to us. *Ab antiquis diebus Deus in nobis elegit per os meum audire Gentes verbum Evangelii et credere.* Thus Saint Peter defines his mission and that of his successors. Ecumenical Councils cannot be always in session, and are exposed to many obstacles. A palpable argument is the most recent, that of this very Vatican Council, which has been suspended for more than a year, and whose reassembling no man can predict, and God only knows. The judgment of the dispersed Church is most difficult to obtain, and is subject to numberless cavils and objections. The true legislation, unfailing, and ready in every emergency, in all circumstances, is that which Christ has established in the person of His Vicar. But this authority, if not irresistibly declared to be infallible, could not fully produce the effect for which it was ordained. We have a proof of this in the *Syllabus*, promulgated before the definition of the Papal Infallibility, to which many Catholics refused to give their assent only because they did not see that it was pronounced by lips whose utterances none may resist without falling, *ipso facto*, into open heresy.

The disease of our society is error. The medicine cannot come from the philosophers; it cannot be administered by the science of man. Philosophers, and the science of men, by their rebellion against God, have produced it. The cure must be worked by faith which takes possession of the soul and the knowledge of God, which enlightens the mind. But, for their affliction, these sovereign remedies, faith and knowledge, require a promulgator and an interpreter, always at work, and to whom dissent cannot oppose itself. This is the meaning of Papal Infallibility. Therefore, the definition of the dogma was the only valid method of curing the disease of society, and of leading it back into the ways of truth and light.

Hence, all sincere Catholics have hailed the dogma with joy, as the herald-star of peace and life. By it, the teacher of righteousness has been solemnly proclaimed and proposed to the people, in an irresistible fashion. All the errors of the human intellect must inevitably succumb to the thunder of that voice: "Sons of Zion, rejoice and be glad in the Lord your God, for He has

given you the Teacher of Righteousness." These grand words of the prophet Joel have been spoken again by the mouths of the faithful. Now, would it not have been natural to suppose that so great a benefit would have been understood and rejoiced in by secular Governments; that they would have conceived it their bounden duty, in virtue of the charge of the interests of society confided to them, to welcome and support the aid thus afforded them by Divine Providence, in their task of saving their people from the ruin which is evidently coming upon them? They did nothing of the kind. Certain Governments received the definition with ill-concealed dislike, and others set themselves at once in open opposition to it. Austria made a pretext of it for the disruption of the Concordat with the Holy See. Bavaria extended special favour to all the contumacious spirits, inflated with pride, and devoid of true wisdom, and traversed in every possible way the promulgation of the health-giving dogma. Prussia behaved still worse; in addition to favouring the obstinate rebels, she laid a cruel hand, which had already oppressed them heavily, upon the clergy, and the liberty of her Catholic subjects. Let us not speak of Italy. The least of her evil deeds was the loosing against the Church, and hounding them on, her ministers, her deputies, and her journalists.

Let us admire the wisdom of statesmen! Society, committed to their care, is wounded even unto death. The efficacious cure whereby it may be restored is the dogma of Papal Infallibility. This dogma is sent to them from heaven, and they blindly reject it, and make every conceivable effort to render it null and ineffectual. *Lux venit in mundum, sed dilexerunt homines magis tenebras quam lucem.* We need not, surely, demonstrate the stupid folly of such conduct.

Their want of understanding is no less evident, if we consider the motives which they assign for their enmity. They say that if the Pontiff is infallible, it results that the right, exercised by many Popes, of deposing sovereigns, and absolving subjects from their allegiance, must be recognized. But, in the first place, if this argument were valid against the infallibility of the Pope, it would necessarily be also valid against the infallibility of Œcumenical Councils. The first general council of Lyons, convoked by Innocent III. chiefly in order to examine the cause of Frederic II., formally deposed that perfidious emperor. According, therefore, to those much-extolled politicians, neither the Pontiffs nor the Councils are to be infallible; and the Church of God, deprived of its fundamental prerogative, shall remain exposed to the powers of hell, whose "gates" shall "prevail against it."

Beyond this, however, we find that, with the sole exception of the Gallicans, who, of late have dwindled down to very insignificant numbers, the whole Church of God has always firmly believed in the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, in all that regards Faith and Morals. The records of all the sectional and provincial councils of France, Germany, Hungary, England, and America afford proof of this, having all been collected a short time before the Vatican Council, and all attesting unanimously the common belief in the Pontifical Infallibility. Nevertheless, no one ever supposed that such a belief was injurious to the authority of secular princes. Now, how does it happen that that which was held to be innocuous to the civil power for the

space of nineteen centuries, should, all of a sudden in 1870, become dangerous, because it is defined by the Vatican Council.

But Pope Pius IX. exposed this pretended ignorance, which was really malice, sheltering itself under a pretended confusion respecting, first, the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, and secondly, concerning the condition of the present time and that of past ages. In replying to an address from the deputation from the Academia of the Catholic religion, he alluded to the attempts which were being made to falsify the ideal of *Pontifical Infallibility*, in order to create dissensions between the Church and the State, and he spoke in the following terms, as reported in the *Voce della Verità*, No. 85, of the 22nd July :—" Among other errors, none is more malicious and harmful than that which pretends to include *the right to depose sovereigns, and to absolve subjects from their allegiance*. This right was indeed, in former times, in supreme emergencies, exercised by the Pontiffs, but it had nothing whatever to do with *Papal Infallibility*. The origin of that right did not exist in the *Infallibility* of the Pontiff, but in his *Authority*. According to the public right then existing, and by the common consent of all Christian nations, the Pope was acknowledged as the supreme judge of Christendom, his rule extending over all princes and states. The present condition of countries is entirely different, and only a malicious intention could lead to a confusion of *things and times* so essentially distinct, implied in the assertion that an infallible judgment upon a principle of revelation has any affinity with a right, which the Popes, called to do so by the voice of the peoples, were bound to exercise when the common good demanded it."

As we have not seen any rectification of this narrative in the *Giornale*, we may fairly suppose that it is correct, and that it contains, if not the express words, at least the substantial meaning of the Pontiff's reply. It seems evident to us, then, that concerning the right, so loudly called in question by these politicians, there are two things to be distinguished,—first, its origin ; and secondly, the cause by which in former times its exercise was rendered useful, and reasonable. As to the first of these, the Pontiff has expressly told us that it existed, not in the *infallibility*, but in the *authority* of the Pope. And, looking at it candidly, what was the action of this right ? It inflicted a punishment. Now, punishment is the effect of coercing power, and pre-supposes, not infallibility, but authority in the person who wields it. Will any one maintain that the secular judge has no faculty to punish the guilty, because he is not infallible to judge them ? The Popes, then, enjoyed this right, not because they were infallible, but only because they were the supreme rulers of the Church of Christ. In fact, the first authors of Gallicanism, Gerson, Pietro d'Ailly, John of Paris, John Major, Almain, and others, denied Papal Infallibility ; but yet recognized the right of the Pontiff to judge and punish princes for the abuse of their civil power. It will be sufficient to quote the words of the most famous among them, in support of this assertion. " All these men," he said, " princes and not princes, are subject to the Pope, in respect of the abuses they commit in their jurisdictions, temporalities, and dominions, against the Divine and Natural Law, and this superiority may be *derived*, and *ordained*, rather than political."

In truth, the Pontiffs never exercised this right on any other principle.

Let us recall the words of Innocent IV., in the sentence fulminated against Frederic II. After the Holy Father had enumerated the crimes of the contumacious Emperor, he continued : " Upon all these excesses, and many others, we have deliberated, with our brethren the cardinals and with the most Sacred Council, filling, as we do, however unworthy, the place of Jesus Christ upon the earth, and having been told by Him, in the person of the Blessed Apostle Peter, ' Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven,'—We therefore declare that the said prince, who has proved himself unworthy of the Empire and of the regal charge, in short of any honour and dignity whatsoever, is for his crimes and iniquities rejected of God, and shall be henceforth, neither emperor nor king. We declare and pronounce him tied and bound by his sins, rejected by God, and deprived of all honour and dignity from the Lord ; of all which we deprive him by our sentence, absolving for ever from their oaths all those who have sworn fealty to him, and strictly prohibiting by our *Apostolic Authority*, that any shall henceforth render obedience to him, as emperor or as king, or regard him as such ; and decreeing that any who shall henceforth give him counsel, or succour, in this quality, shall be *ipso facto* excommunicate."

It is plain that in this there is no sign of infallibility, but solely of the authority granted to St. Peter and his successors by Jesus Christ. The power of the keys, the faculty of binding and loosing, according to the exigencies of the welfare of the Church and of the nations, is equivalent to the right proper to every supreme ruler of a society, and the security of those who have recourse to him.

The Great Pontiff, St. Gregory VII., expressed the same truth in the sentences by which he first suspended, and afterwards definitively deposed, Henry IV. from the throne of Germany. Here are the words of the first : " By no worldly counsel, but for the health and the honour of the Church, I, the lawful Pontiff, and true lieutenant of God, excommunicate, in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, Henry, Emperor of the Romans, an impious man, who with unheard of pride oppresses and persecutes the Church,—I interdict him from the government of the German kingdom and that of Italy ; I release all Christians from all such oaths as they have taken, or may take to him, and I forbid each and all henceforward to obey him as a king." Afterwards, when it came to the formal deposition of this perfidious prince, he stood up, in the midst of the numerous Council assembled around him, and, having invoked the Divine assistance, and that of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, and enumerated the crimes of Henry, he spoke thus : " In the name of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, of the Virgin Mary, Mother of God, of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, pastors of the Catholic Church, I, Gregory, Vicar of Christ, excommunicate Henry, called king : I interdict him the kingdom of Germany and Italy ; I strip him of the Sovereign dignity ; I prohibit all who profess the Catholic faith to obey him as their Lord ; I liberate all Germans, Italians, and foreigners from the oaths of allegiance to him which they have taken or may take ; and I curse his arms, and the arms of his soldiers. Do you, O Holy Apostles, sanction my words !"

Again, in this instance, it is plain that there was no question of infallibility, but solely of the authority of the Pontiff, and lieutenantcy of God.

With respect to the second of those things which we have indicated, *i.e.* the causes which in past times operated so as to render the exercise of the Pope's right reasonable and useful, Pius IX. has justly assigned it, in the discourse attributed to him, to the public custom of those times, in which Christian nations, by common consent, recognized in the Pontiff the supreme guide of princes and of peoples in civil affairs. In the uncertainty and mobility of rights under the feudal order, in the partly hereditary, partly elective system of succession to thrones, in the frequent and continuous conflicts between lords and vassals, between governors and governed, in the easy exorbitance of power, and its ill-defined distribution, Europe would never have come out of barbarism, would never have attained to any elevated grade of civil life, if a power, revered by all men as divine, and whose sole force was moral, had not assumed a real supremacy over the social orders, in respect to civil and political interests. The very instinct of self-preservation and the love of life itself impelled princes and people to place themselves spontaneously under this supreme jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, even in matters which concerned the purely temporal order. Thus, in the *Diritto Germanico* we find the affirmation and recognition that the material sword of political power is a derivation from the power of Christ, conferred on St. Peter and his successors. This is expressed in the following words :—"The Prince of Peace, recalled by God, before He ascended into heaven, left to us below two swords for the defence of Christianity, and committed them both to St. Peter. One is the sword of secular, the other that of ecclesiastical justice. The sword of secular justice has been given by the Pope to the Emperor. But the sword of ecclesiastical justice the Pope has reserved for himself, so that he may do justice in due season, mounted upon his white war-horse, and the Emperor shall hold the stirrup for the Pope, so that his saddle may not be shaken, which signifies, that if any shall resist the Pope, so that he cannot compel them by his ecclesiastical judgments, the Emperor, and all other secular princes and judges as well, shall constrain them by their proscription." In such a condition of things, it is plain to the perception of all, that the exercise of the right to punish princes, rebels to God and the Church, was most beneficial to the people, and acted as a curb to political power, when, as was but too frequently the case, it degenerated into tyranny, and that, if it sometimes, in consequence of the resistance of the guilty, produced violent social shocks, this evil was very much slighter than those which would otherwise have befallen human society, and was easily remedied by the submission of the obedient to the voice of the Supreme Pastor.

But, in the present age, this state of things has ceased to exist. The heresy of Luther has destroyed the unity of Christendom. Little by little, Governments have withdrawn themselves entirely from the paternal arbitration of the Popes, and have chosen rather to decide their destinies on the battle-field. Princes, though they do not run the risk of becoming tyrants, have lost all real authority, and have become the laughing-stock of the tumultuous multitude, or of those who claim to represent it. Pope Pius IX. said truly, in the discourse which we have already quoted, that "to recall in

these times the right of deposing sovereigns, once exercised by the Holy See, is to revive an idea of which no one thinks, and less than any the Sovereign Pontiff."

Another indication of the absence of wisdom in the politicians of whom we are speaking, is the frivolity of this pretext, showing their complete ignorance of the changed conditions of modern society. Would to God the princes of our time were in no danger of deposition except on the part of the Pope! They might sleep tranquilly, to quote the old saying, "on both their ears." But the danger they are in at present comes to them from a very different quarter, and has nothing of the paternal element in it leading the father to punish the son, with bitter grief, and only when he has vainly tried every resource of gentleness and love. In eight lustres we have seen at least a dozen princes turned adrift, a greater number than were deposed by the Popes in eight centuries. Who turned these princes off their thrones? The rabble; for it is on them the right of judging and discrowning princes has devolved. And what has made the rabble so arrogant and so rebellious? The idea of the sovereignty of the people, absolute and inalienable; the principles of unchecked liberty and independence which have been diffused, and are more and more widely diffused every day among the ignorant multitude; the negation of all social order, and of all legitimate rule, which is gaining ground rapidly in the hearts and minds of the peoples. These are the influences which are shaking every throne, and our politicians ought to meditate deeply upon them, if there be any true zeal in them for the cause of their own sovereigns. Instead of doing so they are taking fright at Papal Infallibility! These imprudent men do not understand that that very Infallibility is the only invulnerable shield which, in this day, could be spread over the sovereignty of which they are so jealous. In No. LXIII. of the Syllabus, Pope Pius IX. has condemned the following proposition: "That it is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, and to rebel against them." This condemnation sweeps over the entire tribes of revolutionaries which at present menace the authority of sovereigns on all sides. What assistance would it not lend to the secure maintenance of authority if the voice which has promulgated such a condemnation were universally acknowledged to be infallible! Where could an arm more powerful to strike down the converse error be found, and to reform human society by reforming intellect, than that which lent to human society its normal form, and beginning? Let us see, then, whether we are not right in accusing the politicians who oppose this dogma of consummate want of wisdom.

Their senselessness surpasses the bounds of credibility, if we consider the absurdity of the aim which they propose to themselves. What do they expect will be the result of this contention? The retraction of the dogma of Papal Infallibility? A more utterly foolish notion could not possibly be conceived. The formula, in which the solemn definitions of the Church are expressed, was decreed by the Apostles in their own first Council, the type and the model of all which were to follow: *Visum est Spiritui Sancto et Nobis*. The sentence pronounced by the Fathers is first pronounced by the Holy Spirit. They do but repeat its meaning in sensible form. A Council which should retract its definitions or decrees must acknowledge

that the Holy Spirit has retracted, and confessed error. What would you think, readers, of such an hypothesis? There are no madmen in our asylums mad enough to believe the thing possible. If recourse should be had to the miserable subterfuge that the Vatican Council was not free, then—laying aside every other answer to the assertion—the Fathers of the Council themselves would condemn the foolish calumny, making solemn declaration in public, with one voice, that the Council had enjoyed full and absolute liberty.

On this head, then, the war waged against the dogma of Papal Infallibility is utterly vain. The opposition, feeling that the dogma was about to be defined, might have fairly endeavoured to dissuade the Fathers from this act. But when it was accomplished, they must, at any cost, bow to the decision. The act is irrevocable, whoever does not assent to it declares himself by the fact a heretic. The Council itself has pronounced the anathema against recalcitrants.

And, here, we cannot refrain from admiring the exalted wisdom of God—in so graciously disposing the means, having willed the end. The politicians, though they, at the commencement, might have offered an effectual resistance to the definition of the dogma, put it out of their own power to do so. Their declaration that they would not intervene at the Council, rekindled the principle, which was growing cold, of separation between Church and State. If they had intervened, their resistance must necessarily have had very considerable weight in the deliberations of the Fathers, and perhaps their reluctance to alienate friendly powers, their desire to keep unbroken the links of amity between the Priesthood and the Empire, might have induced the Council to postpone to a more convenient opportunity this great step. But the resolution of the European statesmen to hold themselves aloof, and refrain entirely from all participation in the proceedings of the Council, cut the ground from under their own feet. They could not, then, without a manifest self-contradiction come forward with their veto, and they were constrained to adopt a simple course of indirect opposition, which was merely ignored. The iniquitous maxim of the separation of the Church from the State, proved on this occasion a most useful relief to the Church, and it appears from this that God especially intended the convocation of the Vatican Council. Thus God *ludit in orbe terrarum*, and changed evil into good.

It being quite clear that the definition of Papal Infallibility cannot be withdrawn, what aim can the political opposition to it have? No other, in truth, than to inflict suffering on the Church, in childish vengeance, by exciting all her disloyal and proud children to revolt against her. But this design is, in the first place, eminently contemptible; and, in the second, the Church is well used to suffering, and by suffering her strength is refreshed and increased. For her every fresh combat is a new triumph. Again, this opposition cannot boast of novelty. Every dogmatic definition of the Church has had to encounter the same, beginning with the first Council of Nicea, by which the divinity of the Word was defined, and proceeding, step by step, to the decisions of the Tridentine Synod. Was it to be supposed that the dogma of Pontifical Infallibility would meet with less resistance? Certainly not. It is in nowise wonderful that it has been opposed, and we

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must not think too much of the opposition. For, after all, to what issue is it tending? The opposers, in a few years, shall have descended into the tomb, and received at the hands of the Great Judge the condemnation of their guilt, and the dogma will remain for ever immortal, and shining all the more brightly for the conflict.

But this is also clear, that politicians, by their obstinate opposition, have involuntarily supported the position taken by the Church, and gravely ignored the cause which they desire to serve. They are fostering the strength of the enemies of civil society, and they are alienating from themselves the Catholic party, who could afford them precisely the support on which they ought to rely. The antisocial war which is raging at present is directed against the very principle of authority. Thus, every wound which is dealt to such a principle is a growing breach, open to the daring of their adversaries, and facilitates the assault. Now, no more deadly wound can be inflicted upon the principle of authority than the promotion of rebellion against the most venerated of all authorities, the authority of the Catholic Church, the origin and example of every other authority upon earth.

In this war, therefore, the boldest and most persistent combatants must necessarily be the Catholics, for whom the principle of authority is the base and rule of their belief. Now is it possible that Catholics can love a Government which persecutes their mother and offends the most sensitive feelings of their souls,—the religious conscience? How can they do aught but hate such a Government; and in place of succouring it with all their might, do what they can to secure its prompt overthrow? This is the fruit which the politicians will have to gather from the tree of their insensate planting,—the destruction of that same civil authority, which they use as the pretext of their strife with their Church. We are not misinterpreting the signs of the times, when we say that those politicians, under the semblance of being friends of monarchy, are, on the contrary, most active in undermining the thrones of Europe, and their worst enemies.

Notices of Books.

Irish University Education. Speech of Sir Rowland Blennerhasset, Bart., M.P., on the Debate on the second Reading of Mr. Fawcett's Bill, Aug. 2, 1871. London : Ridgway.

WE have read this speech with the greatest pleasure. The speaker has studied his subject, and moreover shows that he shares the feelings in which the Irish people are unanimous, although unhappily they are only too rare among the representatives to whom they have committed the office of speaking for them. Sir Rowland opposed Mr. Fawcett's Bill, first because there was no possibility of its being carried this year, and therefore to carry the second reading would, at best, be only the declaration of an abstract principle ; next because the Bill itself was "eminently unsatisfactory, crude in conception, and loosely drawn." And then he says admirably,—

"It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of this question. The establishment of proper University education for Ireland is one of the most serious subjects for the consideration of statesmen and politicians. Nothing tends more to the formation of a sound public opinion in a nation than a system of higher education suited to the traditions, circumstances, and wishes of the people. Nothing is more needed in a country than sound public opinion ; nothing in Ireland is more conspicuous by its absence. Great fault is often found with the violent tone of Irish newspapers ; and I regret that Parliament has passed laws which in some degree tend to interfere with the liberty of the Press. It would have been wiser, instead of taking those measures of repression, which cannot last long, to have established a system of higher education, to counteract whatever was unhealthy in the influence of journalism. In Ireland the power of the Press has become nearly unlimited by the fact that day after day every passion, every illusion of the hour, every national, social, and religious prejudice finds there its organ. It fosters at the same time a half-education which is extremely injurious to precision of thought, and in the interest of knowledge a solid and trustworthy bulwark is required to resist it. The most effectual means to control the power of the Press, and to counteract anything which may be unhealthy in its influence, is by the authority of a University worthy to be considered the highest court of appeal for the intellectual forces of the nation. A national University ought to be the guardian of true scientific tradition, the home of prudent and regular investigation. It should rule and correct opinion, and lead it back when wrong into the right course. A great political philosopher once said that if he were given the making of a nation's ballads he cared not who made its laws. The power once possessed by popular poetry is now exercised by general literature. That literature must needs be influenced by a great Uni-

versity, as it, in its turn, cannot fail to shape and fashion the ideas out of which laws and political systems grow" (p. 6).

There was probably no one member of the House of Commons whose feelings and sympathies did not go heartily with the speaker so far. A really first-class University education accessible to all Irishmen would be the most valuable of all remedies for the remaining ills of Ireland. The only difficulty is that different views are taken by the immense majority of Irishmen on the one side, and by a large majority of English and Scotchmen on the other side, as to what a really good University for Ireland must be. The great mass of the Irish believe that to be really useful University education for Catholics must be founded upon the Catholic religion. The majority of English and Scotchmen sincerely believe that the one thing that would benefit Ireland is to make its people less Catholic. Protestants they have almost left off hoping to make them; but they feel, most truly, that there is a great deal that may be done to the end that while continuing to call themselves Catholics they may be brought into a state of indifference, in which the Catholic religion will have no practical influence upon their hearts and conduct,—nay, in which they would feel that although they called themselves Catholics because their fathers did so before them, there was no real and important difference between themselves and those who do not so call themselves. And this state of indifference they believe (and very truly) is in no way so likely to be brought about as by mixed education, and especially mixed University education.

On the other hand, the Irish people agreeing with them in believing that nothing is so likely to foster religious indifference as this mixed education, differ from them in believing that religious indifference is at all times the most deadly moral pestilence that can affect any nation nominally Christian; and moreover, that it is so especially the evil and danger of the present day, that the least contact with it is now to be avoided as a mortal infected.

The great question between England and Ireland at the present moment is whether the education of the Irish people is to be regulated in accordance with the English idea on this subject or with the Irish. Of course Englishmen do not say, in so many words, that their object is to lead the people of Ireland to religious indifference. They express the same meaning in other words. They wish get rid of "bigotry," "religious animosities," and the like. But this change of words makes no real difference in the thing signified. Religious indifference is what they really wish to produce, and what the Irish desire to guard against. The Irish and they are quite of one mind in thinking that it will be produced by "mixed education." The only question is whether the public education of Ireland is to be adapted to foster or to guard against it.

In truth, there is no real difference between the motives of very many English Members of Parliament in what they are saying and doing about Irish education in the present day, and the motives which led to the persecution of Irish Catholics in times past. Neither now nor then did English legislators wish to make Ireland miserable. On the contrary, the authors of the penal laws believed that the one thing needful to the happiness of Ireland

was that it should be Protestantized. The present advocates of mixed education really believe that the one thing needful is that, whether it retains the Catholic name or not, it should be practically indifferent about religion. The happiness of Ireland has been and is the motive of both. The fault of both is, that they are resolved that Ireland shall be happy in their way, and not in her own.

No doubt, we individually feel the injustice of the common English demand far more keenly, because we know, as certainly as we know that God is in Heaven, that the Irish are right, and the English in deadly error in their feelings about religious indifference. But not to enter on this, we ask Mr. Gladstone, who asked the other day at Aberdeen what the Irish had to complain of,—we ask any fair man, whether it is not a monstrous injustice that a system of education, which the great mass of Irish people from the very bottom of their souls believe will be fatal to the temporal peace and prosperity of their country in times to come, and also destructive to the souls of their children, should be forced upon Ireland against her will, only because the majority of English politicians believe that it will promote her welfare?

And this is really the question which Parliament has now to decide. Shall this thing be done or not? We can only say that the writer of this notice (though himself an Englishman to the backbone), and all who feel with him, are prepared to maintain that, if Ireland is to be legislated for on these principles by the British Parliament, then there is no one consideration which ought to reconcile any Irishman to the rule of the British Parliament even for a single day, except that which would reconcile him equally to every tyranny which ever existed on earth, namely, that he thinks it hopeless to resist it. That is, the government of Ireland by the united Parliament would in that case become merely the government of the weaker by the stronger, because he is not able to resist. The question is, whether this is what English statesmen wish to be the future relation of Ireland to England?

Sir Rowland Blennerhasset says :—

“What we want in Ireland is a system of national university education, which, by taking into account the religious convictions of the nation and the claims of science, shall elevate the intellectual vision without wounding the religious sentiment of the Irish people (p. 7).

“A large section of the Irish people have objected to the present Queen's University and Queen's College, both on religious and on educational grounds. The sincerity and strength of their convictions have been attested by the subscription of £7,000 or £8,000 a year, till the total sum collected has exceeded £150,000, for the establishment of an organ of university teaching in harmony with them. The House, if it reads this Bill a second time, will meet the complaints of the Irish Catholics against the existing three Queen's Colleges by merely asserting that it is desirable to form a fourth. Such a course would only tend to increase the number, and confirm the opinion, of those in Ireland, who do not consider it safe to trust their interests to the Imperial Parliament” (p. 4).

Of Mr. Fawcett's Bill he pronounces—

“As to the scheme proposed by this Bill, it can only be regarded as illusory. The teaching body of Trinity is well and densely filled. A crowd of

candidates, well prepared, have been ready for every opening; and will, of course, still be ready. It is not pretended that there is equality in the preliminary conditions of Catholic and Protestant aspirants to the teaching office. Catholic teachers, it appears to me, might hope to be introduced in the ordinary state of things, at the Greek Kalends. A generation ago Trinity was open to Catholic students, and the result has been failure. A generation ago Catholics were eligible for professorships, and there is but one member of the professional body a Catholic at the present moment. A generation hence, if we were to be content with the honourable gentleman's plan, the same spectacle could be seen. This measure moreover would, if passed, only lead to further agitation. All Catholics intended for the priesthood would be, by the force of circumstances, shut out from university life. All Catholic lay students in clerical schools would be restrained from going to the college. The measure would not, certainly, be approved of in the Queen's Colleges. As seats of the secular system, they would clearly fare ill in competition with undogmatic Trinity; and despite all that has been said, I persist in thinking that the scheme is not really congenial with the sentiments of Trinity itself" (p. 13).

The City of God. Translated by the Rev. MARCUS DODS, M.A. Two volumes. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1871.

The Origin of the Two Cities, Heavenly and Earthly; being Books XI., XII., XIII., XIV. of S. Augustine's treatise "De Civitate Dei." Translated by the Rev. T. A. WALKER, M.A. London: Longmans, 1871.

WE have here two translations of the great treatise of S. Augustine, the "De Civitate Dei," the former being a translation of the whole treatise, the latter, of only above one-fifth of it. The first work, forming two handsome volumes, is a sort of sequel to the well-known "Ante-Nicene Library" of Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh. The collection of translations that has been published under this name now reaches eighteen volumes, and we perceive that six more will be published this year, and will complete the series. The two volumes now before us are the first volumes of a translation of the works of S. Augustine, and also, apparently, the beginning of a new series—a series of Post-Nicene translations. When we recall that the same publishers have had in hand, since 1864 up to the present year, another series of translations, which they have called their "Foreign Theological Library," and which consists entirely of modern works translated from the German, and that they have been issuing these at the rate of four volumes a year, it is impossible not to admire their spirit and enterprise. Of course, from a theological point of view, the attempt to translate such writers as S. Clement, S. Ignatius, and S. Cyprian was a very different matter from undertaking to render Keil and Delitzsch. And the theological antecedents of one at least of the editors of the Ante-Nicene series were not such as to re-assure a Catholic. Any one who knows Dr. Donaldson's "Early Christian Literature and Doctrine" must know what to expect from

him in an attempt to translate a Father of the first centuries. Such opinions as are signified in the use of "overseers" and "servants," for "bishops" and "deacons," and in the almost ludicrous attempts to "resolve" the miraculous features of a narrative into merely natural occurrences (see Dr. Donaldson on "Clemens Romanus" and "Polycarp") are sufficient to warn us of the small respect for Churches or traditions which will characterize whatever Dr. Donaldson has to do with. Still, with this drawback, which, when once known, is not difficult for each reader to remedy for himself, we cannot but think that the translations of the works of the early Fathers will be found most useful to a great many readers, and in the long run very advantageous to Catholic truth.

The "De Civitate Dei" of S. Augustine has been the most popular of the great Doctor's works, with the exception of the "Confessions." His contemporaries were taken by surprise when they found what had been occupying his wonderful mind for more than a dozen years. Cassiodorus, in later years, writing in the interest of these monastic studies of which he was for so long a time the legislator, recommends it to be read "infatidibili sedulitate," with unwearying diligence. Charlemagne is related to have taken delight in it, and Charles V. to have handsomely rewarded the man who translated it into French and dedicated it to him. Mr. Dods mentions, in his interesting preface, that no fewer than twenty editions were called for between 1467 and 1600—a fresh edition every eighteen months. He attributes this popularity, mainly to "the great variety of ideas, opinions, and facts that are here brought before the reader's mind" (Pref. xiii.) For our part, we are rather disposed to ascribe it to its character of a summary than to that of an encyclopædia. S. Augustine's treatise is, among other things, a compendium of Bible History, of Roman history, and of Greek and Roman philosophy. Such a summary exactly suited the convent library of the Middle Ages, the busy gentleman of the *renaissance*, the hard-worked minister or sovereign; and such a summary done by the hand of the great S. Augustine would be doubly acceptable. Its extreme discursiveness and variety of matter would rather have tended to make it neglected than otherwise, and accordingly we find that, in modern times, when manuals are more readily accessible, and when S. Augustine's own breadth of view has been reproduced by writers who are more or less indebted to him for their inspiration, its popularity with mere readers has not stood its ground. And we find that a certain class of scholars has uniformly depreciated the "De Civitate Dei." We refer to that school of learned men which flourished in the seventeenth century—men of whom Huet and Dupin may be cited as specimens—who had more learning than æsthetical insight, and more critical power than real taste. Huet calls the treatise "gold in bars and ingots." Doubtless S. Augustine was not a master of what is now called "form." He would as soon have thought of dividing his homilies into three points and a conclusion, as of working out a treatise on a synopsis or skeleton. But while we admit this, we must distinguish between formlessness and deformity. The early Fathers are generally formless. S. Chrysostom's homilies, S. Gregory Nazianzen's great discourses, S. Ambrose's moral treatises, would be very hard to analyze and bracket. But if they have no

pattern, they have a beauty of form like nature has, a beauty which is the result of endless variety, contrasted yet harmonious colouring, light, shade, and infinite richness of material. S. Chrysostom, compared with Massillon, is as a tropical forest to a landscape garden. And large-minded taste ought to be able to appreciate both. The "*De Civitate Dei*" should not be compared to bars and ingots of gold. If there is any undiscovered land where gold encrusts the rocks and hangs in stalactites from the roofs of stupendous caverns, S. Augustine's richness and grandeur may there find a similitude.

Like all *epoch-making* works, there are two elements in the "*De Civitate Dei*." There is first that special character which it bears from the very fact that it does start a new era. No one but a genius could have made it what it is, yet every one of its imitators may find it easy to surpass it; just as the first locomotive steam-engine is at once the greatest triumph of its maker and the rudest of all locomotives. In the words of Ozanam, it is the first outline or sketch of a philosophy of history.*

"Rome having been stormed" (we are quoting Mr. Dods's translation of S. Augustine's own words in the second book of his '*Retractationes*,' c. 43), "and sacked by the Goths under Alaric their king (A.D. 410), the worshippers of false gods, or Pagans, as we commonly call them, made attempt to attribute this calamity to the Christian religion, and began to blaspheme the true God with even more than their wonted bitterness and acerbity. It was this which kindled my *zeal for the house of God*, and prompted me to undertake the defence of the City of God against the charges and misrepresentations of its assailants. This work was in my hands for several years, owing to the interruptions occasioned by many other affairs which had a prior claim on my attention, and which I could not defer. However, this great undertaking was at last completed in twenty-two books. Of these the first five refute those who fancy that the polytheistic worship is necessary in order to secure worldly prosperity, and that all these overwhelming calamities have befallen us in consequence of its prohibition. In the following five books I address myself to those who admit such calamities have at all times attended, and will at all times attend, the human race, and that they constantly recur in forms more or less disastrous, varying only in the scenes, occasions, and persons on whom they light, but, while admitting this, maintain that the worship of the gods is advantageous for the life to come. In these ten books, then, I refute these two opinions, which are as groundless as they are antagonistic to the Christian religion.

"But that no one might have occasion to say, that though I had refuted the tenets of other men, I had omitted to establish my own, I devote to this object the second part of this work, which comprises twelve books, although I have not scrupled, as occasion offered, either to advance my own opinions in the first ten books, or to demolish the arguments of my opponents in the last twelve. Of these twelve books the first four contain an account of the origin of these two cities—the city of God and the city of the world. The second four treat of their history or progress; the third and last four, of their deserved destinies. And so, though all these twenty-two books refer to both cities, yet I have named them after the better city, and called them the City of God."†

* "*La Civilisation au 5ième Siècle*," i. 97.

† Editor's Preface, vii. viii.

Thus the "De Civitate Dei" is an apology for Christianity on the grandest scale. Former apologies had been addressed to emperors or judges, and had confined themselves to a brief treatment of those smaller issues that the Pagans, in their power, could be persuaded to listen to. The great work of Origen against *Celsus* had vindicated Christianity in its moral and social aspects against heathen morality and theories of society. What had to be done, after the fall of Rome, was to exhibit Christianity as the ruler and guide of the world's history. Christianity was now established, and Paganism was down; but the world was still full of Pagans, and many of them were men of great culture and strong prejudices, which were all the stronger by having at their back the mighty historic traditions of Roman greatness. Only a few years before, S. Ambrose had been forced to resist with all his eloquence a strong attempt made by the Pagan party in the Senate to persuade Valentinian to re-establish the false worship. But the fall of Rome had made the situation a thousand times more impressive, and S. Augustine, with the intuition of genius, is ready to seize the occasion. Once for all the *Jus Christi* was compared with the *Jus Romanum*, and the theory of Christian Europe was sketched out. Christian thought followed the torch of the great African Doctor. Paul Orosius, whose History was inspired by the personal advice of S. Augustine, began that long series of Christian histories that has sometimes offered to the world such a masterpiece as the *Histoire Universelle* of Bossuet. From Orosius to the Abbé Rohrbacher, who avowedly writes on the model of the "De Civitate Dei," sixteen centuries have elapsed, and during them all S. Augustine has been teaching us in the words in which Orosius expresses it (perhaps S. Augustine's own words), "Divinâ providentiâ agitur mundus et homo."

But the "De Civitate Dei" is not merely the first essay in a line in which it has afterwards been surpassed by smaller men. It is also a work whose details are full of the spirit of S. Augustine himself—of his peculiar strength of phrase, his philosophic subtlety, his fitful glowing feeling, and his admirable power of narrative. This is the element in it for which people will read it in these days.

A translation of S. Augustine cannot but read comparatively weak and attenuated. It is like translating Carlyle into Latin; the languages not only have not the same idiom, but they have not even corresponding idioms. But we have no fault to find with Mr. Dods's rendering of the "De Civitate Dei." It is as good as a translation can be, and whilst it is very close and accurate it freely changes the Latin idiom, so that the version is perfectly readable English. We have noticed one or two slips. *Loca martyrum* is not very accurately rendered by "reliquaries." *Ut confitemur, &c.* (l. 191) should not be "in order that we may confess," but "as we confess." There are one or two other little mistakes of this sort here and there, but they are hardly worth mentioning. We observe, also, that Mr. Dods, for some reason or other, has considerably softened the language which S. Augustine applies to Cicero when he is refuting the latter's fatalism, in b. v. c. 9. There is one rather ridiculous blunder towards the end of the book that we can only account for by supposing that Mr. Dods left the passage to the inexperience of some tyro and forgot to look it over. S. Augustine is

relating (b. xxii. c. 8) a striking miracle that occurred at Hippo in his own church and under his own eye. When it began he was outside, in some vestry probably, waiting to come in for service. He enters the church. Mr. Dods continues (ii. 498) : "The church was full, and ringing with shouts of joy—'Thanks be to God! Praised be God!' Every one joining and shouting on all sides, 'I have healed the people,' and then with still louder voice shouting again." This last exclamation, "I have healed the people!" is rather odd. On referring to the original, we find "*Salutavi* populum," and it is at once seen that, instead of being a "shout" of the people, it is simply S. Augustine saying "I *saluted* the people," which he would probably do as he entered the church.

The second work at the head of our notice translates only those four books in which S. Augustine gives the "origin" of the two cities; in other words, a philosophical abstract of Bible history, with a commentary. If any one cares to have a translation of these, he can have what seems a very good one in this volume.

Contemporary Review, August 1871. Article by F. DALGAIRNS on "The Bearing of Infallibility."

THE very striking essay before us is primarily on the *Church's* infallibility, and but secondarily on the Pope's. The former is in fact the truer controversy against Dr. Dollinger and his heretical followers; for their whole position shows, that what they really repudiate is any living and energizing authority which imposes a yoke on their intellectual freedom: and this is also the stand-point of their Protestant sympathizers.

Now as regards rationalists, who have no real affection for Christianity and are only too delighted to rid themselves of one Christian doctrine after another—there is little which a Catholic can directly do for them, except pray that they may be led into a better mind. But there are still in England very many non-Catholics, who abhor rationalism, and who in one shape or other are earnestly seeking for Christian truth: and few Catholic works of charity are more hopeful, than the placing Catholicity before such persons in its true colours and native beauty. Now these are the persons who will be most influenced by Mr. Maurice and his school; and it is against this school accordingly, that F. Dalgairns's arguments are principally directed. Mr. Hutton's recently published volumes have been before him from first to last; and Mr. Hutton in his Preface professes hearty theological allegiance to Mr. Maurice. Now it is not only the *Church's* infallibility which these piously disposed writers repudiate; they are impatient of *all* claims to authoritative and infallible teaching. Mr. Hutton says almost in so many words—not only that all the Apostles except two were practically ignorant of our Blessed Lord's Divine Personality—but that even "His own expressed conviction in the Eternity of His own Life would not and could not be decisive,

without echoes in our own experience" (Dalgairns, pp. 7, 8). Here is a writer, the representative of a school, and himself exhibiting great earnestness combined with signal ability—a convert from Unitarianism to the central truth of Christianity—repudiating as unchristian the very notion of submitting his intellect unreservedly to any superior authority. Never was there a phenomenon appealing more loudly to the thoughtful Catholic's charitable intervention.

F. Dalgairns argues (1) that the Christian religion is dogmatic; and (2) that a superrational dogmatic religion cannot be preserved in its purity, without a living infallible authority. It is the former of these propositions, which Mr. Maurice and Mr. Hutton will most emphatically deny; and indeed they would probably enough admit the latter as undeniably true.

To begin then at the beginning, they deny that Theism itself is dogmatic. Mr. Hutton contrasts "beliefs *about* God" with "belief *in* Him." Would he say then that belief in a non-omniscient Creator is "belief in God"? Of course not. A certain "belief" therefore "about God"—viz. a belief that He is Omniscient—is a necessary part of "belief *in* Him." And the same argument holds concerning all God's other principal attributes successively. When on the other hand Mr. Hutton protests against those, who "affect to express His Essence exhaustively in a number of abstract propositions,"—he is fighting a shadow. No one on earth ever professed this: least of all, any Catholic theologian or philosopher.

In like manner, when Catholics speak of Christianity as a dogmatic religion, nothing can be further from their mind than the notion, that any definitions can exhaustively *express* its dogmata. "A religion of formulas" on the contrary, says F. Dalgairns (p. 8), "can take care of itself. Such a dead thing has only to be engraved on bronze or marble. What I suppose is meant by a formula, is a set of words, which *either has no meaning or pretends to exhaust its subject*." In this sense "never was there a religion less formal than the Christian. While on the one hand it is conveyed in words since it is taught by man to man, on the other no one ever pretended that human words adequately express its depths."

So far then, Theism and Christianity are alike. In either case there is a large body of truths, which (p. 9) is on the one hand intelligible, and yet on the other incomprehensible. This body of truths therefore can on the one hand be partially expressed by propositions, while on the other no number of propositions can adequately represent it.

So much on the agreement between Theism and Christianity: now for the difference between them. "Both contain incomprehensible mysteries: but the difference is, that the being of a God is discoverable by natural reason; while no effort of intellect, backed by the conscience and the moral being of man, can, apart from revelation, prove the Incarnation. Hence the being of God may safely be left to the guardianship of reason" (p. 17): though for our own part we would add, and we are sure F. Dalgairns would not deny, that the dogma of Theism has gained incalculably both in completeness of exposition and in permanency of preservation, by being united with the other verities of the Faith under the Church's infallible magisterium. But the characteristic dogmata of Christianity are such, that human reason neither

could have discovered them nor can prove them when they have been discovered. For our knowledge of them we absolutely depend on an external guide, which shall prove to *us* its authority ; and they will inevitably be corrupted, unless a living infallible authority preserve them. "The Christian religion is from its very perfection most liable to corruption, because, while it cannot be apprehended, it can be understood. On the one hand its incomprehensibility makes it naturally defenceless against human imagination ; on the other hand its intelligible side exposes it to the disintegrating process of the human intellect" (p. 8). "Fling such a faith undefended upon the disputations of men, it is utterly impossible that so powerful a crucible as the intellect of man shall not dissolve it in the passage" (p. 10).

Here then we come to Mr. Maurice's and Mr. Hutton's second mistake : not only they do not account Christianity dogmatic, but they do not account it a revelation. They fall into that error of naturalism, which the Holy See has so emphatically condemned. They really consider that reason alone would suffice to anticipate, or even to prove, the Incarnation. The Incarnation, says Mr. Maurice (Dalgairns, p. 13), "is involved in the very existence of man, in the very order of the universe." In that case, answers F. Dalgairns, it was no free gift at all. And moreover "such a natural correlation between humanity and the Son is sure either to imperil our belief in the real Godhead of the Word, or to remind us painfully of pantheistic theories. Catholics are not the only theologians to accuse Mr. Maurice of pantheism ; and there are some unpleasant symptoms in his language of a belief in the Son's inferiority to the Father" (p. 14).

The doctrine then of infallibility (p. 19)—of a living energizing infallibility—"is not the imposition of a wooden tyranny : but the condition of the existence of any doctrinal Christianity." Had there been no question except of Gallicanism—had all Catholics continued to admit (as some three years ago all did seem to admit) that every Papal *ex cathedrâ* pronouncement is infallible against which the Episcopate puts forth no protest—the case would have been most different from that presented to the Council. But it is precisely a living energizing infallibility, which the recent apostates detest. They hold that there is no infallible judge of controversy whatever, in the interval between one Œcumenical Council and another ; nay, they lay down such fantastic conditions of Œcumenicity, that it may well be doubted whether in their view there has been one infallible definition since the Apostles died. Meanwhile (p. 20) in every part of Catholic Germany naturalism has sprung up in one or other shape ; and these men are really claiming for natural "science the unlimited liberty to speculate on the truths of supernatural religion" (p. 21).

We are particularly glad that F. Dalgairns has devoted such careful attention to Mr. Hutton's essays. That writer exhibits so much love and desire of truth in every word which he says on things religious, that he puts Catholics under a kind of obligation to give him every means they can of arriving at his goal.

The last twelve Verses of the Gospel according to S. Mark vindicated against recent critical objectors. By JOHN W. BURGON, B.D. Oxford: James Parker.

THIS important volume, written by a well-known zealous Anglican clergyman, reaches us just as we go to press. We have only time this quarter to mention it most briefly, and heartily to recommend it to the notice of Catholic theologians. Mr. Burgon exhibits in striking colours the reckless destructiveness of modern Protestant Biblical criticisms even where the writers are pious Anglicans. We have heard on what seems good authority, that the English Protestant Committee for revising the New Testament had resolved to recommend that the concluding verses of S. Mark's Gospel should be marked as certainly spurious! Mr. Burgon merits our warmest gratitude for his labours. The Catholic reader will be more grieved than surprised that he (p. 15) incidentally denies the genuineness of 1 John v. 7.

The Tablet for September 15 and September 22, 1871.

THESE two numbers of our admirable contemporary contain the record of a most important and (in a strict sense) miraculous movement towards Catholicity, which has arisen among the Mahometans of Syria. We are very glad to hear that the two papers are to be republished, with additions and corrections, in the form of a pamphlet, which we hope to review in our next number.

Martyrs omitted by Foxe, being Records of Religious Persecutions in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Compiled by a Member of the English Church, with a Preface by the Rev. FREDERICK GEORGE LEE, D.C.L., F.S.A., Vicar of All Saints, Lambeth. London: John Hodges, Bedford Street; and Frome Selwood. 1870.

THIS is a little volume excellently intended, written in the best spirit, with simplicity and fairness, and at the same time with evident sympathy with the glorious sufferers it describes. It is likely to be highly useful, and we have great pleasure in most heartily recommending it. The price is only two-and-sixpence, and, being written by a Protestant, it may probably obtain admission and a fair hearing in many quarters where any Catholic account of the English persecution would hardly be read. God grant that the intercession of the blessed martyrs whom the writer has honoured, and whose passion he has described, may obtain for him the grace of conversion to the one Body of our Blessed Lord, the Church for which they suffered and

died. We have been surprised by the fairness with which he states facts. For instance, there is no attempt to make it appear that the martyrs really suffered for political offences. That, as all the world knows, was the lie invented and put out by their persecutors. Time was when it would have been accounted little, if at all, short of treason in any Protestant writer to question it. Even thirty years ago it needed courage of another sort. Then it was that Macaulay wrote, concerning the arguments by which people professed to prove that Catholic priests could not help being traitors in the reign of Elizabeth, and therefore that their execution was not persecution: "If such arguments are to pass current, it will be easy to prove that there never was such a thing as religious persecution since the creation; for there never was a religious persecution in which some odious crime was not, justly or unjustly, said to be obviously deducible from the doctrines of the persecuted party. We might say that the Cæsars did not persecute Christians, that they only persecuted men who were charged, rightly or wrongly, with burning Rome and with committing the foulest abominations in secret assemblies, and that the refusal to throw frankincense on the altar of Jupiter was not their crime, but the evidence of their crime." It is the characteristic of our day that truths which a professedly Catholic writer—Dr. Lingard for instance—would hardly have ventured to state in the most cautious terms thirty years ago, are now ostentatiously proclaimed by men like Dr. Littledale, who, we fear, have no more thought of ever becoming Catholics than Mr. Newdegate or "Dr. Cumming of Scotland." We are, therefore, in some degree prepared for the language in which our author, and Dr. Lee in the Preface supplied by him, do justice to the character of the martyrs. Take for instance the following:—

"The compiler of this volume has at all events placed before Church of England people a reliable and interesting record of the sufferings and death of many of our Roman Catholic fellow-Christians. These latter were faithful souls, who loved truth rather than peace, and manfully refused to repudiate their principles in times of the fiercest trial, resolved to go down to the dark valley of the shadow of death amid woes the most bitter, rather than change one iota of their ancient faith. They merit our warmest admiration and respect. More than heroes, they were Christian witnesses to the Divine character of the Church universal. Their names have been cast out as evil, their good deeds disparaged, their intense faith laughed at, their loftiest motives and last hours misrepresented. But they are not less worthy of our admiration. They were Englishmen. They were English Christians. They were sufferers for righteousness sake. Therefore they are surely blessed. May we be led to see how craftily the enemies of God's Eternal and unalterable Truth have put darkness for light and light for darkness, sweet for bitter and bitter for sweet" (p. x. Preface).

Throughout, there is no attempt to conceal the fact that these holy men died for the one Catholic Faith, and that their persecutors and murderers were nothing more or less than Anglican Protestants. Take one instance out of a hundred; the Rev. Alexander Brian (who suffered with Campion, and of whose supernatural strength under the most complicated tortures we have details of touching beauty taken from Challoner, &c.), having long refused,

under the torture, to give any information, by which his fellow Priests, or the laymen in whose houses he had said Mass, would have been implicated (for, as is well known, this was one of the invariable objects with which the torture was inflicted), Mr. Norton, the persecutor, "because they could get nothing out of him," asked "whether the Queen were Supreme Head of the Church of England."

"To this I said, 'I am a Catholic, and I believe in this as a Catholic should.' 'Why,' said Norton, 'they say the Pope is.' 'And so say I,' answered Mr. Brian. Then we are told, 'Brian's constancy was only comparable to that of the martyrs of the primitive Church under torments which no human strength could have borne, unaided by God's gift of supernatural grace. In a letter subsequently written he says—'The same day that I was first tormented on the rack, before I came to the place, giving my mind to prayer, I was filled up and replenished with a kind of supernatural sweetness of spirit, and even while I was calling upon the most holy name of Jesus, and upon the Blessed Virgin Mary (for I was saying the Rosary), my mind was cheerfully disposed, well comforted, and readily prepared, and bent to suffer and endure those torments which even then I most certainly looked for. Whether this that I will say be miraculous or not God knoweth; but true it is, and thereof my conscience is a witness before God, and this I say, that in the very end of the torture, though my hands and feet were violently stretched and racked, and my adversaries fulfilled their wretched lust in practising their cruel tyranny upon my body, yet notwithstanding, I was without sense and feeling, well-nigh of all grief and pain; and not so only, but, as it were, comforted, eased, and refreshed of the griefs of the torture by-past."

No one can doubt, after reading this, that the sufferer was what is called "a Papist," and the torturer not a Protestant merely, but above all, an Anglican. So the Rev. Thomas Cottham, who suffered the same day, when—

"Those in office addressed him with many soothing speeches, expecting he would make some kind of confession and renounce his faith, raised his voice with a kind of holy indignation and protested that he would rather lose a thousand lives than depart the least tittle from the doctrine of the Catholic Church. The same martyr, when the sheriff and the people around him sought to make him abjure his faith, to gain his life—the rope being then about his neck—replied, 'I will not swerve a jot from my faith for anything; yea, if I had ten thousand lives I would rather lose them all than forsake the Catholic Faith on any point.' On which the sheriff cried, 'Despatch him, since he is so stubborn.' When the executioner held up the head of Richardson (one of his fellow-martyrs) and said, as the custom was, 'God save the Queen,' Cottham said, 'I beseech God to bless her and save her as my sovereign Queen.' They willed him to say 'and the supreme head in matters ecclesiastical.' To whom he answered, 'If I would have put in these words, I had been discharged almost two years since.' Again, (page 51), Sherwine (another martyr of the same day) was called before the Lieutenant of the Tower, and asked whether he would go to the service of the Common Prayer, which he refused to do, upon which he was threatened with the penalty according to the late statute," &c.

When we force ourselves to remember that the men by whom this volume has been put out (the Editor at least) are men who actually hold preferments, revenues, and social position, for which they have qualified themselves by

solemnly swearing that the Queen's Majesty is "supreme in all causes ecclesiastical," and are in the daily habit, not only of "going to the service of the Common Prayer," but of publicly performing it; nay, that they actually condemn as schismatics those who separate themselves from it, as this very Cottham had done, by becoming converts to the Church (a class whom they habitually designate by a new term of reproach, invented by one who has himself abandoned the Faith), we cannot but ask ourselves how they can possibly persuade themselves that they themselves are on the side of the martyrs, not on that of the persecutors. It occurred to us that perhaps they might say that the persecutors were not Anglicans, but Puritans or Dissenters, or at the very least, ignorant laymen belonging only in name to the Anglican communion. But the author before us is too honest for that; he says—

"Here it may be well to point out the fact that the atrocities committed upon these good men cannot be laid wholly to the secular power, but that the Church of England, as represented by the clergy and bishops, was not only a consenting party, but aided and abetted the breach of Christ's great 'law of love,' and that not merely by hard speeches, but by force of cruel deeds and the infliction of barbarous bodily torments."

In proof of this he quotes a passage from the Burleigh papers, adduced by Mr. Froude, who says: "In the beginning of September (1562) two prelates, Grindal [Protestant Bishop of London and afterwards of Canterbury] and Coxe [of Ely] suggested the use of torture as a fitting means of obtaining evidence." The words of the bishops (who were speaking of a priest who had been taken, but could not be induced to give evidence by which his Catholic brethren might be implicated) were: "Some thought that if the priest were put to some kind of torment, and so driven to confess what he knoweth, he might gain the Queen's Majesty a good mass of money" (p. 46), in the fines that might be inflicted upon Catholics who had heard his mass, and whom he might be compelled to betray.

Another sufferer for the faith, about whom we have here many particulars, is the Catholic Archbishop of Cashel. It appears from letters quoted by our author, and not known to Challoner, &c., that for his torment diabolical devices were expressly planned by the Secretary of State in England, "the dextrous Walsingham," as he is termed by Lord Macaulay, and prescribed by him in letters sent to his willing agents in Dublin, by whom they were executed. And of these agents one was the Anglican Archbishop.

The martyr was arrested in September, 1583, and brought before the Protestant Archbishop and his colleague, who "at first received him kindly, and promised him both pardon and promotion if he would deny the spiritual power of the Pope and acknowledge the supremacy of the Queen. He replied that he was resolved never to abandon, for any temporal reward, the Catholic Church, the Vicar of Christ, and the true Faith." The justices then referred for instructions to Walsingham. One of their letters to him runs as follows. It is dated December 10th, 1583 (see page 102):—

"Among other letters directed to us and brought by this passage, we received one from your Honour, declaring her Majesty's pleasure for the proceeding with Dr. Hurley by torture, or any other severe manner of pro-

ceeding, to gain his knowledge of all foreign practices against her Majesty's statute. . . . But for that we want here racke or other engine of torture to terrify him ; and doubt but that at the time of his apprehension he was schooled to be silent in all cases of weight, and the Tower of London should be a better place than the Castle of Dublin ; and in the mean season we would not only inform ourselves of all that may be gained here out of the examination of him, &c., and so do commit you to the Lord."

Walsingham's answer to this letter is not given, but the author gives us the reply made to it by the Protestant Archbishop, taken from the "State Papers," edited by Dr. Maziere Brady. It is dated March 7th, 1584, and says :—

"So as not finding that easy manner of examining to do any good, we made commissions to Mr. Waterhouse and Mr. Secretary Fenton, to put him to the torture, *such as your Honour advised us*, which was to toast his feet against the fire with hot boots."

This letter is signed by the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin and by H. Wollop. Three months later the martyr was hanged in Dublin, which could not have been done without the warrant of the Protestant Archbishop and his colleague.

Strange indeed it is to see men, who call themselves Catholics, and are content not only to remain members of the Anglican Communion but to hold spiritual offices in it, and who yet fully recognize to themselves the horrible fact that "the Church of England, by her clergy and bishops," has for centuries been torturing and dragging to the gallows "faithful souls who loved truth rather than peace," "Christian witnesses to the divine character of the Church universal," "sufferers for righteousness sake ;" and that this has been done, not really for any political offences, although they were pretended, but only because the sufferers held the one Catholic Faith. How can they think that through all the long years in which it was thus persecuting to the death the Catholic Faith, that communion was really not only a "true branch of the Catholic Church," but *the* branch of it in England and Ireland ?

We think we see the explanation of all this, but our space prevents our entering into it. What it really comes to is, that these gentlemen in real truth regard "the Catholic Church," of which they are so fond of speaking, as an invisible body, no less really as do the most extreme Protestants. And hence the writer thinks that the offence of those who tortured and put to death those who hold the Real Presence was, not that they persecuted the Truth of God, but that they "violated the law of love." For in principle the difference between the martyrs and their persecutors, from his point of view, was only that the one thought in their private opinion that the doctrine is Catholic, and the other thought it not. His opinion agrees with that of the martyrs, but the persecutors] much right to theirs, only they "violated the law of love" in hanging and quartering those who did not agree with it. Dr. Lee evidently takes the same view, and he expresses it in a way new to us. He considers the distinction between the Catholic martyrs and Protestant persecutors was, that the former were "Conservative" and the latter "Reformative." Are these to be henceforth the received substitutes for the old terms? That a man is Catholic because he

belongs to a particular communion, and a Protestant if he does not, has apparently not occurred to either of these gentlemen, and so the book is signed "a Catholic Member of the Church of England." He means "a member of the Church of England who holds certain opinions."

And so he writes in a good and beautiful spirit, but really missing the fundamental difference between the Catholic Church and the heretical sects.

"It is not by ever blazoning abroad our brother's misdeeds towards us, while bragging of our own martyrs, as if none other than ours existed, that we shall further the fulfilment of our Master's will, who is that brother's Saviour no less than our own.

"An acknowledgment of our evil deeds, and that 'we have verily and indeed been guilty towards him,' involves no compromise of principle in regard to our respective points of faith, while much edification may be derived from the holy lives, and the sublime self-sacrifice for conscience sake, of many saints whom we, in our blind and diabolic intolerance, persecuted even to the death.

"The object of these brief records is a twofold one,—to hold up a mirror, that we may see ourselves in our hideous deformity, as breakers of this 'law of love,' puffed up, as we undoubtedly are, with the grossest because the most unjustifiable spiritual pride.

"It is also to edify the reader with records of the power of faith in many a last conflict, and with exemplifications of the working of that 'law of love,' enabling the sufferer to forgive the persecutor, who, like a second Cain, imbued his hands in his brother's blood" (p. xiv).

Well, humbly, and beautifully said, and most true; but not the whole truth, unless it had pleased our Divine Lord to leave his people to grope after the truth without any guide, only charging them to love one another, and each to bear with "what he considers" his brother's errors—that is, unless we accept, with our author, the Protestant rule of faith. But we, who know that God has appointed an authority on earth to speak in His name, must see that the persecutors were not only guilty of a breach of "the law of love" (which they were on their own principles), but also were guilty of persecuting to the death the revealed Truth of God, that is, our Divine Lord Himself, although we may hope that they "did it ignorantly, in unbelief."

The author imagines, 'that before the Greek schism the Church had been one, that it then became two, and at the so-called Reformation three. This is the view common to the Unionists; and accordingly he says (p. xvi) that "a desire for reunion is obviously manifest in her three great branches." There are many expressions of the same kind, but what is strange, he seems to consider that the persecution of Catholics by men calling themselves Christians is a new feature of evil since the days of the so-called Reformation. He says :—

"Eight hundred years and more beheld her as a rock unshaken in her fidelity both to her God and herself. Eight hundred years and upwards bore testimony to her unity, made up as she was of a multitude of all nations, and peoples, and tongues. Alas for the day when that glorious unity was lost, and the long undivided Church was rent asunder, and persecutions, and consequent recriminations, came, not from the hand of the common enemy, but her foes were those of her own household" (p. xiv).

What is new in this passage is, not that the author assumes that the Church

in early times was undivided, although he can hardly fail to be aware that there were in those days, as there are now, a multitude of heretical and schismatical bodies calling themselves Christians. This is nothing new, because the high school of Anglicans have long been accustomed to say that the early heretics were divided from the Church, but the Church not divided against herself, as they maintain to be the case now. But it is something new to find that he fancies that the persecution of Catholics by professed Christians is a thing new since Protestantism was invented. We need hardly say, that ever since the Catholic Church was set up, she has ever found her most bitter persecutors among the heretical sects calling themselves orthodox Christians, but whom it was her duty and office to warn in the name of her Lord. The Anglicans of the days of Elizabeth were but following the example and "filling up the measure" of the Arians and Donatists of earlier days. In fact we much doubt whether there ever has been any heretical sect powerful enough to persecute, by which Catholics have not, at one time or another, been persecuted even to death.

We have enumerated the points on which the writer differs from the Catholic Faith ; not that we think his book, as it is, will be dangerous either to Protestants or Catholics, on the contrary, we heartily wish it an extensive circulation among both, but because when men write in so good and Christian a spirit as he, it becomes an especial duty, incumbent on those who know the Truth of God, to point out their errors, in justice and charity to them and to those who think with them ; and we heartily hope that in doing so we have not used a single word unkind or unloving to him, or which can give a moment's cause of just offence to any Anglican reader. Pain, we do not and cannot desire to avoid giving, so far as it must be painful to men to be convinced that they have hitherto been in dangerous error : but, thanks be to God, the remedy of that pain is near at hand.

A Compendium of the History of the Catholic Church from the Commencement of the Christian Era to the Ecumenical Council of the Vatican, in which are narrated her Combats and her Victories in times of Persecution, Heresy, and Scandal, and wherein is shown that her Preservation is a Divine work. By Rev. THEODORE NOETHEN. Third revised Edition. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1871.

THIS volume of 587 pages gives a popular summary of the history of the Church from its foundation to the convocation of the Vatican Council. Without having read every word of it, we may truly say that we have not merely looked through it, but carefully read enough to form a fair judgment of the whole. The result is that we can recommend it as supplying a want which we think most Catholics must have felt,—that of a short sketch of the history of the Church, fit to put into the hands of those who want either time or inclination to study lengthened histories. More than a sketch, we need

not say, it could not possibly be ; for of the eighteen centuries the history of which it relates there is no one which could be fully treated unless many volumes were devoted to it. The writer has kept in view the important object avowed in his title-page. He has brought home to the minds of simple readers one of the main proofs of the Divine origin of the Christian Religion and of the Catholic Church ; viz, that while all human institutions change and are swept away, this alone, standing in the midst of them, and looking like them, has a character and a fate wholly different from theirs, because it is in its origin and life not human but Divine. Hence it is that it has stood unshaken among all the revolutions of eighteen centuries, and is the only one institution existing at the present moment of which a thoughtful man, even although he knew nothing of its Divine origin, would pronounce that he saw no reason to anticipate its fall. Of course such a man would of necessity look forward with very different feelings from those of a Catholic. The Catholic knows with the certainty of faith two things—first that the Church will always be in danger, and next that she will never be overthrown. To him, therefore, the darkest appearances, instead of inspiring fear, are but a certain pledge that some intervention of the Providence or the Grace of God is near at hand, by which she is to be delivered from the danger ; because God Himself is pledged that she shall always stand, and, according to the proverb, “Man’s extremity is God’s opportunity.” There have no doubt been times in the past history of the Church when the future was so dark that nothing but such a supernatural confidence could enable any man to believe that she was still reserved for future conquests. Such may again be the case ; nay, we ourselves may live to see it ; and should it be so, it will only be those whose confidence stands fixed upon the strong foundation of faith in the truth and omnipotence of God, who will be without doubt or fear as to her perpetual existence and ultimate triumph. But as things now are, even those who have not that Divine faith can hardly fail to see, that while the characteristics by which our age is chiefly marked are, that the balance of nations, by which peace was long believed to be secured, has been overthrown ; that wars seem everywhere impending ; that all ancient institutions have lost their *prestige* ; that the religious traditions even of the most conservative nations and the institutions upon which they were founded, and by which they have long been supported, are being swept away like clouds before an April wind ; while thrones, and constitutions, and ancient laws are everywhere manifestly tottering to their fall, and while a more lamentable symptom even than these is forcing itself upon us, in the spreading disaffection of the labouring class, both in Europe and America, towards the very basis of civil society, including property and family relations ; yet, in the midst of this wild storm, there is one existing institution the fall of which it is impossible to anticipate within any period to which human foresight can penetrate ; and that one is the Catholic Church. This historical fact it is most important to impress upon men who have not the gift of faith or whose faith is in danger from the influences of the world around them. Supernatural confidence in the promise of God is the privilege of Catholics, but the experience of the past and the apparent probabilities of the future are an argument addressed to those who do not believe or those

whose faith is weak and unenlightened. We are not aware of any popular volume in moderate compass in which the facts upon which that historical argument rests are so well represented as they are by our author. The book is in general simply and naturally written, and free from that plague of an ambitious attempt at ornament which infects so very large a proportion of the books intended for popular reading in the present day, and we think even more in America than in England. We have observed a few inaccuracies of language, which in a book so likely to be so extensively useful are worth correcting. We have looked to see how historical subjects upon which controversies have lately been raised are treated, and we think the author has judged well with regard to them. He has merely stated the facts in few words, and not alluded to the controversy. This is well; because it must be remembered that although a few unlearned readers in our own day, who look to a history like this for an explanation of facts which they hear discussed by half-informed persons, may be disappointed, yet the controversy will soon be forgotten; and had it been mentioned as a controversy now existing, it must have been brought before multitudes in times to come who, as it is, will never hear that it has existed.

Almost the only thing we really regret in the volume is the allusion to some recent events in Ireland. The great strength of the Fenians lies in their having succeeded in persuading many good Catholics among the Irish in the British islands and in America that it was to the terror inspired by Fenianism, not a sincere love of justice and right, that Mr. Gladstone's two great measures for the benefit of Ireland are to be attributed. That this is not really the case is most certain. The English people as a nation supported Mr. Gladstone's demand that justice should be done to Ireland, but we sincerely believe that if there was any one circumstance which tended to throw the popular feeling in England on the other side and to run the risk of alienating the support by which those measures were carried in spite of a strong opposition from the Orange party in Ireland and from their confederates in England, that circumstance was the crimes and outrages to which Fenianism gave rise, and which were appealed to by Mr. Disraeli and his party to prove that Irish disaffection was not to be explained by any real grievances but by the nature and geographical position of the Irish race, "the melancholy ocean" (to which it was referred by Mr. Disraeli himself), and that Ireland ought, therefore, to be treated and governed as a country hopelessly irreconcilable. Our author misunderstands, and therefore misrepresents facts, when he says, referring to those measures, "Fenianism undoubtedly made an impression upon the leaders in the English Parliament, and it is owing to the terror its organization inspired that the English Government felt impelled to make concessions, which it is to be hoped will be followed by many others, so that Ireland, relieved from English tyranny and oppression, and her children from being forced to seek shelter in other countries, may yet enjoy the happiness of remaining in their own dear and beautiful isle." In another page our author says, speaking of the events which followed the success of O'Connell, "The cry for justice, which from the impoverished and starving millions of Ireland has constantly risen to the British Throne, has been cruelly disregarded, and famine and pestilence, with all their attendant

horrors, which have stalked through the devoted island—the terrible fruits of British cruelty and injustice—have failed to soften the stony heart or awake a feeling of sympathy in the bosom of that remorseless Government.”

The effect which these sentences must produce upon readers of Irish blood, whether in Europe or America, cannot fail to be that the English Government has been deliberately and without remorse cruel and stony-hearted towards Ireland, and that it is only to the fear produced by Fenianism that any measures of justice are to be attributed, and the practical result must be that those who desire the good of Ireland will be under the strongest temptation to unite themselves to those secret societies which Catholics are positively forbidden by the Church to join, and which they cannot join without being excluded from her Sacraments. This result we are sure the author would regret as much as we ourselves. But what else can he expect? If indeed a man is obliged to speak at all, he is no doubt obliged to speak the truth, without regard to possible results. But in this case we are sure no sufficiently-informed man will say that what our author states is true. We have so often spoken out upon the wrongs of Ireland that we shall not be suspected of undervaluing them. But we sincerely believe that even in the worst times the hateful and abominable measures of the English Parliament were not dictated by “stony-hearted cruelty,” but by a total misinformation as to the real state of Ireland. What England intended was not to oppress Ireland, but to support one party of Irishmen, the Orange Protestants, against another party. In truth, no doubt they were enabling a hateful faction to oppress a great and noble nation, but they “knew not what they did.” And a man better informed would hardly have spoken of the “stony-hearted cruelty” of the English Parliament during the terrible famine which desolated Ireland in 1847, for he would have remembered that in that single year it voted no less than ten millions sterling to its relief, not to mention the enormous voluntary collections made throughout the country for the same purpose. For ourselves, we have never shrunk from denouncing the real crimes of England against Ireland or from demanding justice for her; but we are very sure that the way to obtain this is not by encouraging the Irish people to enter into secret societies, nor by misrepresenting facts, much less by imputing malevolent motives where it is clear that benevolent ones really prevailed. That our author should have written as he has in this page may however convey a useful lesson to English readers. It may show them what the impression produced upon foreigners by the facts of Irish history has been, and how essential it is, by doing unquestionable right for the future, to produce gradually upon the minds both of the Irish people and of those who sympathize with them in foreign nations, an effect which no one or two measures, however just and merciful, can be expected to produce in a moment. Time is the first requisite, but it must be time turned to account justly, wisely, and considerately.

The Life of S. Ignatius of Loyola. By Father GENELLI, S. J. Translated from the German by M. CHARLES SAINTE FOI ; and rendered from the French by the Rev. THOMAS MEYRICK, S. J. London : Burns, Oates, and Co. 1871.

CHANNING, in one of his letters, describes with some admiration what he calls the "composition of forces in the Romish Church." He means the infinite variety of machinery which Catholicism brings to bear upon the human mind, and the skill and sagacity with which it adapts itself to human nature. He adds that he would like to see Protestants take a few hints, and adopt the good whilst avoiding the bad. He thinks that even the Confessional could be made to teach a lesson. He says nothing about the Jesuits. Yet perhaps the Jesuit organization is the type which, next to the Church herself, represents best the Church's system. A life of S. Ignatius is a hard thing to write, because S. Ignatius belongs to Church history as much as he belongs to hagiography. Perhaps the only way to solve the difficulty is to have several "lives" written, each taking a special point of view.

F. Genelli's "life," here translated into English from M. Sainte Foi's version, is not so much a spiritual reading-book as an historical sketch. In his pages we have the whole "form and pressure" of those eventful years of the sixteenth century which saw Charles V. and Francis I., Paul III. and Philip II., Martin Luther and Ignatius of Loyola. The work brings out Ignatius the legislator rather than Ignatius the Saint. It is written with a somewhat polemical purpose ; that is, to prove that the Jesuit institute was really founded by S. Ignatius and really inherits his own spirit, against those who assert that actual Jesuits are in reality the disciples of Lainez and Acquaviva.

In saying this we by no means wish to imply that it is not a most excellent biography. As a literary production, and judged by the canons of art, it is really the best biography of the Saint with which we are acquainted. The admirable plan of letting the Saint tell his story in his own words, wherever this is possible, has led the author to give a multitude of his own letters and papers, and the regularity with which the chronological order of events is followed keeps up the interest of the story. It is one of those books which serve as a groundwork for devotion, without directly furnishing devotional materials. Names, dates, controversies, and explanations are fatal to a book of spiritual reading, and therefore any one who wants such reading will rather prefer a life in which they are sparingly introduced, in which a calm optimism takes the place of polemics, and in which the hero is rather treated as the embodiment of a catalogue of virtues than as a living historic figure. When either of these lines is too exclusively followed, the result fails of being perfectly satisfactory. The history must contain the portrait of the *Saint* ; the devout portrait must give us the lineaments of the man.

We cannot say that we think the literary style of this life a great success. We do not think this is the fault of the translator. Let any one read, for example, the first chapter of Part II., in which the author explains the end

of the Society and the means prescribed to attain it, and he will have to study some time before he can see his way through the explanation. Take the following passage :—

“ All the motives which the Society proposes to itself are concentrated in its ultimate object, which is the greater glory of God. Its members seek to procure this effectually by labouring for their own sanctification and the sanctification of others ; and they do this, not by undertaking any obligations of a particular kind, but by excluding nothing which is either good in itself or is conformable to the Gospel and to the end of the Society. It follows from this that the Society embraces every practice of virtue conducing to its end, since in everything that is done, the glory of God is proposed as its final object, and it is this which must be the measure of the efforts each individual is to make for his own sanctification and for the sanctification of others. It is on this principle that the freedom of the Institute turns ; it is the mobile part of it which is incessantly being renewed, and which derives its origin from the will of God ” (pp. 191, 192).

This, and much more of the same kind, reads hazy. Yet it would seem to be easy to state in plain words the object and spirit of the Society of Jesus. We make this criticism because a work of such a high order seems to challenge criticism ; in regard to a less valuable book it would not have been worth our while. The narrative parts are much clearer and better, and the matter, as we have said, is most interesting, whilst the general plan and arrangement leave nothing to be desired.

Ignatius Loyola and the Early Jesuits. By STEWART ROSE. Second Edition. London : Longman. 1871.

WE noticed Mr. Rose's work in October, 1870, just a year ago, and we have now to congratulate him on his second edition. He says that “ the censures of his indulgent critics have been carefully considered,” and that the reader will observe that in the second edition “ some errors will be found corrected.” A very copious Index has been added, and that will be certainly hailed as a great improvement and gain.

We think we ought to say that we still hold, and that not without considerable reflection, to the opinion we held a year ago. Mr. Rose, of course, differs from us, and can, in a sense, triumph over us by pointing out that his work has been successful and popular. The public has not objected to a “ literary ” Life of S. Ignatius ; perhaps it has even applauded the author for an act which is, we think, a novelty or innovation. A mere literary man might write a life of the saint, no doubt, but this comes upon us—very much like an unexpected blow—from one who so highly admires, we ought perhaps to say, venerates, S. Ignatius and the Society which he founded. In spite of this, we venture still to say that this method of writing is not without grave dangers. Perhaps Mr. Rose has not avoided them all. The last sentence of the Preface is as follows :—

"There is nothing incredible in his [S. Ignatius] story until he passes into the preternatural state, which some will regard as an illusion, and others as a favour granted by Providence to a sinful world, then struggling into intellectual light."

Now this language is at least unfortunate. The world was sinful, undoubtedly, when S. Ignatius laid the foundations for his order, but it is strange to hear from a biographer of the Saint that the world was "then struggling into intellectual light." Is it possible that the Saint ever thought so? The world was "struggling" then as now, and always has been struggling ever since Cain murdered Abel, but not into "intellectual light." All its struggling has but one end, to escape from the light into darkness, or to put out the light if it can. In the time of S. Ignatius the world was struggling to quench the light of the faith, and to bring back the ancient darkness; good men, too, were struggling, not however into intellectual light, which they possessed, but to save the light from being quenched, and to help its burning. The world hates the light, and is struggling hard by a thousand devices to put it out. That is what the Sovereign Pontiff is never weary of telling us, and what, unhappily, we are all so unwilling to believe. The world is fair to look on, and makes all sorts of promises; but the world has never changed its purpose, which is the ruin of the faith.

In England the Spaniards have been an unpopular race ever since the Reformation; but that unpopularity became a social necessity during the reign of Elizabeth, when English pirates, such as Raleigh and Drake, were to be regarded as honest men. At this day there is no reason why we should persevere in that delusion, and we are grieved to read in Mr. Rose's book that the Spaniards were a "fierce and superstitious people" (p. 476). We doubt very much the truth of this account, and we should be surprised to find them more fierce than the English or the French; and we are quite sure that their "superstition" consisted simply in professing and maintaining, at all risks, the Catholic faith, which, after all, was neither more nor less than a simple duty.

Mr. Rose writes as follows—speaking of Spaniards:—

"It was well known that the Jews frequently passed themselves off as Christians, in order to obtain the emoluments of office, even of offices in the Church. Stories of bishops discovered to be secretly unconverted Jews, even of an archbishop, crucifying in their horrible orgies innocent children, and still worse atrocities, exasperated the popular indignation into madness: nor did the Spaniards hesitate about inflicting death at the stake" (p. 477).

Mr. Rose is not the first to bring this charge against Spanish ecclesiastics, but most certainly he ought to have told us on what authority he makes it, for of his own knowledge he cannot say what he has so plainly said. We should like to have the names of the bishops and archbishops who, being unconverted Jews, administered sacraments, and punished heretics, and maintained the public profession as well as the private practice of the Catholic religion. Spanish bishops were not unknown or untried men: their families generally distinguished, their fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, known to be Catholics, and not unfrequently even remarkable among a

Catholic people for their zeal, personal austerities, and love of the Faith. Is it too much to ask for the name of the archbishop who crucified a child? He probably crucified more than one. It would be a melancholy fact, no doubt, but still we should like to hear the name of any one of the bishops who, after or before the solemnities of Holy Week by him duly celebrated in his cathedral, betook himself to these "horrible orgies" and crucified "innocent children."

In the same page we read this :—

"In Spain the dread of heresy seems to have been perpetually reviving, even to an extravagant excess."

English people certainly, since the Reformation, have never been afraid of heresy, and therefore never guilty of any "extravagant excess" in their dread of it. It would have been better for them, both in this life and the next, if they had been greater cowards in the face of their greatest enemy. Language like this seems to us an "extravagant excess," a worshipping of the world, and a mean concession to the liberalism and indifferentism of our age. If there can be no excess in men's love of God, how can there be an "extravagant excess" in the fear of offending Him by the gravest sin we can commit? Surely the Spaniards are not to blame for their dread of heresy, which was nothing else but a real zeal for God's honour, Whose word they preferred to the lies of wicked men bent on deceiving them to their everlasting ruin.

In pp. 491-2 we read as follows :—

"This, the last supernatural incident related in the life of Ignatius, reminds us to recall what has been said before, that his children never then claimed for him a power of working prodigies, and he would certainly have greatly resented such an attribute. All the remarkable circumstances of this kind that it has been thought right to detail, may be set aside, if the reader so pleases; the true and only miracle that it is necessary to show and to appreciate is that of a most noble, extraordinary, and original character, and of an admirable work. It would have been as well to omit such incidents, perhaps better, but for one reason,—that they form a picture of the times, which would be very incomplete without them, and to realize that "communion of saints," that familiar and frequent mingling, so to speak, of the material and spiritual world which makes the incomparable happiness of those who are in the Catholic Church. But it is an entirely sober and reasoning happiness, and such manifestations as have been here described form no necessary part of her faith. We have the authority of a Jesuit of our day for this assurance."

It is possible, perhaps, to explain this strange passage in a Catholic sense, in which sense no doubt it was written; but it is also possible, and far more easy, to explain it in a sense that is not Catholic; and more possible and more easy still, to say of it that it sounds ill. We do not wish to use stronger language ourselves, though we cannot accept the doctrine involved in it. It may be very well to say that S. Ignatius lived a life which was miraculous; but if he wrought miracles or "prodigies," it is not right to depreciate them. now that he is beyond the reach of failure, and unassailable by human weaknesses or delusions. Miracles are directly the acts of God, beside the natural order which He has established; and we therefore humbly conceive that

they are deserving of notice, and that they are not to be regarded as "a picture of the times," but as pictures of the power of God. It might be said of a given miracle that we are not bound to accept it, or believe the fact done to be a miracle; but to say, as we understand Mr. Rose to say, that it would be as well to omit the miracles wrought by S. Ignatius—contrary to the practice of his predecessors who have written the life of the Saint—seems to us, at least unworthy, and out of keeping with the spirit of the Church. Miracles are in a certain way a sign of the Church; and it is of faith that miracles will be wrought in her from time to time, for our Lord has promised it shall be so, and S. Paul numbers them among the gifts *gratis date*. The eleventh mark of the Church, according to Cardinal Bellarmine, is the "glory of miracles," and this mark he discerns in all ages. It is true he does not speak of the miracles wrought by his father S. Ignatius, but he does speak of those wrought by S. Francis Xavier, and firmly believed them on the authority of letters from India.

Perhaps Mr. Rose may have misunderstood the Jesuit, on whose authority he relies. If we may judge from the passage he has quoted, we may say that the Jesuit was not speaking of miracles of canonized saints, but of those wrought by the ministry of living men, who have not reached the term of their probation, and therefore liable to shipwreck. Directors and confessors will not allow their penitents to make much of the miracles which the latter may perform; but those directors, nevertheless, do not make light of them themselves, for they redouble their watchfulness, and are more careful lest the soul, thus visited of God, should come to a miserable end in their hands, and through their fault.

Besides, the Pontiff himself, when he canonizes a saint, requires the proof of miracles; and we therefore think that, on the whole, this passage is, at least, an unpleasant one.

The Life of the Servant of God Vincent Palliotti, of Rome, Founder of "the Pious Society of Missions." Extracted from the Process for his Beatification. By RAPHAEL MELIA, D.D., Priest of the above Society and Miss. Apost. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. Also to be had from the Sacristan of St. Peter's Italian Church, Hatton Wall, Hatton Garden. London, 1871.

THERE is no one thing which enables us so strongly to realize to ourselves the identity of the Catholic Church in all ages, and that its power, its life, its security in every age is really the same, while, on the other hand, the dangers and trials through which it passes in our own time are no more than those which it has ever experienced; as the wonderful likeness which runs through the Saints and distinguished servants of God in every successive age. No doubt each is strongly marked by characteristics of his own. No one could fail to see a broad distinction between two who lived

at the same time and in the same place. S. Ignatius, for instance, and S. Philip were in natural character and circumstances as little alike as any two contemporaries could well be ; yet it is impossible not to feel that they resemble each other far more than they differ. What strikes us is analogous to the resemblance which we cannot help seeing among all men, however unlike each other. They have the resemblance, nay the identity of a common nature. It is not, therefore, wonderful that men whose whole nature is penetrated and absorbed by the same Divine Grace should in a similar manner have one common supernatural character—for, in truth, the principle of their supernatural life is the indwelling of one and the same Spirit. The Spiritual catechism of F. Surin (quoted in Faber's Essay on Beatification and Canonization) says, "though the Saints differ very much from each other when regarded with reference to their outward conduct, they resemble each other very strikingly in their ideas of virtue and in their manner of practising it, so that it is evident that they are actuated by one Spirit. This assemblage of ideas, maxims, and practices in which the Saints agree, form what we call true wisdom. It has two essential characteristics : the one is, to be opposed to human prudence to such a degree as to look to men's eyes like folly ; and the second is, to be so deep and hidden that even the majority of those who practise virtue do not *comprehend* it, although no one who lives according to the spirit of Christianity can be altogether ignorant of it." Father Faber discusses the subject at length, and concludes that "the marvellous and the eccentric, as the foolish wisdom of the world would call them, form the logical *differentia* by which we get the species 'Saint' from the genus 'good Catholic.'"

And thus it is that as we open a life of a Saint, we find that we are at once transported out of a particular century,—nay, out of the particular country in which he lived, and are suddenly conversant with the Heavenly Jerusalem of which he was a citizen, and in which his life was spent, according to the early proverb, that the Church is Heaven upon earth. This fulfils in its most complete sense the saying of the Blessed Apostle, "our citizenship is in Heaven."

Here, then, we have an answer to those who tell us that the world is changed—that we cannot apply to our own times the maxims and principles of times gone by, and the like ; our answer is, that there are still Saints, and that the Saints of our own day manifestly inhabit the same supernatural world in which those of earlier times lived and moved. And this is the special interest of the life before us ; for, without presuming to anticipate the judgment of the Church as to F. Palliotti's claim to the title of Saint, it is impossible to read it without seeing that the world in which he lived was that in which the Saints had their being. And yet he was born in April 1795, two years after the death of Louis XVI., and just before the conquest of Italy by the arms of the Revolution ; and died in January 1850, just when Rome was expecting the return of Pius IX. from Gaeta, which actually took place a few weeks later. The times in which he lived were exactly the most steeped in the spirit of modern unbelief, and yet, as far as he was concerned, he might have been the contemporary of Philip and S. Ignatius. What example could be more encouraging to us, who live in days in which so many men

boast that an earnest and consistent Catholic is an anachronism, that the whole current of opinion sets so strongly towards physical science, that it is vain to expect that dogma should have any practical power in the world ; for it is plain, that dogma and scientific truth are ascertained by processes wholly different. To all this we answer, that as long as Almighty God is pleased to grant to the Church Grace to become the Mother of Saints, so long her power upon earth is real and indisputable. Alas ! it is most true that men may shut their eyes to it, but then so they could and did in every age. In his youth Vincent Palliotti no doubt was for years the subject of Napoleon I., while the Sovereign Pontiff, Pius VII., was his prisoner at Savona. In his age he lived under the usurped power of the Triumvirs, when Pius IX. was an exile at Gaeta ; but then it is equally true that S. Philip was twelve years of age when Italy and Rome itself were devastated by the Hugonot soldiers of the Constable Bourbon. Who can say, then, what Saints may be ripening at this moment under the usurpation of Victor Emmanuel ?

It is vain to attempt to give any idea of the life of a Saint by extracts detailing a few particulars, and yet we are tempted to give one or two, because they illustrate what we have said of the identity which runs through the lives of the Saints, even those who have lived in the most dissimilar times. Let us take one illustration,—his confidence in God.

“The great confidence which Vincent had in God and in the intercession of the Saints, was in the first place accompanied by a salutary fear of himself, of being, through his want of due correspondence, a hindrance to the Graces of God ; saying that in undertakings for the glory of God we ought not to fear anything but ourselves. In the second place, it was accompanied by a conviction that his own works were of no avail of themselves ; whence he often repeated *Universæ justitiæ nostræ quasi pannus menstruatus*. For this reason he had cut on his seal the words *Nihilum et peccatum*. This sentiment he felt during the whole course of his life till the point of death, when he protested that his salvation would be an act entirely of Divine Mercy, since his own works were a mere nothing. He used to make the sign of the Cross in the manner indicated by S. Francis of Sales. Placing his hand on his forehead, he said, ‘Of myself I can do nothing,’ and then on his breast, ‘With God I can do all ;’ then from the left shoulder to the right, ‘In the love of God I wish to do all ;’ and finally joining his hands, ‘To God honour, to me contempt.’ He was persuaded that he could obtain all graces through prayer, and therefore he prayed continually, having even from his youth the gift of prayer.

“On one occasion, when he had promised to D. Francesco Vaccari twenty-nine scudi, he said, ‘Let us endeavour to gather the money required, and I, for the first, give my quotum.’ He gave three scudi. D. Francesco observed that three scudi were almost nothing in consideration of the sum required, and Vincent replied, ‘Have faith.’ D. Francesco said that he had faith, but Vincent should add some more money to the three scudi already given. Vincent then reservedly replied, ‘Have faith ; you have not faith ! Have faith.’ D. Francesco was silent, and put the three scudi in a drawer where there were a few other scudi. In the evening of the same day the person who was to have the money came, and then D. Francesco, with an air of jesting (being a friend of his) opened the drawer, which had been locked, and told him, ‘Behold the sum that I owe you.’ wishing to give him the three scudi. But to his great surprise, with

the three scudi he found a paper with some gold in it and a little silver, which with the three scudi precisely made up the sum which was owing. The event being related to Vincent, he smiling said, 'I told you that faith was wanting,—faith, faith, faith ; God does all.' The said Priest mentions that both the key of the said drawer, as well as the key of the room wherein the drawer was, had been always in his own pocket, and there were no double keys. . . . D. R. Melia [the author of this volume] deposes that, returning from London after Vincent's death, he was called upon by the Princess of Fiano and by the same was made acquainted with the following wonderful event. It was on November 13th, 1849, when Vincent went to the same princess to ask an abundant alms for a very poor family. The princess, finding herself on that day unprovided with money, said to Vincent that he must excuse her that time, as she had no money, but that if he returned another day, she would willingly assist this pious work. Vincent added that she would give the money on the feast of S. Omobuono. The princess asked when that feast would take place. Vincent replied that it was precisely that day. The princess, confused, repeated that on that day she really could not, and Vincent told her to go and look for it with confidence in God and on the merit of obedience, and, since obedience worked miracles, she would find the money. She then obeyed and went to look for it, but found only two paoli (less than one shilling). Returning to Vincent with this money and consigning it to him, found in her hand not only the two paoli, but a large sum of money in gold. The princess of course became thunderstruck at such a miracle, but Vincent imposed upon her to keep it as a great secret, which she did faithfully during Vincent's lifetime, and only related the fact after his death" (p. 103).

Any person accustomed to read the Italian lives of the Saints compiled from the processes of canonization will at once perceive from this extract that the book before us is, in all respects, one of them. It is not merely that the language is not that of an Englishman, which of course is apparent enough ; but there is hardly a page which does not bear unquestionable marks that the author's ideas and ways of viewing matters are those of an Italian, and moreover that in the present volume his facts have been taken from the process for the canonization of F. Palliotti. The consequence is (what F. Faber points out in more than one passage of the *Essay* which we have already quoted,) that he has given us rather a book of spiritual reading than a biography. In fact the only subjects treated in it are not the events of F. Vincent's life, still less how he was affected by the course of public affairs in the midst of which he lived, but only his graces and the manner in which they were exercised. F. Faber says : " It is this definite and orderly discussion of the theological and cardinal virtues which has impressed itself so completely upon the form and arrangement of modern Italian biographers,—that fourfold division into facts, virtues, gifts, and miracles, which so entirely mystifies all chronology, and is mostly so teasing to English readers, by its apparent awkward methodism. There can be no doubt but that Bacci's biography of S. Philip Neri would be far more lifelike and captivating if it were arranged in chronological order ; the absence of this destroys all the light and shade of a life : and the development of a Saint is in itself, especially when he is a founder, of immense interest. But it may be questioned whether as spiritual reading and a help to mental prayer, a life written on the Italian method is not the best of the two. Any how there can be no doubt

that it is the processes of the Congregation which have introduced this style of biography."

Our special object in the long extract we have given has been to show our readers what they have, and what they have not, to expect in F. Melia's volume, and those who can value a book of spiritual reading composed of English words arranged into Italian sentences will hardly be disappointed in it. Letters from the Archbishops of Westminster and Baltimore and Archbishop Eyre of Glasgow are prefixed, which bear testimony to the deep interest which the name of Vincent Palliotti has excited among Catholics in all parts of the world. The former says: "I am very glad to know that the life of your venerable founder, Vincenzo Palliotti, is now being published in English. In the year 1848 I remember how much I heard in Rome of his sanctity and his labours for souls. I pray that his spirit may be upon us all in England, and I hope that all blessings may rest on you and on all his spiritual sons, whose labours in the Italian Church deserve my thankful commendation." Archbishop Spalding speaks from personal knowledge:—

"We well remember him as we knew him nearly forty years ago, when we had the happiness to be under his spiritual direction. The good odour of his virtues still sweetens our memory, and clusters like a halo round our heart. What impressed us as most striking traits in his character were his mortification, including the entire forgetfulness of self; his charity to all, and especially towards his penitents, which never failed or never flagged; his patience, which no disappointment or cross could ruffle; his deep humility, which made him consider himself the last of men; his zeal, which continually burned in his heart, but with a subdued and steady flame; finally, above all and pervading all, his ardent love of God and of Jesus Christ in His sacred humanity as well as in His awful Divinity, which prompted all his exertions, was the very life and soul of all his actions, and was at the same time the key to his wonderful equanimity, and the source of all his fortitude, while it was the well-spring of that internal peace which beamed forth, in spite of himself, in his heavenlit countenance.

"For almost forty years of missionary life, that pale, benign, and saintly face has continued to beam on us pleasantly, and we hope usefully. With the eye of so holy, so strict a spiritual director upon us, we could not find it in our hearts to stray far along from the straight path which he had pointed out so impressively in his instructions, but more eloquently still by his example. Had we followed both more faithfully we should now be much farther advanced in the way of perfection. We have not a doubt that he practised for long years in a heroic degree the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity; nor are we less assured of his having already entered into the mansions of the blessed, where we hope to meet him. And we ardently desire that he may soon be beatified and canonized; that so great a light may be placed upon the candlestick to illumine the pathway of Christians, to encourage the weak and fortify the strong. It is for this reason that we rejoice so much that his biography has been written by one in every way so well fitted for the task. We trust it may be read by all, and we feel quite confident it will be productive of great good in the Church of God."

Rome and Geneva. A Letter to the Rev. MM. Merle D'Aubigné and Bungener, Protestant Ministers of Geneva. By a Young Student at Law (M. FONTAINE). *Post tenebras Lux.* Translated from the French, with an Introduction by M. J. SPALDING, D.D., Archbishop of Baltimore. Baltimore : Murphy, and New York Catholic Publication Society. 1871.

THE Young Student's letter gives in a few pages a popular view of arguments which, if fairly and dispassionately considered, would convince any man that the term "Christianity" means "the Catholic Religion." To make a man a Catholic is not a thing effected by argument (although, of course, the truth of the Catholic religion may be intellectually *established* by argument), but a supernatural work of Divine Grace, to which we may apply the words of our Divine Lord, "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father who is in Heaven." But to convince a thinking man that, whether Christianity be true or false, this particular thing is Christianity, is a result which reason alone must and does produce upon the mind of any thinker, whose eyes are not closed by early prejudice and who really knows the facts of the case. We think, therefore, that arguments such as this can hardly be too much multiplied. One will impress one man, one another. And herein it is that we have so greatly gained since the times of our immediate fathers, when Catholics were hardly able to publish; for although the laws which had very recently imposed silence upon them had become obsolete (and it was rather thus than by their actual repeal that the change was effected), they could hardly venture to avail themselves of the common liberties of Englishmen, for public feeling, though in favour of toleration in general, was by no means in favour of its being fairly extended to Catholics.

As to M. Fontaine's tract, it is the natural outbreak of indignation of a young Catholic who knows his religion, when he hears the strange medley of ignorance and falsehood of which Protestant arguments are made up. The judgment given of it by Archbishop Spalding is exactly our own. "Making due allowance for the youth and inexperience of the writer, it is well worthy of perusal." He adds that, "for reasons which will readily occur to every reader, no answer whatever was furnished by the ministers to the terse and stringent arguments contained in this letter." One opinion expressed by the author (page 37) is most natural in one who has always had the happiness of being a Catholic. He cannot imagine that "serious and instructed men, that ministers above all, who have spent their lives in the study of the Gospel and of history, and whose minds must have examined all religious questions, can be ignorant of the absurdities and contradictions which are found in Protestantism." We are far from surprised at this feeling, but we do not share it. A man who personally knows many Protestant ministers cannot doubt that very many among them (wonderful as the delusion is) really believe the system they teach to be true. Such is the force of long prejudice. We may add that there are hundreds of Catholics among us, who will testify that they themselves at one time shared the same strange delusion, until it pleased God to open their eyes. It is this conviction which gives us hopes for our country, for it would indeed be gloomy to believe that all the

thousands of apparently earnest men who are at this moment teaching different forms of Protestantism, from the Bishops and clergy of the Establishment down to the preachers in small village meetings, are all of them hypocrites. That there are many whose eyes God has opened to see the truth of the Catholic religion, and who continue in the Establishment, not because they really believe it to be Catholic but because they have not been able as yet to make up their minds to the enormous sacrifices which, in the present state of society, are implied in leaving it, is a miserable truth which we personally know; as indeed do all who have had any means of forming an opinion upon it. Even of these, however, we do not abandon hope; for God is "rich in mercy," and it may be that His Grace may again and again continue to knock at the door of their heart, and that they may yet open to the Divine Visitor. But we believe these cases to be not the rule but the exception; that there are many Protestant ministers who really believe they are in the right we cannot doubt.

The most interesting part of the pamphlet before us, however, is Archbishop Spalding's "Introduction." His heart has been melted by the beautiful city of Geneva, where he has taken a needful rest after the labours of the Vatican Council; and what Catholic that has stood on the bridge under which the Rhone rushes with a brilliancy and deep colour equal to that of the sky overhead, or watched the glorious outline of Mont Blanc mirrored on the still lake, that has not felt his heart yearn over the city of Calvin as over a person of matchless loveliness but possessed by a malignant demon. How shall we fail then to rejoice with Archbishop Spalding that the evil spirit has been cast out, and that the lovely patient is already beginning to sit at the feet of her Divine Redeemer, "clothed and in her right mind. Of the inhabitants of the city he says very nearly half are already Catholic and of the canton more than half. This last is partly because some Catholic districts of Savoy were added to the canton in 1815. The Archbishop describes his visit to the ancient Cathedral of Geneva. They are feelings continually impressed upon us English Catholics by the sight of the cathedrals and parish churches of our dear father-land. We can hardly imagine what it must be to be, like him, a citizen of a Protestant land of English tongue, but in which there is no one fabric built for the offering to God of the Divine Sacrifice and now desecrated to Protestant worship. For ourselves we can never visit such churches as Tintern or Fountains without a comparative feeling of relief at seeing one of the glorious shrines of ancient days which is not, like the Cathedral of Hereford, or the Minster of York, or the Benedictine Abbey of Gloucester, polluted by being applied to heretical worship and teaching, but which is left free to those unfallen creatures of God whom in the *Benedicite* we daily invite to praise and magnify Him for ever—the green grass and trees and shrubs, the cattle and birds of the air. To Catholics of the United States such feelings are new, and they cannot fail keenly to impress them when they visit the Protestant countries of Europe.

"We shall never forget (says the Archbishop) the impression made upon us on our visit to the Cathedral of S. Peter at Geneva.

Altars, its paintings, and statuary, it appeared to us a grand picture of desolation, a temple instead of a church, a shell without a kernel, a body without a soul. How our heart sunk within us at the sad spectacle of desolation, especially when, in reply to our implied question while we pointed to the empty and desolate sanctuary and said, 'There once stood the high altar,' the elderly female sexton said, with a bland smile worthy of John Calvin, 'We Protestants have no altar.' Cold walls and empty benches—that was all" (p. 9).

We cannot speak upon this subject without protesting against that monstrous clause of Mr. Gladstone's Act for the disestablishment of the alien Establishment in Ireland, which has given to the Protestant Episcopal sect the few ancient Catholic churches (only twelve, we believe, in all) which three hundred years of neglect on the part of the Protestants who (by the might of England) have usurped them, have still left undemolished in Ireland. This is not the place to enlarge upon the subject, but we desire to leave unimproved no opportunity of stirring up the people of Ireland to raise their voice against this vast insult and wrong. Nor can opportunities be wanting for reparation. It is certain that, before very long, Acts of Parliament will be required to amend that by which the present Protestant Episcopal communion was founded; and if Ireland speaks out on this subject as she should, it will be impossible that one such Act should be passed without a clause by which these ancient shrines should either be restored to the purpose for which they were erected,—the glory of God by the worship of the Catholic Church,—or at least (as an intermediate step) freed from desecration by being made national monuments, not to be used (for the present) for any religious purpose at all. Had not centuries of oppression so beaten down the hearts of the Irish people that they received a considerable instalment of justice without much examination, it would surely have been impossible that the clause in the Act which continued this insult and wrong to the Irish nation and this dishonour to Almighty God, could have passed without protest and opposition.

But we return to Archbishop Spalding.

"From the church of John Calvin we went to his house; and here our spirits were suddenly refreshed. What a change, and how unexpected by us, until we found ourselves at the very spot! The Sisters of Charity, with their angelic ministrations, now occupy the ample residence where the once great apostle of *uncharity* had his abode, and where he planned his heartless system! Hundreds of Catholic children now fill the religious schools taught by them, and receive in the very *salons* of Calvin the elements of a sound Catholic education. Time hath wrought a wondrous change. Monsignor Mermillod has already built two splendid churches, one of them the spacious Gothic Cathedral of Notre Dame, and the other the large parish church of S. Joseph; and he is completing a third, dedicated to God under the special patronage of S. Francis de Sales. Add to these the old parish church of S. Germain, restored to Catholic worship by the French while they held Geneva, and we have four spacious Catholic parish churches in the city itself, besides a greater number in the immediate vicinity. . . . It was not without a meaning irony that a non-Catholic gentleman of Geneva once remarked to a zealous Genevan Protestant, who bitterly complained of the activity of Monsignor Mermillod in erecting new Catholic churches: 'Let

him alone ; he is doing very well ; we can take them for our own use hereafter when we need them ; it is much cheaper for us to have him build our churches' " (p. 10).

Not that there is any fear that the churches Catholics are now building, whether at Geneva or in England, or anywhere else, will ever be turned into places of Protestant worship, for Protestantism is dead, and Protestants are more and more finding out that they have no use for churches. Of course, if it pleased God to allow the infidel party to succeed, they may be desecrated in other manners.

We heartily agree with the protest against the utterly false notion that the Catholic cantons of Switzerland are, *cæteris paribus*, behind the Protestant cantons in cultivation and civilization. Those who have put forward the notion have compared districts in no respect similar, as, *e.g.*, the *Pays de Vaud* and the *Vallais*, *i. e.* a district naturally fertile and healthy with one naturally sterile and unwholesome. His suggestion as to the reasons why the more favoured districts are Protestant seems to us both just and original.

The Blessed Virgin's Root traced in the Tribe of Ephraim. By the Rev. F. H. LAING, D.D. London : R. Washbourne, 18A, Paternoster Row. 1871.

THE Roman Breviary enjoins on all who have to recite the office of our Lady's Nativity (Sept. 8) a statement of the fact, that the Blessed Virgin's Root is to be found in the tribe of Judah and in the family of David. *Nativitas gloriosæ Virginis Mariæ ex semine Abraham, ortæ de tribu Juda, clara ex stirpe David* : so runs the first antiphon of Vespers and Lauds. Against this view Dr. Laing has directed his learned volume. It is not that he is actuated by any sentiment of disloyalty to the Church, which in various other ways gives expression to the idea of the antiphon. To her he is devoted with all the enthusiasm of an ardent mind. But, believing the question of our Lady's tribe and family to lie yet open for discussion, he claims the liberty to upset the old landmarks, to cancel the received opinion, and to give the glory of her parentage to the rival tribe of Ephraim.

A thesis so startling should not be lightly put forth. Accordingly the author brings much biblical learning to bear favourably upon the point, and, handling his materials with singular ability, pleads most skillfully for the acceptance of his view. He is successful in placing many relevant passages of Scripture in a fresh light ; he manages to throw a new interest round the prophecies which foretell so grand a future for Jacob's darling son ; and he effectually demolishes some of the usual preconceptions on the subject of the genealogies.

But the two chief postulates of his theory are assumed, not only without sufficient proof, but even in opposition to Hebrew law and custom. These

are Joseph's legal Paternity, and Mary's legal fitness to inherit Ephraim's birthright. "These two correlative sides of the Holy Seed's human ancestry—the paternal and the maternal—had," he says, "to be settled on persons in two different lines of Abraham's race, together with the two appended charges, which the two parental sides, male and female, also divided between them ; that of—

"*i. Genealogy*, by which the Messianic Seed's outward worldly standing, as legitimately begotten Child of Man, should be conveyed to Him validly. And this comes from the Father.

"*ii. Primogeniture*, by which He should be born the proper claimant to the prime honour of His Father, and that should go by *the Mother*" (pp. 63-4).

The first requirement is met, according to Dr. Laing, by the genealogy of Joseph, who, as Mary's lawful husband, communicated to her child the right of being registered in the tribe of Judah and in the family of David. The second can be met in no other way than by Mary's descent from Ephraim, who held the primogeniture of Israel.

Now, it seems to us that in the hypothesis of the author neither the genealogy nor the primogeniture would be acknowledged in Jewish law. Not the *genealogy*. For there is no legal provision at all for the peculiarity of the case. Beside the natural paternity there is only one other known to the Mosaic code ; and that is the legal paternity arising from the law of Levirate (Deut. xxv. 5-10) : for the validity of which it is essential, not only that there should be a real human father, but that the *legal* father should be dead. Such a law is not applicable to Joseph, who cannot therefore be the *legal* father of the Child.

Indeed, the case of a child born without a human father is necessarily above the law, and must be judged of by the principles of analogy. Now, the analogy that comes nearest it is a case of progeny from a Hebrew mother and a Gentile father : where the father goes for nothing in the genealogy, and the mother is all in all. It is the very tribe of Judah which, with a prophetic consciousness, has registered the instructive example. "Now Sheshan had no sons, but daughters. And Sheshan had a servant, an Egyptian, whose name was Jarha. And Sheshan gave his daughter to Jarha his servant to wife ; and *she* bare to him Attai. And Attai begat Nathan, and Nathan begat Zabad," &c., and so on for fourteen generations, all registered in the tribe of Judah in virtue solely of the mother (1 Chron. ii. 34-41). So it must have been with Mary and her Son. For Joseph's genealogy, if dis severed from that of Mary, could give the child no more claim to Davidic descent than the mere presumption, that the birth was in the ordinary course of things.

The primogeniture of Mary has as little foundation in Hebrew law as the paternity of Joseph. Even though she were of Ephraimitic descent, even though she were the sole survivor of the leading Ephraimite family, her sex incapacitated her from inheriting or transmitting the primogeniture. The privileges of birthright never passed the males in a family. In exceptional cases, as we have seen, the mother could communicate to her child the right of registration in her own family and tribe. But there is no hint either in

law or history of the female's power to inherit herself, or hand down to posterity the prerogatives attaching to the birthright.

As these considerations, if of any weight, shake the entire ground of the author's hypothesis, we need not take up his arguments in detail. But we may remark in general that the prophetic rôle of Rachel and her family regards rather the Gentile Church, than Mary and the Messianic Seed.

In conclusion we may ask how it is that no hint is given in the Gospels of Mary's connection with Ephraim, if such there be? S. Luke indicates the family not only of Joseph, but of Zachary (i. 5), of Elizabeth (*ibid.*), and of Anna (ii. 36). Of Mary why should he be silent? He is not so, if she be of the family of David. For as it became the rule with David's male descendants in the decline of the Hebrew commonwealth to intermarry only with the daughters of his race (Drach, *La Sainte Bible de Vence*, Matt. i. 1, not. apud Patrizi *De Evangeliiis*, lib. iii. dis. vi. 4), the royal genealogy of Joseph was enough for his purpose. In addition, he seems to assert her Davidic descent directly, though somewhat obscurely, in i. 27, where, in all likelihood, the phrase "of the house of David" qualifies the whole preceding clause, including the Virgin as well as Joseph.

La Chiesa e lo Stato. Del P. Matteo Liberatore. Napoli: Giannini.

THIS very important work has been sent us for review, and we trust in our next number to do it what justice we can. Its general scope is to set forth and defend the doctrine taught in effect by Boniface VIII. in his well known "Unam Sanctam," that "the temporal authority is bound (oportere) to be subject to the spiritual power" in all those matters which directly or indirectly affect the religious interests of baptized persons. The author (p. 19, note) defends the *ex cathedra* character of that Bull; and his volume is mainly occupied with setting forth and illustrating the profound harmony of its declarations with other Catholic doctrines and with theological reason. We hope in our next number to give our readers a general sketch of F. Liberatore's argument; and to vindicate (what many at first will doubt) the practical importance of writing on such a theme in times like the present.

Saturday Review. September 30, 1871.

IN our last number (pp. 55, 56) we incidentally drew a distinction, which seems to us of much philosophical importance, between "conception" and "imagination." There is an article in the above-named number of the *Saturday Review* which treats the same matter with so much ability, that we

are desirous of placing it on more permanent record. We do not of course imply agreement with every proposition which it contains, but only with its general drift. In fact, there are one or two statements in it against which we hope to argue on future occasions :—

“IMAGINATION AND CONCEPTION.

“In one of his Epistles Spinoza makes an assertion by which, with singular precision and audacity, he illustrates a distinction which, even by those who professedly make the human mind their study, is frequently but vaguely comprehended. He tells his correspondent that if he is asked whether he has as clear a conception of the Deity as of a triangle, he decidedly answers in the affirmative. If, on the other hand, he is asked whether he has as clear an image of the Deity as of a triangle, he as certainly gives a negative reply.

“It is not our object here to discuss the peculiar idea of a Deity which was inculcated by Spinoza, and which assuredly will not find a place in any positive system of religion taught on this side of the Indus. Eliminating from the assertion all that bears a theological meaning, we expand it into the declaration that an adequate conception of the mind is not necessarily accompanied by a mental image. The fact should not, however, be overlooked that Spinoza, a man of extraordinary speculative genius, is speaking of himself, and not with reference to the generality of mankind. The typical ploughman, for instance, when he discourses of the matters of ordinary life, requires probably a mental image of bold colour before he can get on at all; and when he listens to the Sunday sermon he most likely becomes a sort of ultra-Nominalist, to whom words are altogether devoid of corresponding notions. Soaring, however, above the ploughman, we find that his practice is reduced to theory by many thinkers of profundity, who, by some very common expressions, lead us to doubt whether they accurately distinguish the function of intellectual conception from that of imagination. Let it be understood that when we speak of imagination, we refer comprehensively to that faculty or operation of the mind by which a mental image is produced, not to be confounded with the sensible impressions from which perhaps it is derived. By this broad use of the word we would, for the nonce, not only cancel the difference between the most erratic poet and the most matter-of-fact tradesmen, but even reject that definition of the imagination which confines it to the mental production or reproduction of objects corporeally absent. Imagination, in our present comprehensive use of the word, by no means implies the absence of the object as a condition of its operation. The smoothness, colour, smell, and taste of the apple on our plate are so many separate sensible impressions, and the term imagination may fairly be applied to the power by which these are collected into one unity. That unity itself comes from the imagination is not comprised in our hypothesis.

“That the domain of the imagination, productive and reproductive, is very wide, is indubitable. The question is, whether it is commensurate with the region accessible to the mind. Speculative philosophy is often rebuffed by this formidable interrogatory,—‘Can the infinite be grasped by the finite?’ With many philosophers the negative answer to this question is an article, if not the whole, of their creed. In the eyes of the mere man of business it is a handy scarecrow to warn people against a waste of precious time on unprofitable puzzles. To the humble ‘saint’ it looks like a pious maxim, whereby the littleness of man is concisely expressed. But amid this general assent one small difficulty wells up. Granted that we are unable to comprehend or grasp infinity, we all nevertheless talk about it with considerable fluency, nor do opinions as to the sense of the word ‘infinity’ appear to

differ in unsophisticated minds. Indeed, if we know nothing about the infinite at all, how do we know that it cannot be grasped by the finite? If we are totally ignorant of the geography of France and China, we have no right to declare that Paris cannot be within the Celestial Empire.

"Leaving the infinite for awhile out of consideration, let us see how far imagination will carry us even through the region of the indubitably finite. We may conveniently find a tutor in the inventor of ordinary playing-cards. Number is formed by the successive addition of units, and if the number ten were represented in space after the manner of its production, we should have the dots arranged in a straight line. Thus the cards of what we may call the natural pack would be long narrow strips, showing step by step the arithmetical progression from one to ten. In the artificial pack something like this arrangement may be observed in the ace, deuce, and three, though it is noteworthy that the progression begins in the middle of the first card, the middle of the second being left blank. The three passed, the pips composing the four are dispersed into the corners of the cards, leaving the centre a blank, to be occupied in the five. In the six the order of the three reappears, a series of three pips being placed on each of two opposite sides of the card. We need not pursue further the description of an arrangement with which everybody is familiar, but we may call attention to the inventor's motive. He perceived that, after a certain limit, a series of numbers presented no distinct image to the mind: that, for instance, without the aid of counting, a row of ten dots could scarcely be distinguished from a row of nine. Fixing his limit at three, he gave in his four not only an additional unit, but a new picture; that is to say, the figure of an oblong indicated by its points; the five was another new picture; new again was the six. All this meant that, in his opinion, the number ten represented by a series of units only was far beyond the reach of the imagination, and should therefore be denoted not only by pips, but by a distinct shape, qualitatively differing from those assigned to the numbers preceding.

"The cardmaker's method, however, goes but a very little way in giving distinctive images to separate numbers. Had there been (say) ninety-seven cards in a suit, it would obviously have been at fault altogether, and the cardmaker would have been forced to abandon the use of pips, by which alone numeration is realized to the eye, and to have had recourse to mere signs, such as '97', or 'xcvii'. These are symbols in the strictest sense of the word, and though constructed according to a rigidly defined system, no more image forth the number they represent than a man's name indicates the length of his nose. It is thus quite clear that the number ninety-seven is utterly beyond the grasp of the imagination, which indeed begins to slacken its hold somehow about five. Yet who shall say that we have no conception of this particular number, that we do not perfectly know what it is? Ninety-seven is one more than ninety-six, and as it is a prime number, not resolvable into fractions, there is no more to be said about it. Were a person blessed with a miraculous imagination that could grasp the ninety-seven of hearts as readily as the deuce, he would not be a shade wiser than we who are less gifted. The whole essence of ninety-seven consists in its being one more than ninety-six, and our knowledge is exactly commensurate with the property of that thing which we profess to know. If we select a number not prime, say one hundred, we may indulge in a plethora of definitions. Besides declaring that it is ninety-nine plus one, which declaration is of itself exhaustive, we may add that it is the square of ten, that it equals five score, or a brace of fifties, and so on; but not a particle of this mass of erudition would require illustration by an image.

"The stickler for images would here step in and object that, although the row of dots which represents the genesis of ninety-seven extends beyond the reach of the imagination, we have a substitute in (say) the Arabic combina-

tion "97", which, though it is no portrait of ninety-seven, is quite sufficient for practical purposes. This view of things precisely corresponds to that of the mediæval Nominalists with regard to 'universals' or *genera*. A number of entities are observed to resemble each other in certain important particulars; these are all mentally thrust into a pigeon-hole, which is ticketed with the word 'horse', and when in future we discourse about horses, we refer not to the contents of the pigeon-hole but to the ticket. But it should be borne in mind that the case of numbers is not the same as that of 'universals'. These are obtained by eliminating those qualities which are peculiar to individuals, and assembling the rest under a common head. The 'universal,' even by so staunch a Realist as William of Champeaux, cannot be regarded as thoroughly exhaustive, when predicated of the things of the sensible world, even though, according to the theory of the Realists, it constitutes their essence. Subdivide as we may into species and families, we never can descend from the universal 'horse' into that historical celebrity which was named 'Eclipse.' Here the word 'horse,' probably accompanied by a rude image, in the mind of the particular thinker, of the sort of horse to which he has been most accustomed (a brewer's horse in the case of a drayman, a racehorse in the case of a jockey), must do imperfect duty for a conception that is not exhaustive. But ninety-seven is not universal; on the other hand, it is pre-eminently individual. It is not attained by any act of abstraction, save that general abstraction from qualitative difference to which all conception of number owes its origin, and which is equally requisite for the conception of two or three. All that can be known about it we perfectly know, with an accuracy of knowledge compared to which our knowledge of our most intimate and confidential friend is crass ignorance. The Arabic symbol '97' is the shorthand record of a process which we can repeat at pleasure; and in the case of those higher numbers which no one (save Mr. Nasmith's clerk) would care to count, we have those four rules—Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division—by which the primitive process of numeration can be simplified.

"Let us pass from arithmetic to geometry. We read in the life of Pascal that at a very early age that great and original thinker evolved a system of geometry out of his own mind, being so utterly ignorant of the technical terms of the science, that he called the circle a 'round' (*ron*), and the line a 'bar' (*barre*), chalking very rude representations of those figures on the floor. The exact degree of scientific knowledge which he attained in this primitive state we do not know, but if he did anything at all, we may be sure that he ascended from an image to a conception, that he advanced from the 'round' to the circle, though he retained the word which he had heard in infancy. The 'round' at once presents itself to the imagination of any schoolboy who has trundled a hoop, though it is doubtful whether his hoop, even if tested by the rule of thumb, would correspond to the definition of a circle given by Euclid. 'A circle is a plane figure, contained by one line, which is called the circumference, and is such that all straight lines drawn from a certain point within the figure to the circumference are equal to one another.' Nothing can less address itself to the imagination than this definition; nothing can be less suggestive of an image or picture. And yet we may safely affirm that he who has not mastered this definition, or some other definition given by Analytical Geometry (say, $x^2 + y^2 = r^2$), has no conception of a circle at all, though he may have worked as a first-rate cooper for half a century.

"The remark may here be made that, although the geometrical circle cannot be conceived without the employment of Euclid's definition or some equivalent thereto, it was not in this abstract manner that the notion of a circle was first impressed upon the human mind. People first saw and remarked a 'round' like a schoolboy's hoop, and this 'round' was after-

wards touched up, polished, and refined into the circle of the geometrician. This remark is, no doubt, perfectly correct; but it does not bear upon the distinction to which, throughout this article, our attention has been directed. We are not dealing with the genesis of thoughts, but with the possibility of grasping them when, by whatever process, generated. Whencesoever he started, whether he drew his circle from the depths of his own internal consciousness, or whether he gathered it by staring at a washing-tub, certain it is that Euclid has given us a circle which, owing to the imperfection of instruments, cannot be realized by the senses, much less by the imagination. Nevertheless the merest smatterer in mathematics is rightly convinced that he has an adequate exhaustive conception of such a circle, and that without that conception he could not even waddle through the alphabet of his science.

"It thus appears that, without leaving the sphere of the finite, we can arrive at objects of thought which can be adequately conceived by the intellect, but to which there can be no corresponding image. Our instances are taken from the modifications of space and number, because the sciences relating to these pre-eminently allow exhaustive definitions. Let us now return to infinity, and ascertain whether it is a whit further from the mental grasp than the perfect circle or the number ninety-seven. Certainly, as we have said, the words 'infinity' and 'infinite' are common enough, and no one seems to have the least doubt as to their signification. When a person talks of the 'infinite', he means, and perfectly knows that he means, 'that which hath no bounds.' This definition is as exhaustive and as perfectly intelligible as Euclid's definition of a circle.

"Against the theory that the infinite can be conceived by the mind an objection is made that it corresponds to no positive object, and that therefore the word which denotes it has merely a negative import. The various things with which we become acquainted through experience are all finite, but we mentally abstract the boundaries, and fancy that we have arrived at a positive result. This objection does not really touch the question whether or not the infinite can be grasped by the mind. And is it clear that our conception of infinity is merely negative after all? Surely we have an instance of positive infinity in space. Space is not a 'universal' of which limited spaces are the subordinate individuals; but, as Kant observes, it is an individual, of which the so-called spaces are parts. When we distinguish a visible object from those that surround it, we mentally negate all save one small portion of space; and here it is finity, not infinity, to which negation is essential. 'Omnis determinatio est negatio,' says Spinoza, and without determination there can be no finite object. So essential, indeed, does infinity seem to space, that we are uncomfortably jarred when Aristotle tells us that space is bounded, and we feel that the words must somehow be used in a non-natural sense. If space is bounded, we reason, that can only be by another space, and as between those spaces there cannot be a gap that is not itself a space, we find that we have again that one space, continuous and infinite, which we vainly endeavoured to limit.

"We sometimes hear it remarked that, when we speak of the 'infinite' we really mean the 'indefinite'—that is, an object the limits of which we are unable to determine; and authority for this view may be found in the *ἀπειρον* of the early Greek philosophers. But really the two ideas are completely distinct from each other. A man looking from a window sees in a small field a crowd which he is unable to count. Of this inability he is conscious, and he is equally conscious that the number of persons composing the crowd is not infinite, since, if it were, the field could not contain them. To him, therefore, the number of persons is indefinite. On the other hand, to a man stationed at the gate opening upon the field, and able to count the persons as they went in or came out, the number would be perfectly

definite. Thus the word 'indefinite' simply indicates the absence of accurate knowledge. If we say that the number of fixed stars is indefinite, we do not affirm that it is either finite or infinite, but simply that circumstances prevent us from determining it by the usual process of numeration.

"With Kant's theory that space and time have no objective reality beyond the region of the human mind, but are mere forms of intuition, we have here nothing to do. We have merely been inquiring whether certain ideas can be grasped by the mind without in any way referring to their objective value, and we think we have said enough to show that the grasp of the intellect is not to be measured by the reach of imagination."

Cœlum Christianum, &c., à Cœlestino Leuthner. Augustæ et Herbipoli, 1749. Londini: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1871.

CÆLESTINE LEUTHNER, a Benedictine of the Bavarian Province, published this little volume of meditations in the dead times of the eighteenth century. It seems, almost accidentally, to have fallen into the hands of the present Lord Bishop of Hexham and Newcastle, by whom it is now republished in the original Latin, with a dedication to the clergy of his diocese. It consists of one hundred short meditations, each of which is divided into three heads, and occupies a page of the little volume, which is very elegantly printed, and does credit to Messrs. Burns and Oates. The meditations are on the life and death of our Blessed Lord, and on some of the chief miracles and parables recorded in the Gospels. From the 76th to the 96th inclusive they are devoted to the scenes of the last days of our Blessed Lord's ministry, to His Passion and burial; the 97th is on the descent into Limbus; the 98th on the Resurrection; the 99th on the Ascension; the last upon the sending of the Holy Spirit. It is impossible to give, by any description, a real idea of a book of meditations, but we are confident that our readers will feel under an obligation to us for commending to them this most valuable little volume. The Bishop of Hexham says: "As I read it it struck me that it would be most useful and pleasing to you to republish this book, almost wholly unknown, and commend it to you, most dear brethren, for your reading and meditation. You full well know the benefit, nay the necessity, of daily devout meditation, for all the masters of the spiritual life cry out with united voice, that the priest who labours diligently in this exercise cannot perish, but that he who neglects its use neglects also his own sanctification, for that he does not "lay hold of eternal life, wherein he is called."

Horæ Diurnæ Breviarii Romani. London : Sumptibus Joannis Philp. 1871.

THIS edition of the "*Horæ Diurnæ*" bids fair to rank with, if not to surpass in its way, the editions of the Brothers Elzevir of Amsterdam. Mr. Philp seems to have been guided by the principle, that the Divine Office should be presented to the eye in the best possible mannner, to excite respect and devotion. The piety of former ages thought it not too much to employ skilled artists in illuminating the petitions they addressed to the King of kings ; it is surely fitting that the facilities of the printing press should be used for a similar purpose.

The attempt which Mr. Philp has thus initiated to produce an Office Book worthy of the clerical body is the more praiseworthy, because it can hardly be a safe commercial speculation in a Protestant country. This fact makes it the more desirable that the English clergy should support the spirited publisher, by their patronage in purchasing the book. They cannot procure an edition more beautifully printed ; while, independently of this, the tones are prefixed to all the Antiphons, a speciality which we believe to be the property of this edition alone. Each prayer begins with a capital letter in red, and these capitals have been taken from the most perfect specimens of the old Missal characters, made at great cost for the special use of the publisher.

As far as we have been able to judge for ourselves, from the hurried examination which we could give at the time of receiving the "*Horæ Diurnæ*,"—issued just before we went to press,—the references are exact, the Calendar is carefully prepared, and altogether it is a most beautiful specimen of ecclesiastical printing. We cordially recommend it to the use of the clergy ; and would remind those who think of making a little present to their clerical friends, that they could scarcely give anything more acceptable or more constantly useful.

This edition, we should add, is furnished with an index ; it contains also preparation for mass and thanksgiving after it ; the order of administering viaticum and extreme unction with the last blessing ; the forms of Papal and various other benedictions, &c. &c.

Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. By SECONDO FRANCO, S.J. Translated from the Italian. Baltimore : Murphy & Co.

THIS translation of Padre Franco's work is reprinted from the "*Messenger of the Sacred Heart of Jesus*," the well-known monthly bulletin of the Apostleship of Prayer. Padre Franco tells us in his introduction, that he had originally intended to republish some already existing work upon the subject ; but finding that the greater part of such books, especially those written at the close of the last century, were chiefly taken up with answers

to objections, he changed his plan, and resolved to write a new book, which, leaving aside controversies that the decision of the Church has now rendered useless, might give a correct idea of the devotion, and of its many advantages and privileges.

The plan of the work may be given in a few words. The essence of the devotion is first of all clearly brought out, by going over the elements which compose it. These elements are then taken singly, and their dignity and excellence considered ; and thus the greatness of the object, which embraces all these in itself, is firmly established. The effects of the devotion are dwelt upon in the next place, and lastly the most practical manner of honouring the Sacred Heart is pointed out. At the end of the volume there is an admirable note, in which the various significations of the word "Heart" are explained and illustrated, and in which also the author shows how the two objects of the devotion, the one spiritual, the other material, are naturally united, and how the sensible object undoubtedly leads to the spiritual, which by reason of the former becomes more apparent to the minds of men. "We see, therefore," he says, "that by the worship rendered to the Sacred Heart, Jesus Christ is fully glorified, since, by so doing, we honour all the actions of His great Soul, all the sentiments which It cherishes, all the emotions to which It is subject, all the virtues which enrich It, all the joys which dilate It, all the griefs which afflict It ; in a word, all the interior of Jesus."

In these days, when the Spirit of God, in fulfilment of the gracious promise made by our Blessed Lord to His servant S. Gertrude, is breathing over the whole Church a more earnest and tender devotion to the Sacred Heart, a work written by so accurate a theologian as Padre Franco, and in so devotional a spirit, cannot fail to be acceptable to many readers, while at the same time it will help to spread the warm, familiar, Italian method of honouring the Sacred Heart of our Lord among those who speak the Anglo-Saxon tongue.

We hope before long, in contrasting mediæval and modern spirituality, to point out the many foreshadowings of devotion to the Sacred Heart, which existed in earlier ages, and which are far more numerous than is commonly supposed ; and to show how beautifully and gradually one devotion leads on to another. What, for instance, can be more beautiful than the revelations made to B. Angela of Foligno upon this subject ? and yet there are many others, of still earlier date, hardly less remarkable or striking. The only defect we have noticed in the little work before us, is the American manner of spelling, which is such an eyesore to English readers ; but as the book has been published chiefly for circulation in America, we suppose we have no right to complain. We mention the fact however, as we have observed that of late in Ireland, and even to some extent in England, this practice has met with imitators.

The Holy Communion, It is my Life ; or Strains of Love of the Fervent Soul. By HUBERT LEBON. Translated from the French by M. A. GARNETT. Baltimore : Murphy & Co.

THIS little work in its English dress has the cordial approval of the Archbishop of Baltimore, and is dedicated to S. Joseph. No doubt it will please a certain class of readers, amongst whom, however, we are unable to number ourselves. The author evidently means so well, that we are unwilling to speak in any way unkindly of the result of his pious labours. But when at the very outset he tells us that he is "going to say a few words on the most ineffable of the Sacraments,"—and then in reply to his own question, whether it is temerity so to do, informs us that it is not, because it is too much happiness for him to speak of that which is *his* life,—we feel instinctively that what he is about to say would have been better adapted for his own private meditation than for the general public. "Soliloquies of the heart," when they come to us from such a heart as that of S. Augustine, or from the life of such masters of the spiritual life as Thomas à Kempis or Gerlac Petersen—whose "Fiery Soliloquy with God" we are glad to see is about to be translated—are indeed admirable, and instructive to all : but in general they fail to move, even when they do not positively grate upon the religious feelings of those who read them. The present work belongs to a class of French books, which seem to us to lack the solidity of the earlier French writers, and of the best religious writers in France at the present day, as well as the true warmth and glow which distinguish the spiritual works of Italy. Sentimental exclamations do not constitute warmth, and of the former this little work is full. The best thing about the book consists in the extracts from really good writers upon the Blessed Eucharist ; although, from the contrast which they offer to the author's own soliloquies, the latter necessarily suffer in the reader's eyes.

Golden Words, or Maxims of the Cross, selected chiefly from the Latin of Thomas à Kempis. By F. H. HAMILTON, M.A. London : Wyman & Sons.

A PRETTILY got-up little work, consisting of some well-chosen passages from the "Following of Christ," and of some thoughts on eternity, apparently taken from a Cistercian source. From its size it may be easily carried about, and it is therefore well adapted to form a constant companion to all who love to ponder on the maxims of the Cross. The translation from the Latin of Thomas à Kempis is we presume new, and is perhaps the best we have yet met with. We should be glad if Mr. Hamilton would give us a complete translation of the "Following of Christ."

The Lily of S. Joseph. London : Washbourne.

THIS tiny prayer-book ought to be in the hand of every Altar-boy. It is so small, although printed in clear and legible type, that it need never be in his way while serving at the Altar, while it also offers him an admirable method of making his very ministrations a means of hearing Mass with profit. Besides a preparation for Confession and Communion, the "Lily of S. Joseph" contains some well-chosen prayers and hymns which render it as attractive a little prayer-book as could be well desired.

Of Adoration in Spirit and Truth. Written in Four Books. By JOHN EUSEBIUS NIEREMBERG, S.J., native of Madrid, and translated into English by R. S., S.J. With a Preface by the Rev. Peter Gallway, S.J. London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1871.

ENGLISH Catholics owe a debt of deep gratitude to the Jesuit Fathers, for the ascetical library they have lately planned. There is a dearth of ascetical books in the language ; and, in consequence, we fear there is a dearth of taste to enjoy them. With the increased supply, doubtless the demand will grow apace. The series, to judge from the work we are noticing, promises to be a great success. Like the basis of a strong and durable structure, the foundation of the list is a deep and solid volume. "In spirit and in Truth" is divided into four books, furnishing the Christian Athlete with suitable advice in his three states of purgation, illumination, and union with God. Taking him by the hand it guides him, from the hour he wearies of a "secular life" till he rests in the "superessential light of the Holy Trinity." The title of the book is the best description of the spirit it inculcates, and the spirit it inculcates is clearly the spirit of the writer. He was eminently a "*spiritual* and a *truthful*" man. In the words of F. Gallway (see Preface) "he was one of those who, imitating their Divine Master, first do and then teach." The marked aim of the author is to induce in the reader's conduct a perfect consistency between his faith and practice. "He walks in falsehood and forgery (p. 18), not in truth nor spirit, who takes not faith for his path and guide." "What imports it to *believe* truth (p. 19) if we ourselves *practise* falsehood ? Saving truth is good works, and the true word the deed of the work." "All is mere falsehood and vanity (*ibid.*) which is not according to the doctrine of Jesus. Why do we neglect the practice of this great blessing, contenting ourselves with a dead kind of faith ? We should reap great advantage from our faith if we knew how to use it, and *work* as we ought, according to its *prescript*—greater than if we beheld those things it affirms with our eyes. All by faith *believe* true things ; but they ought also to *believe truly*, which all seem not to do. If thou *believe*, O malapert soul, what Christ taught, *work accordingly*" (pp. 19–20). "Our manner

of working follows the certitude of our knowledge and the judgment we frame of a thing ; and proportionable to this knowledge must needs be the excellency of our operation. Wherefore, whoever desires to walk in truth, let him *square the actions and paths of his life according to the model of his faith, believing* not only true things, but *after a true manner*, lest he become ridiculous to the angels and joint-secretary with the devils, who are all solidians, their belief being barren of works."

"What avails it to know the way to heaven if we do not walk it?" (p. 20). "But if we *believe* these things and *believe* them with our *actions*, what greater absurdity and derision of God," &c. (p. 22). "We must be sure to make our works square in all exactly with our belief, and adhere more tenaciously than if those objects were patent to the eye or any other sense or experiment" (p. 22).

To *believe intensely* and *work accordingly* sums up the author's Apostolate. If he had laid stress on this point alone, we should have considered his book a gift deserving our abiding thankfulness. We do not know a book that so completely demolishes the popular notion of Jesuit, which the bigotry of three hundred years has built up in the minds of our countrymen. It is the revelation of a sincere and earnest man, of warm and cloudless faith, striving earnestly and successfully to act according to his belief. From beginning to end we breathe an atmosphere of *thoroughness* and vigorous common sense. Starting with clear faith in the principles of Christianity, sound logic and a warm pious heart must land a man in asceticism. That F. Nieremberg was a man of large faith, great sense, and deep religious yearning, none can doubt who read these pages. Occasionally we come across, in the work before us, a train of antithetical reasoning, which strikes us as too refined and farfetched ; but read side by side with his general earnestness, we are bound to conclude that what is over-refined to minds of more earthly mould is common sense to one drawing a purer and a keener air.

To speak of the style, we regret the book has not had the benefit of a new translation, instead of being a new edition of an old one. Looking at the translation as it stands, we should have thought a garb of more modern English would have added attractiveness to the matter. There are passages of much beauty and eloquence which we think a more polished English would have improved, whilst we fear to some minds several passages as they now read will be repulsive. At the same time, though we should ourselves prefer a fresh translation, yet we can conceive its present dress on the whole having a special charm for other tastes. There is a quaint raciness in many of its expressions which smacks like Elia, whilst the antique aphoristic ring and condensed truth of others remind us of Bacon's Essays. Indeed it would be an easy, agreeable, and useful task to cull from the several chapters a body of maxims—"Nierembergiana"—"pregnant with celestial fire." Though Nieremberg sprang from a German family, there is none of the German "cloudiness" in his sayings. Always vigorous, they are never unintelligible. Those who are acquainted with the maxims of another great German—Blessed Henry Suso—will appreciate the clearness which Nieremberg doubtless owed to his Spanish education. His book abounds in beautiful thoughts and most happy images—sometimes overcrowded, but always good.

However, for our own part, as we have said, we would prefer a new translation ; but, read in any dress, the book will well repay the perusal. Thanking those who have begun so good a work, we heartily recommend this book to all who hunger after "Adoration in Spirit and Truth."

The Bells of the Sanctuary.—"Agnes." By GRACE RAMSAY, Author of "A Woman's Trials," "Iza's Story," &c. "*Monseigneur Darboy.*" By the same.

THE second and third of the little volumes forming the series to which the poetic and suggestive title "*Bells of the Sanctuary*" has been given, are well worthy of the first. They, too, are records of the triumph of God's Grace, in the soul of a fair girl, called to the life of the cloister, in the soul of a great prelate, called to the crown of martyrdom. The same grace was given in full measure, "pressed down and running over," to each. The writer tells the wonderful story of "Agnes"—the gay, vain, troublesome, tiresome girl who was never for a moment unconscious of herself, and who never left off acting, but who was called by a vocation, sudden, irresistible, and lasting, to the strict penitential life of the *Clarissis* ;—and tells it with the charm, the simple, joyful faith, and the touching sympathy which characterized her "*Mary Benedicta.*" It is good and hope-giving to read such true stories, so told, in days like these, when the world is so strong, and when it would "like to persuade itself," and us, the attraction of the Church is so weak.

The murder of the Archbishop of Paris is still so recent, the horror with which it inspired all good people is so fresh, that every reference to it gives renewed pain, and yet the writer's little book is not all painful. It is deeply interesting, from her personal acquaintance with the murdered Prelate, and from her intimate and exact knowledge of the much-disputed circumstances of his imprisonment and death. She rejects some of the sayings ascribed to him as untrue, but she adds one detail to the picture of his sufferings, which is terrible. She is relating the incidents of 21st May, when the hostages were removed from the Mazas to La Roquette. "They were collected in the courtyard, where they were waiting for several minutes before the Archbishop made his appearance ; at first sight they could hardly believe it was indeed he ; he was wan and emaciated as a skeleton ; his beard hung ragged and unkempt upon his breast, and he was so feeble as to be hardly able to support himself. One of his own secretaries did not recognize him, until Monseigneur Darboy, as soon as he espied him, exclaimed in surprise : "Ah, so you are here too, mon ami !" and held out his hand. The priest fell upon his knees, and kissed it. "You are ill, monseigneur, you are suffering," said the Abbé. "Yes, I have suffered a good deal here," said the Archbishop, putting his hand to his side ; "I put a blister on it some days ago, and it is very painful." Père Olivaint went up to speak to him, and in answer to

a question, the Archbishop said to him, "*I am dying of hunger!*" The writer's informant, a prisoner *au secret*, whose own story is sufficiently interesting to fascinate attention, were the surroundings not of such all-absorbing importance, witnessed the march of the prisoners to their death, and though he did not behold the murder, and therefore cannot confirm the story of the Archbishop's final blessing, he saw the hand, from which the thumb and fore-finger were completely shot away, lifted in benediction many times, as the martyr-priests crossed the place of the prison towards the *Chemin du Ronde*, where they were shot. The narrative is therefore entirely authentic, and is beautifully written.

Patron Saints. By ELIZA ALLEN STARR. Baltimore : John Murphy & Co. New York.

THIS little manual of Saints' lives, written expressly for the young, appears to us both attractively written and judiciously compiled. A very happy selection of lives has been made, comprising the more well-known and celebrated both among the ancient and the comparatively modern Saints. Their order of succession is made chiefly to depend on the time of their festivals ; thus S. Benedict and S. Scholastica come between S. Agnes and S. Dorothea, and S. Joseph succeeds both. The illustrations are plentiful, and a great addition to the book ; the authoress states that she owes them to the Düsseldorf series of religious prints, and other sources.

The Lamp. *An Illustrated Catholic Magazine.* New Series. Numbers 1 and 2.

EVERYONE will be glad to welcome *The Lamp* under its new and attractive form of an illustrated magazine. The lack of an illustrated Catholic serial to compete with the numerous Protestant publications evincing both spirit and talent in their lavish engravings, has long been felt ; and any effort towards supplying so manifest a want should excite the gratitude and elicit the support of Catholics.

The subjects of the illustrations in the numbers of *The Lamp* that have hitherto appeared, seem peculiarly well chosen ; and the printed matter, especially in the short stories and miscellaneous bits, is full of interest, and well worth reading.

The Apparition at Pontmain. Translated from the French by F. C. HUSENBETH, D.D. V.G., Provost of Northampton. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE owe much to Provost Husenbeth for bringing into notice in England the interesting miraculous apparitions with which our Catholic neighbour country is occasionally favoured. Some time ago he called attention to the now celebrated visions at Lourdes, by publishing a little book in which he so successfully extracted the pith of the somewhat prolix French accounts, that, in dependently of graver interest, his narrative read like a tale of amusement. The little girl of delicate health picking up sticks with her companions, and hesitating to cross the cold river-water bare-footed, was so naturally described, that the effect of the sudden apparition of the beautiful Lady clothed in white, and with golden roses shining on her feet, standing above the wild rose-bush over the cave, was almost as fraught with startled admiration for us who read of it as it must have been for Bernadette herself.

The apparition at Pontmain, unlike that at Lourdes, was only seen on one occasion ; but, on the other hand, it was witnessed not by one little girl, but by six children, four of whom were above nine years of age, the eldest, Eugène Barbedette, being twelve years old. For the interesting particulars we refer the reader to Provost Husenbeth's little book, of which he says in the Preface :—

“The little French work relating this wonderful apparition appeared to me well worthy of being placed before the English reader in his own language. A translation I considered would be admirably calculated to promote the glory of God, and increase devotion to the Immaculate Virgin Mary in our own country, as well as to encourage confidence in her powerful patronage.

The Catholic's Vade-Mecum. The Pocket Prayer-Book. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

THERE is, for its size, no more complete and beautifully-printed prayer-book than the new edition of the “Catholic's Vade-Mecum,” a manual of devotion which has always been a favourite, as at once comprehensive and compact. This edition contains a larger number of spiritual exercises, all the more important Litanies, and a complete system of daily devotions conveniently arranged. It is admirably printed in partial red letter, and each page is enclosed in a finely-executed scroll border. The binding is exceedingly elegant. The “Pocket Prayer-Book” is a tiny volume, containing a compendious selection of devotions from approved sources, the public offices of

the Church, several Litanies, and very well-chosen hymns. It is a curiosity of printing, for minuteness, clearness, and ornament, and prettily bound in bright blue and gold. Its convenient size and shape verify its title—a pocket prayer-book.

WE understand that a translation, from the Latin, of the “Book of the Visions and Instructions of B. Angela of Foligno,” by the translator of the “Life of V. Grignon de Montfort” reviewed by us in January, will appear before Christmas.

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
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